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
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FOREWORD

✓ This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States government. ↗

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:

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PREFACE

In June 1976 about 93 percent of Italy's eligible voters cast ballots in general elections that had been called a year ahead of schedule because of a governmental crisis—two governments had already failed in the first five months of 1976. The Western world watched the Italian political campaign with some anxiety as many observers predicted that the Communists might emerge victorious. Actually the Christian Democrats maintained their dominance, capturing about 39 percent of the vote compared with the communist total of approximately 34 percent. The Communists had been ruled out as possible coalition partners, and the Socialists had stated that they would not join a coalition; therefore Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti formed a minority government that was still operating at the end of the year. Because of the close ties between the United States and Italy, it was deemed appropriate to research and write the *Area Handbook for Italy* at this time.

The handbook is intended to provide a concise, objective description of Italy and the Italians. It includes coverage of the historical background and the geography of the country as well as the principal economic, political, and social aspects of the society. This book is designed to give readers an understanding of the dynamics of the component elements of the society and a view of the ideas and feelings of the people as well as a view of how they live, work, and interact.

The rulings of the United States Board on Geographic Names have governed the authors in the spelling of place-names; however, because so many Italian cities and regions are known by conventional names, the authors have opted for the more common usage in each case (see table A). Area measurements have been given in hectares rather than acres, and tons are metric unless otherwise noted.

This study results from the combined efforts of a Foreign Area Studies multidisciplinary team of researchers assisted by the organization's research support staff. The team was chaired by Eugene K. Keefe, who wrote chapter 1 and coordinated the contributions of the other authors. David P. Coffin wrote chapters 7, 8, and 9; Herbert W. Dowd wrote chapters 3 and 12; Sallie M. Hicks wrote chapters 4 and 5; William A. Mussen, Jr., wrote chapters 10 and

11; and Robert Rinehart wrote chapters 2 and 6. The authors have relied on published and unpublished scholarly studies, official reports published by governments and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, numerous European and American periodicals, and interviews with knowledgeable individuals. Brief comments on some of the more valuable sources used appear at the end of all chapters except chapter 1. The authors wish to thank members of the Italian embassy in Washington and the members of the Italian Cultural Institute in New York for their valuable assistance. Any errors or omissions, however, are the responsibility of the authors.

Table A. Conventional English Usage for Italian Place-Names

English	Italian	English	Italian
Apulia	Puglia	Piemont	Piedmonte
Florence	Firenze	Rome	Roma
Genoa	Genova	Sardinia	Sardegna
Latium	Lazio	Sicily	Sicilia
Leghorn	Livorno	Trent	Trento
Lombardy	Lombardia	Turin	Torino
Milan	Milano	Tuscany	Toscana
Naples	Napoli	Venetia	Veneto
Padua	Padova	Venice	Venezia

COUNTRY PROFILE



COUNTRY

Formal Name: Italian Republic.

Short Form: Italy.

Term for Nationals: Italians; adjectival form—Italian.

Capital: Rome.

GEOGRAPHY

Size and Location: Approximately 116,318 square miles including Sicily, Sardinia, and several smaller nearby islands. An elongated peninsula jutting from south-central Europe and, with Sicily, almost reaching North Africa. Has land borders with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia.

Topography: Predominantly mountainous. Alps across the north from France to Yugoslavia; Apennines from the Alps to the southern tip of

the peninsula. One major lowland—the North Italian Plain—the most important area of both agricultural and industrial production; generally coincident with Po River valley. Minor lowlands in coastal regions. **Climate:** Central and Southern regions, except high mountain areas, have typical Mediterranean climate with mild winters and hot, dry summers. Alpine regions have cold winters; precipitation distributed throughout year; some peaks snow covered all year.

SOCIETY

Population: Estimated at about 56 million in January 1976. There were ninety-five males per 100 females, the imbalance having resulted from heavy emigration of young men. Some regional imbalances even greater because of internal migration from south and north and from rural to urban areas.

Socioeconomic Diversity: Historic division—social, cultural, and economic—between north and south persists despite massive development program for the south.

Ethnic Groups and Languages: Ethnic and linguistic minorities form less than 5 percent of the population. Ethnic groups and groups of non-Italian speakers found primarily in border regions: Slovenes in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, German speakers in Trentino-Alto Adige, and French speakers in Valle d'Aosta. Some speakers of Greek and Albanian dialects found in Calabria and Sicily.

Religion: Estimated at 97 percent Roman Catholic. Freedom of religion constitutionally guaranteed.

Education: Free and compulsory from ages six to fourteen. Literacy estimated at 95 percent in 1971.

Mass Communications: The state-controlled Italian Radio-Television has a monopoly over nationwide transmission and broadcasts overseas via shortwave on Radio Roma. Privately owned cable television and radio is restricted to local transmission. Eighty-one newspapers, most operating with heavy government subsidies, publish approximately 7 million copies daily. Milan, Rome, and Turin are leading press centers.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Form: Republic.

Government: Parliamentary system. Bicameral legislature elects president of the republic, who appoints prime minister acceptable to a majority of the legislature. Constitutional Court determines validity of legislation and decides on impeachment of top-level officials.

Politics: Christian Democratic Party has formed governments, alone or in coalition, since World War II. Italian Communist Party is strongest competitor. Parliament elected in 1976 was 39 percent Christian Democrats and 34 percent Communist. Prime Minister

Giulio Andreotti formed minority government that must have, at least, tacit support of Communists under leadership of Enrico Berlinguer.

Administrative Divisions: Twenty regions, ninety-four provinces, and more than 8,000 communes. All governmental authority flows from the republic.

Justice: Legal system, based on Roman law, consists of ordinary courts and administrative courts. Judiciary is independent. Highest ordinary court is Court of Cassation.

Major International Memberships: United Nations and many of its specialized agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Communities (EC), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

ECONOMY

General Character: Private enterprise with state participation in major industrial and service areas. Advanced industrial sector, dominated by state holding companies and multinational private conglomerates in the north, contrasts with traditional small-scale industry and lagging agriculture in south and on islands.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Approximately US\$172 billion in 1975; GDP per capita—US\$2,710.

Agriculture: Contributes about 8.4 percent of GDP and employs 16.5 percent of work force. Major crops are cereal grains, wine grapes, olives, fruits, and vegetables.

Industry: Contributes 41.6 percent of GDP and employs 43.6 percent of work force. Strong engineering and transportation equipment industries. Food processing and textiles also important.

Economic Planning: Emphasis on raising southern portion of peninsula, Sicily, and Sardinia to economic and social equality with the north.

Foreign Trade: Major imports are raw materials, fuels, and foodstuffs; exports are primarily manufactured products. Chronic trade deficits are usually offset by tourist revenues and emigrant remittances.

Currency: Lira; pl., lire (see Glossary).

TRANSPORTATION

Roads: Almost 197,000 miles of roads included 3,000 miles of superhighways. Road system handled more passengers and freight than railroads.

Railroads: Almost 13,000 miles of standard-gauge railroads—about half electrified—serve the nation and connect with rail lines of neighboring countries through Alpine passes.

Civil Aviation: Twenty-three international airfields served by Alitalia, the national airline, and several foreign carriers. Domestic air service is important in linking distant cities.

Water Transport: Inland waterways of little importance; coastal shipping a major element of transportation network. Genoa and Naples on the west coast, Palermo on Sicily, and Venice and Trieste on the Adriatic Sea are most important seaports.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Armed Forces: Army, 306,500; navy, 44,500; air force, 70,000; Carabinieri, 80,000 on active duty. Army, navy, and air force mostly committed to NATO roles under operational control of Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), headquartered in Naples. Carabinieri a paramilitary national police force trained, equipped, and organized as a small army.

Service Requirements: Conscripts serve twelve-month tours in army and air force and eighteen months in navy. After required active duty, reserve status lasts until age forty-five.

Equipment: United States equipment has been a mainstay during the post-World War II era, much of it manufactured in Italy. Long-range program for modernization of all forces will include more items and weapons designed and manufactured in Italy.

Military Budget: Military expenditures equaled about 8.6 percent of total spending in 1975.

Police: Combined strength of Carabinieri, Public Security Police, and Customs Police about 196,000.

ITALY

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Figure 1. Political Divisions: Regions

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

In mid-1976 the Italian Republic (Repubblica Italiana) was once again shaken by a governmental crisis of the kind that has become familiar to the Italian electorate. In May the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI) withdrew its support from the ruling minority government, causing the resignation of Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The fall of the Moro government marked the thirty-eighth time since World War II and the twenty-ninth time since the promulgation of the Constitution in 1948 that a government had fallen because of a lack of parliamentary confidence. Such governmental instability would seem overwhelming if it were not for the fact that all governments since 1948 had been led by the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC), which at least provided continuity. In the elections of 1976 the DC again secured a plurality, but its closest rival, the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI), gained in popular support and was approaching the point at which it might challenge the DC for leadership. The new government, formed by Giulio Andreotti, was immediately under fire from all sides because of its call for a stringent austerity program, which upset the rank and file of all parties. Despite the severe economic and political problems that gave the Andreotti government a shaky start, at the end of the year it was still attempting to achieve some sort of compromise among Italy's disparate political factions.

The republic that Andreotti was trying to govern in 1976 was descended from the first unified Italian state of modern times—the Kingdom of Italy—which was not established until 1861. That kingdom was relatively short lived. By the mid-1920s, although the king still reigned, Benito Mussolini ruled, and the Kingdom of Italy had become a fascist dictatorship. Neither Mussolini nor his dictatorship survived World War II, and in a plebiscite held on June 2, 1946, the monarchy was voted out and a republic voted in. The electorate also selected 556 deputies as members of a constituent assembly for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for the new republic.

The Constitution, promulgated on New Year's Day 1948, established a parliamentary democracy consisting of three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—under a head of state known as the president of the republic, who would be elected by the Parliament for

a term of seven years. The president has the nominal and ceremonial powers usually exercised by a constitutional monarch, but in addition he wields significant power in the selection of a prime minister and in the acceptance or rejection of a prime minister's resignation. Also above the regular structure of government is the Constitutional Court, which rules on the constitutionality of cases referred by lower courts and decides questions pertaining to the allocation of power between levels of government or between branches of government.

The executive branch is headed by the prime minister and his cabinet (Council of Ministers). The bicameral Parliament, which consists of the 315-member Senate and the 630-member Chamber of Deputies, is elected by universal suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. The judicial branch is divided into ordinary courts for civil and criminal cases and administrative courts for handling affairs between citizens and the various levels of government.

Italy is a unitary state; all power emanates from the center, which delegates authority to the twenty regions, ninety-four provinces, and more than 8,000 communes. Every square meter of the national territory is included in a commune, a province, and a region (see fig. 1). The number of regions is provided for in the Constitution, but the numbers of provinces and communes can change as further subdividing or incorporating occurs. The central government is represented at provincial and regional levels by appointed prefects and commissioners respectively. The popularly elected organs of government at the subnational levels are similar; all have juntas and councils, the regions and provinces have presidents, and the communes have mayors. A commune may be a major city, a small town and its environs, or a rural village and its surrounding territory.

Governmental powers and intragovernmental relations were still evolving in 1976, as was the relationship between the central state and the subnational levels of government. Between elections the people appeared to be apathetic about politics and government. Feelings of loyalty to a commune or province took precedence over a broader loyalty to the state. Historically the average Italian's experience with governmental authority has been negative; he felt that the government collected taxes but provided few benefits in return. Perhaps most debilitating to the system has been the public's low expectations of it. In the mid-1970s the low expectations were intensified by the seeming inability of successive governments to deal with economic and social problems keeping the country in a state of political uncertainty.

As in other countries *clientela* (patronage) situations have developed in which interest groups have established special, influential relations with various elements of the government bureaucracy. In place of formal bureaucratic decisionmaking, which was frequently inept and slow, a quasi-institutional system of political favoritism, called *sottogoverno* (subgovernment), has long existed. The power of

sottogoverno makes itself evident in situations wherein interest groups bypass governmental organs by directly influencing the political parties controlling them.

From the first parliamentary elections held after promulgation of the Constitution, all Italian governments have been led by the DC. During the late 1940s and 1950s the DC ruled alone or in coalition with various right-of-center parties. As the center-right coalitions continually encountered difficulties in maintaining the confidence of Parliament in the late 1950s, the leaders of the DC began to consider what was termed an opening to the left (*apertura a sinistra*), a policy that reached fruition in 1963 with the formation of a coalition government that included the PSI.

The center-left formula continued as the basis for government until the early 1970s, when economic setbacks and growing social problems led to strained relations between the DC and the PSI. In 1976 the PSI withdrew its support, causing the government to fall and eventually leading to the parliamentary elections held in June of that year in which nine national parties entered candidates. The DC barely maintained its plurality, winning 39 percent of the vote while the PCI won 34 percent. After the narrow victory the DC formed a minority government under the leadership of Andreotti, who avoided giving any cabinet positions (ministries) to the Communists. The PCI, however, did obtain the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Parliament), as well as several chairmanships of parliamentary committees. When the Andreotti government presented its proposed program to the legislature, the PCI abstained from the vote of confidence to avoid bringing down the new government before it even took office.

Leading to the larger vote won by the PCI, perhaps, was the moderation of its policies during the late 1960s. Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the party in 1976, had declared acceptance of various broad policies that the ruling DC had used as its principal bases throughout almost thirty years in power. Chief among these policies were membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), some form of European integration, and maintenance of a mixed economy. The PCI under Berlinguer had become the leading advocate of so-called Eurocommunism, a philosophy or movement that emphasized independence for national communist parties to pursue their own brand of socialism through the formulation of domestic and foreign policies free of external interference. Some critics of Berlinguer and the new philosophy referred to Eurocommunism as a sham or a smoke-screen designed to hide the true nature of the PCI. According to the critics, the Communists would act reasonably or cooperate as long as such action furthered their true goal of a complete takeover, after which Italy would become a one-party state in the mold of the world's other countries under communist control.

Despite increasing communist influence in Italy's affairs, the country's foreign relations remained pro-Western in 1976. A strong Western orientation had developed after World War II when the country benefited from United States aid under the Marshall Plan. That orientation was also enhanced by Italy's entry into NATO and the European Communities. In pursuing its foreign policies Italy had been successful in bilateral negotiations in which specific national interests have been at issue. These have included negotiations with Austria regarding the rights of the German-speaking Tyroleans in Trentino-Alto Adige and with Yugoslavia concerning Trieste. In addition, as an attempt to establish its own international identity, Italy has stressed its role as mediator between East and West and between industrialized and developing countries. The latter aspect has led Italy to pursue special interests in the Mediterranean area, especially the Middle East.

The Italians are as diverse in their social attitudes as they are in their politics their homeland is truly one of many contrasts. Regional variations in customs and dialects have persisted into the 1970s, more than 100 years after the political unification of the country, and it would seem that such variations will persist. Regional loyalties are evident in the parochialism of the people and their attachment to their village, to their local heritage, and to their traditional way of doing things. At the same time, however, there appears to be no danger to the unity of the country; there is a definite sense of a common cultural heritage among the people as well as a common world view. The most important divisions among the Italians are socioeconomic rather than regional or cultural. For example, the divisions between rural and urban areas or between the poor south and the prosperous north are divisions that affect the everyday lives of the Italian people.

Ethnic differences do not have any great effect on the lives of the people because ethnic minorities are not large and for that reason do not exert any great political or cultural influence on the country. Tyroleans have in the past agitated for greater autonomy, but they do not constitute a threat to the unity of the country. The Tyroleans have their own political party and regularly send three elected members to the national Chamber of Deputies. Other minorities include Slovenes in the Trieste area, French speakers in the small northwest region of Valle d'Aosta, and Greek and Albanian speakers scattered throughout the south and on Sicily.

Religion has been considered one of the main integrating forces in the country—virtually all Italians are Roman Catholics. In fostering universal practices and promoting direct ties between the individual and the church, the Catholic hierarchy has promoted a unity that has been important to the nation as a whole. Despite the fact that church officials have often been active in politics, the Italian people have appeared to maintain a division in their political attitudes and their

religious attitudes. Such a dichotomy is evidenced by the people who would not be bothered by the seeming incongruity of attending mass in the morning and a communist meeting in the evening.

Education, industrialization, and modern communications and transportation have been critical in promoting a national consciousness and in showing the Italian that there is a world outside his village—even Rome has been referred to as a collection of villages. Despite problems of inadequate facilities and limited funding that have plagued the educational system, progress under the republic has been obvious. According to the 1971 census approximately 95 percent of the population was considered literate, although there were still more illiterate people in the south and on Sardinia and Sicily than in other areas. The rural poor have traditionally turned to emigration to escape the crushing poverty of their home areas. Since the early 1960s internal migration from the rural south to the urban north and temporary emigration to other countries of Western Europe have had a profound effect on the social structure and value orientation of the people.

Even though there have been many social changes since World War II as the country has become more industrialized and more urbanized, the family continues to be the most important social unit. Self-identity as well as the honor and social position of the individual are defined in terms of the family unit. The father-husband theoretically exercises authority over all family members, but in various parts of the country the father's authority has been diluted. Despite changes, however, no other social grouping seems to engender any kind of loyalty—certainly no other grouping compares with the family. When close relationships do exist—such as between patron and client or between friends—they are usually phrased in terms of kinship bonds. A patron more often than not is asked to become godfather to a client's child, and a friend is referred to as cousin.

The traditional bond that once tied the landowner (patron) and the peasant (client) was based on a recognizable if uneven reciprocity. The patron controlled all important resources—land, economy, positions of political power, and channels of communication to the outside world. Patrons helped their clients obtain jobs or loans and helped them handle problems that required authoritative intervention. Clients gave their patrons loyalty and public support. Although the traditional patron-client bond has generally been superseded (no one group controls all important resources any longer), patronage networks continue to be operative. Individual success hinges to a great degree on business and social connections.

As noted, the average Italian is conscious of his cultural heritage—which certainly must rank among the world's greatest—but the educated Italian of the 1970s is also aware that the modern art, literature, and design of his country have been among the most innovative in

Europe. Italian literature is widely read abroad in translation, Italian sculpture has earned a respected position in the plastic arts, and Italian architecture—continuing a centuries-old tradition of excellence—is recognized as a pacesetter in functional design.

Italy's film industry remains one of the world's most prolific, and the cinema is one of the country's most popular forms of mass entertainment. Serious literature since 1945 has been marked by its preoccupation with the wartime experience and with the political and social evolution of the postwar era. Along with contemporary film and theater, literature has been profoundly politicized. Cultural activities are promoted and encouraged by the state as well as by private enterprise, and there is extensive government patronage of the performing arts.

Radio and television enjoy enormous popularity in Italy. It was estimated in 1976 that the nightly television audience included as many as 30 million viewers, or more than half the population of the country. Italian Radio-Television (Radiotelevisione Italiana—RAI) is a joint stock company in which the state is majority shareholder, exercising administrative control over the national monopoly. Local transmission by privately owned radio stations and cable television, long forbidden by the government monopoly, was finally permitted in the mid-1970s. Some critics have contended that the viewing audience is poorly served by the state-controlled electronic media, which they say are leftist oriented and have propagandized the people in that direction.

The number of daily newspapers is relatively small in relation to the large population; fewer than 4 million Italians are counted as regular readers of newspapers. The press has suffered from a steady decline in circulation, and since 1973 the publishers' woes have been compounded by sharply increased production and labor costs. The number of different newspapers has also declined since World War II, and the trend in the 1970s has been toward concentrating financial control of the remaining dailies in the hands of a few large enterprises and publishing houses. Since 1975 the government has provided direct subsidies to the press, including the various party newspapers. Editorial freedom does not appear to have been affected either by the concentration of financial management or by government subsidies, but the press has been plagued in the 1970s by labor-management disputes arising from threats to job security in a depressed industry.

The overall economy by the mid-1970s has developed to the point that Italy was ranked as the sixth industrial power among the non-communist nations of the world, but in many respects the economy remained underdeveloped. After a rapid recovery from World War II, economic growth advanced steadily from the early 1950s until 1963. The last five years of that period were marked by one of the strongest growth patterns in the world, leading observers to describe it as an economic miracle. Most observers also described Italy's economy as

dualistic because of persistent structural imbalances and sharp gaps in development between urban and rural, modern and traditional, and north and south.

Economic development from 1964 to the mid-1970s followed a stop-and-go pattern. The uneven course reflected to some degree the existing worldwide conditions, to which Italy was particularly sensitive as a major trading nation, but more significantly the unevenness reflected internal events. A rapid rise in wage rates and associated social welfare costs demanded by increasingly militant labor unions cut into industrial profits and capital investment, creating inflationary pressures. Controlling inflation became increasingly more difficult for the perennially shaky governments. By 1976 the inflation rate was the highest in Europe, and the economic growth rate was among the slowest. Inflation and unemployment made it difficult for the government to proceed with much-needed programs of economic and social reform.

The economic problems of the 1970s have also hampered reorganization and reequipping of the armed forces—the army, navy, and air force had all begun modernization programs aimed at replacing obsolete and obsolescent weaponry and equipment, but Parliament constantly argued about the high costs of these multiyear programs. About 500,000 men were maintained in the armed forces in 1976, and the modernization programs would substantially reduce the overall figure; but the savings on manpower would be consumed many times over by the acquisition of new planes, tanks, and missiles and the other accoutrements of modern warfare. The leaders of the armed forces wisely programmed their modernization for a ten-year period knowing that a more rapid rate would be prohibitively expensive. It is the hope of Italian planners that more production of necessary arms and equipment will be carried on at home as a spur to the domestic economy.

The bulk of the armed forces are committed to NATO. Italy's location made it an important NATO partner from the beginning but, after the withdrawal of French forces in the 1960s and the withdrawal of Greek forces in the 1970s, Italy's importance to the alliance became crucial. One of NATO's major commands, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), has its headquarters in Naples, and there are subordinate air and naval headquarters in that city as well as a subordinate ground force headquarters in Verona. The United States Sixth Fleet uses Gaeta, just north of Naples, as a home port for its Mediterranean operations. The continued gains by the PCI have worried Western strategists but, despite communist power in the country, Italy seems solidly oriented to the West.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SETTING

Italian civilization is ancient—a product of the Roman Empire and the source of the Renaissance—but Italy as a nation-state is relatively young, emerging only in 1861 as a political entity. The name *Italy* is one of great antiquity, used for nearly 3,000 years to identify the boot-shaped peninsula that juts from the Alps and the Po Valley into the Mediterranean Sea. It was the Greeks who coined the term *Italy* to describe a spacious country good for grazing cattle. Poets and patriots, ancient and modern, have heard in it the name of their homeland. The Roman political reformer of the second century B.C. Tiberius Gracchus understood this when at the end of the Punic Wars he protested, “The wild beasts of Italy have their dens and holes and hiding places, while they who fight and die in defense of Italy enjoy indeed the air and light, but nothing more.” Vergil wrote of the exiled Aeneas that he was “the first to sail from the land of Troy and reach Italy.” Dante, Petrarch, and Machiavelli all understood that Italy had cultural if not political boundaries that set it apart from the rest of Europe. Nineteenth-century European statesmen dismissed a politically disunited Italy as a mere geographical expression. Italy’s cultural, emotional, physical, and political boundaries have historically seldom coincided, but that an Italy and an Italian people have existed from antiquity has been recognized by Italians—although they may have called themselves Venetians and Florentines—and by foreigners alike.

Three wars with Austria and an open breach with the papacy were the price paid to complete the long process of Italian unification, known as the Risorgimento (revival), and to establish a national monarchy under the House of Savoy in the late nineteenth century. As one of the victorious powers in World War I, Italy annexed additional territory. Parliamentary institutions broke down, however, in the atmosphere of depression, disillusionment, and fear that gripped the country in the aftermath of the war, and the country succumbed to Benito Mussolini’s fascist dictatorship. Mussolini led Italy to defeat as the ally of Nazi Germany in World War II. Elements of the Italian army and the antifascist partisan movement participated, however, in the liberation of Italy after Mussolini’s ouster in 1943. The monarchy was abolished after a plebiscite in 1946 and a republic established.

All of postwar Italy's governments have been formed under the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC), frequently in coalition with parties of the center-right and since 1962 in collaboration with the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI). Successive governments have maintained the commitment made in the years immediately after the war to European cooperation and participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the United States.

The gradual growth of Italy's industrial potential—the so-called economic miracle—reached its peak in the mid-1960s and provided for a rise in national income and unparalleled improvement in living standards, although these benefits were unequally distributed. Inflation severely plagued the Italian economy in the 1970s, however, causing economic problems that were accompanied by increased labor unrest, agitation for social reform, and demands for more efficient government services. Despite impressive gains made by the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI) in the 1976 general elections, the DC retained its position as the largest party in both houses of parliament and was called upon to form Italy's thirty-ninth government since the restoration of parliamentary institutions in 1944.

Several salient themes run through much of Italy's complex history: the role of the church—or, more properly, the papacy—in Italian political life; the effects of regionalism on the historical development of the country as a whole; and the Italians' awareness of Italy's historic greatness. Italy was virtually untouched by the Reformation, and Italians are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, if not always in practice then certainly in their cultural and social orientations. A corollary of the country's profound Catholicism has been that strain of anticlericalism always strongest where the temporal power of the church has been great.

Regionalism has been important because Italian political and cultural instincts have usually been intensely local in their orientation. Geography has divided the peninsula into sharply distinct regions. Italians are also divided by language and, although they treasure a common literary heritage, the natural speech of most has until recently been in dialects unintelligible outside their home regions. Artistic styles have been regional. The regions have had primary contacts with different foreign influences. They have developed politically, socially, and economically in widely disparate fashions. Patriotism until the last century usually implied loyalty to a town or region, not to a country. Each of Italy's regions therefore experienced its own unique historical development.

The disunity within Italy caused by stronger regional than national loyalties gave rise to what some observers have qualified as a sense of political inferiority. It has not always been easy to live in a country that is probably Western civilization's most remarkable monument.

Italy's magnificent past has often been a great burden for its people. The Italian social critic Luigi Barzini has commented on the "absurd discrepancy between the quantity and dazzling array of [his countrymen's] . . . achievements through the centuries and the mediocre quality of their national history." Indeed attempts at the moralization of Italian life—by patriots—have been a constant feature of social criticism from the time of the Roman Republic, through that of Dante and Machiavelli, to the Italian Communists and Catholics of the present day.

EARLY INHABITANTS

The Latins and other Italic tribes, speakers of Indo-European languages who had settled in Italy by 2000 B.C., provided the basic genetic stock. There was a disparity in the levels of civilization achieved by early Italic cultures, which were usually intensely local in their expression. These tribal groups consolidated unsuccessfully in common defense against the intrusion of the Etruscans, who appeared in Italy about 1200 B.C. The origin of the Etruscans, whose influence and civilization in Italy were not surpassed until the emergence of Latin Rome as an independent power, is a mystery that has confounded scholars for centuries. Archaeological evidence of their civilization, though plentiful, is subject to contradictory interpretations. Their language, its alphabet derived from Greek, had no known affinities with other languages and is undecipherable. The explanation put forward by Herodotus that the Etruscans had migrated from Asia Minor has remained a popular speculation. Although their origin is obscure, much is known of their politics and art. It was the Etruscans who introduced the city-state as a form of political organization to Italy. Although politically disunited and often hostile, the city-states of Etruria were linked in a religious confederation and were capable of concerted action against common enemies. Rivals of the Greeks, they nonetheless assimilated Hellenic culture and transmitted it to the Italic peoples whom they had subdued.

In the second millennium B.C. lines of trade extended from the Aegean islands into Italy, the depot for amber and copper brought from beyond the Alps. The first Greek colonies were planted in southern Italy in the eighth century B.C. Politically and economically independent of their mother cities, the colonies in Magna Graecia (Greater Greece)—as Sicily, Catania, Apulia, and Lucania were called in antiquity—remained an integral part of the Hellenic world. Some of the city-states of Magna Graecia—for example, Syracuse on Sicily—were powerful and prosperous and played a part in the political life of Greece and the Aegean. In Italy the Greeks also manifested their suicidal tendency for warring among themselves. The Greeks were challenged by the Phoenician colony of Carthage, which in its drive for

hegemony in the western Mediterranean settled enclaves in Sicily and Sardinia in the sixth century B.C. and made allies of the Etruscans. The Etruscans, in their turn, were pressed by waves of Celts who crossed the Alps and settled in the northern plains.

ROME

The origins of Rome are the stuff of myth, not history. It is probable that in the eighth century B.C. (756 B.C. is the traditional date) Latin villagers and refugees from a countryside harassed by hill tribes sought safety behind the wooden palisades constructed on the Palatine hill overlooking a crossing on the Tiber River. Legend relates that these outcasts took as their first king Romulus, descendant of Aeneas the Trojan, and that he gave his name to the city. The families, clans, and tribes to which all citizens claimed ties by blood or adoption were the basis of the city-states' social structure and military and political organization. A hereditary Etruscan monarchy was overthrown and a republic established in 510 B.C. The Etruscans, however, left their imprint on Roman institutions, particularly in the identification of religion and the state. The proverbial Roman habits of austerity are also thought to have been a reaction to the hedonism of their Etruscan overlords, but both tendencies remained as strains in Roman and later Italian thought. The political history of the Roman Republic, governed by a patrician oligarchy, was marked even in its early stages by the persistent and ultimately successful struggle of the plebeians—as a class—to gain an effective voice in government and to improve their social and economic status.

The building of the Roman Empire was begun with the slow subjugation of Italy and the gradual assimilation of its diverse peoples into the Roman state system. The poet Vergil eulogized the toil it took to make the Roman state, but Roman expansion in Italy was not deliberate or the result of a preconceived strategy. It developed haphazardly from commitments made to other Latin towns and from intervention into the political squabbles of the Greek cities that took Rome step by step from conquest to conquest. Victories in the Punic Wars against Carthage gave Rome mastery of the Mediterranean and put Italy at the center of an empire that would stretch from the British Isles to the Euphrates River at its height in the first century A.D.

The privileges of Roman citizenship were extended throughout Italy, but the devastation suffered during the Punic Wars and the measures required to defeat Carthage permanently affected the social and economic structure of the Roman state. Large estates worked by slave labor replaced the small holdings of the yeoman farmers, who had provided the manpower for Rome's armies. Driven from the land, they swelled the ranks of the city's violent mobs.

Serious attempts were made to ease the plight of Roman citizens displaced from their land and to reform republican institutions. All failed, none more tragically than the Gracchi brothers' introduction of a democratic note into Roman politics. Civil wars and periods of anarchy were only temporarily halted by military rule, which usually enjoyed popular support. During his dictatorship Julius Caesar pledged to return the republic to the people but, while preserving the name *republic*, the state evolved toward a monarchical system. Octavian, Caesar's nephew, concentrated all power in his hands and, having been named *princeps* (first citizen) and given the title *Augustus* by the Senate, began the reign of the Roman emperors in 17 B.C.

Through their early history Romans displayed a natural conservatism that opposed acceptance of alien ideas. Not without a struggle from the puritans in their midst, they became deeply affected, however, by the Hellenistic culture of postclassical Greece, which in time permeated every aspect of Roman thought, religion, and art. Skilled at integrating conquered peoples, imperial Rome was a melting pot of cultures. In turn, Roman law, institutions, and ideals and the use of the Latin language radiated like its roads out from the city and across the empire, survived its decline, and provided the basis for a new European civilization.

From a military perspective the empire went on the defensive in the first century A.D. By the third century it was in full retreat, although Italy remained secure from invasion for another century. There was no one reason for Rome's decline. Its security system was tested beyond its capacity to defend the empire's frontiers, and its natural leaders withdrew gradually from state service. In simple terms the Roman state suffered ultimately from a loss of will to survive. By the end of the third century the empire had been divided for administrative purposes, and the city of Rome had lost its status as a capital. Although remaining the symbol of Roman unity, the city was an unproductive consumer of wealth too distant from the military frontiers to provide leadership.

Sacked by the Visigoths in 410, Rome was prey thereafter to attacks by marauding Germans. The imperial government encouraged the settlement of some Germanic tribes as allies on Italian land, however, and Germans increasingly made careers in the army and in the administration of the empire. In 476 a palace coup forced the abdication of the last western emperor, a puppet of his German advisers. In 488 Theodoric, king of the Goths but also a Roman patrician, set about to restore Italy and rebuild Rome. Defending Italy with his Gothic army, he ruled it as a Roman official. In 526 Justinian, the eastern Roman (Byzantine) emperor, turned on the Goths and revived direct imperial control over Italy. Justinian introduced into Italy the *Corpus juris civilis*, the compilation of Roman law, which was passed 500 years later from Italy to the rest of western Europe. In removing

his Gothic allies, however, Justinian left Italy open to invasion by the Germanic Lombards who, although few in number, established kingdoms throughout the peninsula. Other portions of Italy including Rome remained in Byzantine hands, but with the creation of the Lombard kingdoms an end was put to the political unity of Italy for the next 1,400 years.

PAPACY AND EMPIRE

Christianity was brought to the Greek-speaking Jewish communities of the cities and towns in Italy in the first century. As one of a number of oriental mystery religions that gained in popularity among native Italians as traditional ethics and morality lost their relevance, Christianity survived persecution and was granted recognition by Constantine, the first Christian emperor, in 315. Christianity had been accepted throughout Italy by the time that it was adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire late in the fourth century. Heir to the empire's institutions, the church adapted Roman law for ecclesiastical uses.

By the fourth century the Christian bishops of Rome, who claimed succession from Saint Peter, had assumed a position of primacy in the western, or Latin, church and bore the title pope. With the transfer of the imperial capital to Constantinople, temporal jurisdiction over the city of Rome was passed to the pope, and estates were conferred on the holder of the office to provide him revenue as an imperial agent. The papacy grew more independent of the distant imperial authority, and theories grounded on tradition were introduced to define the sometimes ambiguous relationship between secular and spiritual jurisdictions, between empire and church, whose interests overlapped in many areas. Papal theorists explained that, whereas civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions were distinct, only the papacy possessed a *plenitudo protestatis* (fullness of power) and that the authority exercised by civil authorities was merely a reflection of the power of the church. The argument continued that Constantine had made a free gift of Rome to the pope, to whom he and his successors owed their imperial titles. Whatever the theoretical underpinning for his position, the pope was called on in the absence of other authorities to assume a wide range of civil, diplomatic, and even military responsibilities in Italy albeit in the emperor's name, as Byzantine power contracted under pressure from the Lombards.

Because imperial Italy had been left to its own devices, Rome came to resent imperial interference in Italian affairs, a situation exacerbated by religious differences that had developed between the Latin and Greek churches. In 754 the pope called on Pepin, king of the Franks and strongest of the Germanic warlords, to expel the troublesome Lombards from Roman territory, which Pepin restored to the pope

rather than to the Byzantine emperor, thus establishing the basis of what became the Papal States.

In 800 Pope Leo III recreated the western Roman Empire by conferring an imperial crown on the Frankish king, Charlemagne. The practical effect on Italy of the reestablishment of the western empire—including areas that were never part of the old empire—under a Germanic king was to link Italy's political future to the emerging states of northern Europe rather than to the Byzantine Empire. The Holy Roman Empire stood for 1,000 years as the visible sign of the unfulfilled ideal of European unity and of the cooperation between the civil and ecclesiastical order. The authority of the western emperors in northern and central Italy was nominal, but periodic intervention on their part was required to restore order in Rome, where in the tenth century the papacy had become the pawn of rival Roman aristocratic factions.

By tradition emperors of the Holy Roman Empire were elected by German princes and traveled to Rome for their coronations. Some emperors, such as Otto III, found residence in Italy more congenial than in Germany, but the concentration of imperial power in either one of the two parts of the empire always implied neglect of the other and a decline of imperial influence there.

The eleventh-century reform movement within the church aimed at disciplining the ecclesiastical hierarchy by curbing lay investiture of bishops, that is, the control of ecclesiastical appointments by secular rulers. Bishops were seen to owe not only their temporalities but also their spiritual offices to the emperor. There was a complementary effort to forge a chain of command that tied bishops directly to the pope through a centralized ecclesiastical administrative system. Concurrently the selection of the pope was removed from the Roman nobility to an electoral college of eminent churchmen—the cardinals.

The moving spirit in this medieval reformation was Pope Gregory VII, himself a Roman nobleman, who waged a running battle with Henry IV in Italy and Germany. When moral sanctions failed to bring the emperor to heel, the pope stirred rebellion against him among the Italian towns that were anxious to diminish imperial power over them. Henry IV's abject submission at Canossa in 1077 was a fleeting triumph for the pope. Gregory ultimately failed in his struggle with the emperor, who drove him from Rome and set up an antipope in his stead. But Gregory's long-range goals, separating the spiritual credentials of bishops from their temporal positions as imperial agents, were vindicated by his successors, adding to the strength and prestige of the papacy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and freeing it to play a vigorously independent role in the political development of Italy. Nevertheless conflict between the spiritual and the temporal remained the recurrent theme of medieval history, and nowhere was it more apparent than in Italy.

Although there were acute shifts in papal foreign policy, a single principle dominated the papacy's relations with foreign rulers and its dealings in Italian affairs. Experience had proved that, in order for the church to fulfill its spiritual mission unimpeded by secular authorities, the pope had to have temporal sovereignty in his own right in the Papal States and, as a corollary to that principle, southern Italy had to be kept independent of imperial control and its ruler tied to the papacy (see fig. 2).

Sicily and the south remained in Byzantine hands after reestablishment of the western empire, although the Byzantine hold on them was weak. Early in the eleventh century landless Norman knights, employed by the Greeks as mercenaries, seized the southern provinces and staked out their individual claims. In 1053 Robert Guiscard united the Norman territories in southern Italy. He and his dy-



Figure 2. Twelfth-Century Italy

nasty created a centralized feudal kingdom in which all land tenure was granted by the king to whom all his subjects owed their primary allegiance. In Italy as elsewhere the Normans combined ambition and a genius for organization and administration. At first resisted by the papacy, Robert Guiscard's claim to a portion of the Byzantine Empire was legitimated by the pope, who accepted the Normans as his vassals, using them many times as a weapon to hold the western emperor at bay in Italy and to defend the Papal States. In 1130 the Normans added Sicily, conquered in the ninth century by the Saracens, to their domains.

MEDIEVAL COMMUNES

Towns, although diminished in size and activity, had survived from antiquity in northern and central Italy. Although nominally subjects of the emperor, the city-republics or communes won greater autonomy in the eleventh century during the investiture controversy at the expense of their bishops, who had governed them as imperial vicars. The maritime republics—Venice, Genoa, and Pisa—had a longer tradition of independence.

Greater political freedom in the communes coincided with improved security in the countryside and on the land and sea trade routes. Italian nobles and townsmen, the first in Europe to understand the use of money and to master business procedure, invested a slowly accumulated surplus of wealth in increasing agricultural output. Surplus food production made it possible to support an urban population of craftsmen and workers and to create the marketplaces around which industry and commerce grew. Northern Italy was medieval Europe's first industrial center, and in its countinghouses, warehouses, and workshops capitalism originated.

The life of the communes engendered the fierce local patriotism and competitiveness that fueled incessant warfare among them. Strong class feeling and intense family rivalries also bedeviled the communes with political and social turmoil. Having secured recognition of their autonomy within their walls, the communes forced the submission of the landed nobility and annexed the surrounding countryside. Many of the old nobility retained their influence but only by joining the guilds and entering the full life of the communes on the same basis as the merchants and manufacturers. Attempts by the guilds—on which representation in communal governments was based—to regulate economic life varied in effectiveness, but a tension existed between corporations and individuals that was the basis of much of the social discontent within the communes that spilled over into their political life.

Although political institutions developed differently in each commune, patterns common to each are discernible. Oligarchies composed of merchant families dominated political life through the more

important guilds. The members of the unrepresented lesser guilds struggled to win recognition and a voice in communal affairs. The internal politics of the communes was so turbulent that foreigners—anyone from outside the commune—were employed to serve as chief executives (*podestas*) to arbitrate among the factions.

Urged on by Italian nobles to curb the radicalism of the communes, the emperor, Frederick of Hohenstaufen (called Barbarossa in Italy), insisted on their membership in a federation under imperial supervision. Putting aside their rivalries, the communes of Lombardy united for their collective security under the pope, and at Legnano in 1176 the Lombard League defeated the emperor's forces and won Barbarossa's grudging confirmation of their liberties. But the question of their independence was not settled. Emperor Frederick II, Barbarossa's grandson, inherited the crowns of Naples and Sicily through his Norman mother, allowing the Hohenstaufens to outflank the Papal States. Called *Stupor Mundi* (wonder of the world), Frederick II considered himself an Italian prince and kept a brilliant, polyglot court at Palermo, from which he ruled a kingdom that was prosperous and possessed the strongest government known in the Middle Ages. His attempts to subdue the communes of Lombardy and Tuscany came to nothing, however, and in the effort he exhausted the resources of the southern kingdom, which his heirs were unable to hold. Naples and Sicily passed under papal patronage to the French House of Anjou, a move intended to counter imperial influence in Italy. Angevin claims in the south were in time contested by the kings of Aragon, and the seed was planted for the centuries-long competition between France and Spain for control of Italy.

Italians were by no means unanimous in their opposition to the Hohenstaufen scheme for an imperial federation, and the struggle between the emperor and the communes for control of the city-states intensified party strife under the titles of the pro- and anti-imperial parties in Germany. The Ghibellines favored federalism and an imperial presence in Italy. The Guelfs, who stood for particularism (the independence of the communes and the primacy of local interests), looked to the pope as their nominal leader, not as an alternative to the emperor but as the steadiest representative of resistance to imperial claims to overlordship in Italy.

There existed a distinction, not always easy to maintain, between the pope as temporal ruler of the Papal States and as head of the church. In the context of Italian politics, he was but one of several princes, and on that level, rather than as a spiritual leader, relations with him were conducted by other states. However, the powerful thirteenth-century papacy increasingly employed moral sanctions—part of its spiritual arsenal—as political weapons, ultimately to the detriment of both the church and Italy. The pope's responsibility to intervene in questions affecting morality was universally understood, but Dante

Alighieri in the *Divina Commedia* (Divine Comedy) and other works berated the papacy for having usurped the function of empire, weakened secular authority, and thus sown the seeds of human discord.

The fourteenth century—a time of war, famine, plague, and doubt, contrasting sharply with the relative stability of the previous century—witnessed the transformation of many city-republics into lordships (seigniories). The intense, disruptive activity of the political factions encouraged a demand for the arrogation of constitutional authority in the communes to a single ruler, above party, who could restore order. Having popular support, the despots needed not tolerate any check on their authority. The courts of the dynasties that ruled the Italian city-states—the Visconti of Milan, the Gonzagas of Mantua, the d'Este of Ferrara, the Scaligeri of Verona—ranked in their time as the equal in magnificence of those of the royal houses of Europe. Often men of intelligence and usually of refined taste, the seigniors attracted to their courts the genius of Italy—scholars, poets, artists—and created the atmosphere in which a great epoch in civilization, the Renaissance, flourished.

The political history of Renaissance Italy is that of the interaction of five Italian states—Naples, the Papal States, Venice, Milan, and Florence—which had drawn many of the smaller states within the orbit of their influence (see fig. 3). These states, all fully sovereign by the end of the fourteenth century, took on the characteristics of nation-states and devised systems of alliances within which they acted out in Italy the balance-of-power diplomacy that the great kingdoms of Europe adopted in their practice of statecraft.

The Italian League, a formal alliance agreed to in 1455 at the pope's prompting, was designed to keep the peace among the Italian states and to prevent foreign intervention in Italian affairs. A succession of particularly able statesmen-popes, who possessed the political and diplomatic skills demanded by the times, constructively contributed to the success of the league, which endured for forty years and coincided with the period of the finest cultural and intellectual achievements of the Renaissance.

It was Florence, a city of wool and banks, that was the linchpin in the alliance system. Its politics were dominated by the remarkable Medici family, whose banking house operated branches in Europe's most important commercial centers. Cosimo de' Medici was in every sense a seignior, although he took no title and seldom held public office. He controlled the commune through the manipulation of elections and, not the least, because of public confidence in his ability to provide for the welfare of Florence. Under his grandson, Lorenzo the Magnificent, the Medici seignior assumed princely proportions but always within the limits of the commune's republican institutions. His taste, good judgment, and generous patronage confirmed the artistic and intellectual preeminence of Florence in Italy and in Europe.




Figure 3. Fifteenth-Century Italy

CENTURIES OF FOREIGN DOMINATION

The Italian allies fell out after the collapse of the Medici seignior, and in 1494 France took advantage of the breach to put forward long-standing claims to Milan and Naples. When Spain intervened on Naples' behalf, divided Italian states chose sides between the two foreign powers, and Italy was made a battleground for the protracted rivalry between France and the Habsburgs. Charles V, Holy Roman emperor and king of Spain, subsequently forged a defensive arc—sweeping from Spain through Italy to Germany and the Low Countries—to contain France, ensuring Spanish Habsburg dominance in Italy for nearly 200 years. Milan and Naples became part of the Spanish crown and other Italian states its satellites.

It was in this environment that the Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, a politician possessed of extraordinary insight into the dynamics of politics, wrote *Il Principe* (The Prince). Infuriated by Italy's weakness, which had invited its domination by foreigners, Machiavelli searched—as Dante had—for a liberator, suggesting in his treatise the qualities needed in a strong man by describing the tactics of the most successful princes. Reviewing the so-called dwarfing of Italy with remarkable detachment, Machiavelli's contemporary Francesco Guicciardini acknowledged that states like men were mortal but nevertheless deplored "the infelicity of being born at such a time when his country has to fulfill its doom."

After the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), Austria replaced Spain as the dominant foreign power in northern Italy. A Bourbon king was put on the Neapolitan throne, but Lombardy (Milan) was retained in the Habsburg dominions. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as Naples-Sicily was styled, entered into a family compact with France and Spain and, to keep the influence of the Bourbon and Habsburg rivals in balance in Italy, Sardinia was awarded to Piedmont, carrying with it a royal title for its reigning House of Savoy. Italy was the outcast of Europe in the eighteenth century, but the despots imposed by foreign rulers, especially in the smaller states of central Italy, were often benevolent and reform minded, providing enlightened and frequently progressive government. Tuscany in particular, ruled by the Habsburg-related House of Lorraine, gained a reputation as one of the most liberal states in Europe.

News of the French Revolution was given a sympathetic reception in Italy only among small groups of middle-class liberals. The old regimes busied themselves rounding up local subversives but—except for Austrian Lombardy—took few precautions against the possibility of France's exporting its revolution by force. Napoleon Bonaparte's spectacular Italian campaigns in 1797 and 1799 shattered Austrian hegemony, drove the Bourbon king of the Two Sicilies from the mainland, and ended the 1,200-year history of the Venetian Republic. By 1806 Napoleon—now emperor—had annexed large portions of Italy, including Rome, Piedmont, and Venetian possessions in Dalmatia, to France; deeded Naples to his brother-in-law, Marshal Joachim Murat; and created the Kingdom of Italy in northern and central Italy, naming himself its king (see fig. 4). The Napoleonic period was crucial for the development of modern Italy, and the changes wrought by the French occupation had a lasting impact on the laws and institutions of the country. The most effective opposition came on a regional basis from small groups of patriots organized in underground secret societies. They had no regard for the old regimes but were inspired by a deep desire to rid Italy of all foreigners and to establish independent, constitutional governments in their respective regions.




Figure 4. Italy under Napoleon, 1812

RISORGIMENTO

The Risorgimento was the movement for political unity in Italy in the nineteenth century. It was not a mass movement, and until its last years it did not engage the imagination and support of a broad range of Italians. It was first promoted chiefly by an elite of middle-class liberals and the intelligentsia and entailed a running civil war between the old and the emerging Italian ruling classes. Violent revolution and gradual reform, republicanism and national monarchy, federalism and the unitary state were all proposed as solutions for Italian disunity and subservience. The nationalist movement was organized during the French occupation around a core of secret societies. Later in the century three figures—Giuseppe Mazzini, Giuseppe Garibaldi,

and Camillo di Cavour—emerged, often in competition, as leaders of the Risorgimento.

In the reactionary atmosphere that attended Napoleon's defeat, nationalism seemed a dangerous corollary of the French Revolution. Governments represented at the Congress of Vienna (1815) were intent on reviving the prerevolutionary equilibrium of a Europe torn by a generation of war. Old boundaries and old rulers were restored and their security guaranteed by the great powers (see fig. 5). Lombardy-Venetia was returned to Austria, which also counted the satellite states—Tuscany, Modena, and Parma—within its sphere of influence. The Bourbons were restored to Naples and the pope to Rome. Only Piedmont stood outside the circle of foreign control or influence; yet there, as elsewhere in Italy, efficient, well-organized repression quashed the petty rebellions stirred by the secret societies.

After 1830 direction of the Risorgimento was preempted by Mazzini's Young Italy movement. Mazzini, an ascetic who brought a quasi-religious element to the struggle for independence, demanded that his followers make themselves morally worthy to lead Italy to the destiny that history had appointed for it. Mazzini contended that only by violent revolution could Italy be freed and unified and that the struggle itself would have a purifying effect on Italians. Mazzini's goal was a




Figure 5. Italy after the Congress of Vienna, 1815

unitary state—eliminating the regionalism that had divided Italians throughout their history—under a republican government with its capital in Rome. From exile he and his followers organized expeditions and conspiracies that touched every part of Italy.

The shock wave of the Paris revolution in 1848 was quickly felt in Italy, sparking rebellions in Lombardy and driving Pope Pius IX from Rome, where Mazzini set up a short-lived republic. Piedmont, joined by other Italian states, took advantage of political unrest in Austria to invade Lombardy, but the campaign—referred to as the First War of Independence—ended in their decisive defeat. Mazzini's revolutionary government in Rome fled before the French troops dispatched by Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III), newly elected president of the Second Republic in France. A permanent garrison was left behind to guard the pope. In its long-range effects, however, the most significant event in Italy in 1848 was the promulgation of a liberal constitution in Piedmont, which transformed the state into a limited monarchy with a strong parliamentary government.

Piedmont was a relatively old state that had been kept outside the mainstream of Italian political development. Traditionally oriented toward France and the only Italian state with a military establishment of any size, Piedmont was set apart by its independence from foreign control or entanglements with foreign dynasties. Despite its setback in the brief war against Austria, Piedmont was recognized after 1848 as the only Italian state capable of giving concerted leadership to the Risorgimento.

Cavour, prime minister of Piedmont, set himself the task of building an efficiently functioning parliamentary government. His territorial aims were limited to creating an enlarged kingdom in northern Italy under the House of Savoy. Conspiring with Napoleon III, Cavour's government entered into a secret agreement guaranteeing French assistance in taking Lombardy-Venetia. Piedmont's rejection of an Austrian ultimatum provided the pretext for an invasion of Lombardy in 1859. Austrian forces were defeated, but the cost of the fighting was greater than Napoleon III had bargained for, and the Piedmontese were forced to accept a peace less advantageous than Cavour had been promised. Under the provisions of the treaty of Villafranca, negotiated by the French and Austrians, Lombardy was surrendered to France, which re-ceded it to Piedmont in return for Savoy and Nice; Venetia remained in Austrian hands; and, more humiliating, a federation of northern Italian states, with Habsburg interests intact, was proposed in place of the unified kingdom envisioned by Cavour.

The war with Austria had, however, stirred successful rebellions in the satellite states and in Romagna (in the Papal States), from which appeals came for union with Piedmont. Commissioners were dispatched to hold these areas for King Victor Emmanuel II and, disre-

garding the peace treaty, Cavour called for plebiscites to approve the annexation of each region into a unitary state. At that point he braked the momentum of the Risorgimento, and Mazzini condemned Cavour as a traitor for not moving to annex Rome and Naples. It was Garibaldi, a follower of Mazzini, who forced Cavour's hand and brought the south into the Kingdom of Italy.

Garibaldi launched his redshirted "Thousand" on a triumphal procession through Sicily and Naples, deposed the Bourbon monarchy, and proclaimed a dictatorship in the name of Victor Emmanuel II. His conquest was as rapid as it was complete, and Garibaldi turned his attention to Rome. Cavour feared the international repercussions of an assault on Rome, defended by its French garrison; and a Piedmontese army, the king at its head, was sent to block Garibaldi's advance. The two forces confronted one another south of Rome, and in a dramatic gesture, typical of the man, Garibaldi turned over Naples and Sicily to Victor Emmanuel II. Venetia was acquired in 1866 after a third war with Austria. Only Rome remained outside a united Italy (see fig. 6).

Cavour called a national Parliament in 1861 to proclaim Victor Emmanuel II king of Italy. The Piedmontese constitution, providing for representative institutions, became the basic law of the new kingdom. The euphoria of unification soon wore thin and was replaced by misgivings, especially pronounced in the south, about Piedmontese influence in the national government—a highly centralized administration distant from the people—and its lack of sympathy for local institutions. Each region had its own history, unique culture, and social and economic structures, and there was no tradition of practical cooperation among them. Only Piedmont was experienced in parliamentary government. Mazzini's followers complained that political unification had not been accompanied by social revolution, something Cavour had not intended it should. Catholics protested the seizure of the Papal States and the confiscation of church property by the new anticlerical government. Italy was united, but the Italians were not, and Cavour died in 1862 leaving his successors with the problem of making a nation out of the new kingdom.

KINGDOM OF ITALY

The Roman Question, that is, the settlement of relations between the Italian state and the Catholic church after the seizure of Rome in 1870, remained the most vexatious and seemingly insoluble problem confronting Italian governments for almost sixty years. Pope Pius IX refused to consider Cavour's proposal in 1860 for "a free church in a free state," which was intended to guarantee the ecclesiastical freedom of the Italian church, uninhibited by government intervention, in return for the renunciation of the pope's temporal claims to Rome.




Figure 6. The Unification of Italy

Pius IX noted that Cavour's words contrasted markedly with his record of anticlerical legislation in Piedmont but, more important, he adamantly stood by the position that papal sovereignty in Rome was essential for carrying out the spiritual mission of the church.

Agitation mounted—especially from Mazzini's republicans looking to discredit the Savoy monarchy—for armed intervention in Rome. When the French garrison was withdrawn in 1870, Italian troops occupied the city. A plebiscite confirmed its annexation, and the next year the Italian capital was transferred to Rome. Still hoping for an equitable accommodation with the papacy, Parliament enacted the Law of Guarantees in 1871, which would establish the Vatican as an independent papal territory within the city of Rome and accord the pope

the dignity of a sovereign. Pius IX rejected the offer out of hand, to the disappointment of many Catholics, and proclaimed himself the "prisoner of the Vatican." As far as the Italian government was concerned, the law stood in force awaiting the pope's agreement. For his part Pius IX refused to recognize the legality of the Italian state, excommunicated King Victor Emmanuel II, and condemned the occupation of Rome as an aggressive act, appealing to foreign powers to restore the city to the papacy. In retaliation the Italian government sharply restricted the civil rights of the clergy.

The impasse between the pope and the state created a crisis of conscience for Italian Catholics who wanted to reconcile their intense devotion to the church with their natural love for their country, their dilemma made even more difficult by the pope's prohibition of Catholics' voting in national elections or participating in national politics as being *non expedit* (inexpedient). Rather than challenge the anticlericalism of the liberals on their own ground—in Parliament—the church chose instead to organize the Catholic masses socially and economically outside the political system through church-sponsored unions and cooperatives. The government was thereby virtually left to the anticlericals; potential Catholic leadership was cut off from the political life of the nation.

The Italian Parliament was composed of the appointed Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, elected by a restricted electorate (about 300,000 voters in 1870 or one in every seventy Italians). Early governments were dominated by Piedmontese politicians. The party structure was loose and undisciplined. The right, based on Cavour's liberal coalition, stood for national stability and drawing the parts of the country closer together through a highly centralized state administration. The left, composed of ex-republicans and Mazzini's followers, advocated social reform and a more democratic electorate. With the passing of Cavour's political generation in the 1870s, the quality of leadership in Parliament appeared to diminish. After 1876 the left continually maintained a parliamentary majority, but so many factions within it—usually brought together by a single personality—vied for recognition that clearly defined party government, necessary for rigorous parliamentary life, was impossible.

What the Italians substituted for party government was *trasformismo*, defined as "making it worthwhile for a sufficient number of members [of Parliament] to vote with the government" by using various forms of bribery and political brokering. Seats in the cabinet were allocated to factional or regional leaders, and as a result governments were formed whose members were so divided in outlook that coherent programs could seldom be formulated and, with all good intentions on the part of the government, reform measures were regularly stymied. Only the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI), organized in 1892, offered a clearcut program of social and po-

litical reform, and by 1900 it controlled 25 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The potential strength of the PSI, however, was sapped by ideological divisions within the party. The mounting violence in public life—capped by the assassination of King Humbert I by an anarchist in 1900 and the spectacular growth of socialism—prompted a rapprochement between the ruling Liberals under the reformist prime minister Giovanni Giolitti and the Catholics, who were gradually integrated into political life after the relaxation of the *non expedit* by Pope Pius X in 1904. Giolitti's government introduced universal male suffrage in 1912, raising the number of eligible voters from 3.3 to 8.6 million.

Italy, an economically underdeveloped country, was late in entering Europe's scramble for overseas possessions, but Prime Minister Francesco Crispi pursued a determined expansionist policy in the 1880s and 1890s to ensure Italy's place among the European colonial powers. Crispi was not contented with the two strips of desert—in Eritrea and Somalia—on the Horn of Africa, acquired in 1889; but an attempt to penetrate Ethiopia in 1896 was ended by the military disaster at Adowa. Imperialism remained an aspect of Italy's foreign policy, and Italy's colonial holdings increased with the occupation of Libya and the Dodecanese during the war with Turkey (1911-12). The Italians also established spheres of interest in the Balkans and Asia Minor through the construction of port facilities and railroads and the exploitation of resources. Throughout the early colonial experience Italy's interests were concerned primarily with economic rather than political expansion.

Italy adhered to the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria in 1882, but after 1900 Italian foreign policy tended toward closer ties with France and Great Britain. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914 Italy declared its neutrality, explaining that under the Triple Alliance its commitments were solely defensive in nature. Whereas the Giolitti government opposed entry into the war, public opinion, urged on by the popular press, democratic sentiment, and irredentists who saw the war as an opportunity to complete the *Risorgimento*, prevailed. Under the terms of the secret London Pact Italy was promised the Italian-speaking areas still held by Austria as well as colonial concessions. Accordingly in May 1915 Italy declared war on Austria. Psychologically Italy was conditioned for war, but the Italian armed forces were woefully unprepared.

By the end of the war Italy had mobilized more than 5 million men, and more than 600,000 had been killed. But Italy's case was poorly presented at the Versailles Conference and its bargaining position compromised by unstable conditions at home. Under the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919, Austria surrendered Istria, Zara in Dalmatia, Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol), and—of strategic importance—control of the Brenner Pass. However, the extravagant

offers made in the London Pact were held to be contrary to the spirit of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the United States refused to support further Italian territorial claims.

MUSSOLINI

For many Italians it seemed that the gains won on the battlefield at such great cost had been thrown away at the peace table, and a sense of frustration and disillusionment—and of betrayal—permeated the country in the years immediately after the war. Italy was saddled with an enormous war debt. Inflation and shortages of basic goods triggered strikes that paralyzed large segments of the economy. Demobilized troops swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Profiteering, often involving public officials, took its toll on public confidence in the government. Socialist gains in local elections inspired fears of expropriation—especially among small landholders—and outbreaks of violence and counterviolence. The government admitted its inability to maintain public order, and amnesties granted to striking workers confirmed the middle class in its belief that the parliamentary government was not only corrupt but weak.

This was the atmosphere that spawned Benito Mussolini's fascist movement, which for nearly one-quarter of a century demeaned and demoralized Italy's national life. Mussolini had always been a political maverick. Imprisoned and exiled for his political activities, the schoolteacher-turned-journalist from Romagna had begun his activist career as a pacifist and anarchist, later joining the militant wing of the PSI—at one time being the editor of the party's official newspaper. Mussolini broke with the party on the issue of entry into World War I and abandoned Marxism for nationalism.

Mussolini was a manipulative orator; his showmanship was not mere buffoonery but struck a responsive chord in his listeners. He had attracted a personal following as early as 1917. In 1919 he assembled the paramilitary Combat Groups (Fasci di Combattimento—see Glossary), called the Blackshirts, from among army veterans and youths, modeled after the *arditi* (commandos), the shock troops of the Italian army. Organized in more than 2,000 squads, the Blackshirts were used as strikebreakers (subsidized by industrialists for the purpose), attacked Socialists and Communists, whom they claimed the government was too timid to deal with, terrorized left-wing town governments, and set up local dictatorships while the police and the army looked on—often in sympathy. Mussolini profited from the anxieties of the middle class—their businesses threatened and their savings wiped out by inflation—and from the smallholders' fears of expropriation by the Socialists.

In 1921 Mussolini, seeking a broader following than among the fascist squads, formed a parliamentary party, the National Fascist Party

(Partito Nazionale Fascista), which captured thirty-five seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The party, running on a bloc list with Giolitti's Liberals, was admitted to the coalition government. The party program called in vague terms for social reform, financial stability, assertion of Italy's prestige abroad, and order at home. The Fascists considered themselves a revolutionary party in opposition to nineteenth-century liberalism, middle-class humanistic values, and capitalism, but Mussolini advanced no guiding ideology. Fascism, Mussolini insisted, represented a mood in the country, not ideas, and he wrote, "Fascism . . . was a form of a need for action, and in itself was action."

Despite their relatively minor representation in Parliament, no government could survive without the support of the National Fascist Party, and in October 1922 Mussolini was summoned by Victor Emmanuel III to form a government as prime minister. The much-heralded March on Rome by 300,000 armed Fascists, usually credited with bringing Mussolini to power by a coup, was in fact the result rather than the cause of his appointment to office, a brilliant bluff intended to impress the nation—and Europe—with the strength and determination of his following. Mussolini governed constitutionally, heading a national government comprising the Fascists, some Social Democrats, Liberals, and members of the Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, known as Popolari).

The Popolari were a center-left reformist group founded in 1919 by a Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo. Formation of the party marked the entry of an organized, mass-based Catholic party into parliamentary politics, although without the approval of the Italian hierarchy or the Vatican. In 1919 Sturzo's party won 101 seats in Parliament, second in strength only to the PSI. Mussolini considered the Popolari, parent party to the postwar Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC), the toughest obstacle in his rise to power. The Popolari withdrew their support from the Mussolini government in 1923.

The Fascists, under a revised electoral law, polled two-thirds of the votes cast in the 1924 elections. Seemingly secure in his parliamentary majority, Mussolini's confidence was shaken—and his regime endangered—by the public reaction to the murder of a socialist politician, Giacomo Matteotti, by fascist toughs. The opposition withdrew from the Chamber of Deputies in protest. Without resistance Mussolini assumed dictatorial powers in January 1925, ruling thereafter by decree, and replacing elected local government officials with fascist operatives. Although a rump chamber of deputies continued to sit, advisory functions passed to a party organ, the Fascist Grand Council, which Mussolini integrated into the state apparatus.

Controlling all the organs of government, Mussolini set about constructing a totalitarian state in Italy that would dominate every aspect of national life. Il Duce, as Mussolini was styled, proclaimed the doc-

trine of "everything within the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state," including professional and labor associations, youth groups, and sports organizations. Political parties—other than the Fascists—were suppressed. The press and court system were cowed. Strikes were made illegal and, although the free trade unions were not abolished, they were gradually throttled. Mussolini was less successful in imposing economic control, and the corporate state, which remained part of the myth of the fascist regime, was never more than its facade. In some respects the Italian character, especially its spirit of individualism, mitigated the worst effects of Mussolini's totalitarianism, which was, as a critic noted, "a tyranny tempered by the complete disobedience of all laws." In addition totalitarianism in the strictest sense was not possible where an independent church, claiming the spiritual allegiance of a large part of the population, existed. Mussolini's political background was anticlerical, but he understood the importance of the church to Italian life and realized that he could not expect to consolidate political support behind the regime until an accommodation was made with the Vatican—which had not recognized the legality of the Italian state.

The Lateran Pacts of 1929 consisted of a treaty between Italy and the Holy See and concordat regulating relations between the Italian state and the Catholic church. The treaty created the independent state of Vatican City and recognized the sovereignty of the pope there. In the concordat the church was assured of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, and canon law was recognized as superseding the civil code in such areas as marriage. The church was restored to its role in education and allowed unencumbered operation of its press and communication facilities. The clergy were prohibited from membership in political organizations. The solution of the Roman Question, which had vexed Italian politicians since 1860, marked the peak of Mussolini's political leadership and has been considered by some observers the singular positive achievement of an otherwise execrable regime. The provisions of the Lateran Pacts were included in the 1948 Constitution.

Imperialism was always a facet of fascism but was not explicit until 1935. The need to provide space for Italian emigration was emphasized by the occupation of Ethiopia in the 1935-36 period. The action might well have been passed over except for Ethiopia's protest in the League of Nations, but to the league's condemnation Italy responded that it had done no more in Africa than other powers had done earlier. France and Great Britain were unwilling to risk war for the sake of Ethiopia, but league members agreed to impose economic sanctions on Italy. The sanctions were halfheartedly enforced and subsequently withdrawn. They provoked bitterness in Italy, especially against Great Britain, and rallied theretofore lukewarm Italians to Mussolini. The sanctions also spurred the drive for economic self-

sufficiency, an uneconomic project better suited to propaganda than to feeding the Italian people. Cut off from other sources, Italy relied on Germany as a supplier of raw materials and was drawn within its political orbit.

Mussolini was frankly impressed by German efficiency, overlooking outstanding conflicts of interests in Austria and the Balkans that might otherwise have kept the two dictators at odds. In 1936 Mussolini agreed to the Rome-Berlin Axis, pledging cooperation in central Europe. The next year Italy joined with Germany and Japan in the Anticomintern Pact, directed against the Soviet Union. By the time that Italy had formalized its military ties with Germany in the so-called Pact of Steel in 1939, Mussolini had so identified his country's interests with those of Hitler that Italy had become a virtual German satellite.

Italy aided Franco's forces during the 1936-39 Spanish civil war, contributing supplies, naval and air support, and more than 50,000 men. Mussolini participated at Munich in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938, but his foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, had tried to dissuade Germany from attacking Poland. Cut off from advanced notice of its ally's plans, Mussolini's government was acutely embarrassed by the Soviet Pact in 1939 that opened the door for invasion of Poland. Mussolini had pompously bragged about the "8 million bayonets" at his disposal but, as was the case so often during his regime, propaganda had taken the place of actual preparation, and Italy was no more ready for a major war than it had been in 1915. Confident of German strength, Mussolini believed that the war would be short and remarked that it would be humiliating "to sit with our hands folded while others write history." Italy attacked France after the issue of the Battle of France was already decided; nevertheless the French rallied to halt the Italian invasion. Later in 1940 Italy launched an unprovoked invasion of Greece—a fiasco, requiring German intervention to rescue an Italian army fought to a standstill by the Greeks. After a disastrous campaign in Africa, during which entire units surrendered to the Allies en masse, Mussolini squandered another army in the Soviet Union.

The Allies were greeted as liberators when they landed in Sicily in July 1943. In what amounted to a palace coup in Rome the Fascist Grand Council, including Ciano, forced the resignation of the ailing and beaten Mussolini and returned the power of state to Victor Emmanuel III. He had the former dictator arrested and called on Marshal Pietro Badoglio to become prime minister. Badoglio formed an interim government that dissolved the National Fascist Party and granted amnesty to political prisoners. Although pledging to continue the war, Badoglio entered into negotiations with the Allies for an armistice, concluded in September to coincide with Allied landings on the mainland. Hopes for a quick occupation of Rome were disappointed, however, and the king and Badoglio moved the government to Brindisi

out of German reach. The royal government declared war on Germany in October, but the disintegrating Italian army had been left without a commander, and the Germans were in control of most of the country away from the Allied beachheads. A veteran politician, Ivanoe Bonomi, was called on to form a government of national unity that included both Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI) and the DC leader, Alcide De Gasperi. The new democratic government derived its authority from the all-party Committee of National Liberation, which reorganized local government in liberated areas and directed Italian resistance in occupied regions.

Rescued by German commandos, Mussolini set up a rival government—the Italian Social Republic—under Hitler's patronage in the German-occupied region with headquarters at Salò. Mussolini still commanded some support and, at a National Fascist Party congress in Verona in November 1943, called for a return to the revolutionary "fascism of the first hour." The more fanatical fascist elements were in control at Salò, eager to emulate Nazis in every way. Ciano and others who were held responsible for Mussolini's ouster were executed. The National Racial Code, unpopular in a country where anti-Semitism was virtually unknown when the code was enacted in 1938 to impress the Nazis, was now enforced in the occupied area with terrible thoroughness. At least 10,000 Italian Jews, part of a well-established, assimilated community, perished in Nazi death camps.

The German army put up stiff resistance to the Allied advance in Italy. Having relatively few troops to spare, the Germans took advantage of the terrain and Allied indecisiveness, stabilizing the battlefield along the Gustav Line during the 1943-44 winter. Rome was liberated in June 1944 after the breakthrough at Cassino in May. A second German defense line to the north, the Gothic Line, held until the last weeks of the war (see fig. 7).

Partisan units of the Italian Liberation Corps carried on a costly but effective resistance campaign against the Germans in the north, and units of a reconstituted Italian army subsequently contributed to the Allied war effort. Mussolini, protesting at the end his betrayal by the Nazis and berating the Italians as a "race of sheep," made a dash for Switzerland in the last days of the war but was captured by partisans and executed.

Two years of shelling and bombing and of reprisals by the Germans and Fascists had taken a heavy toll in Italy. The economy was disrupted, large parts of the country were in ruins, and hundreds of thousands were left homeless.

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Although the royal government ended World War II as a cobelligerent with the Allies, Italy was treated as defeated power when the




Figure 7. Italy in World War II

peace settlements were concluded. Italy was deprived of its colonial possessions; it lost Istria, Zara, and islands in the Adriatic to Yugoslavia and was obliged to recognize Trieste's status as a free territory under Allied supervision. The size of the Italian armed forces was limited, and the Italian government was charged with the payment of reparations amounting to approximately US\$400 million.

Italian concerns were concentrated, however, on such domestic questions as the rebuilding of a shattered nation, reconstructing the country's economy, and establishing a democratic government. A republican form of government was approved by referendum (12.7 million voters for a republic, 10.7 million opposed) in June 1946. At the same time a constituent assembly was selected in the first elections in Italian history held on the basis of universal suffrage. After

months of debate the assembly agreed on the draft of a constitution, finally approved in December 1947. Under the new republican Constitution the government was responsible to a popularly elected Parliament consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The president of the republic, elected by Parliament rather than by popular vote, was head of state with responsibility for nominating the prime minister.

The first parliamentary elections under the new Constitution, held in 1948, gave a clear majority (53 percent of the vote and 305 of 574 seats in the Chamber of Deputies) to De Gasperi's DC. De Gasperi and his party had an unimpeachable record of opposition to fascism. Although its contacts with the church were obvious, De Gasperi insisted that the DC was a secular party. He formed a broad coalition government in collaboration with the moderate Social Democrats, the reformist Republicans, the conservative Liberals—small parties that nonetheless had influential constituencies (see ch. 11). The new government put forward a program calling for land reform, worker participation in management, and devolution of power to the regions. De Gasperi and his foreign minister, Carlo Sforza, adopted a pro-Western and uncompromisingly anticommunist foreign policy. Italy sealed its commitment to the Western alliance by joining NATO in 1949 and subsequently made an equally strong commitment to European integration. Italy became a member of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Western European Union and was signatory to the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market) in 1956. The question of Trieste, a constant source of bitterness, was answered temporarily when it was returned to Italian control in 1954. Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia improved, but final resolution of the Trieste problem did not come until November 1975 when both countries formally accepted the status quo.

When De Gasperi retired from politics in 1953, he had taken his place as one of Europe's most remarkable public figures in the twentieth century. As prime minister he had laid the foundation for the reconstruction of the Italian state, nurtured the growth of Italian democracy, and set the stage for economic growth in an atmosphere of freedom. He had also led his country in a few years to a new position of respect in the community of nations.

The DC was consistently Italy's largest votegetter and led every Italian government after 1946. It was a broadly based mass party that tolerated and survived greater divergences of opinion within its own ranks than it did with parties that had joined it in forming coalitions or had given it tactical support in Parliament. Described as representing a microcosm of Italian political life, the DC attempted to appeal to all segments of the population, but the catalyst that kept so heterogeneous a party together was its anticommunism. Generally DC

membership consisted of three wings. The centrists, of whom De Gasperi was the most typical representative, were the nondoctrinaire heirs of Sturzo's progressive Popolari and attracted more pragmatic younger politicians. The right included a melange of monarchists, clerical conservatives, traditionalists suspicious of capitalism, and business interests having an affinity for the conservative economic policies of anticlerical Liberals. Many members of the party's left wing were virtually indistinguishable from Socialists in their views on social and economic issues and on state ownership. One of their number, Giovanni Gronchi, later president of the republic, plugged for a broader coalition to include the PSI. Amintore Fanfani, four times prime minister, was less enamored of a socialist alliance but advanced social policies animated by the teachings of the papal encyclicals. The use of the stock terms *left*, *right*, and *center* did more to mislead the observer than to define the trends active within the party.

Contacts between the church and the DC were close although unofficial in nature. The clergy was banned by the concordat from membership in political organizations, but the prohibition never implied that the church was obliged to absent itself from political debate or that individual members of the clergy could not make their political opinions known. At the end of the war—when the monarchy and political institutions in general were discredited—the church was the one traditional and familiar feature of Italian life that could still command the respect of a large number of Italians. Anticlericalism went out of fashion for a time in the immediate postwar years. The activist Catholic Action movement resumed a role in political education and labor organization denied it under fascism. The republican Constitution reaffirmed that the state and the church were independent and sovereign in their respective spheres of action, but it also recognized that, when the state felt the need to share officially in activities of a religious nature, it would do so through the Catholic church; this did not imply, however, that Catholicism was the state religion in Italy.

While denying formal links with the church, the DC nonetheless expressed its gratitude for assistance given by the hierarchy and clergy—as well as by the Vatican—by sometimes supporting politically unpopular measures that were of particular interest to the church and opposing others to which the church had strong objections. Some critics argued that the church stood above the law of the land. Others pointed out, however, that it was an independent entity functioning within but not of the state—as would have been the case if it were a state church. Still others maintained that as Italy's single most important institution—and the institution with which the largest body of Italians could identify—the church was justified in taking stands on political and social issues, even in those areas where the line separating spiritual from political interests was hazy. Among the church's more controversial excursions into political activity was its use of the threat

of excommunication against Catholics known to support the PCI. Without naming a specific party a bishops' conference repeatedly urged Catholics to vote "in conformity with the principles of the Christian religion," and stressed the moral incompatibility of Christianity and Marxism.

The PCI emerged as postwar Italy's second strongest party. It boasted a well-disciplined, highly flexible organization that had contributed decisively to the wartime resistance movement and had cooperated in national governments after 1943. Following the example of its founder, Antonio Gramsci, the PCI had taken a conciliatory approach in its relations with the Catholic church and had adopted a determinedly anticlerical line only after the close identification of the church with the rival DC became apparent. While pledging support for pluralistic political institutions in Italy, the PCI adhered strictly to the Leninist principle of the process of democratic centralism (strict party discipline and binding rule from above). The PCI increased its share of the vote from 22.6 percent in 1953 to 34.4 percent in 1976 and made even more striking gains in local elections.

The PSI, led by the veteran politician Pietro Nenni, retained closed relations with the PCI, ran on a joint ticket with the Communists in 1948, and frequently collaborated with them in local elections. Nenni's common front with the PCI led to the breaking away of the moderate and anticommunist Social Democrats under Giuseppe Saragat in 1947. The breach was only temporarily mended in the 1960s. The continuing split in socialist ranks allowed the PCI greater scope in appealing for the support of left-wing voters.

The DC was never able to win a parliamentary majority after the 1948 elections. In the six general elections between 1953 and 1976 its share of the vote varied between 42.4 and 38.8 percent. Governments controlled by the DC in the 1950s and early 1960s were either minority one-party governments depending on the tactical support in Parliament of parties not represented in the cabinet or quadripartite coalition governments in which one or more of the DC's smaller allies—Social Democrats, Republicans, or Liberals—were represented in the cabinet, those not included agreeing to vote with the government in Parliament. The choice of coalition partners often depended on the influence at the time of a particular wing of the DC—the center and left preferring to work with the Social Democrats and Republicans, the right with the Liberals.

The Italian political scene was disturbed in 1953 by the sudden growth in voting power of the neofascist Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano—MSI). In the general elections held that year they polled 1.5 million votes. As a matter of principle the DC refused to cooperate with them officially, but on at least two occasions—during the governments of Adone Zoli (1957-58) and Fernando Tambroni (1960)—their tactical support in Parliament was accepted

unofficially to ensure the life of the government. Although the MSI tried to project a moderate image, its youth wing was prone to violence. The MSI merged with monarchist groups in 1972 to form the National Right (Destra Nazionale) and won fifty-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Prodded by demands for action on social reforms, in the early 1960s the DC moved to create a new political equilibrium by inviting PSI participation in a coalition government. The opening to the left (*apertura a sinistra*) was encouraged by President Gronchi, stepping out of the supposedly nonpartisan role of his office, and also by the fresh outlook of the papacy during the pontificate of the Pope John XXIII. Fanfani formed a government that included the PSI, Social Democrats, and Republicans in 1962, and Nenni served, as he would in subsequent center-left coalitions, as deputy prime minister. Cooperation was broadened during the three governments of Aldo Moro (1963-68), and the alliance was continued by Mariano Rumor and Emilio Colombo (1968-72). A concerted, albeit largely unsuccessful, effort at social and tax reform and modernizing the bureaucracy was sparked by PSI members of the government. In foreign affairs the coalition reaffirmed Italy's adherence to the Western alliance, of which the PSI had previously been critical.

Starting from a much lower industrial base than that of Germany, Italy's economic recovery between 1950 and 1964—the so-called economic miracle—was the most striking in Europe, its growth rate averaging almost 6 percent annually during the period. After the war Italy was impoverished, its economic survival dependent almost entirely on United States grant aid, which through the Marshall Plan and other assistance programs had totaled about US\$2.8 billion by the end of 1952. De Gasperi's financial policies had slowed inflation by 1950 and left the lira in a relatively stable position. Without raw material resources, Italian industry depended on its ability to provide high-quality products at competitive prices. There was extensive participation by the public sector in industrial development. As national income increased, living standards climbed to levels unparalleled in the Italian experience, but many Italians did not share in these gains. Unemployment, which remained at about 2 million even during peak years of expansion, was endemic in many areas, especially in the south. The Development Fund for the South (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) promoted agricultural improvement and industrialization in the south, but large-scale internal migration to the prosperous north continued and caused severe social problems (see ch. 9). Italy's urban population tripled in the twenty years after the war; cities were not prepared to receive the influx nor were the migrants receptive to urbanization.

Italy's economic recession after 1964 was blamed by the DC right wing and the Liberals on the policies of the center-left coalition.

Increased production costs, mainly brought about by the higher price of labor, made Italian products less competitive abroad. Inflation, increasing at a rate among the highest in Europe, cut into the purchasing potential of consumers and fueled discontent. Social programs, bogged down in a notoriously labyrinthine bureaucracy, had not kept pace with economic development or with public expectations for health care, housing, and education. Strikes, student unrest, and extremist activity increased in 1969, accompanied by an alarming resurgence of political violence and a steep rise in the crime rate.

A bill permitting civil divorce, perhaps Italy's most controversial piece of legislation since the advent of the republic, was enacted into law at the end of 1970 despite opposition from the DC and the vigorous objections of the church. Public opinion remained sharply divided on the issue after passage, however, and questions were raised regarding the constitutionality of a measure that appeared to some authorities to run counter to the provisions of the concordat. Opponents of the legislation successfully petitioned to have it submitted to a referendum in 1974, in which Italian voters elected by a six-to-four margin to retain the divorce law. The decisive results of the referendum were interpreted as a serious political setback for the DC, which had campaigned for repeal. Agitation for the legalization of abortion continued to be a feature of public debate in 1976. Observers have pointed to defections from the DC and popular defiance of the church on these issues as additional indications of the increasing secularization of Italian life.

* * *

The most accessible introductory survey remains the revised edition of *A Short History of Italy*, edited by Harry Hearder and Daniel P. Waley. Denis Mack Smith's *Italy: A Modern History*, the work of an outstanding scholar, is the most reliable and readable guide to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. *A History of Modern Italy* by Shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino is a documentary history with commentary of the same period. A useful analysis of contemporary history is found in Mueiel Grindrod's *Italy in the Praeger Nations of the Modern World Series*. Daniel Waley's *The Italian City-Republics* is a delightfully written, well-illustrated treatment of a crucial aspect of Italian historical development. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 3

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Geographically the country is diverse; its mountainous terrain and differences in physical environment were factors delaying unification in the nineteenth century. In the post-World War II era the same factors have made it difficult for the less developed parts of the country to compete with the more prosperous ones.

The two main geographic areas, which differ in climate, natural resources, and historical ties with other countries, are continental and Mediterranean Italy (see fig. 8). Continental Italy is divided into the Alps and the North Italian Plain, and Mediterranean Italy is composed of the peninsula and the islands.

The major external influences on continental Italy have been from across the Alps, which have never barred determined invaders. Before the development of modern transportation, however, the northern range of the Apennines discouraged contacts from the south (see fig. 9). Continental Italy's climate, influenced by the distant Atlantic Ocean, is characterized by ample precipitation throughout the year; the area has the lion's share of the best agricultural land in the country. In addition the country's most productive industrial areas are found there.

For thousands of years Mediterranean Italy had its major contacts with civilizations on the shores of that sea and was subject to frequent raids by pirates. It is predominantly mountainous, has hot, dry summers and, as a result of thousands of years of land abuse, has few forests, poor soil, and recurrent floods.


In the Mezzogiorno, comprising the peninsula south of a line from Gaeta to Ascoli plus Sicily and Sardinia, a large, impoverished population presses on very limited natural resources. Migration to other countries and to the industrial areas of continental Italy has relieved such pressures, but the loss of ambitious young men has contributed to the backwardness of the area.

A century ago Italian leaders pressed for the construction of railroads to break down the isolation and backwardness of the Mezzogiorno. Since 1950 the major domestic goal has been to accelerate industrial and agricultural development in the south.



Figure 8. Geographic Divisions

The country is poorly provided with natural resources, especially minerals, and it must import a large portion of the fuels, iron ore, and bauxite needed by industry. The mountainous terrain and various climatic difficulties also hinder agricultural activities—only on the North Italian Plain and on a few lowlands elsewhere are there areas suitable for mechanized cultivation. These handicaps made Italy's recovery from wartime devastation and its subsequent industrialization all the more remarkable.



Source: Based on information from *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1974, Rome.

Figure 9. Italy in Relief

AREA AND BOUNDARIES

Italy has land borders 1,058 miles long, with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. From the Alps it extends 10° latitude southward into the Mediterranean and includes the two largest islands in the sea—Sicily and Sardinia. There are two minute sovereign states, Vatican City and San Marino, within the total area of 116,381 square miles.

The 3,015 miles of coastline are bordered by the Adriatic Sea to the east, the Ionian Sea to the south, and the Tyrrhenian and Ligurian seas to the west. Italy claims twelve nautical miles as its territorial limit. After World War II there were disputes with Austria and Yugoslavia over land borders, but larger mutual interests led to their settlement.

Borders with France and Switzerland were established in the nineteenth Century and follow the main Alpine watershed. About 100,000 people in Valle d'Aosta region speak French, and they enjoy local autonomy. Separatism is not an issue.

After World War I Italy persuaded the victorious powers that its need for a militarily defensible border extending northward to the Brenner Pass justified inclusion within its borders of the area around Bolzano (formerly Austrian South Tirol), which had a German-speaking population. Italy retained this area including the Brenner Pass after World War II as well, although it had to pledge to provide autonomy to the German-speaking population (see ch. 4). The Austrian minority was dissatisfied with the manner in which the Italian government carried out the pledge, and in the late 1950s the Austrian government championed the minority cause. Numerous terrorist incidents perpetrated by extremists in the 1960s resulted in forty-seven deaths. In 1969 Austria and Italy negotiated an agreement on the treatment of the minority, and the two countries have been on good terms since then.

Italy's border with Yugoslavia was established by the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty and by later negotiations between the two countries concerning ownership of Trieste and surrounding territories. By the terms of the 1947 treaty Italy ceded to Yugoslavia the ports of Fiume and Zara (Yugoslav—Rijeka and Zadar respectively), both located on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia; the Adriatic islands of Cherso and Lagosta (Yugoslav—Cres and Lastovo); and most of the Istrian Peninsula.

The 1947 treaty also provided for the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste, an area of slightly more than 300 square miles that included the port of Trieste and the surrounding territory. The freedom of the free territory was to be guaranteed by the United Nations (UN). The free territory was divided into two zones; Zone A, consisting of about eighty-five square miles including the city, was to be administered by the military forces of the United Kingdom and the United States; Zone B (about 217 square miles) was to be administered by Yugoslavia. The free territory never became a viable entity, and until 1954 the area remained a matter of dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia. In 1954, through direct negotiations, the two principals agreed that Zone A would henceforth be administered by Italy and that Zone B would continue under Yugoslav control.

Both the post-World War I boundary and the one established after World War II cut Trieste from its hinterland and made its prosperity dependent on the status of relations with Yugoslavia and other countries. Between the two world wars Trieste had stagnated, and after World War II Tito's hostility toward Italy reduced the port's use by neighboring countries. Since 1954 Italy and Yugoslavia have been on better terms, and Trieste's selection as the terminus for a high-capacity crude oil pipeline extending to the Danube at Ingolstadt, in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), contributed to increased maritime traffic in the port. Although the 1954 agreement proved to be a workable replacement for the free territory, it was considered a temporary solution to the problem. Not until 1975 did the two countries formalize the agreement and accept the status quo.

The major administrative and political division is the region (see ch. 10). The twenty regions, which vary greatly in size and population, were established by the 1948 Constitution and remained the same in name and number in 1976. Although regional boundaries sometimes coincide with geographical ones, the regions are based primarily on traditional associations, many of which go back to the Roman era (see fig. 1). The next divisions are the ninety-four provinces, each named after its major city or town.

TOPOGRAPHY

Continental Italy

The Alps

The borders with France, Switzerland, and Austria follow the main Alpine watershed, which separates streams flowing into the Rhone, Rhine, and Danube rivers from those flowing into the Adriatic Sea. The Alps may be grouped into western, central, and eastern ranges. The western Alps begin a short distance west of Genoa at Cadibona Pass near Savona and sweep in a great arc to Lake Maggiore. They include fifty peaks of over 10,000 feet. Mont Blanc on the French border reaches 15,782 feet, and the highest peak entirely within Italy, Gran Paradiso, is 13,323 feet. The western Alps often resemble cliffs rather than slopes, and in some places less than fifteen miles separate the plain from the 9,000-foot peaks.

The central Alps, extending from Lake Maggiore to the Adige River, also have over fifty peaks of more than 10,000 feet, but the highest are less than 13,000 feet. In contrast with the western range, the central Alps tend to have valleys between the mountain ranges, making communications easier. In earlier geologic times glaciers gouged some valleys, creating lakes; other valleys were filled in, making them more suitable in modern times for hydroelectric sites. The central Alps cover a larger area than the western Alps, collect more precipitation, and have larger glaciers.

The eastern Alps run from the Adige River to the Tarvis Pass on the Yugoslavian border. In the eastern Alps the valleys tend to be wider and the terrain less steep. One range in the eastern Alps, the picturesque Dolomites, has only eighteen peaks over 10,000 feet; east of the Dolomites all peaks are less than 10,000 feet.

The difficulty of communication in the Alps has helped perpetuate local dialects and distinctive customs. The Alpine region has always felt strong influences from neighboring countries. Moreover in the nineteenth century Napoleon and later the Austro-Hungarian rulers built roads through the Alpine passes to ensure tighter control of their Italian domains.

The North Italian Plain

This lowland is about 200 miles long and varies in width from about fifty to 150 miles. It is drained by the Po and several other important rivers; it is sheltered on the north and west by the Alps and on the south by the Apennines. Toward the east it reaches the sea along a low-lying, highly irregular coast of marshes, lagoons, and deltas.

The North Italian Plain has fertile soils and abundant and regular supplies of water. For centuries its inhabitants have worked energetically and skillfully to overcome adverse natural factors—draining marshes, preventing floods, and building irrigation canals. The largest area of irrigated farmland in Europe is found there, and much of the plain supports mechanized, diversified, and highly productive agriculture. The North Italian Plain also contains much of the country's modern industry, partly because of the relative ease of communication, its supply of natural gas (methane), and its access to hydroelectric power sources in the Alps.

Mediterranean Italy

The Peninsula

The Apennines cover most of the peninsula, except for the plain at the heel of the boot and a few other small plains. Unlike the Alps, which have consecutive ranges, the Apennines are made up of a highly irregular arrangement of chains and peaks. These are neither geologically uniform nor of equal age, and the peninsula's topography is a jumble of highlands, occasional broad valleys, and gorges. The difficulty of communications in such rough terrain has contributed to the preservation of cultural and linguistic differences and the impoverishment of much of the peninsula.

Taken as a whole the Apennines are older than the Alps and have weathered to gentler shapes. The highest peak, 9,560 feet, is Gran Sasso d'Italia in Abruzzi region.

The highest Apennine peaks are found near the Adriatic coast, which has a narrow plain and few natural harbors. The Tyrrhenian coast is more varied. At its northern and southern extremes the

mountains drop steeply to the sea, but elsewhere there is much variety in landforms, including plains of varying size. Some coastal areas and parts of the valleys of the Tiber and Arno rivers include good agricultural land. As a result of early volcanic activity the otherwise mountainous landscape has eighteen partially dried-up lake basins—large, flat-bottomed areas with terraced sides—most of which are near the valleys of the Arno and the Tiber.

The Islands

Sicily's Peloritani, Nebrodi, and Madonie ranges are geologically similar to the Apennines. The interior of the island is wild and barren, and the southern part is a dissected plateau that slopes gradually toward the sea. Around Catania in the east is a large, fertile alluvial plain, and smaller coastal plains extend from Syracuse south and west to Marsala.

Sardinia consists mostly of plateaus interspersed with mountain ranges. On the east coast mountains rise steeply from the sea; the lowlands, about 10 percent of the island's total area, are found mostly in the south and west. The sparse, impoverished population is supported by sheepherding and primitive agriculture, but light industry and tourism have been introduced.

SEISMIC AND VOLCANIC ACTIVITY

There are four active volcanoes as well as numerous hot springs and fissures where gases escape from the earth. All parts of the country are subject to earth tremors, and some parts have experienced earthquakes of varying severity. These phenomena are a reflection of Italy's youth in geological terms—the Alps were thrust up only during the Age of Mammals, perhaps 20 million years ago. Volcanic activity has contributed to the varied landscape and occasional fertile areas on the peninsula and on Sicily.

The active volcanoes are Etna on Sicily, Vesuvius near Naples, and the tiny Liparian islands of Stromboli and Vulcano off the northeast coast of Sicily. The activities characteristic of the volcanoes vary, but each can intensify and become dangerous to nearby inhabitants.

During the 1900s Italy has had three severe earthquakes that caused high casualties and extensive destruction. Moderately severe earthquakes tend to occur at intervals of from three to ten years. Eastern Sicily and certain parts of the southern peninsula are most vulnerable to such earthquakes. Moderately severe and less severe earthquakes also occur on the Ligurian coast, in the northern Apennines, and in the Alps. In May 1976 more than 700 people lost their lives in an earthquake near Udine in the Alps.

CLIMATE

Climatic factors strongly affect Italian life. Sunshine and low humidity draw visitors to resorts in the Alps and on the Italian Riviera and to tourist attractions in central and southern Italy. Ample precipitation and underground water supplies and a long, hot growing season account for the high agricultural productivity on the North Italian Plain, but farmers in the Mezzogiorno must cope with dry, blisteringly hot summers.

Continental Italy, exposed to polar air in winter and warm winds from the distant Atlantic Ocean in summer, has a wide range between winter and summer temperatures, and precipitation is well distributed throughout the year. In the Alps there are wide variations in temperature, depending on whether slopes are shaded or open to the sun. Some peaks remain snow covered all year.

The sub-Alpine lakes, such as Maggiore, Como, and Garda, are especially favored climatically because, having been deepened by ancient glacial action, they contain large quantities of water, which moderate air temperatures. Their shores are sheltered from the wind, and in sunny places fruits and olives can be grown.

The North Italian Plain is sheltered on three sides by mountains. It receives little precipitation in winter, although humidity is high, and below-freezing temperatures are frequent. Spring is warm and wet; in summer temperature and humidity are high, and storms are frequent; in autumn there are heavy rains.

Several parts of Italy have severe seasonal winds. On the Ligurian coast winter winds from the Alps, called *mistrals*, pose a real danger to ships, even in harbors. Around Trieste bitterly cold, dry winds from the Alps, called *boras*, blow so fiercely that some buildings have handrails for pedestrians to grasp. A third wind, the *sirocco*, blows from the Sahara. On the peninsula it causes humid, stifling weather; but in Sicily it retains its parching, Saharan character, and midnight temperatures of 95°F have been recorded. On Sicily the *sirocco* is accompanied by sustained high temperatures that cause severe crop damage and are hazardous to infants and people in poor health.

SOILS AND DRAINAGE

Continental Italy

The usually abundant and regular supply of water from the many rivers contributes to the prosperity of continental Italy. In some places, however, floods are a chronic problem.

The Alps are drained by many swift-flowing streams, the largest of which have been harnessed as sources of electricity. The upper basins

of many northern rivers have soils that absorb water and release it gradually; much of the natural vegetation remains.

The Alps' rugged terrain and poor soils limit land use primarily to forestry and livestock raising. Lower slopes and valleys are used to grow fodder and small amounts of food for human consumption, including grapes and tree crops.

The Po and its several tributaries ordinarily carry large quantities of water, and in the lower Po valley the flow is regular because of differences in rainfall received by the various tributaries and other factors (see fig. 10). The tributaries from the Alps are fed by glaciers, but the deep sub-Alpine lakes tend to delay the peak flows of spring.




Figure 10. Rivers of Italy

Tributaries from the Apennines peak at different times of the year than the Alpine tributaries, reducing the variation in the quantity of water in the lower Po.

On the eastern plain the main rivers are the Adige and the Piave. Although they are Alpine rivers, their flow is less regular than that of the Po.

The North Italian Plain, once a shallow sea, has been gradually built up by soils carried by rivers and, on its fringes, by glaciers. The accumulation of alluvial soil is continuing, and the Po delta advances about seventy-five yards each year. Ravenna, once a Roman port, is seven miles inland. These alluvial soils tend to be highly fertile but pose complex problems because they do not have naturally good drainage.

Near the mountains the soils consist of coarse gravels deposited by glaciers. At intermediate elevations there are alluvial soils from comparatively recent geological times. Such soils usually require irrigation, in contrast with the most recently deposited ones, which are soggy. In some places the lower Po has a higher elevation than nearby fields.

Since the thirteenth century inhabitants of the plain have worked to tame this difficult environment. They have diverted the flow of the river to nearby low-lying fields so that their levels would gradually be raised by alluvial soils. Floods occur frequently in the lower reaches of the Po, especially in the Polesina area, and have made it necessary for the government to install electronic sensing and early warning devices.

In the nineteenth century improved technology made feasible the reclamation of large parts of the plain, as well as the construction of a system of irrigation canals. Agriculture on the plain is diverse and highly productive. A long, hot growing season and a usually ample water supply allow the growing of seven hay crops a year, providing the basis for livestock raising. The plain produces one-third of Italy's wine, one-half of its wheat, three-fourths of its beet sugar and corn, and nine-tenths of its rice and milk. It also supplies substantial quantities of flax and hemp.

The eastern edge of the plain is made up of marshes and lagoons. Flooding is particularly severe in Venice, partly because of the increasing industrialization of nearby areas. Underground water has been removed from nearby land areas slated for industrial and residential purposes, with the result that Venice and surrounding areas are slowly sinking. This predicament is made more difficult by the worldwide rise in ocean levels.

Mediterranean Italy

The rivers of Mediterranean Italy are much less useful to man than those in the northern part of the country. Their basins receive less rainfall, hardly any of which falls in the summer. All the rivers of Mediterranean Italy carry less water than one fair-sized tributary of the Po, the Ticino. Many central and southern Italian rivers are short, swollen for a few months a year, and dry or greatly reduced in flow for many months in midyear. Some rain falls on bare rock or impermeable soils in the basins and rushes to the sea without benefit to the farmer. In other places the rock or soil is so permeable that the water descends to unrecoverable depths.

For more than 2,000 years the inhabitants of Mediterranean Italy have deforested the mountains in attempts to make them arable. Goats grazed on the land, and wood was gathered for fuel, accelerating the process of deforestation. Vegetation suitable for poor soils and hot, dry summers has been replaced with varieties more immediately useful to man. Mussolini's drive for self-sufficiency resulted in the partial replacement of crops suitable for each particular part of the country with wheat, a crop that is harder on the land.

Deforestation left swampy places where mosquitoes could breed. When malaria was most severe, near the end of the nineteenth century, it affected virtually the entire populations of Calabria at the tip of the peninsula and Sicily.

Some parts of the peninsula and Sicily where erosion is extreme are referred to as badlands. The worst are in the northern Apennines around Bologna.

Circuitous routes connecting neighboring towns and a clear preference for hilltops and ridges as settlement sites reflect the threat of landslides in many areas of the peninsula and Sicily. Despite such precautions, however, landslides cause loss of life and extensive property damage. In Italy most landslides result from clay soils that dry thoroughly in the summer and become slippery after absorbing sustained winter rains. Some such clays are so unstable that slides occur even on slopes that are not steep. Particularly severe landslides occur near Volterra in Tuscany, and the loss of whole villages is not uncommon. Earth tremors sometimes set off landslides.

Of the country's eleven longest rivers, Mediterranean Italy has only three—the Tiber, the Arno and the Volturno. In some places their courses lie in flat, fertile areas that absorb rainfall and release it gradually. For centuries the inhabitants have attempted to make the valleys of the Tiber and the Arno more usable, and there have been several successful reclamation projects. These, like all other Italian rivers, are subject to flooding. In 1966 Florence was inundated by the Arno. In 1976 these two river valleys—their banks graced by towns and carefully tended landscapes—were major assets to Italian tourism.

A considerable part of the world's mercury is mined just south of Siena. Small quantities of sulfur, obtained from Sicily and near Naples, are also exported, but Italy is a net importer of this mineral. Bauxite is mined in Apulia and other places in the southern half of the peninsula, but this natural resource has been greatly depleted, and Italy must import most of what it needs. Small quantities of lead, zinc, manganese, gold, cadmium, and uranium are also mined.

Natural gas was discovered on the North Italian Plain in 1946; large quantities were subsequently found elsewhere on the plain and smaller quantities on the southern peninsula and in Sicily. By the late 1960s natural gas met about 15 percent of the country's total energy needs. The discovery of this inexpensive fuel near Milan in the country's industrial heartland was extremely fortunate. A model industrial suburb—Methano—was developed to take advantage of this resource. Discoveries near Ravenna have spurred the growth of the southeastern part of the plain. Natural gas is also being extracted from the Pontecorsini field under the Adriatic.

Small quantities of crude oil have been discovered at Malossa, not far from Milan, but most crude oil comes from Sicily. It is processed at the large refineries that have been set up to handle imported oil. Considerable investment was made in refineries on Sicily in order to take advantage of its coastal location and as part of the program to help the south gain on the north, industrially and socially.

The plain of Campania, which surrounds Naples, has excellent volcanic soils and sustains a large population. On small plains elsewhere in the southern part of the peninsula, the government is increasing the potential for productivity.

NATURAL RESOURCES

For a country of 56 million Italy is only modestly provided with agricultural resources and is considerably worse off with respect to other kinds of natural resources. It is heavily dependent on imported petroleum, and this dependency is likely to intensify with depletion of its natural gas reserves, which have played such an important part in the expansion and diversification of the economy since World War II. The country has very little iron ore.

The iron ore produced comes mostly from near Mount Etna in Sicily; smaller amounts are produced in the western Alps and Sardinia. Raw materials for the iron and steel industry have always been imported, and most plants have been located near the sea.

Coal resources are particularly meager. A small quantity of coal is mined on Sardinia, and lignite is extracted in the northern part of the

peninsula. Before the discovery of natural gas the lack of energy resources spurred development of hydroelectric and geothermal sources of power. Before World War II commercially feasible prospective sites of hydroelectric energy had been exploited. Since then locations in the central Apennines and on Sardinia also have been developed. Hydroelectric energy in Italy is expensive to develop because catchment areas are small. In the mid-1970s it appeared that all economically feasible sites were being exploited. In 1973 about 40 percent of electric generating capacity came from hydroelectric sources.

About 1 percent of electric generating capacity came from geothermal sources in 1973; the plant at Larderello, in Tuscany, was the largest geothermal plant in Europe. Italy's heavy dependence on imported fuels, made even more evident by the 1973 Arab oil boycott, impelled the National Electric Power Agency (Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica—ENEL) to begin an investigation of the geothermal potential of other volcanic zones in the central Apennines, southern and western Sicily, and Sardinia.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

In January 1976 Italy's population was estimated to be 56 million. According to the 1971 census there were ninety-five males per 100 females—a reflection of long-continued patterns of emigration and the absence of male adults from the impoverished south temporarily working in other European countries. The estimated rate of natural increase for all of Italy is 0.7 percent. There is a preference for smaller families in the industrialized, prosperous continental Italy and for larger families in the southern peninsula and the islands. No one part of the country has the bulk of the population, and areas of high density are widely distributed (see fig. 11).

As might be expected, mountainous areas are thinly populated and plains areas heavily populated. The country's most thriving segment, the western portion of the North Italian Plain and the Ligurian coast, is heavily populated; so are other prosperous areas of the plain and the Tiber and Arno valleys. Lowlands around Naples, at the heel and toe of the boot, and on Sicily are also heavily populated, but the people are much poorer—reflecting the heavy pressure of population on limited resources.

Italy is highly urbanized, but no one city contains a large part of the population. In 1973 Rome, with a population of over 2.8 million, was the largest city; Milan, with 1.7 million, was the next largest.

There are many medium-sized cities and large towns. The North Italian Plain has no leading city. Historically, important cities developed on the edges of the plain, where the foothills begin. Such sites usually had supplies of underground water and may also have been selected because they were more healthful and comfortable places to live.




Figure 11. Population Distribution, 1971 Census

In the Apennines hilltops were often favored as dwelling places, to provide defense against brigands and pirates in earlier times and to avoid areas where malaria and landslides were prevalent (see Soils and Drainage, this ch.). The difficulty of land communications encouraged the growth of coastal cities. The tendency for major towns to develop on the coast was more pronounced in the southern part of the peninsula and on Sicily, because natural harbors were better and trading contacts with other parts of the Mediterranean area were more frequent than in the north.

Cities have been associated with agricultural centers, communications centers, and industrial sites but rarely with mining. The city of

Carbonia on Sardinia is an exception, but Italy's meager mineral resources have precluded much growth.

Census data do not differentiate between urban and rural dwellers, but other sources indicate that only a small part of the population lives in the countryside, even though many Italians are still dependent on agriculture. In 1971 only 35 percent of the population lived in towns inhabited by less than 10,000 people.

During the Middle Ages in the southern part of the peninsula and on Sicily people clustered together to avoid malarial lowlands and to protect themselves from enemies. Moreover some landowners preferred to have the tenants live in large rural agglomerations. For example, in wheat-growing areas where workers were needed only for certain parts of the year, it served the landowners' interests better to have prospective workers live in the towns, be entirely dependent on their wages, and turn out each morning in the hope of getting a day's work. Other kinds of agriculture, such as viniculture and irrigated vegetable raising, require workers on the land for more of the year, and in such areas workers tended to live fairly close to the fields.

The concentration of rural population in parts of the Mezzogiorno left much of the countryside overgrown and uncultivated. Italy's cultivated areas tend to absorb and hold back soil erosion better than uncultivated areas.

The government's major effort, initiated in 1950, to help the south included an attempt to break up some large rural population clusters into smaller nuclei or to convince people to live on the land they worked. Such attempts have not been fully successful, partly because they run counter to tradition and partly because underemployment is prevalent and individuals consider work prospects to be better in larger places.

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The single most useful broad summary for the general reader is J.P. Cole's *Italy—An Introductory Geography*. It is concise and conveniently organized. *Southern Europe: A Systematic Geographic Study* by Monica and Robert Beckinsale presents Italy's physical environment in a regional context, has unusually good graphics, and is particularly helpful for understanding present-day developments. The chapters on Italy in J.M. Huston's *The Western Mediterranean World: An Introduction to Its Regional Landscapes* provide an excellent presentation of this topic for the reader familiar with geographical terminology. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 4

THE PEOPLE

Italy, compared with most other countries of Western Europe, achieved political unification at a late date—1861. Many writers, pointing to the persistence of dialects and regional loyalties, maintain that Italy remains a fragmented polity. Yet Italians do evidence a sense of common cultural heritage; all share equal pride in the great Italian artists, scientists, and statesmen.

Despite regional variations it is possible to speak of an Italian people. There appear to be certain common ways of viewing the world and of handling social interaction. The family, for example, is the building block of all Italian society. Authority is vested in the father, whose prime obligation is to protect the honor of the household by controlling the behavior of family members. To the outsider the family presents a unified front.

There are many forces at work that militate against parochialism. Italians evidence what may be called an urban ethos. The city is glorified as the center of civilization, and most Italians look to the cities and city life for models of behavior. At one time the local elites in nearby towns set the pace, but they have been superseded by the elites of the large urban-industrial centers.

Education, migration, and religion have all had an effect on the degree to which Italians evidence a national consciousness. Education has steadily reduced illiteracy and, although local dialects were still in use in 1976, most Italians could (at the very least) understand the standard language, and the young in particular were fluent in both a local dialect and standard Italian. Migration, always a significant aspect of Italian life, has served to expose more and more Italians to life beyond the village. Returned migrants have brought back new ideas and new ways of looking at the world. The church was late in supporting a unified Italian state, but a common religion is something the Italians have traditionally shared, and the church has played a primary socializing role.

On the surface Italy remains a mosaic of differing peoples and customs. The real divisions in present-day Italy, however, are socioeconomic rather than cultural-linguistic.

THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR WORLD

Italians relish their uniqueness as a people. They are proud of their local variety, and many wax eloquent on the positive qualities of their village or region as compared with some other village or region. In fact the tenacious regional loyalties of the Italian people are often contrasted with their apparent national indifference—their apparent lack of concern for national political, economic, and social issues. Many observers of the Italian social scene point to this contrast as evidence of Italy's lack of national integration despite more than 100 years of political unity.

Certainly fragmentation is a feature of Italian society—one need only look at the varied history, the differing peoples and customs, and the persistence of regional dialects. Yet in spite of the diversity of the country it is still possible to identify certain shared characteristics—common behaviors, modes of interaction, and ways of looking at oneself and the world around one. Many of the beliefs, attitudes, and values that the people share are tinged with a strong sense of ambivalence. This ambivalence pervades almost every aspect of Italian life and makes the task of describing the Italian people and their society particularly difficult.

Nowhere is the tension between tradition and change more marked than in the Italian's hostility toward, yet glorification of, the urban life. *Campanilismo* (parochialism) is the term given to the Italians' attachment to their villages, heritage, and traditional ways of doing things. The word derives from *campanile* (bell tower). Every town, village, or hamlet, no matter how small, has a church at its center or atop a nearby hill. Literally *campanilismo* refers to the villager's preference for traveling a distance no farther than that from which he still has sight of the church steeple.

Campanilismo appears to be in part a defense mechanism. While it symbolizes attachment to the past, it also reflects a resentment at not being included in the wave of the future—of which the city is the prime manifestation. The villager is envious of the city life and the prestige that accrues to those who have a knowledge of city ways. At the same time he is ever aware of his inability to partake in such a life given the resources at his disposal. It is the dissatisfaction brought out by comparison between the city life and his own that creates feelings of ambivalence.

Unlike many societies with large peasant populations, Italy has no positive tradition or myth that surrounds the tiller of the soil. In Germany, for example, the rural people were idealized and looked to as the source of strength and the true foundation of the country. In Italy no such myth glorifies the peasantry. Instead everything that pertains to country life is denigrated.

Many writers have commented on the aversion Italians display for living very far from a town or village. In southern Italy people live in large nucleated settlements sometimes called agro-towns or, sarcastically, peasant cities. These villages are noteworthy in that they are made up almost entirely of an agriculturally based population, although their size often exceeds that of some of the southern industrialized communities. Despite the hardships involved, the villagers prefer to group together and to travel daily, often over long distances, to their fields. In the rural areas of central Italy scattered homesteads predominate, but they also form part of a larger aggregation whose hub of activity is the town. These towns and their countrysides constitute almost independent and self-sufficient entities, reminiscent of the many city-states that once characterized that part of Italy. Settlement patterns, of course, are much affected by land use and cultivation practices. But the distinct urban ethos that pervades Italian society, the desire to participate in or to be somehow connected with urban life, explains in part the Italians' preference for living in large nucleated settlements or in close proximity to towns.

The orientation toward city life and the concern with *civiltà* (civility) form the theme of an important anthropological study of a community in central Italy. The author, Sydel Silverman, explains *civiltà* as an ideology that shapes and gives expression to a range of complex behaviors and personal qualities:

There is no exact equivalent of "civiltà" in English. It is close to "civility," but broader in meaning. It is related to "civic" and the "urbane" but it is not quite either of these. It is more like "civilization," but not quite so broad or so grandiose. In general, it refers to ideas about a civilized way of life. It must be understood in terms of a range of meanings rather than a precise definition, but it always implies an *urban* way of life.

One of the most important aspects of *civiltà* is the desire to project a good image. It has been said that Italian life is like a continuing drama. The cafés and the public meeting places become stages upon which each individual acts out a socially prescribed role. Thus at times the Italian may display what appears to the American as an almost obsessive concern with making a good impression. The list of behaviors that qualify under this heading—dressing properly, displaying good manners, showing hospitality, conversing with skill, acting cleverly, living up to one's obligations, seeing one's children properly married, guarding one's honor—is almost endless. A good image is not contingent on wealth or status, although the upper classes have at their disposal many of the resources (money, education, and social contracts) that help one put forth and maintain a desirable image.

Much of the success in projecting a good image depends on personal qualities and skills. One example is ability as a conversationalist. Conversation is generally regarded as a favorite Italian pastime. It is

not unusual to see large groups of men gathered in the public square or small groups of women sitting on the steps of a neighbor's home engaged in lively and animated discussion. An outsider is quick to notice the Italian's love of conversation for conversation's sake and the intensity with which he listens and argues. Oratorical skills are most important for men; they are the ones who must represent the family before the public. Wit and the ability to manipulate the language have a bearing on the evaluation of the individual's public performance. For this reason knowledge of standard Italian is valued; it implies education, and it extends the circle of communication. Men converse; women gossip—at least that is a distinction often made by Italians. Women gather in small groups and engage in neighborly chats. Their topics of conversation are usually more local and personal than those of men, which are usually political. Gossip among women is an informal method of social control, for it is during these neighborly conversations that the behavior of other women in the community is scrutinized and commented on. Women who constantly criticize others are looked down on and avoided, however, for they have a *mala lingua* (bad tongue).

Another valued and useful quality in an individual is cleverness—particularly important in a world that the Italians see as marked by competition and struggle. A clever person is one who can outwit his fellow or take advantage of an otherwise unfavorable situation. Minor deceptions, cleverly and subtly executed, are acceptable if necessary. A man who is constantly outsmarted, no matter how good a person he may otherwise be, is a fool; he has shown his inability to circumvent rules and “beat the system.”

Honor is perhaps the quality most closely tied to the ability to put forth a good image. Honor is defined socially—that is, through interaction with one's fellows. A man's self-esteem depends on honor, and his honor is evaluated continuously by the people around him. The Italian's conception of honor is based to a great extent on his ideas about virility. It is no accident that most infringements against honor involve man-woman relationships.

Emphasis on virility, manliness, and potency is a common feature of many Mediterranean and Latin American cultures. Concern with masculine behavior in Italy is impressed on children at an early age. Boys are brought up to cultivate certain masculine patterns of behavior; girls are raised to appreciate the virile, domineering man. One anthropologist who studied a village in Apulia was struck by the frequency with which “sexual epithets [were] used as nouns” in describing and talking to male children. In contrast more playful and generalized words were used in reference to young girls. Thus a baby boy was a handsome “little male” and quite a “young man,” but a baby girl was a cute “infant” or a pretty little “doll.”

The ideal man need not necessarily be brilliant or rich as long as he is of good character and physically and sexually strong. There are many ways in which Italian men assert their virility. They are, for example, notoriously aggressive and preoccupied with physical beauty and strength. Inability to control women reflects on one's manliness. An adulterous wife or unchaste daughter is a disgrace to the family, because she has flouted the authority, and hence the manliness, of the husband-father. For a man to be called a *cornuto* (cuckold) in other than jest is a grave insult. As one author noted, "loss of virility means the loss of the essence of man's existence." In contrast to masculinity, femininity is a less specific concept. Beauty is prized, but other qualities (modesty, loyalty, strength of character) may suffice.

A number of writers have suggested that Italians treat life as a struggle. In their opinion many poor Italians, particularly in the south, are engaged in a Hobbesian kind of competition for scarce resources. Everything is thought to be available in finite quantities, so that one person's gain is another's loss.

This description of the Italian world view has come under attack for its extremely pessimistic portrayal of the nature of Italian interpersonal relations. The sense of struggle can certainly be said to exist, but it is more a result of poverty and poor living conditions than of an ethos of noncooperativeness. Poor families have no cushion to fall back on when unexpected mishaps occur. What is a temporary setback for some is a full-fledged disaster for others.

Living means struggling against fate, the environment, and sometimes one's fellowman. Luck or fate is a theme running through much Italian folklore. Winning or being successful is often attributed to luck or the grace of God. Yet the element of fate does not excuse one from continuing to struggle.

THE FAMILY

It has become almost a platitude to describe the family as the backbone of Italian society. Yet the importance of the family and family life in Italy cannot be emphasized enough. For Italians the family is sacred, and nothing is guarded more than the honor of the house.

A number of observers of Italian social life—particularly in the south—have suggested that the family is the only group toward which the Italian feels any loyalty and within which there is a generally recognized set of rights and obligations. Other kinds of social, economic, and political organizations are thought to have survived only because they have not dared to challenge the family's supremacy. The term *amoral familism* has been coined by Edward Banfield, an American sociologist, to describe the southern Italian's concern with the family to the exclusion and sometimes at the expense of other social groups. Banfield's characterization has come under attack by a number of

social scientists as an extreme and only partially warranted description. Most do agree, however, that family ties are the strongest and most stable ties that the average Italian ever experiences.

The individual in some sense loses his identity within the family, for self-identity is enmeshed in the family unit and can only be described and realized in terms of the family. People are talked about in reference to the household to which they belong, and participation in the social life of the community is mediated by the family. The Italian, oriented toward a world overlain by kin relations, seems to be able to comprehend close relationships only insofar as they fall within the family network. He or she makes sense of non-kin relations, for example, by bringing them into the sphere of fictive kin relations. Close friends may be affectionately referred to as cousins, and patrons or longtime friends are often initiated into the family through godparenthood. Aspersions cast at one member of the family seem to be felt and reacted to equally by each of the other members; an affront to the honor of one is an affront to the honor of all. No one dares trespass against any one member without fear of reprisal from others. The much talked about vendettas or blood feuds of the south and the islands were an extreme form of such reprisals, but in present-day Italy minor property damage or public avoidance is the more common response of an injured party.

The inclusiveness of the term *family* varies from region to region. The government for census purposes recognizes the family as an economic unit—that is, the group that lives together, pools resources, and bears mutual responsibilities for the welfare of individual members. Most often this corresponds to the nuclear family, although in certain northern and central villages some form of the extended family still exists. In everyday usage it is generally the household or economic unit that is implied by *family*. For wealthy traditional landowners this would include domestic servants and permanent employees since they too are dependents.

When *family* is expanded to include relatives beyond the household, it may apply only to the father's side or to both the mother's and the father's sides of the family. Usually, however, it is not extended past two generations (grandparents, uncles and aunts, and first cousins). Otherwise the importance placed on relations outside the immediate or near-immediate family varies from region to region. In general rural southerners recognize a very restricted network of relevant kin; in the rural north the network is somewhat larger, although obligations are much more vague and only in times of special need are distant kin ties called into force. In large urban areas the circle of relevant kin also tends to be limited but, unlike the rural southern Italians, urbanites have to some extent substituted membership in political or social organizations for membership in kin groups. In the south there exist neither the extensive kin networks nor the tradition of loy-

alty to some suprafamilial collectivity. Among the wealthy, extended kin ties may be maintained more for the "recommendations" (social and business connections) they provide than out of any real sense of obligation and loyalty.

The man as head of the household wields absolute authority over every other member of the family and represents the group in all dealings with the public. In effect he mediates between the family and the outside world. A number of observers have suggested that the principle of *patria potestas* (the authority of a father) still regulates familial relations, though in attenuated form. In theory the father-husband relinquishes his rights over household members only at death. In reality the degree of control that a father exercises over his married children varies. In some parts of Italy the father does indeed claim rights over his children (particularly his sons) as long as he is alive. In most parts of Italy, however, the authority of the father is cut short when the son marries and moves out of the household. Many familial conflicts in fact center on the issue of paternal authority over married children. If a father dies before his children are grown and married, the oldest son assumes responsibility for maintaining the household, caring for his mother, and ensuring that his sisters are suitably married before he takes a wife.

In contrast to the husband-father the wife-mother is home oriented, her activities centering on domestic and private affairs. Only in cases of unusual emergency or necessity will a woman be swayed to leave home and pursue wage employment. Women are thought to be subservient to men. As young girls grow up, they are subject to their father's (and sometimes brother's) authority; at marriage they merely exchange one master for another.

Primary allegiance is owed to the family of marriage, although the wife, especially, never loses contact with her own family. Evidence of this is the fact that she continues to be known by her maiden name. Despite the attenuation of authority and economic control, the emotional commitment between parents and their married children remains and is given explicit expression. In times of disaster as well as in times of joy, the wider kin group is counted on for assistance—sharing and sacrificing when necessary.

Ideally family relations should be tension free. Italians generally attempt to avoid disagreements among relatives, because they feel such disputes might undermine the united front that every family should present before the public and reflect poorly on the family members involved. Still, tensions cannot always be averted, and many relations within the family reflect an underlying ambivalence. "If you wish a happy life, stay away from your relatives" is a Sicilian proverb that reflects the sometimes ambivalent attitude toward kin. The husband-wife bond, for example, is theoretically one of dominance and subordination; yet the very nature of the bond is such

that intimate moments are shared and confidences exchanged. In fact part of the justification for the marked separation of family activities into those dominated by men and those dominated by women rests on concern for family unity. Separating the male and female domains keeps conflict in the family to a minimum.

Children are valued in Italian society, and marriage is never really considered solemnized or stable until after the birth of the first child. The ideal size of the family varies, but two children are considered the minimum. Male children are, without doubt, preferred to female children. Sons symbolize a man's virility. Daughters are more burdensome; not only do they represent a drain on the family resources (they must be provided with a dowry at marriage-, but they also must be constantly watched over lest they damage the family honor (women are thought to be particularly vulnerable to seduction). It is the responsibility of the parents to provide children with *sistemazione* (literally, arrangement)—the ability to stand on their own.


"A father's authority should never be questioned, and a mother's request should never be denied," concluded one anthropologist when describing parent-child relations in a Sicilian village. That statement summarizes a widespread belief in Italian society and points to the essential difference between the father-child and the mother-child bond. The former is a socially prescribed bond that demands respect and obedience; the latter is an emotional bond in which respect is given freely out of love and devotion. The mother-child bond tends to be infinitely stronger and more stable than that between a father and his children. The father's position requires that he remain aloof. With younger children he is generally affectionate but affection becomes less demonstrative as the children grow older.

The strongest link in the family is perhaps that between a mother and her son. Italian men of all ages are noted for their attachment to their mothers, though not in an effeminate or subservient sense. A young boy tends to experience his closest moments with his mother and, to some extent, his sisters. The kind of contact with females that results in mutual trust is not usually open to young boys outside the family. A young man only begins to know his wife after marriage.

EDUCATION

Education in Italy, as elsewhere, has always been considered an important instrument of socialization and a prime welder of national unity. The diffusion of a national culture through the teaching of the Italian language and the raising of literacy levels have been objectives of the post-World War II Italian government. Although many criticisms may be leveled against the Italian educational system and its performance, remarkable progress has been made. In the early 1930s over 20 percent of the population did not possess even rudimentary

reading and writing skills. Little progress was made during the war years, and by 1951 the number of illiterates had fallen only to 18 percent. Great strides were made, however, during the 1950s and 1960s, and according to the 1971 census the number of illiterates had plummeted to just over 5 percent (see fig. 12). The south of Italy and the islands have always lagged behind the national average, but even there the number of illiterates was cut in half between 1951 and 1971.



Source: Based on information from United Nations, International Coordination Committee for National Research on Demography, *La Population de l'Italie*, Rome, 1974, p. 73.

Figure 12. Percentage of Illiterates, 1971 Census

The biggest problem facing Italy's educators is the shortage of modern and adequate facilities. Problems have been compounded by the economic situation. Limited funds are available to serve an ever-growing population. In the south the number of schools has not grown proportionately with the population. In contrast the most modern schools and the brightest, most progressive personnel are found in the north. In addition to the better educational services provided there, other services are available. Thus, for example, children are usually instructed in hygiene, and qualified health personnel are at the disposal of a school or group of schools. Nonetheless in the late 1960s and early 1970s migration from the south to the north and from the countryside to the cities had created a problem of overcrowding even for the well-equipped northern schools. The emotional problems peculiar to immigrant children and the usually lower level of learning were problems that required special attention. In many parts of Italy it has become necessary to divide the schoolday into shifts in order to accommodate the expanding school population.

Paradoxically the number of unemployed teachers in Italy is notoriously large. Teachers are also among the poorest paid professionals. The number graduating from teacher training schools far exceeds the positions available. In addition graduates show a marked preference for teaching positions in the cities and large towns. In the mid-1960s the ratio of applicants to city teaching posts was estimated at forty to one. Few prospective teachers are eager or willing to be assigned to the small and often still-isolated villages of the south. As a result the part of the country that has the greatest educational needs usually receives the least experienced and least innovative teachers. Because teachers ordered to report to a village often choose to reside in a neighboring town, they are even less accessible to the people of the village.

The simple logistics of Italy's highly centralized school system poses formidable problems. It is interesting that in delegating limited autonomy to regional centers the central Italian government decided to retain absolute control over the educational system. Only the five specially constituted regions are allowed more leeway in improvising programs within their own territories, although they too must conform to the basic structure of the central system.

For the other fifteen regions the Ministry of Education sets the curriculum, selects the books, and prepares the examinations that permit students to proceed from one level to another. Education throughout Italy comes under the purview of the minister of education, who appoints education directors for each of the ninety-four provinces. These directors are in charge of administering and overseeing all the primary and secondary schools in their provinces. They form the effective link between the central and local governments. While they

handle the administration and the bureaucracy, they employ school inspectors to tour the schools and report back on individual problems and needs. The elementary schools, in addition, are grouped under teaching directors who are somewhat similar to American school principals (although they are usually responsible for more than one school). The number of schools and the number of pupils under the supervision of the teaching directors vary. The everyday affairs of the individual school are left to the senior teacher if the teaching director has more than one school under his supervision. The centralization, coupled with limited resources, means that many of the schools do not receive the attention they deserve. Teaching directors, given time and travel constraints, often have only limited and infrequent contact with many of the schools and must instead rely on information provided by the senior teachers.

Eight years of education have been compulsory in Italy since the 1948 Constitution. It was not until the 1960s, however, that the government began to place such education within the grasp of most school-age children. The greatest obstacle to providing the eight years of compulsory education, in addition to the lack of facilities, has been the prohibitive cost to parents of sending their children to school. Schooling through the age of fourteen is free, but the cost of clothing, books and supplies, and transportation is formidable for many Italians, particularly in the rural south. As children get older, their help with the family work load becomes valuable enough to outweigh any evident advantages of further schooling.

Compulsory schooling does not begin until the age of six, but nursery schools and kindergartens for children between three and six are quite popular and have been promoted vigorously by various private and local organizations as well as by the Roman Catholic Church. The state encourages and, whenever possible, supports preschooling but does not control it. These schools are considered useful because of the free social services they provide in addition to the preparation they give for the regular schools. They act where necessary as day-care centers for the children of working mothers and offer free meals to needy children.

Primary schooling to the age of eleven has been fairly widespread and available to most of the population. It was estimated in the late 1960s that over 90 percent of the school population completed their primary education. The emphasis in primary schools has been on mastery of basic skills—reading, writing, and simple mathematics.

The unified middle school is the next level; it is roughly equivalent to an American junior high school. It accommodates children from age eleven to age fourteen, when compulsory education ends. Middle schools charged entrance fees until the mid-1960s, when the government abolished the fees and made an effort to ensure that every

commune with a population of over 5,000 was provided with a middle school. The unified middle school provides a general course of study, although students are usually either prepared for a higher education or channeled toward a vocational career. The choice is often dictated more by financial capability than by academic qualifications.

A student has four alternatives once he has completed his middle school studies and has passed the necessary state examinations. He may terminate his education. He may enter one of the technical institutes, where he will receive specialized training in agriculture or industry. He may opt for the teachers institutes and go on from there either to teach in an elementary school or to study at a university faculty of education. Or he may enter the lyceum, which is similar to an American high school. One track of the lyceum, the classical high school, provides a liberal education and prepares the student for entrance into any university department. The other track, the scientific high school, provides a more specialized training oriented toward mathematics and the natural sciences. Graduation from a scientific high school allows the student access to a number of specialized university departments.

Most Italian universities are state institutions that receive their primary funding from the government, although contributions may also be solicited from private sources. There are also some private universities, accredited by the state, that are maintained through the grants and support of individuals, organizations, and the church. All students desiring to enter a profession, regardless of the kind of university attended, must pass statewide examinations.

Since the end of World War II and the fall of the fascist state, limited experimentation and curriculum variation have been permitted at the elementary school level, but innovation is not a regular feature of the educational system. Italian children are introduced at an early age to the lecture method of instruction, and learning often depends on rote. Class participation is not encouraged. Given that the child must pass state-standardized and -administered examinations in order to qualify for each block of schooling, however, the style of learning is not surprising.

University-level instruction has come under increasing attack by young Italians, who find it impersonal, stifling, and authoritarian. University education in Italy, as in much of Europe, is more regimented and impersonal than in the United States, although many of the criticisms leveled against the system have their counterparts in large, prestigious American universities. One criticism among the Italian youth, in particular, surfaces repeatedly: that the system is "dominated by a few thousand full professors who often devote only a small portion of their working time to university duties."

MIGRATION

Italian attitudes toward migration are mixed. Does it, in the long run, hinder or help development efforts? One side argues that migration only delays the necessity of dealing with some very serious domestic development problems. Advocates of this view maintain that the north has been "colonializing" the south—that is, purposely maintaining it as an agricultural and underdeveloped region so that excess population can be drawn off as cheap labor for the northern industrial complex. The other side sees migration as a temporary and transitional safety valve. Those who advocate this view maintain that the migrant is even an important agent of change. Whatever their position, all observers seem to agree that migration has had a profound effect on Italy and the Italian people socially, culturally, and psychologically. Internal migration from the south to the north and from the rural areas to the cities, particularly heavy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has been perhaps the most important factor operating in favor of nationwide integration. The process has not always been a smooth one, as traditional beliefs and value systems have clashed head on with modern industrial ideas.

Since World War II socioeconomic conditions have improved steadily. Italy's entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market) resulted in increased industrialization and economic activity, but the number of needy and unemployed still outdistances the country's capacity to handle them. One estimate from the 1960s placed the number of job opportunities per year at 200,000. These were available almost exclusively in the northern industrial triangle of Milan, Turin, and Genoa.

The prime motive for migration has always been economic. Workers in underdeveloped areas have been enticed by the seemingly endless opportunities available in foreign countries or in northern cities and at the same time repulsed by the poor conditions and limited opportunities in their own regions. Most migrants during the post-World War II era have come from southern Italy. A number of writers have referred to the "natural poverty" of southern Italy, and such a description is close to fact. The south has been characterized by poor environmental conditions, intense population pressures, and an agricultural economy. About 70 percent of the fertile valley lands in Italy lie in the north (see ch. 3). By contrast most of southern Italy is hilly and mountainous. Seasonal rainstorms cause severe erosion and are usually followed by long dry periods. Birthrates have been consistently above the Italian average—posing a formidable problem for a people who are almost entirely rural and who must live off a land neither particularly arable nor fertile. Industry in the south lags far behind that in the north, and much of what does exist consists of small-scale entrepreneurial activity—businesses employing family members

and few others. Transportation facilities are notoriously poor. It is still possible to find villages largely isolated from main thoroughfares and inaccessible to motorized vehicles. Per capita income in the south has always been well below the average; incomes of the small-farm owner and the agricultural worker fall even below the southern average.

Economic factors, however, have not been the sole cause of migration. In addition to economic gain the poor southern Italian has desired to better his social standing and gain self-respect, recognition, and a sense of dignity. Seeing no such opportunities at home, he has frequently migrated.

The long tradition of emigration, the apparent prosperity of repatriated emigrants, and the substantial remittances received from relatives who have emigrated have led the Italians to consider emigration a very real and attractive solution to their problems. Those who have returned have served as a constant reminder of outside opportunities. With money earned abroad they have been able to attain a new social position by acquiring such symbols of status as land and fine clothing. More important they have brought back with them ideas that indirectly have affected their fellow countrymen.

It has been estimated that from the time of Italian unification until 1970 nearly 26 million people emigrated from Italy. The net loss, however, was about 20 million because of the many who returned home (see fig. 13; table 1). Students of Italian emigration generally divide the movement into four key phases—distinguished according to the number of emigrants, their place of origin and destination, and the amount of government regulation.

The first phase, the period from unification to the end of the nineteenth century, was characterized by a fairly heavy outpouring of

Table 1. *Percentage of Emigration by Area of Departure, 1876-1900, 1901-20, and 1959-70*

Area of Departure	1876-1900	1901-20	1959-70
Northwest	25.6	19.8	8.4
Northeast	38.2	22.0	18.2
Center	7.3	13.0	7.7
South	24.4	31.3	55.3
Islands	4.5	13.9	10.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on information from United Nations, International Coordination Committee for National Research on Demography, *La Population de l'Italie*, Rome, 1974, p. 53.



Source: Based on information from United Nations, International Coordination Committee for National Research on Demography, *La Population d'Italie*, Rome, 1974, p. 52.

Figure 13. Annual Average Emigration, 1871-80 to 1961-70

emigrants from the north. Nearly two-thirds of all Italian emigrants (of a total between 6 and 7 million) hailed from the northern regions. The prosperous countries of Europe were the favored destinations, attracting over three-fifths of the total. Most of these early emigrants were off to seek their fortunes and were determined to return eventually to their homeland. During this phase the government offered little protection or advice to the would-be emigrant. By the same token, however, few restrictions were placed on emigration, although the government tended to view the practice with displeasure.

The period from the beginning of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I constituted the second important phase of Italian emigration. It was primarily an emigration from southern Italy and oriented toward North and South America. The government became active during this period and, although it still did not promote emigration, it did pass legislation aimed at protecting those who chose to leave. In 1901 the General Commissariat of Emigration was organized. Operating through local committees it regulated the recruiting of labor and aided the emigrant from the time of his departure until his arrival in the host country. The peak year for emigration was 1913, when 872,598 people left the country.

There was a dramatic drop in Italian emigration during the third phase, the period from World War I to the end of the World War II. At the start of World War I annual emigration dropped to less than one-sixth that of the previous period. As in the first phase, more than half of this movement was from northern Italy to European countries. Emigration picked up briefly immediately after World War I, but the days of mass flows of population out of the country had come to an end. Gradually there was an introduction of ever more restrictive migration legislation both in Italy and in many of the previously favored host countries, such as the United States. Moreover during this period repatriation began to overtake expatriation. One source estimated that during the interwar years "returns were more than 70 percent of the exits and the new emigration was less than 350,000 persons (less than 27,000 a year)." During the years of fascist rule the General Directory of Italians Abroad was organized under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to replace the General Commissariat of Emigration. The government was interested in directing workers to newly acquired African colonies. Emigrants were invited to return to Italy, population growth was encouraged, and several land reclamation projects were undertaken within Italy.

Post-World War II emigration constitutes the fourth phase. The majority of the net emigration (total expatriates minus total repatriates), have come from the south. The most salient feature of post-war emigration has been its almost exclusively European orientation. The economic boom of Western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s and Italy's status as a member of the EEC has permitted, at least

theoretically, the free movement of Italian workers into such countries as France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Emigrants during this phase have been primarily semiskilled and unskilled workers. A 1969 government survey found that 70 percent of all emigration was seasonal and that the rest involved emigrants who left their homes for only a few years and then returned. In addition to seasonal workers in France and West Germany there are laborers who live in Italy but cross the Italo-Swiss border daily to work in Swiss factories. In the early 1970s there was some evidence that educated and skilled workers were also beginning to leave the country—a phenomenon that, if it continued, could prove harmful to Italy's plans for internal development.

In the late 1960s the government began taking an active interest in Italian workers abroad. In 1967 the Committee of Italians Abroad was organized to advise on emigration-related problems. Both government officials and business leaders serve on the committee. It has been instrumental in promoting measures designed to aid and protect the emigrant and his family once in the host country. In addition a department of emigration has been set up in each region.

Perhaps the most impressive part of Italian migration in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the internal movement from rural to urban centers and from the south to the north. Reliable figures on the volume of internal migration are difficult to obtain, but it has been estimated that between 1951 and 1969 about 3.2 million migrated from the south to central and northern Italy. A number of these southerners moved to rural areas of the north while the northerners were abandoning the countryside for the cities.

RELIGION

Religion has always been a prime unifying factor among the Italian people. Italy is almost wholly Roman Catholic; according to the *Catholic Almanac*, 1976 the proportion is as high as 97 percent of the country's population. There are Protestants, Jews, Orthodox Christians, and Waldenses (an indigenous and pre-Reformation sect), but their numbers and influence have always been negligible. Thus the saying "to be Italian is to be Catholic" is more than a cliché. According to a number of observers many Italians, particularly in rural areas, divide the world into Christian (meaning Catholic) and pagan (meaning all others). Everyday expressions reflect the deep association between Christianity and humanity. "We poor Christians" is the same as saying "we poor people."

Catholicism in Italy has been superimposed upon a system of beliefs and practices that antedate the introduction of Christianity into the area. Religious festivities and celebrations display, therefore, both the peculiarities of local traditions and elements of universal Catholi-

cism. Religious life in Italy reaffirms that local loyalties and national integration need not be mutually exclusive. Beliefs and practices can be examined both in a local context as they express and give form to local loyalties and in a national or universal context as they unite and give order to disparate groups of people. For its part the church has consciously sought to downplay the local in favor of the universal.

The location of the center of the church in Rome and the fact that all the popes of the last four centuries have been Italian have helped keep Catholic influence in Italy strong. Relations between church and state, however, have not always been congenial. Animosities were at their peak in the years immediately after unification. Rome with its environs (Patrimony of Saint Peter) was the last major territory to be incorporated into the Italian state. In 1870 the lands were forcibly seized from the papacy: Pope Pius IX refused to relinquish his temporal powers and recognize the new sovereign, Victor Emmanuel II, as king of a united Italy. The pope remained secluded in the Vatican as a self-proclaimed prisoner, urging all good Catholics not to participate as candidates or as voters in the national elections of the new Italian state. The state countered by stripping the church of many of the privileges and powers it had once enjoyed. Church weddings were no longer considered valid; religious instruction in schools was greatly restricted and limited to the elementary level; and many charitable and other church-based organizations were placed under the purview of the state.

The church, however, slowly began to take an interest in the newly formed Italian state. Beginning around 1904 the papal ban on political participation was gradually loosened and in 1919 was officially lifted. Many Catholics wanted to support the newly organized Italian Popular Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*) headed by a Sicilian priest. Church-state relations were normalized with the negotiation of the Lateran Pacts of 1929. The church and the state had each come to the realization that a dogmatic stand against the other was neither a viable nor a realistic policy. The state desired the tacit support of the church in a country where over 95 percent of the population professed Catholicism, and the church needed the tacit approval of the state if it was to reassert and extend its influence over the faithful. With the Lateran Pacts the church gained several concessions. Its prominent role in the country was officially recognized. The Holy See was allowed to reestablish itself as a temporal power (the Vatican state) with the right to transact and enter into international agreements of its own. Financial compensation was given to the church for the loss of its territories. Clergy were exempted from military duty. The church's competence in the educational sphere was enlarged to include secondary-school-level religious instruction. Church marriages were again recognized as binding under civil law. After the fall of the fascist government and the end of the World War II the Lateran Pacts, in a controversial

move, were written into the Constitution of 1948 with only minor revisions. They remain the prime document guiding church-state relations in Italy.

The Catholic church has been more involved in politics in Italy than in any other country. Since World War II it has actively and openly supported the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC). The DC is not an arm of the church, but the church hierarchy and party leaders maintain close contacts with one another, and some church officials have vigorously campaigned for the DC and against the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI). The more moderate line followed by Pope John XXIII in the 1960s seemed to portend a lesser role for the church in Italian politics. Catholics were only urged to vote according to their consciences. The election of 1976, however, demonstrated that the church was not altogether ready to take a neutral stand on political issues. Catholics who ran on the communist ticket, campaigned for the Communists, or voted communist were threatened with excommunication.

The parish organization of the church permits it to reach the people at the grass-roots level. For many, especially rural, Italians the church is the only center of social activity outside the family. In 1976 there were 29,764 parishes in Italy. Parish size varied. A rural parish could include as few as 500 people; urban parishes could have as many as 40,000. There were 41,816 diocesan clergy to serve the various parishes.

Besides its direct influence through the Catholic clergy, the church has sponsored or supported a number of lay organizations. The best known is Catholic Action, a mass-oriented, general-purpose organization whose very broad goals include keeping Catholicism alive and spreading the Catholic spirit. According to some, Catholic Action has also "done much to socialize young devout Catholics and prepare the way for their recruitment into the ranks of Christian Democracy." Catholic Action does not involve itself in politics, but civic committees, most often operated by Catholic Action members, have been instrumental in grass-roots politicking. In every parish there is likely to be a branch of Catholic Action or a civic committee that becomes active at election time. The church exercises a great deal of control over Catholic Action and its subsidiary organizations. The organization is headed by a cardinal, and its leaders are selected by church officials. The Catholic church and Catholic lay organizations are particularly active among Italian youth. Several Catholic Action groups are for the young, and the church has always worked closely with the Italian boy scouts and girl scouts.

It is difficult to ascertain whether the church's participation in politics serves to influence the Italian people positively or negatively. Italians appear to separate their belief in God from their attitudes toward the church hierarchy and also to separate their attitudes on

religion from their involvement in political affairs. In fact they do not always recognize a contradiction between Catholicism and communism. Many good Catholics—those who attend church and support religious activities—have voted for, campaigned for, and even run on the communist ticket. Their support of communism stems from the economic promises made by the party rather than from the ideological content of communist doctrines. A 1963 opinion poll asked: "Is it possible to be a good Communist and at the same time a good Catholic?" Only 20 percent thought the two mutually exclusive; about 71 percent believed that Catholicism and the Italian brand of communism were compatible; the rest were undecided.

NON-ITALIAN MINORITIES

The unity of Italy is in little danger, despite occasional outbursts of national feelings from provinces in the north containing non-Italian ethnic minorities and the separatist rhetoric sometimes heard on Sardinia and Sicily. Non-Italian minorities form less than 2 percent of the population. The majority of the ethnic minorities are concentrated in provinces close to Italy's Austrian, Yugoslav, and French borders. In addition there are small linguistic islands of Greeks and Albanians throughout southern Italy.

Tyroleans

The largest non-Italian minority is the German-speaking population in the province of Bolzano in Trentino-Alto Adige, estimated at 250,000 to 300,000. The number is inconsequential in the country's total population, but German speakers make up almost two-thirds of the population of Bolzano itself. South Tyrol (the name that the German-speaking Tyroleans give to the area) became part of Italy after World War I. Italy immediately sought to strengthen its control over the population by promoting Italian immigration into the area and by joining Trento (an Italian-speaking province) to Bolzano so that an Italian majority would exist in the area as a whole.

South Tyrol has probably constituted the only real threat to Italian unity. Signs of animosity and distrust, though they should not be overemphasized, still exist between the two populations. In the early 1960s there was a minor terrorist activity, and the South Tyrol question was still important enough to be brought to the attention of the United Nations by Austrian authorities. The Tyroleans do not appear to be seeking secession from Italy so much as asking for greater autonomy than is provided under Italy's special regional administration. Attempts by the Italian government to encourage internal migration and industrialization have been viewed with suspicion as political moves designed to promote a rapid assimilation of the German-

speaking minority. There is a tendency to blame Italians for a variety of socioeconomic problems. Unemployment, for example, is blamed on the influx of Italian workers who, the Tyroleans believe, hold jobs that should belong to them.

Language and culture have become symbols in the sometimes subtle but ever-present desire of the Tyroleans to maintain a separate identity. Language is the most obvious difference between the two populations, but other cultural characteristics also distinguish the Tyrolean and Italian people. Anthropologists have pointed out a number of differing customs. For instance, the Tyroleans tend to follow the practice of impartible inheritance—that is, the oldest son inherits the property, and the others stay and work for him or seek work elsewhere. Among the Tyroleans landholdings tend to be larger, and there is a stronger attachment to the land. The Italian community is often a nucleated settlement, but the Tyroleans prefer scattered settlement on homesteads. For Tyroleans kin relationships appear to be less important than loyalties to and participation in public organizations. Perhaps most important, there is a basic difference in world view. The Tyroleans have their own special myth, rooted in the German glorification of the common people, which allows them to maintain their self-respect and to see virtue in manual labor.

Greek- and Albanian-Speaking Minorities

Greek- and Albanian-speaking populations are found in the regions of Calabria, Molise, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, and Abruzzi and on the island of Sicily. In the late 1960s some nine villages in Apulia (with a total population close to 34,700) and four villages in Calabria were all that remained as evidence of the once vast influence of Greece in the south of Italy. The villages in Apulia constitute a territory known as "la Grichia" (Greece); however, the term is deceptive, because it implies an exclusive, bounded, and ethnically conscious group of people. In fact the population includes some who still use and retain a knowledge of Greek and others who speak only Italian. There is no feeling of a unique ethnic identity or an unbroken cultural heritage on the part of the Greek speakers. Greek speech has become an indicator of social standing; only the lowest strata continue to speak Greek. As a result of the interest shown by linguists and anthropologists, however, some members of the elite have begun to cultivate and refine their knowledge of Greek, Hellenism, and the region's unique history.

Italo-Albanians are scattered more widely throughout southern Italy than the Greeks. In the late 1950s (the last available estimates) they numbered over 100,000. They are known as the Ghegi by Italians in the area (although the term is not indicative of their ethnic Albanian origin); they call themselves the Arberesh. The Italo-Albanians appear

to be slightly more conscious of their cultural heritage. They have had exposure to a written language (unlike the Italo-Greeks, who possess only an oral tradition), and the more educated among them have taken an interest in preserving their language history, and customs. Unlike the present-day Greek-speaking communities, which are Roman Catholic, many of the Italo-Albanian communities follow the Greek Catholic rite (in union with Rome). Albanian and Greek are used in the liturgy, and the clergy are instrumental in keeping alive an Albanian consciousness. Much of the social activity in Albanian villages is mediated by the church; religious festivals provide a convenient vehicle for reaffirming ethnic identity.

There also appears to be a larger sense of community among the Albanians of Italy. Whereas Greek-speaking communities often are unaware of one another, Italo-Albanians know there are villages outside their immediate area where Albanian is still spoken. The Albanian language provides an *entrée* for travelers from one Italo-Albanian village to another.

Except for language (and, in the case of Italo-Albanians, the Greek Catholic rite) there are no significant characteristics that distinguish these two groups from their Italian neighbors. For all intents and purposes these two groups are Italian. They evidence the same settlement patterns; they practice the same kinds of cultivation; family life, social structure, and value systems are the same; and interpersonal relations take the same form.

In the 1970s both the Italo-Greeks and the Italo-Albanians were rapidly being assimilated. Advances in transportation, communication, and education were bringing these once isolated populations into the mainstream of Italian society. Migration was also drawing off part of the population, particularly the young, and a premium was being placed on knowledge of Italian as a *lingua franca*.

Other Minorities

Some non-Italian minority groups have not attracted the attention of scholars; therefore information about them is sketchy. A substantial population of French origin, speaking a French dialect, can be found in the autonomous region of Valle d'Aosta along the Franco-Italian border. Although standard Italian is the official language of the region, French has been named as the second official language. Valle d'Aosta, the smallest of Italy's twenty regions in area and population and the least densely settled, had a total of about 109,000 people according to the census of 1971. Estimates of the French speakers that year varied from 67,000 to 100,000. There was no apparent irredentist attitude.

Another small non-Italian ethnic group came under Italian sovereignty in 1954 when Trieste was incorporated into Italy after long negotiations with Yugoslavia. More than 60,000 Slovenes lived in Tri-

este and its environs at the time. During the next several years many of the Slovenes left the area, and by 1971 the number remaining was estimated at about 25,000.

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There are a number of illuminating works on Italian society and culture, but most are studies of particular Italian communities. Anthropologists and sociologists have tended to focus on rural southern Italy to the virtual exclusion of the rest of the country. Edward Banfield's well-known and controversial book *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* concerns life in a village in Basilicata. Joseph Lopreato's book is based on the study of a village in Calabria. Charlotte Chapman's monograph describes social life and customs in a village in Sicily. A. L. Maraschini and Jan Brögger discuss in their works Greek-speaking communities in Apulia and Calabria respectively. The only book-length work in English that describes life outside southern Italy is Sydel Silverman's *Three Bells of Civilization*; it focuses on life in an Umbrian village in central Italy. Studies yielding a broad overview of Italian society and culture are few in number. To date the two best general works on Italy are John Earle's *Italy in the 1970s* and Raphael Zariski's *Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development*. The information in this chapter has been culled from these works as well as from a variety of journal articles and specialized pamphlets. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL SYSTEM

The social system of Italy is a composite of several systems. One method of describing and categorizing the systems is according to their economic bases. Thus it is possible to identify at least three systems—a traditional one based on agriculture, a modern one based on small-scale industrial activity, and a so-called contemporary one based on large corporate enterprise. Social relations in each system take a distinct form. In the traditional system the bond between the large landowner and the peasant is most salient; the relation between entrepreneurs and corporate managers on the one hand and industrial workers on the other is most salient in the modern and contemporary systems.

The Italian peasantry has been studied thoroughly by anthropologists and sociologists. Most of the studies, however, have been based on fieldwork conducted primarily in southern Italy. Generalizations are therefore risky. The few national opinion surveys available suggest (contrary to popular stereotypes) that the Italian peasantry did not see class relations as hostile. Although they recognized the low social prestige accorded them, they did not express as strong feelings of deprivation as did industrial workers. Solid sociological information on other social classes—particularly those that dominated the urban industrial centers of Italy—was lacking.

The social positions of an individual and a family depend on a combination of factors, including education, ancestry, wealth, and social behavior. Titles and special terms of address are in use and give some clue to social rank.

Personal success in Italy often depends on *raccomandazioni* (recommendations), that is, personal connections. Italians turn to informal personal networks of patrons or friends in order to survive in a social, economic, and political system that they view as sometimes corrupt and unjust.

Party membership in and voter support of the two largest and most influential political parties in Italy, the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC) and the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI), are mixed in terms of class representation. The PCI draws support from the working class and is

strongest in central Italy. The DC attracts voters from the old middle class of shopkeepers, artisans, and peasant proprietors. Women also figure prominently as DC party members and supporters. The DC stronghold is northeast Italy.

BACKGROUND

Italy has a complex society. The late political unification of the country, the unique historical backgrounds of the regions, and the uneven progression of socioeconomic development throughout the country make it virtually impossible to categorize the social system of Italy as a whole.

Lucino Gallino, an Italian social scientist, has identified what he terms three "social formations" prevailing in present-day Italy. They are based on the economic structure in a given area and include the traditional agrarian, the modern industrial, and the contemporary post-industrial formations. The traditional social formation is found throughout the south and in parts of central Italy; it is based on an agrarian rural economy. The modern social formation dominates in the urban areas of the north; it is typified by industrial development and private investment, ownership of capital goods, and relatively free market conditions. The contemporary social formation is only beginning to dominate in the large urban centers, such as the northwestern industrial triangle of Milan, Turin, and Genoa. According to Gallino it reflects a situation in which a limited number of large producers are able to influence market conditions. Indeed the northwestern triangle is the home base for many of the largest Italian corporations—Fiat, Olivetti, Alfa Romeo, and others.

The traditional social formation has undergone many changes as a result of interaction with the modern and contemporary systems, but it is largely intact in many areas of Italy. It is a two-tiered system; the focus of social relations is the landowner-peasant bond. At its purest a small landowning class controls access to the land, the primary source of livelihood for the vast majority of the population. What middle class exists is composed of a small group of artisans and merchants. Professionals—teachers, lawyers, and doctors—tend to fall outside the local social system. Theoretically it is possible to speak of socioeconomic classes—a landowning class, a middle class, and a peasant class. Individuals recognize others in the same grouping as equals and tend to limit their social interaction accordingly. There is, however, little semblance of a class consciousness in the sense of common interests within a socioeconomic grouping being recognized and supplying a motive for any kind of class-based action. Landowners occasionally act together, but it generally is only to obstruct the progress of would-be challengers to their privileged position; they act as a group, in other words, only to maintain the status quo.

For the mass of the population the family and the community form the only legitimate social units. Relationships outside the family are generally considered ephemeral and to be entered into with caution. Horizontal linkages based on friendship, occupation, and so forth are subordinated to vertical linkages based on patron-client ties between the landowner and his peasant-workers. Getting ahead in such a system depends on *raccomandazioni* obtained through the patronage networks. As a result there is little overt expression of class conflict. Peasants, in fact, are sometimes moved to action out of a sense of loyalty to their landlord-patron. The south Italian peasants, for example, were allied with the landowning elite in an attempt to ward off the north Italian invaders at the time of Italian unification. Telling, too, is the fact that as late as the 1960s and early 1970s the monarchists still had a stronghold among the south Italian peasantry.

In the traditional system there is a high degree of congruence among wealth, status, and power. The elite enjoy the largest incomes, are the most highly educated, and control the channels of local and sometimes national political power. For the mass of the population the social horizon is limited, and reference groups are local. The prevailing values of the elite tend to be translated into the desired values of the community. There is little contact with people from other communities; a parochial attitude, expressed in hostility toward strangers, dominates. Even the local elite (if the landowners are absentee, their managers often replace them in the local hierarchy) are oriented toward securing and maintaining their niche in the community. As a whole the system is relatively fixed and closed. Individuals assume their positions in society by virtue of birth. Marriage partners are drawn from among those of similar socioeconomic background.

When close relations outside the family develop, they are described in familistic terms. A friend becomes a cousin; a business partner becomes a godfather. The latter relationship is an institutional one—derived from Roman Catholic use—and is common where friendships are asymmetrical and instrumental.

The modern social formation began developing in the northern areas of Italy during the late nineteenth century, ushered in by the Italian industrial era. Whereas prestige and power are based largely on landownership in traditional Italy, money (capital) assumes greater significance in modern Italy. Social mobility is greater in the modern system; more people have access to channels of mobility based on achievement and merit than on family ties or influence. There often is a lack of congruence in the areas of wealth, status, and power, no one group having a monopoly on all three. Thus tension tends to develop as individuals strive to achieve a balance among the three. Industry gives rise to additional occupational categories, and horizontal linkages based on the categories develop across communities and regions. Class groups that recognize and promote common socioeconomic

omic interests and corporate groups—trade unions, cooperatives, and political parties—arise to represent and play on those interests. The middle class grows, often splitting into an upper level (professionals, wealthy entrepreneurs, and medium-scale landowners) and lower level (peasant proprietors, low-level bureaucrats, small merchants, and artisans).

In the modern formation reference groups reach beyond the locality to include regional, national, and sometimes international models. Improvements in transportation and communication allow members of all social strata access (direct or indirect) to the world outside the community. The prestige and power of the landowning elite declines slightly, and the small entrepreneurs come to the fore. Relations between the small entrepreneurs and industrial workers form the pivotal point in the system. A small service class also emerges.

In the 1970s the contemporary social formation in Italy had not spread beyond the northwest industrial triangle of Milan, Turin, and Genoa. It was a product of the postwar industrial boom. The large-scale industry associated with the contemporary formation means that large corporate business managers become important in the social system. Technocrats, not yet politically powerful as a group, are nonetheless part of the elite in terms of prestige and income. Professional politicians are more and more in control of the power positions. Relations between management and workers remain the focal point, but industrial labor is more organized and articulate. Rural workers are somewhat more organized, but their ranks are shrinking as more of them emigrate to cities and abroad. In the *modern social formation* the occupational groups occupying roughly equivalent social positions were not always well integrated. In the contemporary formation different occupational groups tend to recognize common interests and unite for social action. Achievement, education, and technical skills are the primary means of social mobility.

Italian society is evolving and developing; thus none of the social formations exists in pure form. The modern social formation, for example, continues to alter the structure of the traditional system and the relations between the classes in that system. As Gallino notes, the formations have "interpenetrated" so that "large numbers of people increasingly live part of the time in different social formations. The plant they work in may be contemporary while the family or community they return to at night, only modern or traditional."

The national social structure can be viewed as a mixture of the three social formations. At the top is an elite of landowners, entrepreneurs, corporate managers, and professionals. What has been called the new middle class includes salaried white-collar workers, small-scale entrepreneurs, and shopkeepers. This group has expanded considerably. In contrast, the old middle class—peasant proprietors, artisans, merchants, and self-employed shopkeepers—has declined in

relative numerical strength. The working class (agricultural and industrial workers and those in building, trade, and transport and services) constituted almost half of the population in 1971. At the bottom of the social ladder lay what some have termed the subproletariat—the urban and rural poor.

There have actually been few changes in Italy's social structure in terms of the proportions of social categories—elite, middle class, and working class—in the active population. What has changed, however, is the composition of the classes. Among the elite the number of landowners has declined in relation to the number of entrepreneurs and business managers. The old middle class has given way to the new middle class. The proportion of agricultural workers has declined, and the proportion of industrial workers has increased. The number of workers in building, trade, and transport and services has also grown steadily (almost 6 percent of the active population in 1881 and slightly over 20 percent in 1971).

RURAL ITALY

A number of writers have commented on the apparent resignation of Italian peasants to their lowly social position. The traditional view was one of a peasantry that saw little hope for social betterment. Position in the social hierarchy was accepted as God given, something over which one had little control. A rigidly stratified system—each individual fixed in a position, behaving according to well-defined rules—was taken for granted. All men were not created equal; discrepancies in wealth, status, and power were considered at least natural, if not just.

Much of the peasantry's apparent resignation has in fact been a result of its long history under a static and essentially feudal system. And resignation does not mean that the peasants have enjoyed their fate. Joseph Lopreato, a sociologist, found that intensive interviewing uncovered "in the peasant an intense dislike of his life-situation and a strong desire to leave the inferno of his peasant community." Moreover results of surveys conducted in the early 1960s among south Italian peasants revealed that most hoped for a better future for their children.

In the late 1960s Lopreato and Janet Saltzman analyzed the findings of a national opinion survey concerning peasants' perceptions of their occupation, their social position, and the relations between classes. Interestingly the findings did not support either of the two polar stereotypes of the peasantry—that they are happy and content with their lot and experience a kind of communal solidarity as a result of their shared poverty or that they see a world marked by conflict and distrust and are deeply resentful of their position in the social hierarchy. The latter has been the typical view advanced by anthropologists and sociologists who have studied southern Italy.

Data revealed that the peasantry ranked below all other social categories in Italy (including the urban proletariat) in material well-being. The peasants fell into the lowest income bracket; they had the least access to modern conveniences (running water and indoor plumbing) and owned the fewest consumer items (appliances and automobiles); they had the lowest education (over 20 percent illiterate and only about 5 percent educated beyond the elementary level); and their occupation (working the land) was accorded the lowest social prestige. The peasants were cognizant of their low prestige. Although some 95 percent considered their occupation to be useful to the "welfare of the nation," almost 50 percent (a far larger proportion than in any other group surveyed) felt that agricultural work carried with it little respect. Only 10 percent felt that their occupation merited a great deal of respect. Most were dissatisfied with their social position. Only 5 percent were very satisfied; nearly 50 percent expressed dissatisfaction, and about 35 percent of those who were dissatisfied saw no hope for improvement. Regarding their agricultural work the peasants seemed most dissatisfied because of the low income, the lack of material and psychological security, and the poor working conditions.

The Italian peasant, nonetheless, seemed to view class relations as essentially harmonious. About 62 percent felt that relations between classes were amiable or at least not hostile (compared with only 47 percent of the industrial workers interviewed). Furthermore peasants were less apt to perceive others as a barrier to their own social advancement. The socioeconomic system was not seen as benefiting only the wealthy or the politically powerful. Nearly 40 percent of the peasants interviewed indicated that everyone stood to profit when the economy prospered.

Many conditions in present-day Italy have led to changes in the self-image of the peasants and in their attitudes toward their social system. Industrialization, emigration, and improvements in communication and transportation have been perhaps the most important. In a traditional agrarian society social roles are well defined and positions in the social hierarchy relatively fixed; landowner, merchant, artisan, and peasant are relatively discrete social categories. Industrialization gives rise to new occupations and roles that are not readily incorporated into the traditional structure. Moreover the *miseria* (poverty) of the village is compared with the apparent prosperity of the city. Through mass media the peasants have been able to see how other people live without ever leaving the village. Increased communication has meant increased opportunities for comparison. Finally emigration has played a critical role in providing the peasant with a taste of life elsewhere. Within the local social system the remittances of emigrants have been responsible for the rapid rise in the standard of living of many. Thus both those who have migrated and those who have stayed behind have been affected. The peasant class itself has become

more stratified, and tensions have mounted; those raising their standard of living have attempted to leave behind their peasant origins while their former equals have become relatively worse off and bitter about their own situation.

Industrialization, emigration, and improvements in communication and transportation have led to a broadening of the peasant's sphere of social interaction. The peasant has become ever more aware of the world beyond the boundaries of his own community, and with this growing awareness have come a growing class consciousness and intensification of feelings of relative deprivation. Outside reference groups have increasingly replaced the local elite as models of social behavior. Lopreato reports that the rural southern poor compare themselves and their life situation with that of similar groups in northern Italy and Western Europe and North America. "The northerners are admired and thought to be rich, 'civilized,' and 'peaceful.' Southerners are thought to be *affamati* [starving], 'barbarous,' and 'sanguinary.'" Outside models have often done much to raise expectations but have not always provided the means to satisfy new wants.

THE BASES OF STRATIFICATION

A number of important criteria are typically used in evaluating social position. Occupation often is the most telling indicator. Throughout rural Italy, for example, manual labor on the land automatically places a person in the lowest social stratum. The amount of authority wielded by a person in his occupational role is also important. An employer-manager is always ranked higher than an employee-laborer. It is true that ownership of land is coveted—but only if one owns enough to afford to hire laborers or rent out a portion of the property to sharecroppers. Anthropologists report that in southern Italy small property owners engage the services of at least one worker, even when help is not necessary, in order to claim status as employers. Occupations that require special training and skills or a higher education are also considered prestigious.

Education is almost always valued and can be an important and quick channel of mobility. In parts of central Italy it automatically catapults an individual into the highest stratum regardless of his family background, family wealth, or other social factors. Unfortunately access to a higher education in Italy, even as late as the 1960s, was usually limited to the elite. Education was expensive, and schools (especially at the secondary level and higher) were situated in the large cities. Even at the primary level, where schooling was officially free, the cost of supplies, clothing, and transportation was prohibitive for many. The loss of a child's labor as an extra field hand also added to the cost of education. In 1968 less than 15 percent of those entering Italian universities came from the urban or rural working class. In

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contrast over 50 percent of the university students came from the homes of the elite and the new middle classes.

Ancestry is still important in rural Italy, where it acts as a kind of legitimizer of social rank. Most of the rural people make a distinction between the *nouveaux riches* and the established families who can trace their ancestry to the old nobility. However, the ability to trace descent back three or four generations to a well-to-do family—whether or not of noble ancestry—is usually sufficient to ensure an individual's ranking among the elite.

Wealth is, of course, an important criterion of social standing, but money alone does not ensure *entrée* into the upper social echelon. The *Americanci* (emigrants who have returned to live in Italy), for example, were able to build up savings from working abroad and to invest in land. They often enjoyed a comfortable income, but they failed to be ranked by their fellow villagers in the top stratum of the community. Only with the passage of time, when they had again become established and their children were educated, did they rise in social standing. Many anthropologists studying rural Italian villages have discovered that the wealthiest families often fall only into the middle social strata. Money is most important as a vehicle to a desired end. In itself it is meaningless, but it does enable one to buy and display most of the traditional status symbols (land, dress, housing, and education).

Social behavior in its broadest sense is an important mark of social position. Some authors have explained social behavior in terms of *civiltà* (civility), maintaining that an ideology of *civiltà* underlies rural Italian social structure (see ch. 4). Social behavior expressed in *civiltà* is the degree to which an individual is acculturated to city ways. Manners, style of clothing, and participation in urban and national life all have a bearing on social standing.

Italians are family oriented, and status is something that accrues to the family unit rather than to the individual. Usually the position of the head of the household determines the social rank of the family. In exceptional cases it is possible for other members of the family to affect the family's standing. When a son graduates from the university, for example, his family shares to some extent in his newfound prestige. When a woman marries into a family of higher social standing, she is accorded the respect appropriate to her husband's position, although the reverse—for a man marrying a woman of higher standing—is not always true.

In Italy position in the social hierarchy can be gauged by the amount of *rispetto* (respect) shown to a person and the family by members of the community. *Rispetto* is not an evaluation of general character or an indication of regard felt toward a particular individual. A person is owed *rispetto* partly on the basis of age, sex, or position in the family. For example, a younger person owes a certain defer-

ence to elders; a woman, according to the norms of society, must display respect toward her husband; and a child is raised to respect his or her parents. Beyond these tangible and readily assessable factors, however, there is something intangible that seems to dictate correct behavior whenever two people meet. The intangible aspect of *rispetto* is based on a combination of the criteria discussed above—occupation, way of life, financial position, ancestry, education, and so forth. The balance of these criteria determines the deference due a person. Most studies of social stratification have focused on a fixed combination of these indicators in order to rank individuals uniformly. Anthropologists working in Italy, however, have found that different combinations of these criteria are salient in different situations.

Titles and terms of address provide a good indicator of social standing. The Italian language, for example, has three personal pronouns that correspond to the English word *you*. When two individuals meet, their choice of pronouns reveals many things about their relative social positions and their relationship to each other. A person uses *lei* (in some regions *vossia*) when speaking to those who are particularly respected or are considered social superiors. In traditional Italy members of the old nobility, the landowning elite, and sometimes the professional class merit this form of address. The elite also use it when speaking to each other. *Tu* is the least formal term of address; its use implies an intimacy between speakers. It is generally reserved for use among close friends and relatives and in speaking to small children. The elite sometimes use *tu* in addressing those in the lower classes, especially their employees, but use of the form in that context is often thought to be unduly patronizing. Among adults the most frequently used form is *voi*. It is a polite expression that does not connote either the intimacy of *tu* or the formality of *lei*. *Voi* is the form usually chosen when talking to a stranger.

Early immigrants to the United States were often impressed by the absence of distinctions between *you* forms and the informality of terms of address. When returned emigrants discussed what appeared to them as democratic and egalitarian norms in the United States, they often cited the use of the universal *you* of English.

Titles are still used in Italy, though with less frequency than formerly. The term *don* followed by the Christian name usually indicates that the person addressed has a claim to noble heritage. The title itself implies formal respect, and the use of the Christian name after it implies a certain affection, or at least a recognition that the tie that binds the two speakers is a close one. Thus the nobility use *don* among themselves, and the peasantry use *don* when speaking to the landowners for whom they work. In the first case a certain class solidarity and respectful familiarity is implicit; in the second case the closeness of the traditional patron-client bond is emphasized. A priest

is also addressed as *don*. Use of this title is most widespread in the south.

More common, however, is the title *signore*. Used alone it translates as gentleman or sir. Usually it is followed by the surname, in which case it is equivalent to the English word *mister*. *Signore* is a more distant but nevertheless respectful form of address. A stranger whose rank is unknown is called *signore*.

Professional persons who were not always readily incorporated into the traditional social structure rarely merited the title *don* but were addressed either as *signore* or by their professional title alone—*maestro* (teacher), *professor* (professor), or *dottore* (doctor—any university graduate earns that title). Often the wife of a professional is addressed with the feminine form of the title (as in *dottoressa*), although the usage is technically incorrect. The professional title is thought to be a compromise between the distant *signore* and the narrowly restricted *don*.

Use of titles and distinctions between the various forms of *you* are used with less rigor—particularly in the urban areas of Italy—than ever before. They very formal *lei*, though taught as the polite and proper form in textbook Italian, has been replaced by *voi* in everyday conversation. The title *don* is almost entirely confined to parts of the rural south and Sicily. Even the use of *signore* sometimes carries a sarcastic connotation—particularly when used in addressing people who attempt to feign superior status.

PATRONAGE NETWORKS

Patronage, in the broadest sense of the term, continues to dominate many aspects of Italian social, political, and economic life. Many social scientists have described patronage as an adaptive response to an environment perceived as "impersonal unfair, and hostile." Anthony Galt, an anthropologist, has argued that patronage is an adaptive response to such an image but that the image itself is perpetuated by those who control the patronage networks (and hence receive the most benefits) in order to keep the system operative.

Galt sees social and political relations in Italy in terms of an official system and a real system. The official system is perceived as corrupt, remote, and inefficient. Interestingly, use of the real system, although it depends on favoritism and may involve extralegal shortcuts, is not necessarily perceived as wrong—only as necessary. "The codified official system can be viewed as the permanent and rigid trellis around and through which the real system grows. The former is fixed and difficult to change, the latter is always changing and flexible." The official and real systems have reinforced the common man's feeling of impotence on a national level and convinced him that the only way to survive in his society is through coalition building on a personal level.

The Italians say that a person uses or has *raccomandazioni*. Use of the term in this context refers both to actual written or oral references and to pull. Much of an Italian's personal success or advancement depends on the effectiveness and strength of the individual's *raccomandazioni*.

Bribery is different from the use of *raccomandazioni*. Although it is taken for granted, it is not considered part of usual patron-client or friendship relations. Italians prefer to use personalistic networks. Bribery is a single calculated act; no real or imagined emotional tie binds those involved other than the direct payment of money.

Traditionally the Italian related to his system through a series of vertical ties between landowners (patrons) and peasants (clients). Patron-client relations cut across occupational and economic groupings and were partly responsible for the slow development of class-based organizations. Thus one poor peasant often competed against another to secure needed favors and protection from a patron.

The relationship was most often asymmetrical; it involved persons of two different social statuses entering into a kind of partnership for their mutual benefit. One anthropologist has called the relationship a "lop-sided friendship." In the traditional system members of the old landowning elite held all the positions of power in the community. They controlled local political offices; they were active in church affairs; they were involved in a market economy (unlike their subsistence-based sharecroppers, tenants, and laborers); and they provided virtually the only link with the world outside the community. Patrons were therefore instrumental in procuring jobs for their clients, obtaining loans, moving a sluggish governmental bureaucracy to action, and dealing with the authorities when problems arose. Patrons offered relief on an individual and small scale; the generosity and effectiveness of the patron enhanced his social prestige. The client in return offered loyalty, gathered information, and promised voter support at election time.

In the 1970s one still needed the *raccomandazioni* of patrons and friends. The general-purpose, all-effective patrons who could take care of their clients' every need, however, have become for the most part a thing of the past. The number of patrons has increased, and they tend to serve more specialized needs. Thus in order to find employment, muddle through bureaucratic red tape, and so forth, the individual must approach and curry favor with a number of persons from all walks of society. There has been a diffusion of wealth and power in the Italian community. Party bosses, civil servants, priests, police officers, teachers, and doctors may all rival the once omnipotent landowner-patron—depending on what kind of favor is needed. The new patrons do not always combine the status, wealth and power of the old elite, but they do exercise fairly firm control over certain important channels.

Whereas social scientists tend to refer to the traditional relationship as a patron-client bond, they describe the more contemporary relationships as a dyadic (two-person) friendship. The new dyadic relationships tend to be less enduring, more shifting, and more functionally specific than the old patron-client relations. An individual typically forms a part of many dyadic links that could conflict if called into force at the same time. The individual has become, as one social scientist noted, "a unit in a power struggle with respect to what he possesses, whom he controls, and who controls him." Dyadic friendships are horizontal. Individuals are linked through intraclass chains to others within and outside their community. Consequently vertical (interclass) ties have declined in importance.

The specific wealth, power, and prestige of the patron or friend are not as crucial as his connections. One seeks favors from those plugged into the most powerful political, economic, and social circuits. A running tabulation of debts (favors received) and credits (favors given) is said to be maintained by those involved. The idea is never to balance the account perfectly. Credits provide a useful reserve or insurance in case of emergency.

In a situation in which living conditions are poor, economic resources limited, and access to them a matter of intense competition, people become important assets as means to a desired end. Friendships tend to become utilitarian. Mutual self-interest lies, in fact, at the core of most relationships entered into outside the nuclear family. Affection and compatibility may be important, but a relationship is also measured in terms of costs and benefits: how much can a friend offer (through the resources at his disposal), and how much and what will be demanded or expected in return. Thus there are apt to be both sentimental and instrumental elements involved in the relationship.

Italians usually attempt to phrase a relationship in affective, familial terms. They prefer, if possible, to incorporate the friend or patron bond into the kin network, thus solidifying and stabilizing the bond. Patrons, for example, may be asked to serve as godparents. Patronage and friendship bonds usually involve more than just the two individuals who initially enter into the relationship; they involve the families as well. Human resources are similar to other tangible and material resources in that they continue to exist, in some sense, apart from the two individuals who specifically and initially contracted them. Thus friendships and patron-client bonds may be inherited. The peasant-client of a particular landowner-patron may be passed on to the patron's son, provided the son honors the unofficial agreement. Two young men may enter into a friendship because their fathers were friends.

SOCIETY AND POLITICS

Italians are said to view their government officials, party leaders, and civil servants with suspicion, or at best indifference. At the same time they are said to cultivate a dependent role and to expect the government to take responsibility for their welfare. As one social scientist aptly remarked: the peasant "has been educated to consider the government his worst enemy, while expecting it to do everything for him."

The people, especially the poor, are ambivalent because of the sense of impotence they feel vis-à-vis the operation of the government, especially at the national level. The Italian government is highly centralized, and the centers of power are remote from the vast majority of the population. Civil servants are appointed by the central government. They are not ordinarily stationed in the towns or villages where they were born and raised. Often they are not even familiar with the area of the country in which they serve. Many look at their assignment as temporary, and most hope to be promoted and transferred to a large urban area.

The practice of politics varies throughout the different areas of Italy. In the south and on the islands (traditional Italy) patron-client relationships have carried over into present-day politics. The political party leader has taken over many of the traditional functions of the landowner-patron. Party members are linked to the centers of decision-making through vast *clientela* (patronage) networks (see ch. 11).

One author has described politics in southern Italy as a logical outgrowth of the "culture of poverty." Politics is still primarily a matter of personalities. Rarely is a voter's decision based on party platforms or organized group interests. People do not seem to vote on the basis of any clear-cut ideology. The rural southern Italian, facing immediate problems, votes for the candidate who promises and delivers tangible short-run benefits. Votes are used as a sort of currency to pay for favors delivered or expected. Candidates recognize their roles as those of patrons rather than public servants. They do not campaign on the basis of issues or on the basis of their public record. They vie for votes by promising prospective voters strong *raccomandazioni*. Political alliances tend to be shifting and unstable. Raphael Zariski, a student of Italy, reports that "even Southern Communist provincial leaders reflect the paternalism of the Southern subculture by treating their rank-and-file members of peasant origin with a certain air of condescension and superiority and by showing less concern for ideology than do Northern Communist provincial leaders."

Lack of loyalty and distrust said to be characteristic of south Italian relationships make it virtually impossible to develop stable organizations. The rural southerner tends to see ulterior motives in any display of civic-mindedness. Edward Banfield, a sociologist, reports that

the average southern Italian believes corruption of civil servants and government officials to be widespread—if not directly through cash kickbacks then indirectly through the informal pressure to honor *raccomandazioni*. Thus government officials and private citizens who claim to defend the public good are regarded as fools or frauds.

Banfield also discovered that leadership positions were difficult to fill. No one wanted to volunteer or accept responsibility for community projects, and no one wanted to follow orders. There appeared to be a general unwillingness to devote any more time or effort to a position or job than was absolutely necessary. Public officials, teachers, and certain professionals lacked a "sense of mission or calling."

Party allegiance and class-voiced interests are more important in urban areas and in the north in general. Peter Allum, an observer of politics in Italy, has divided the country into five sociopolitical areas. In addition to the south and the islands the areas are the so-called White provinces of northeast Italy—Trentino-Alto Adige, Venetia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and parts of Lombardy; the Red provinces of central Italy—Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, and parts of Lombardy and Latium; and northwest Italy—Piedmont, Valle d' Aosta, and parts of Lombardy. The White and the Red provinces are characterized by a good-evil dichotomy. According to Allum, in the White provinces the church represents the positive pole, or good, and the enemies of the church represent the negative pole, or evil. In the Red provinces the people (proletariat) and the PCI represent good, and the establishment (church, big business, and authority) represents evil.

The White and the Red provinces differ from the northwestern industrial area in that the latter is dominated by a middle-class culture. A working-class consciousness is evident, but prosperity has also brought, according to Allum, "a progressive *embourgeoisement* of the Italian working class."

The breakdown of party membership and voter composition according to sociodemographic and geographic characteristics reflects some interesting variations. The PCI and the DC have the largest membership (approximately 1.5 million each) and are the most prominent parties in Italian politics. About three-fourths of the membership of the PCI is drawn, as might be expected, from working-class families. Industrial workers in urban areas form the core of the membership in the north and center; rural workers (the peasantry) in agro-towns and in the countryside make up the majority of the membership in the south. Party membership is largest in the regions of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna.

The membership of the DC is a composite of class backgrounds. The working class is not as visible as in the PCI, but it does constitute about one-third of the DC membership, and the middle classes make up another one-third. Women also form a sizable part of the

DC. Party members are scattered throughout the country but are found especially in the northeast and south. Allum cautions, however, that information on southern membership is not conclusive since there appears to be a "high annual turnover."

The voting public displays many of the same characteristics as the party membership. PCI voters dominate central Italy, whereas the DC is strongest in the northeast. Results from the 1970 elections revealed that almost two-thirds of DC voters were women; there were slightly more men than women among PCI voters. Both PCI and DC voters tended to be under forty years of age. PCI members were primarily from the industrial and rural working classes, although in the Red provinces the middle classes and the small farmers and sharecroppers also were strongly represented. The DC drew its votes, if housewives are excluded as a class category, from the old middle class of shopkeepers, artisans, and peasant proprietors. It also attracted much of the rural southern vote.

Lopreato has studied the political attitudes of the upwardly mobile, using national survey data from 1964. He found that the middle classes—particularly the established and well-to-do middle classes—were more conservative politically than the lower working class. As working-class individuals (and their families) rose in the social hierarchy, they tended to maintain their comparatively leftist orientation rather than emulate the old established members. Increases in consumption level affected political party preferences—higher consumption levels corresponding to a conservative tendency—but people having recently attained a higher social position were less likely to change their political preferences. Lopreato explained that "status discrepancies" were responsible for the failure of the upwardly mobile to emulate the longer established members of the middle class. The social distance between the upwardly mobile and the established was not closed through material betterment. The established families were defensive of their positions and unfriendly toward those who would enter their ranks from below. The upwardly mobile perceived the social discrimination and tended, as a result, to remain faithful to their former political positions.

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For valuable sources on the social system see notes at end of chapter 4.

CHAPTER 6

COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL LIFE

In 1976 Italy was served by two television and three radio networks operated on a nationwide basis by Italian Radio-Television (Radiotelevisione Italiana—RAI), a government-regulated joint stock company in which the state owns a majority interest. As a result of court decisions in 1974 and 1976, privately owned cable television and radio stations were granted licenses for local broadcasting. In 1975 there were 13.7 million licensed radios registered in Italy and 12.6 million licensed television receivers. Television transmission came into an estimated 60 percent of the households in the country. The country's eighty-one morning and evening newspapers put approximately 7 million copies on the newsstands daily in 1976, but their market included only a limited proportion of the population. Financial difficulties, endemic to the Italian press industry, necessitated direct government subsidies to defray production cost.

ELECTRONIC MEDIA

Although legally the RAI was a private corporation whose relations with the government were defined by contract, the majority of its stock was owned by the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale—IRI), a state holding company administering public investment in Italian industrial and commercial enterprises. A general assembly of shareholders, in which private investors were also represented, reviewed corporation policies, but RAI was essentially a government operation, regulated by the Ministry of Postal Service and Telecommunications and supervised by Parliament. Day-to-day administration of RAI was vested in a council of directors, ten of whose sixteen members were appointed by a permanent parliamentary commission composed of forty senators and deputies representing all political parties who reviewed programming for balance and objectivity. Program schedules were submitted quarterly for approval to the Ministry of Postal Service and Telecommunications. RAI was under statutory mandate to ensure that its productions did not discredit the nation or damage Italy's relations with foreign powers, and its directors were obligated by law to confer with the government on questions regarding the propriety of broadcasts and telecasts.

RAI was subject to fines for failure to comply with these contractual regulation. In 1975 an extensive revision of the RAI charter further extended parliamentary authority over its operation.

Until 1974 RAI had an exclusive concession from the government to provide Italy with radio and television programming. Repeated attempts to introduce independent broadcasting in competition with RAI were blocked by the government, backed by the decision of Italian and European Communities courts upholding the accepted opinion that radio and television transmission is a "public service" that legitimately constitutes a "monopoly situation." In 1974, however, the Constitutional Court, Italy's highest tribunal, ruled on an appeal to allow licensing of privately owned cable television for local transmissions, thus breaking the RAI monopoly. In the high court's view RAI had failed to meet the contractual requirements of impartiality, objectivity, and completeness of coverage, which were judged to be the only defensible grounds on which the monopoly could have been maintained.

A subsequent court decision in 1976 opened local airwaves to private radiobroadcasting, legalizing the more than 600 private stations that had sprung up across the country after the 1974 cable television judgment. No method of regulating so-called free radio has been devised, however, and stations have taken over unused frequencies without authorization to broadcast music, local news, commercial advertising, and political propaganda. According to the court decision, RAI clearly retains exclusive right to national broadcasting, but officials of the corporation, who condemned the ruling, predicted that it would open the "way to chaos."

The litigation over cable television hastened the enactment in 1975 of legislation reorganizing RAI. Difficulties confronted authorities however, in putting into effect Parliament's sweeping proposals to guarantee RAI's independence from political interference, promote the free flow of information reflecting a wider range of opinions, and provide greater public access to the media. RAI's response to the problem of ensuring both diversity and impartiality in broadcasting was to convert its two existing television channels—one of which had carried general entertainment, the other educational and cultural programs—to competing networks with separate news services, one "Catholic" in orientation and run primarily by Christian Democrats, the other a socialist-dominated "lay network." A similar division, perhaps allowing access to nonsocialist lay opinion, was envisioned for the three RAI radio networks, but reorganization was incomplete in 1976. Increased technical and financial supervision of RAI by the Ministry of Postal Service and Telecommunications was implied in the reorganization legislation, which considerably strengthened parliamentary authority to review program planning. Viewers and listeners also

obtained extraordinary latitude to protest programs they considered offensive.

RAI had 10,000 employees in 1976, about 20 percent of whom were involved in production at 145 studios located in Rome, Milan, Turin, Naples, and eleven regional centers. Revenue was derived from license fees on radio and television receivers and from commercial advertising, handled exclusively for RAI by an independent advertising agency. From 5 to 8 percent of air time was given over to commercials, on which RAI imposed strict standards of accuracy.

Radio

RAI's three radio networks were on the air for a total of more than 340 hours weekly. Over half of their output was music. The National Program, RAI's first network, broadcast general fare intended to provide something of appeal to every segment of the population. Approximately 70 percent of its schedule was given over to light entertainment, 15 percent to news and information. The Second Program broadcast popular music to a larger, less sophisticated audience and also featured regional broadcasts and programs serving Italy's linguistic minorities. Unabashedly intellectual in its format, the Third Program scheduled discussions and lectures, serious music, news analysis, and drama for an educated class of listeners. Some medium-wave, amplitude modulation (AM) programs from the home networks were broadcast simultaneously on shortwave to North Africa and the more remote sections of Italy. Radio Roma, RAI's shortwave overseas service, transmitted 215 hours weekly in Italian and twenty-six foreign languages. RAI also operated the Radio-Telephone Journal, a subscription service for news bulletins carried over telephone lines, as well as special wired stereophonic radio services offered to subscribers in twelve cities.

The so-called free radio stations, given legal status by the 1976 court ruling, fell into several categories: profit-oriented commercial operations featuring varied music and local news programs; politically oriented stations, often set up by extremist splinter parties; and so-called alternative radio, catering to audiences with esoteric tastes. Collectively, it was argued, they offered a more realistic reflection of contemporary Italian culture than did RAI, which accounted for the enormous popularity of their around-the-clock broadcasting.

Television

Regularly scheduled television transmission was introduced by RAI in 1953 over the National Program. The Second Program, offering programs of selective cultural and intellectual interest, originated in 1961. Before RAI's reorganization the noncompetitive public net-

works coordinated programming to assure audiences at any given hour of distinct kinds of programs. Limited local programming was provided by regional studios, including telecasts in German from Bolzano and in Slovenian from Trieste. Color transmission was inaugurated with coverage of the 1976 Olympic Games. RAI was expected to have a third national television network in operation by 1978.

Notwithstanding the opinion of critics that Italian television is dull, it has enjoyed enormous popularity. RAI's average nightly audience is estimated at between 25 and 30 million viewers. Their preference in 1976 was for quiz programs and contests, musical shows, and variety packages that feature popular entertainment celebrities and are interspersed with spot commercials.

While media critics criticized the content and the low technical standards of RAI television productions, they focused more sharply on news reporting and analysis for its self-censorship, political bias, and lack of depth and diversity. It was charged, for instance, that RAI information programs avoided discussion of sensitive subjects or issues embarrassing to the government. The RAI administration, it was also pointed out, was staffed primarily by appointees of the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC)—and after 1962 by those of their socialist allies—who were picked for their political affiliations rather than for their technical qualifications.

The implementation of directives in the 1975 reorganization plan to impose objectivity on RAI news coverage sparked debate in political and professional circles. Critics of the plan, such as the Milan journalist Mauro Lucentini, who expressed misgivings at what was taken to be RAI's leftward tilt after 1975, complained that it was politically motivated and intended essentially to extend patronage in the media bureaucracy across the spectrum of political parties to include the Communists. It was asserted that, rather than reforming administration of the broadcasting monopoly and setting out standards of objectivity for it, reorganization had merely provided more groups with an opportunity to distort the news. In 1976 allegations were made in Parliament regarding procommunist censorship by television technicians, and it was subsequently verified that passages critical of Soviet policy had been deleted from an RAI interview with Soviet dissident Andrei Sinyavsky. In another incident widely reported in the United States press, remarks by the American presidential candidate Jimmy Carter were edited to give a positive slant to his position on participation in the government by the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano-PCI).

Except for coverage of special events daytime television is given over to educational programming prepared by Telescuola (educational television) and presented through the facilities of the National Program. Telescuola was the first such service in Europe to use television to supplement classroom instruction. In contrast to evening pro-

gramming its offerings are regarded as being well produced and effective both from an instructional standpoint and as entertainment.

THE PRESS

It is difficult to estimate the circulation of Italian newspapers and magazines accurately. Daily newspapers and most periodicals are sold at more than 25,000 newsstands across the country rather than delivered to subscribers, and circulation fluctuates from issue to issue, depending on leading news stories, special features, or—in the case of popular periodicals—the cover illustration. Large press overruns, counted as part of total circulation, are usual and, of 7 million newspapers printed daily, fully 20 percent are regularly returned unsold to the publishers. Publishers also tend to inflate estimates of circulation to impress advertisers, to qualify for higher government subsidies, or for political purposes. For instance, the daily circulation of *L'Unità*, official organ of the PCI, is seldom half the figure of 600,000 usually cited. Only one newspaper, the nationally circulated *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), sells more than 500,000 copies daily; it is followed at a distance by *La Stampa* (Turin) (see table 2). More than 25 million newsmagazines and illustrated periodicals are sold weekly, however.

Table 2. Circulation of Leading Daily Newspapers, 1976

Newspaper	City	Orientation	Circulation ¹ (in thousands)
<i>Corriere della Sera</i>	Milan	moderate	600
<i>L'Unità</i>	Milan and Rome	communist	600 ²
<i>La Stampa</i>	Turin	moderate	425
<i>Il Messaggero</i>	Rome	left	275
<i>Il Giorno</i>	Milan	left	270
<i>Il Giornale Nuovo</i>	Milan	right	260
<i>Il Resto del Carlino</i>	Bologna	moderate	230
<i>La Nazione</i>	Florence	moderate	225
<i>Il Tempo</i>	Rome	right	225
<i>Paese Sera</i> ³	Rome	communist	160
<i>Il Gazzettino</i>	Venice	moderate	150
<i>Il Secolo XIX Nuovo</i>	Genoa	left	140
<i>La Repubblica</i>	Rome	left	140
<i>Corriere d'Informazione</i> ³	Milan	moderate	140
<i>Stampa Sera</i> ³	Turin	moderate	140
<i>Avanti!</i>	Rome	socialist	130 ²
<i>La Notte</i> ³	Milan	moderate	130
<i>Il Mattino</i>	Naples	moderate	120
<i>Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno</i>	Bari	moderate	100
<i>L'Ora</i>	Palermo	moderate	100
<i>Il Secolo d'Italia</i>	Rome	neofascist	100 ²

¹ Estimated.

² Claimed.

³ Evening.

Newspapers

Eighty-one daily newspapers were published in Italy in 1976, a comparatively small number in a country of 56 million inhabitants. Almost without exception they were unprofitable, unable to meet production costs even with government subsidies. Few newspapers survive as independent publishing ventures; most have been absorbed individually or as part of newspaper chains by large publishing houses, political parties, banks, and industrial or commercial interests. The rate of closure due to bankruptcy has been high even among established newspapers, the invariable cause being the combination of spiraling costs and static circulation.

Only about fifteen of every 100 Italians reads a newspaper regularly, the lowest rate in Western Europe. It has been explained that Italians do not trust newspapers, considering them the instruments of political and business interests, and also that Italians would rather talk about the news than read it. In addition the journalistic style of much of the press is probably beyond the grasp of ordinary readers. Italian newspapers have traditionally appealed to an educated, middle-class audience. The most serious, reliable, and best written of the Italian dailies, the moderate *Corriere della Sera*, is also the country's best-selling newspaper although it makes no concessions to a popular readership. The market for a mass-circulation press is lacking, and no effort has been made by publishers to develop one. Italy has none of the racy daily tabloids that are staple reading for a large segment of the population throughout the rest of Western Europe. Much of that potential market in Italy, however, is served by illustrated weekly magazines.

Italian journalists enjoy unusual social and professional prestige. They consider themselves part of the country's intellectual elite and participants in the public process rather than merely commentators on it. They are also the best paid members of their profession in Europe, and they have been able to count on a remarkable degree of job security. Their position is in large measure the legacy of the patronage bestowed by Benito Mussolini on his former colleagues to court their cooperation, and it explains their considerable independence from editorial control in the postwar period. Journalists are expected to write for themselves, not for owners and editors, and except in the party press readers may find a diversity of opinions expressed in their favorite newspaper regardless of the political thrust of its editorial policy. Journalists are not, however, given high marks for their objectivity.

Italian law carries stiff penalties for libel, and publications are subject to seizure for ridiculing public figures or national institutions. Editors of marginal local newspapers are also cautious not to print material offensive to readers. Newsmen have been subject to official

intimidation, but examples of outright government censorship or editorial interference by shareholders are rare. In 1974 the Arab Boycott Committee threatened Fiat, owner of *La Stampa*, with economic reprisals by member states unless Arrigo Levi, one of Europe's most distinguished journalists, was dismissed as the newspaper's editor, but Levi was kept at his post. Newsmen and editors have also been targets of political terrorists of the extreme right and left.

In 1976 more than half of the Italian dailies, accounting for two-thirds of total circulation, appeared in the industrial north. Twenty-five were published in central Italy, including twenty-two newspapers in Rome alone, and only seven in the entire south. *Corriere della Sera*, *La Stampa*, *Il Messaggero* (Rome), and *Il Tempo* (Rome) circulate nationally and can be found at most newsstands. Special sections devoted exclusively to local news are inserted in the regional editions of the national press. Facsimile pages of *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* are transmitted by radio to Rome, where southern editions are printed. Dailies with regional circulations are published in thirty-six cities. *La Nazione* (Florence) serves Tuscany, and its twin publication, *Il Resto del Carlino* (Bologna), Emilia-Romagna; *Il Secolo XIX* (Genoa) covers Liguria, *Il Gazzettino* (Venice), *Il Mattino* (Naples) covers the Naples region, and *L'Ora* (Palermo) covers much of Sicily. The regional press does not give extensive coverage to the local scene, however, concentrating instead on national and foreign news, and attempts have failed to sustain distinctly regional newspapers focusing on local news.

Evening newspapers are few and usually circulate locally. *Corriere d'Informazione* (Milan) and *Stampa Sera* (Turin) are published as evening editions of *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa*. *La Notte* (Milan) also publishes a Venice edition, *Veneto Notte*.

Corriere della Sera and *La Stampa* outstrip all other Italian dailies in the extent of their news coverage and rank among the most prestigious newspapers in Europe. Among Rome dailies the right-wing *Il Tempo* is judged the most serious and reliable and, with the Milan and Turin giants, it maintains a high standard of journalism. The rival, *Il Messaggero*, survived a severe dispute between staff and management over editorial policy in 1973 and 1974 to attain a position as the capital's largest daily in 1976 and was one of the few newspapers in Italy to show a growth in circulation. A new left-wing Rome daily, *La Repubblica*, established early in 1976 and intended as a quality newspaper, came close by the end of its first year to reaching the circulation considered necessary for continued operation without, however, achieving the professional standards to which it had aspired. *Il Giornale Nuovo* (Milan), which is owned by its staff, is a growing independent right-wing daily, established in 1974 by dissatisfied journalists from *Corriere della Sera*.

Sports dailies command a large readership. *La Gazzetta dello Sport* (Milan), operated by *La Stampa*, has an average circulation of 200,000, which is nearly doubled for the special Monday morning edition. *Corriere dello Sport* (Rome) sells more than 175,000 copies daily in thirteen regional editions. The leading financial daily is *Il Sole/24 Ore* (Milan), followed by *Il Fiorino* (Rome) and *Il Globo* (Rome).

Political parties publish official daily newspapers and own or subsidize others that are not party organs. The most important party dailies in influence and circulation are the communist *L'Unità* and the socialist *Avanti!* (Rome), which claim circulations of 600,000 and 130,000 respectively. *Il Secolo d'Italia*, organ of the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano—MSI), has a significant following in Rome and an announced circulation of more than 100,000. Most party organs are small, and all lose money; but they are considered necessary expenses. The ruling Christian Democrats operate seven provincial dailies in addition to the official party newspaper, *Il Popolo*, whose circulation does not exceed 10,000, and several other small newspapers are unofficially affiliated with party factions (see ch. 11).

Several dailies are also published by church-related organizations. The largest of these newspapers, *Avvenire* (Milan), has a circulation of 90,000. *L'Osservatore Romano*, published daily in Vatican City, is the unofficial newspaper of the Holy See.

Periodicals

More than 2 billion copies of the approximately 4,000 periodicals published in Italy were distributed in 1976. With nearly 2 million copies sold weekly, *Famiglia Cristiana*, a Catholic magazine specializing in articles on childcare and homemaking as well as devotional material, is by far Italy's most widely circulated periodical, followed by *Sorrisi e Canzoni*, a weekly entertainment guide, and the monthly *L'Automobile*, a motoring mechanics journal, both with circulations of over 1 million copies per issue. Topical illustrated magazines and newsmagazines in various formats accounted for sales of 25 million copies weekly.

The illustrated weeklies are aimed at a middle range of readers passed over by the daily quality press and are primarily intended to provide entertainment rather than information. The largest of them, with a circulation of 800,000, is *Domenica del Corriere*, published by *Corriere della Sera*; it offers feature articles on a wide range of topics, interviews, entertainment news, human interest stories, fiction, puzzles, and other diversions but little hard news reporting. *Oggi*, *Gente*, and *Epoca* lead the field in the popular glossy magazine category and regularly include some material of political and cultural interest among their photographic essays and topical specialties. *L'*

Europeo, patterned originally after *Life*, is a cut above the others in its photojournalism and the seriousness of its articles. The weekly newsmagazines, *L'Espresso*, *Panorama*, *Tempo*, and *Mondo*, offer summaries of current events and opinion in a format similar to that of *Time* and *Newsweek*. Politically left wing, the news weeklies have been criticized for resorting to sensationalism in order to hold readers; however, writers with distinguished reputations and varied political backgrounds regularly contribute to their columns. Circulation of the illustrated weeklies and newsmagazines dropped by approximately 10 percent in the 1970-75 period, causing publishers to cut back on size and reduce production standards.

Specialized periodicals with a more stable interest-oriented audience were spared the drop in circulation experienced by the mass-circulation weeklies dependent on a wider cross section of readers. The weekly *Mondo Economica* and monthlies *Quattrosoldi* and *Successo* are the leading financial and business periodicals. The Italian edition of *Europa*, which features well-informed articles on political, social, and economic issues, is produced by *La Stampa* in cooperation with other European newspapers. The monthly literary review *Libri del Borghese* reaches more than 100,000 readers. Despite smaller circulations political and cultural journals, such as the weekly *Il Borghese*, the Jesuit fortnightly *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and the monthly *Il Ponte*, reach an influential class of educated readers. The communist weekly *Renascita*, with its literary supplement *Il Contemporaneo*, and the Christian Democratic *La Discussione* are also valued for their political and cultural commentary. *Domus*, a bilingual monthly, is an internationally respected journal of architecture and design.

A broader range of Italian readers enjoy the large number of periodicals specializing in sports, motoring, entertainment, religion, and children's literature. *Storia Illustrata* is a widely read monthly historical review written in an easily accessible journalistic style. *Confidenze*, *Grazia*, and *Intimità* are popular weekly women's publications.

Investments and Subsidies

The Italian press has experienced chronic financial problems, aggravated since 1973 by the general condition of the economy (see ch. 7). *Corriere della Sera*, despite its impressive circulation by Italian standards, barely broke even in 1974, a year in which *La Stampa* reported a deficit equivalent to a US\$4 million, and it was estimated that the total deficit of the Italian press amounted to the equivalent of US\$150 million in 1975. Publishers, newsmen, and government officials have debated for years how the industry could be shored up financially through new infusions of investment without exposing newspapers to the threat of editorial control by majority shareholders or the state. The trend was definitely established in the early 1970s, however, for

newspaper ownership to be concentrated in the hands of a few large enterprises.

Over a period of years Montedison, a chemical industry-based conglomerate in which the Italian state is a shareholder, has obtained financial interests through either direct ownership or investment in publishing houses in at least half a dozen of the country's leading dailies. In 1976 Montedison backed the publishing house Rizzoli Editore in the purchase of the *Corriere della Sera* chain. Rizzoli, which also financed its investments with government loans, already accounted for nearly half of Italy's periodical market, its publications including *Oggi* and the Italian edition of *Playboy*. Three years earlier the magazine publisher Edilio Rusconi acquired majority holdings in *Il Messaggero* and *Il Secolo XIX Nuovo* with financial assistance from Angelo Morati, an oil magnate closely linked to Montedison. Morati had a majority holding in the sugar complex Eridania, which owned the regional dailies *La Nazione* and *Il Resto del Carlino*. Fiat and other concerns owned by the Agnelli family have for some time controlled *La Stampa* and its chain of newspapers and periodicals.

The motives for such determined investment in an ailing industry puzzle observers. It was suggested that investors were speculating on an increased demand for reading material during a period in which Italy was experiencing rapid social and cultural change. Others charged that groups with substantial capital were prepared to write off considerable financial losses in order to gain political influence through their newspaper holdings. Although the fear remained that concentration of ownership posed a threat to freedom of communications, there was every indication that the staffs of major dailies continued to formulate editorial policy independently of the financial management. A more immediate concern of newspapermen and press workers was the threat to job security from rationalization of over-staffed newspapers by their new owners, plant modernization, and elimination of the most unprofitable publications. Walkouts and labor agitation by newspaper staffs were common in the early 1970s, and in 1976 the closure of the bankrupt *Il Giornale d'Italia* (Rome) precipitated a twenty-four-hour news blackout—dubbed the “Day of Silence”—by newspaper workers and RAI personnel across Italy, protesting concentration of ownership and expressing concern at the precarious condition of the news industry. Press union spokesmen also warned that debt-ridden newspapers ran the risk of coming under increasing state control.

Legislation enacted in 1975 with the support of all political parties committed the Italian government to a long-term effort designed to bail out the economically depressed news industry and forestall further concentration of ownership. A complex system of state subsidies to the press, expected to cost the taxpayer up to the equivalent of US\$70 million annually over a fifteen-year period, provides for direct

grants to individual newspapers, pays at least half the cost of newsprint, allows for tax exemptions and low-interest loans for plant modernization, gives the press preferential postal and telecommunications rates, and guarantees advertising from state enterprises. All newspapers, including party organs, that had been published for at least twelve months qualify for the subsidies, which are administered by a nonpartisan standing committee of newsmen. It was evident after the first year, however, that the funds provided by the government program were insufficient to cover the industry's mounting operational deficits.

News Services

The National Press Associates Agency (Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata—ANSA), the most important of several Italian news services, is owned and operated cooperatively by the Italian newspapers. It distributes 250,000 words daily to more than 100 domestic newspapers and periodicals, to RAI, and to over 150 foreign newspapers. One of Europe's most active news services, ANSA has correspondents stationed in sixty-nine offices abroad. All major international news services, including Associated Press and United Press International, are represented in Italy.

Publishing

Italy's serious book-reading public is small and selective, and even the most optimistic publishers would consider 50,000 copies the maximum printing for a new book. Book sales rose dramatically in the early 1960s with the introduction of inexpensive editions, but the growth in the market was not sustained. With enlarged school enrollments, however, there has been a steady demand for educational materials. Textbooks accounted for approximately 25 percent of the 16,500 titles in print in 1975, which also included 6,800 new titles. Imports constituted about 25 percent of the book trade, and at least 20 percent of all titles published in Italy were translations from foreign languages—more than half of them from English. There are about 1,300 publishing houses in Italy, most operating on a small scale. Milan is the country's publishing center.

CULTURAL LIFE

The skill and genius of Italian artists and writers, builders and thinkers—and the judgment and generosity of their patrons—were crucial to the cultural development of Western civilization. Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio molded an Italian literary language from their native Tuscan dialect, but their words, translated into many

languages, have become part of the common store of the Western literary heritage. The universal genius of Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo sets them beyond the limits of category and chronology. They and Giotto, Donatello, Botticelli, and Raphael—to name but a few of the greatest artists of the Renaissance—shaped a new image of man in Western art.

Italy has given to Western thought the ideas of the religious leader Saint Francis of Assisi, the philosopher Saint Thomas Aquinas, the political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli, and the astronomer Galileo Galilei among a multitude of others. For centuries standards of good taste in art, music, and fashion were set in Italy and, even in times when Italy was in turmoil or languished politically under foreign domination, it was a magnet attracting the creative genius of Europe, there to learn and to imitate. Although Italian culture has a universal appeal, it has usually been expressed in the distinct styles peculiar to the country's regions, by which much of the best Italian art is easily identified. In historical terms, however, the essential cultural unity of Italy is beyond questioning and was recognized long before Italy was conceived of as a political unit.

Painting and Sculpture

The futurist movement exercised a powerful formative influence on contemporary culture in Italy. Set out in 1909 by Filippo Marinetti in the Futurist Manifesto as an essentially antihumanist philosophy of art, futurism called for a reconstruction of twentieth-century man's image of reality in terms of modern principles of beauty—exemplified for them by the racing motorcar. Obsessed by speed, enamored of machines, and extolling violence, futurist artists sought to create symbols for nature in a dynamic state—showing, for instance, an arm in motion by depicting several arms in successive positions.

The starting point of contemporary Italian art is usually considered to be the sculpture of Umberto Boccioni, who with Carlo Carrà, Gino Severini, and Giacomo Balla subscribed to the Futurist Manifesto. Boccioni's work is considered the most concrete representation of the movement's artistic philosophy put in practice. His effort to create the new spatial relationships advocated by the futurists is demonstrated by the subject matter of his mature work—*Development of a Bottle in Space*, *Unique Forms of Continuity of Space*, and *Muscles in Rapid Action*. Boccioni ranks as one of the most original and innovative artists of the twentieth century; his works have universal appeal even outside the restraints of their guiding philosophy.

The most decisive influence on modern painting in Italy was that of the futurist Carrà and the metaphysical surrealist Giorgio de Chirico, whose often disconcerting works were closely linked in style and purpose. In their naturalistic styles they set out to represent metaphysical

forms—Carrà in romantic landscapes or with mechanical characters, de Chirico with a stark and very personal architectural vision of reality that was carried over from his work as a stage designer.

The artistic rhetoric of futurism was peculiar to an Italian environment. Cosmopolitan Italian artists outside their homeland were largely unaffected by it, and some, like Amedeo Modigliani, rejected its principles out of hand. In a brief career Modigliani distilled the new ideas of the Paris avant-garde into the compact form of statues inspired by African art and of the elongated portraits and nudes that were his characteristic mannerisms.

Few Italian artists who came to creative maturity between the world wars, however, could be untouched by the influence of futurism in some way, even if in reaction against it. Futurism had encouraged a new sensibility and had allowed for the possibilities of giving plastic form to the preoccupations of the twentieth century—speed, motion, violence, technology—as well as to its psychological concern with alienation, but as an experimental movement it was quickly exhausted, its objectives preempted by film. The futurists were for the most part absorbed into the movement called *novecento* (twentieth century) in the 1920s and 1930s. Patronized by the fascist regime, the *novecento* style was a response to a call for a return to order in art after years of innovation that was thought to have distorted reality and emphasized “plastic values,” or purity of form, in art. The spirit of the *novecento* movement is best seen in the paintings of the futurist Balla, a master of light and color, and of Fortunato Depero, a master of movement, whose mechanical marionettes danced on canvas to “plastic rhythms,” but it is also disturbingly evident in the monumental polemical art that reflected the official taste of the fascist regime.

Italy's most honored living artist is the sculptor Giacomo Manzù. Some critics saw in the meditative quality of his neoclassicism, which he translated into twentieth-century idiom, a “Catholic opposition” to the *novecento* and a protest against the fascist regime. From a nonpolitical standpoint his work and that of his contemporary Marino Marini have been interpreted as giving modern form to humanist values in art. Among Manzù's most characteristic efforts are *Girl Sitting* and his numerous portrait busts. Manzù recorded events from the Second Vatican Council in bronze and was commissioned to complete new doors at Saint Peter's. One of his most recent works, *Great Creases in the Wind*, is a forty-foot column that was on display in Rome in 1976.

Many contemporary Italian sculptors have won international recognition for their craftsmanship and originality. Francesco Messina is acclaimed for his neo-Renaissance portraits in bronze and terra-cotta, Alberto Viani for the plasticity and sensuousness of his marble nudes and egg-shaped forms. Some of the younger sculptors who were at-

tracting attention in the early 1970s work in a variety of metals—bronze, stainless steel, iron, and copper sheet—as well as in wood and plastic, from which they have created geometric studies and intricate, machinelike abstractions.

A number of the artists who had embraced communism during World War II sought to reconcile Marxism and abstract art, rejecting in the process the socialist realism demanded of them by party leaders. Art, indeed, became an issue within the PCI in the late 1940s, and some artists left the party rather than surrender their freedom of expression. Others modified their styles to conform to their ideology, giving dialectics priority over aesthetics in their art. Renato Guttuso emerged as Europe's foremost social realist in the visual arts in the 1950s. Critics have also admired the socialist realism of Marino Mazzucurati's monuments.

Considered the finest Italian painter since de Chirico, Mario Mafai is a cultured artist who paints calm Roman cityscapes, using a full range of color and light. Another nonconforming Marxist who has also kept himself apart from identification with a distinct school, Renato Birolli has based his reputation on abstract paintings that rely on color for their form. Abstractionists, such as Mafai, Birolli, Fausto Pirandello, and Antonio Corpora, were the most popular contemporary painters in Italy in the 1960s. With social realism a dead issue, even the committed Marxists among the younger artists were concerned with op art, pop art, cinematographic realism, and color painting in the early 1970s.

Literature

The trends dominating Italian literature in the early twentieth century were expressions either of artistic revolt against tradition or of disillusionment and alienation in the modern world. Gabriele D'Annunzio, an erratic and imaginative writer who became closely identified with fascism, led the futurist revolt in literature against the liberal, cosmopolitan values of the nineteenth century. The futurists, in keeping with the principles of the movement, sought to give literary form to the noise and violent motion—and the vitality—of an age of machines. Their flamboyant rhetoric was in sharp contrast to the modest, colloquial style in which the *crepuscolari* (twilight writers) recounted memories of a gentler past. A third school, hermeticism, represented a retreat from the reality of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s for Eugenio Montale, Giuseppe Ungaretti, and Salvatore Quasimodo—Italy's three greatest modern poets—who under the influence of French symbolism experimented with obscure word combinations in an attempt to cut language down to its essentials.

In terms of international acceptance the two most significant Italian writers between the world wars were the playwright Luigi Pirandello

and the novelist Italo Svevo (pseudonym of Ettore Schmitz). Pirandello represented a school unto himself. Introspective and pessimistic, he saw the limitations of realism as a means of describing life in an absurd world, and he set out in his plays—forty-three written between 1910 and 1937—to destroy conventional dramatic structures. His most frequently performed work is *Sei personaggi in cerca d'autore* (Six Characters in Search of an Author). Svevo's self-analytical novels—of which he wrote only three—made no impression in Italy until they were discovered by critics elsewhere in Europe two years before his death in 1928. His last and best known novel is *La coscienza di Zeno* (Confessions of Zeno).

Young Italian writers of the 1930s—Alberto Moravia, Vasco Pratolini, Cesare Pavese, Ignazio Silone, and Elio Vittorini—took their cue from the narrative literature of John Dos Passos, Ernest Hemingway, and John Steinbeck. Social alienation was the theme running through all their work. Moravia, who remained in the 1970s one of Italy's most prolific authors, held up a mirror to his generation with the publication of *Gli' indifferenti* (The Time of Indifference) in 1929, a novel that was interpreted by fascist officialdom as an attack on their regime. In subsequent novels Moravia employed a surrealist style to deceive the censors. His later novels have been characterized by cold objectivity and a continuing concern with alienation, and they have used sex to symbolize violence and spiritual impotence. Silone's novel *Pane e Vino* (Bread and Wine), written in exile and regarded abroad as one of the works most representative of the generation of the 1930s, appeared in Italy only after the end of World War II. An often inspired writer and a leading left-wing intellectual after the war, Vittorini insisted that literature was a form of political engagement.

The war and its aftermath were the preoccupation of many of the best writers through the 1960s. Carlo Levi inaugurated the post-war trend to realism and the documentary novel with the rich and sensitively written *Cristo si è fermato ad Eboli* (Christ Stopped at Eboli) in 1945. Quasimodo, abandoning his pessimistic hermeticism, endorsed realism in his own poetry. Giovanni Guareschi entertained readers with the adventures of Don Camillo. Among the leading writers of the 1950s and 1960s, Giorgio Bassani portrayed the life of the Jews of Ferrara during the fascist era in *Il giardino dei Finzi-Contini* (The Garden of the Finzi-Continis). Carlo Cassola achieved narrative objectivity through his creation of purposely uninteresting characters and use of threadbare language, as in his minor classic *La ragazza di Bube* (Bebo's Girl). Dino Buzzati wrote metaphysical fables in a Kafkaesque vein, and Carlo Emilio Gadda poked fun at literary formalism with novels written in almost impenetrably obscure dialect. Many Italian readers turned with a sense of relief in the late 1950s, however, to Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's old-fashioned, narrative historical novel *Il gattopardo* (The Leopard).

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the gradual dissolution of a literary avant-garde subscribing to the view that their revolutionary use of language somehow hastened social change. Pier Paolo Pasolini had argued in his forceful realistic style that postwar democracy and modernization were more damaging to Italy's moral fiber and more destructive of its values than fascism had been, but his voice was largely disregarded. The popular playwright and political activist Eduardo De Filippo complained that his admiring public applauded the form of his art but did not understand the message behind it.

Skillful—and profitable—management of literary prizes by publishers introduced the works of a number of new writers to a wider reading public in the 1970s, but critics were reluctant to concede an improvement in the quality of contemporary Italian literature. Younger writers, especially those committed to political struggle, tend to be introverted, and condemnation of everything Italian—what one critic referred to as “upside-down patriotism” (*patriottismo capovolto*)—appears to be the one point at which they achieve unanimity of opinion. Social tension is often described in terms of sexual dysfunction and violence. Many writers, including such established authors as Moravia, have become concerned with dramatizing the creative process itself—an example of writers writing about writers writing—and insist on depicting life as a metaphor of art. Some of the most commercially successful serious literature has consisted of so-called memory novels and fictionalized biographies—often trivial and sentimental—and pseudoscholarly historical fiction that takes the form of history, pastiche manuscripts, and diaries.

In 1976 Cassola, Natalia Ginzburg, Italo Calvino, and Moravia were among the busiest and most popular of the established novelists. With interest in poetry reviving, the verse of Mario Luzi and Eduardo Sanguineti was favored by critics but was inaccessible to a large reading public. Among the biggest best-sellers of the mid-1970s were Stefano D'Arrigo's mammoth (1,300 pages) war epic, *Horcynus Orca*; Susanna Agnelli's memoirs, *Vestivamo alla marinara* (We Always Wore Sailor Suits); and *Berlinguer e il Professore* (Berlinguer and the Professor), a political satire by an anonymous author.

Film

Operating from the studio complex Cinecittà, near Rome, the Italian film industry is regarded as the best organized in Europe. It is also one of the most profitable, benefiting from a large export market as well as an enthusiastic domestic audience. Italians name as their three favorite pastimes food, films, and soccer—in the that order—and the immense popularity of the cinema in Italy is attested to by the more than 500 million tickets purchased annually in the 1970s at nearly 11,000 motion picture houses. In 1972 Italian filmmakers produced 294

feature-length films, including 128 coproductions—mainly with French and Spanish studios—and more than 300 short films. In the same year Italian distributors imported 261 foreign-made films, more than half from the United States.

National film policy, governed by a 1965 law, is administered by the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment. A percentage of box office receipts is diverted to subsidize production of films of high quality that may lack a popular audience. Government loans and grants are also made available to producers, and twenty annual state-sponsored prizes, valued at US\$100,000, are awarded for films of exceptional artistic merit.

Films are viewed and rated before release by a committee of the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment that includes representatives of the film industry. Censors are particularly sensitive to films by better known directors dealing with controversial themes. Grade B films, even the most tasteless among them, are seldom affected by censorship. Citizens may register complaints against films before competent magistrates who are empowered to ban them within their jurisdictions.

With the efforts of a handful of neorealist directors in the immediate postwar years, the Italian film industry regained the international prominence that it had lost during the fascist era. Roberto Rossellini's *Roma, città aperta* (Rome, Open City), which appeared in 1945, is considered the first in a school of neorealist films that influenced the tastes of audiences and the techniques of filmmakers around the world. This school included other films since regarded as classics, such as Luchino Visconti's *La terra trema* (The Trembling Earth) and Vittorio De Sica's *Sciuscià* (Shoeshine) and *Ladri di biciclette* (Bicycle Thieves). Trained as documentary artists, the neorealists—Rossellini, Visconti, DeSica, Federico Fellini, and Michelangelo Antonioni—rejected the studied theatrical quality of prewar cinema to set their films in honest social settings, devoid of technical paraphernalia that had got in the way of contact with reality. Often using nonprofessionals in their casts, they were more committed to accurate characterization than to plot structure. Although Rossellini's talents appeared to wane, the other neorealists came to their artistic maturity in the 1950s—Fellini with *La strada*, *Le notti di Cabiria* (Nights of Cabiria), and *La dolce vita*; Visconti in *Rocco e i suoi fratelli* (Rocco and His Brothers); Antonioni in *L'avventura*; and De Sica with *Il Generale Della Rovere* and *Umberto D.*, the latter released in 1953 and considered the best of the neorealist films for its portrayal of life as lived from day to day.

During the 1960s the gulf widened between popular and artistic tastes in films, and films that received critical acclaim at home and abroad attracted a smaller share of a shrinking cinema audience (film attendance in Italy dropped by 20 percent in the 1960-70 period). The

temptation of directors to sacrifice critical acceptance for commercial success explains the uneven quality of new films by Visconti and De Sica in the 1960s. The established directors seemed more self-confident in the early 1970s—for example, De Sica with *The Garden of the Finzi-Continis* and Fellini with *Amarcord*. Rossellini returned to his full powers in 1975 with the production of *Italy: Year One*, a recreation of the immediate postwar years during which he made his reputation.

The generation succeeding Fellini, De Sica, and Visconti (De Sica and Visconti died in 1976) are directors with strong left-wing political sympathies that they bring to the screen in their work. Filmmakers who like engagé director Gillo Pontecorvo see the cinema as the vanguard of the revolution are deeply involved in the debate on the future of Italian society being carried on in the 1970s. A sense of this is nowhere more strongly felt than in the semidocumentary political films of Pontecorvo, Marco Bollocchio, and Elio Petri, but some critics have remarked that their work seems to languish in an ideological rut. Bernardo Bertolucci, acclaimed for *Il conformista* in 1970, released his epic political testament *Novecento* (released in English as *1900*) to mixed reviews in 1976. It is one of the longest (nearly six hours in its uncut version) and most expensive films ever made by Italian studios.

Film critics saw the 1970s as marking an end to Italian neorealism. Subject matter and production were increasingly influenced by actors with a taste for caricature denied them by the neorealists. Dino Risi, Lina Wertmüller, and Luigi Comencini offered popular and predictable parodies of sexual manners that lent themselves to political interpretation. Marco Ferreri took another approach in his "cinema of excess," as in his morbid *L'ultima donna* (*The Last Woman*), in which sex becomes the symbol for Italy's political, social, and economic impotence. Even his warmest admirers found it difficult to justify the grotesqueness of Pasolini's *Salò—or 120 Days in Sodom*, released after his death in 1976. Francesco Rose continues the studied cultivation of violence in his films.

About one-third of all Italian films are so-called spaghetti Westerns—recreations of the Old West made in Roman studios and in the Spanish countryside. The most successful director of this genre, Sergio Leone—who works under the name Bob Robertson—is the creator of *A Fistful of Dollars* and several sequels.

Music

The two factors conditioning the evolution of Italian music in the early twentieth century were the romantic operatic tradition of the nineteenth century and the nationalist movement, which took its inspiration from an even older heritage. The direct influence on Italian

opera of Gioacchino Rossini, Giuseppe Verdi, and Giacomo Puccini—whose careers spanned more than a century of Italian history—was carried fifty years into the twentieth century. Other composers, looking for authentic Italian alternatives to developments in modern music in the rest of Europe, worked to recover Italy's brilliant seventeenth- and eighteenth-century baroque heritage in a modern context. Gian Francesco Malipiero made scholarly adaptations of Antonio Vivaldi and Claudio Monteverdi. Alfredo Casella, an artistic collaborator with D'Annunzio, also reworked antique music into contemporary settings. The best known composer of the nationalist period, however, was Ottorino Respighi, who transcribed a large body of antique music for the large modern orchestra in his *Antiche arie e danze* (Ancient Airs and Dances).

A younger generation of composers in the period between the world wars found the nationalists' attachment to antique themes too limiting, and they explored musical developments from outside Italy—particularly the work of Igor Stravinsky and Paul Hindemith. Ferruccio Busoni, a composer more popular with musicians than with audiences, interpreted for them the aristocratic orchestral heritage of Gustav Mahler and Anton Bruckner, bridging the gap between Germanic and Italian traditions. From roots such as these an avant-garde school of composers grew to maturity after World War II, experimenting with twelve-tone music and with electronic and serial compositions. Luigi Dallapiccola was a leader of the avant-garde along with Luciano Berio and Bruno Maderna. They earned a place among the best postwar European composers. The versatile Niccolò Castiglioni, who worked extensively on television and was noted for his flawless imitations of antique music, was also recognized as one of Italy's most original composers in the 1960s.

Virtually every major twentieth-century composer has written for the opera, but few have been more visible or aroused greater controversy than Luigi Nono. A master of stage presentation and specializing in mixed-media productions, Nono claims that his compositions are documents of social protest and are inseparable from his political beliefs. Far removed from Nono in style and intent, Gian Carlo Menotti works in the United States as well as in Italy. His operas—*The Medium* and *Amahl and the Night Visitors* prominent among them—have been popular on both sides of the Atlantic.

Of living Italian composers, however, Nino Rota is probably the most widely performed. Best known for his film scores, Rota has also composed a large body of chamber music, symphonic pieces, liturgical music, and several operas, but his rather conservative musical language is very much in opposition to contemporary trends. Rota's score for *The Godfather* brought him an Oscar in 1972.

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Previously published surveys of mass communications in Italy, cited in the bibliography, have been rendered obsolete by developments in the electronic media and the press in the 1970s that are described in this chapter. Roberto Salvini's *Modern Italian Sculpture*, Lionello Venturi's companion *Italian Painters of Today*, and Franco Russoli's *Masters of Modern Italian Art from the Collection of Gianni Mattioli* are excellent illustrated surveys of contemporary Italian art. Marianne Martin's *Futurist Art and Theory 1909-15* offers a scholarly analysis of Italy's most influential twentieth-century artistic movement. Published in 1976, *Italian Literature: Roots and Branches*, edited by Giose Rimanelli and Kenneth John Atchitz, was not available for evaluation at the time of this writing. Short biographies of prominent authors can be found in *The Penguin Companion to European Literature*, edited by Anthony Thorlby. Some modern Italian literature available in recent English translation is cited in the bibliography. Pierre Leprohon's *The Italian Cinema* carries the history of the film industry in Italy into the early 1970s. "Occasional Papers" and fact sheets published by the Italian Cultural Institute (Istituto Italiano di Cultura) in New York treat a variety of topics of cultural interest. "The New Class" in Mauro Lucentini and Michael Ledeen's "Italian Communism at Home and Abroad," *Commentary* (November 1976), is a critical appraisal of political influence in communications and culture. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 7

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

In spite of some formidable economic problems, Italy in the mid-1970s was the sixth ranking economic power in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose twenty-four-nation membership includes all the noncommunist industrial nations of the world (Yugoslavia has special-status membership). This ranking, based on a gross domestic product (GDP) of about US\$172 billion in 1975, placed Italy just below the United Kingdom and above Canada among the OECD countries. On a per capita basis, however, Italy was in nineteenth place, outranking only Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey. Thus Italy is still a relatively poor country, and its economy is marked by wide variations in living standards, in regional development, and in the adequacy of public services and social welfare institutions.

The Italian economy is frequently called dualistic in order to describe its mixture of advancement and underdevelopment. There are several features of Italy that distinguish it in degree, if not in kind, from the other advanced nations of the Western industrial world. More characteristic of developing nations are the existence of large-scale, technologically advanced industries side by side with small, traditional, and usually backward and inefficient industrial and service units; shortages of skilled labor and a surplus of unskilled labor resulting in the lowest ratio of employed persons to total population in Europe; and congested urban areas, with shortages of housing and other amenities, and slowly developing rural areas.

Italy has a private enterprise economy with a large public sector. Except for agriculture there are few sectors of the economy in which the state does not operate and several in which it dominates. Estimates of state enterprise control of industry vary from about 20 to over 50 percent, the disparity being explained by a blurred distinction between the public and the private sector. Not only do many companies have mixed public and private ownership, but all firms, both public and private, are subject to many legal and financial restraints and carry heavy burdens of social welfare responsibility. The heads of the large state-controlled companies often exercise more

freedom of action and political influence than those of large private firms. National economic planning, which is usually found in countries with public sectors of the magnitude of Italy's, has run into considerable opposition, and planning is considerably less effective than in other European countries with considerably smaller public sectors (see ch. 9).

Another distinctive feature of the Italian economy is the heavy dependence on foreign trade. Italy has been characterized as a "transformational economy" because a major segment of the modern economy depends on the importation of raw materials and energy and the exportation of finished goods. Until the economic setbacks of the 1970s these activities bolstered by large tourist revenues and remittances from Italians abroad, provided a favorable balance of payments in most years and were a major contributor to the rapid economic growth that has often been referred to as an economic miracle. The term is most properly applied to the years 1959 to 1963 only, as the earlier postwar years were characterized by steady but not spectacular growth and the years from 1963 to the mid-1970s by stop-and-go growth patterns.

The more sporadic growth since 1963 and the deep economic difficulties of the mid-1970s are symptoms of the uneven development of Italian social and political institutions as much as of economic phenomena in the postwar years. Social investment has not kept pace with economic growth, and the government structure, the bureaucracy, and political processes have proved to be too cumbersome to provide adequate direction and adaptability in coping with the problems of a modern economy in periods of difficulty (see ch. 9; ch. 10; ch. 11). The tools of fiscal policy, which are used by governments in attempting to achieve some degree of economic stability, have been inadequate in Italy largely because tax collection and government spending are so poorly administered. Monetary policy measures have also been ineffective, causing unacceptable inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties when used for expansionary purposes and driving many companies toward bankruptcy when applied in the other direction.

HISTORICAL SETTING

Although Italy's major role in the development of Western Civilization includes many economic contributions, there are few vestiges of the economic preeminence enjoyed during the days of Rome's ascendancy or during the period of the flourishing banking and commercial centers of the Italian Renaissance. Italy led the economic as well as the cultural revival of Europe in the latter period with the development of new methods of industrial and agricultural production and played a preeminent role in the opening of trade with the non-European world. Its city-states were commercial and banking powers as

early as the eleventh century. Such prosaic contributions as the invention of double entry bookkeeping had an impact on the economic and even the cultural course of Western history comparable to that of the better known artistic masterpieces of the period.

Other nations of Europe took the economic leadership from Italy in the sixteenth century, reflecting not only the development of maritime trade that favored Atlantic over Mediterranean locations but also Italy's falling under the domination of foreign invaders. From the middle of the sixteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth, Italy suffered long periods of foreign domination and exploitation. Among other legacies of these circumstances was the perpetuation of fundamental differences in orientation between southern Italy with its slow-paced Mediterranean outlook and the more dynamic north with its focus on its European neighbors.

During the Napoleonic occupation of Italy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, certain economic progress was achieved, primarily through the elimination of many of the vestiges of feudalism in the agricultural sector and the stimulus given to commerce and industry. In pursuit of military and political objectives the French carried out a much-needed program of road and bridge construction, thus providing the start of a transportation network that made later economic progress possible. Among other French contributions at this time were the introduction of a uniform coinage and of a system of weights and measures. These activities had slight impact on the south, however, and that region's economy suffered from a forced development of grain production and the denuding of forest areas for timber—not unlike programs carried out by the Fascists over a century later. In both instances the already meager resource base of the region was subjected to deforestation and erosion.

From the unification in the 1860s until the 1890s, economic growth proceeded slowly. Italy remained an agricultural country both economically and culturally except for the northeastern region, particularly the triangle formed by Milan, Turin, and Genoa. This region shared to some degree in the industrial development that was transforming much of Western Europe, but as a whole Italy continued to lag behind the rest of the continent in economic development. In the 1890s, spurred by the importation of German capital and banking techniques and by new opportunities in foreign markets, a period of fairly rapid industrial growth began. It was rapid, however, only in relation to the previous stagnation, and most of the rest of Western Europe was growing even faster. By 1913 Italy's output was only one-third that of France and only about 2 percent of the world's total.

The promise of sustained economic development that appeared around the turn of the century was shattered by World War I. Although industry prospered and grew rapidly during the early years of the war, Italy's participation ultimately cost heavily in manpower

and other resources. The immediate postwar years were marked by high unemployment and inflation accompanied by social and political turmoil. The advent of fascism in 1922 led ultimately to economic policies designed more to further the nationalistic and imperialistic ambitions of the regime than to cope with the worldwide depression and Italy's long-standing economic problems. Although some gains were realized, including transportation improvements, land reclamation, and even some extension of social services, the overall performance of the economy was poor. The effort to make Italy a great military power ended in disaster for the country's ambitions and for the economy.

Although Sicily and the southern part of the peninsula were the major areas of destruction during World War II, the whole country suffered damage from bombing, sabotage, and destruction by the Germans during their retreat. Postwar estimates indicate that industrial damage was more than 20 percent and that obsolescence and wear and tear reduced industrial capacity even more. Industrial production in 1945 was only about 25 percent of what it had been in 1938, and agricultural production was reduced by about 40 percent over the same period. Damage to the transportation network, shipping, and vehicles was also severe.

Italian economic recovery from the war was swifter than the most optimistic expectations. By 1950, with the help of American and international relief programs, most production had recovered to prewar levels. In addition plans were being introduced for land reform and the economic development of the south (see ch. 9). Although much remained to be done in infrastructural development, elimination of unemployment, and the technological upgrading of industry, the economy had recovered sufficiently to be prepared to share in the economic growth enjoyed by much of Western Europe under the stimulus of Marshall Plan aid in the 1950s.

THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE AND ITS AFTERMATH

During the 1950s and the 1960s Italian economic growth compared favorably in both absolute and per capita terms with that of the rest of Europe. From 1950 until 1963 it was also remarkably stable, accelerating in the last five years of the period to the fastest in Europe, a development that has been termed an economic miracle. This period of sustained economic growth resulted from several factors. United States economic aid provided an initial boost, totaling for the postwar relief period of 1946 to 1948 and the Marshall Plan period of 1949 to 1952 nearly US\$2.7 billion. (Economic aid was thereafter gradually phased out, totaling only about US\$540 million between 1953 and 1961.) The main internal reason for the growth was a combination of low wage rates, made possible by surplus labor, and substantial in-

vestment, including the reinvestment of profits that resulted from the low wages. Industrial wages between 1951 and 1961 rose at an average annual rate of 4.1 percent, lagging behind industrial productivity, which rose over the same period at a 5.0-percent average annual rate. Meanwhile gross fixed investment grew at an annual rate of 9.3 percent. The steady increase of exports, particularly in the later years of the period after Italy joined the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market) provided the demand necessary to sustain growth.

A high spot of the 1950s was Italy's successful response to the challenge of European economic integration in spite of its own relatively underdeveloped economy. One of the first manifestations of this occurred when the original joint endeavor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was set up in 1951. Italy's coal and iron ore resources were insignificant, and its steel industry was handicapped by obsolete plant and equipment. It was accordingly given a five-year grace period in which to adjust to the free competition established by the community. In this period Italy proceeded to convert its steel industry into one of the most modern and efficient in the world. In spite of its continued dependence on imports of raw materials and power, the Italian steel industry, largely government owned, was able by the expiration of the grace period to compete on an equal basis with those of the other community members. Other large Italian industries, such as chemicals and petroleum, followed in the drive for modernization and technological improvement. Thus the Italian economy, led by its *modern industrial sector*, was able to join in the European economic growth of the late 1950s.

Italy was one of the original members of the EEC. In fact it was the EEC's establishment in 1957 that gave the major impetus to Italian exports. The EEC partners' share of Italian exports rose from about 20 percent before 1958 to more than 40 percent in the 1970s. EEC membership has provided not only growing markets for Italian goods but also an outlet for emigrant workers.

Although there was also considerable economic growth from 1963 to the early 1970s, it was more sporadic, being marked by two sharp recessions, inflationary pressures, and a falloff in capital investment. The sharp drop of the economic growth rate to 2.9 percent in 1964 from an average of over 6 percent in the preceding five years marked the end of annual increases in industrial investment and the start of a period of sharp increases in wages and associated labor costs. Since these exceeded productivity gains, reinvestable profits decreased, and inflationary pressures increased. As a result of the growing strength of labor and its more effective use of bargaining powers, labor costs, which had averaged about 55.8 percent of value added in industry between 1951 and 1962, rose in the 1960s and reached 70.9 percent by 1971.

The second sharp recession occurred in 1971, which recorded a growth rate of 1.6 percent after an average of 5.9 percent in the previous five years. The causes were the same as in the early 1960s but reflected even more strongly the adverse impact on investor confidence of the labor and political unrest of the period (see ch. 11). In addition the previously favorable balance-of-payments record was worsening—a result not so much of trade difficulties as of severe capital flights that also reflected the loss of investor confidence. In the mid-1970s the prospect for a renewal of Italy's outstanding record of economic growth was doubtful. Rises in wages and associated labor costs had eliminated the advantage of low-cost manufacturing, and Italy's inflation rates were among the highest in Europe. Although exports were being maintained and even increased, import costs were up sharply, led by the rise in oil prices after the Middle East oil crisis in 1973.

These economic difficulties were highlighted in 1976 by a decline in the value of the lira by 27 percent between January and October. Meanwhile international debt had mounted to over 14 trillion lire (about US\$16 billion at prevailing exchange rates; for value of the lira—see Glossary), and reserves had dwindled to a little over US\$5 billion. A comprehensive austerity program for dealing with the crisis was finally passed by Parliament in November 1976, five months after the general 1976 election, a delay that reflected the shaky position of the government, which was—in the words of the prime minister—supported more by abstentions than by votes. The announced planned emergency measures included a freeze on automatic wage increases above 8 million lire per annum (equal to about US\$9,200). Selective price rises were also scheduled. Monetary measures were to increase the discount rate to an all-time high of 15 percent, suggesting that the commercial banks' prime rate would be as high as 21 percent and that nonpriority borrowers would be required to pay nearly 30 percent. Cuts in public spending and a more efficient tax collection system to cut down on tax evasion, which were hardly novel proposals, completed the package. For the moment at least the program appeared to have the guarded support—through abstention—of the Communists, but recurring short strikes in the fall of 1976 indicated less acquiescence on the part of the trade unions.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Except for Japan Italy is probably the most dependent of noncommunist industrialized countries on foreign trade for its economic well-being. Its modern economic sector is essentially transformational, based on imports of raw materials and energy and exports of finished goods. It is also heavily dependent on income from its tourist trade and on the remittances of emigrant workers for the foreign exchange

earnings necessary to offset a chronic commodity trade deficit. The magnitude of the overall current deficit in the mid-1970s reflected a slowdown in these earnings but resulted primarily from changes in the prices of its major imports and its major exports. Substantial increases in the prices of imported raw materials—particularly skyrocketing oil prices—in the 1970s were accompanied by a much slower rise in the prices for Italy's major exports. This reversal of the terms of trade has been a major factor in Italy's economic problems in the 1970s.

The Italian economic boom that started in the mid-1950s had a conspicuously international character. This was the period when the state-controlled energy company, the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi—ENI), led by Enrico Mattei, was engaging in international operations that were encroaching on the monopoly of the international oil giants in the Middle East. ENI was also breaking the ground for large-scale barter deals with the Soviet Union (see *The Role of Government*, this ch.). Such Italian consumer products as Fiat automobiles, Vespa motor scooters, and Olivetti typewriters were making names for themselves in worldwide markets, and Italian steel pipe, ships, and other engineering products were also establishing an international reputation for reliability and economy. Domestically the tourist business was flourishing and stimulating a boom in construction of luxury accommodations and superhighways. The abundance of Italian labor not only kept wages low but provided a surplus of workers who moved into other EEC countries and into Switzerland to meet labor shortages there and swell Italian foreign exchange earnings with their remittances.

Direction of Trade

In 1975 Italian imports were valued at US\$38.4 billion and exports at US\$34.8 billion, leaving a trade deficit of about US\$3.6 billion. Major trading partners for imports were the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, the United States, and a number of oil-producing countries. Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were the second largest group of import suppliers after Italy's EEC partners, who furnished 43 percent of total imports. Communist countries were the source of only about 4.8 percent of imports, of which the Soviet Union was responsible for about half. The leading customers for Italian exports were also West Germany, France, and the United States. All other purchasers of Italian goods in the amount of US\$1 billion or more were EEC partners except for Libya and the Soviet Union.

Since 1973 the major deficits in Italy's trade have arisen from its dealings with the oil-producing nations. Italy's bilateral trade deficit with these countries in 1975 was over US\$4 billion. If this element

were omitted from the trade figures, Italy would have had a slightly favorable balance of trade in that year. Italy's trade with other countries of the industrialized West produced a deficit of only US\$1.8 billion. Of this approximately US\$1 billion arose from trade with the United States and US\$800 million from intra-EEC trade. Favorable trade balances were maintained with most of the rest of Western Europe and communist countries.

Economic Relations with Communist Countries

Italy has been an important participant in the industrial cooperation programs that the Soviet Union has developed with the industrial West. The most celebrated example of this activity was an agreement in 1966 between Fiat and the Soviet Union for the construction of a complete automobile plant at a town on the Volga River; the town was appropriately renamed Togliatti after Palmiro Togliatti, the former Italian communist leader. Italy was also a pioneer among several European countries that entered into agreements for the supply of petroleum processing and transporting equipment, including large-diameter steel pipe for pipelines construction, to the Soviets in return for natural gas, which enters Western Europe through Austria. Similar deals continued into the mid-1970s. In June 1976, for example, Italy's Montedison signed an agreement for the construction of two fertilizer plants in the Soviet Union.

Italy has also been active in trading with the other countries of Eastern Europe and with the People's Republic of China (PRC). In these cases also the emphasis has been on technological cooperation—Italy participating in the design, construction, and equipping of plants within the importing country in return for raw materials, oil, coal, and some food products. In the mid-1970s Italy's participation in East-West trade was second only to that of West Germany among Western industrial nations.

Foreign Investment

Italy has traditionally welcomed foreign investment, and it is estimated that about one-fifth of private business is controlled by foreign capital. This estimate reflects studies made in the early 1970s that show 22 percent of shares issued by Italian companies as held by foreigners. A considerable portion of recorded foreign investment, however, is believed to originate in Italy, returning primarily from Switzerland as ostensible foreign capital in order to take advantage of Italian laws that provide protection and other advantages to foreign investors. Switzerland ranks second only to the United States as a declared source of foreign capital invested in Italy. Whatever the source, foreign as well as domestic capital is sensitive to changes in economic

conditions, and a large capital outflow in times of difficulty is a recurring problem.

Balance of Payments

During the years of Italian economic recovery and growth, one of the most important areas of economic strength was the favorable balance-of-payments performance. From 1955 to 1971 the balance of payments was in deficit in only three years. This record was achieved in spite of substantial commodity trade deficits in most years as well as deficits on the freight and insurance accounts. These deficits were more than offset, however, by a steady increase in income from tourism and from the remittances of emigrants. Before this period there were also inflows of aid funds and other private and official credits. Although foreign aid virtually ceased in the early 1950s, the emigrant remittances and tourist revenues more than took up the slack. In addition the growing strength of the Italian economy encouraged the inflow of private long-term capital. During most of this period there was a steady buildup of foreign exchange reserves.

An average annual surplus of about US\$200 million between 1947 and 1972 was reflected in the growth of gold holdings and foreign exchange reserves by the end of 1971 to US\$6.8 billion from only US\$2.6 million at the end of 1947. The sustained growth of reserves was both the result of and a contributor to the growth of the economy as a whole. There were, however, two periods of balance-of-payments instability over this span. In 1963 there was a loss of confidence among investors, both foreign and domestic, brought on by economic difficulties and political changes in 1962 and 1963. A wave of strikes, the nationalization of the electrical industry, and a new withholding tax on dividends all contributed to a massive capital outflow. There was a similarly large capital outflow in 1969, stimulated by the economic crisis and political and social unrest of that year.

Although these periodic capital flights were reflections of current conditions, they were also symptoms of the lack of confidence caused by longer term economic problems that became more apparent in the mid-1970s. As for the current account the yearly growth in foreign revenues from tourism and emigrant remittances was slowed and had little prospect of substantial renewal. Although Italian exports showed considerable strength, growth in this sector also slowed while imports grew much faster and at more sharply rising prices, particularly for oil, a trend that seemed likely to continue.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Although a very substantial segment of the Italian economy is either owned or controlled by the state, there is little agreement about

the actual percentage of national output that can be ascribed to the government sector. Some of the disagreement arises from the variety of instruments through which the government plays its economic role. There are relatively few sectors of the economy that are fully nationalized, but the government holds majority ownership in many industries and a minority share in many others. There are some in which the government shares ownership not only with private domestic capital but also with foreign investors. The giant firms, such as Fiat and Montedison, commonly regarded as private, often act in the government's interest in international dealings and by virtue of their size and prominence have little inclination to oppose government policy, particularly with the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC) in power (see ch. 11).

The State Holding Sector

Italy has been described as a country of many organizations and little organization, a description that suggests that a full account of the government structure for control of the economy would be difficult and not particularly illuminating. It is not surprising that estimates of the proportion of the economy in government hands vary widely, from a low of about 20 percent to a high of over 50 percent. In addition to those industries that are completely nationalized, such as the salt and tobacco monopolies, the railroads, and most of the generation and distribution of electricity, there is a large state holding sector, which consists of the Ministry of State Enterprises and six-state holding companies, or autonomous management agencies, and their subsidiary companies. Among the key industries in which the state holding companies operate are the steel industry, shipbuilding and other heavy engineering activities, energy production (both hydrocarbon and nuclear), motor vehicle production (Alfa Romeo), air transport (Alitalia), electronics and computer software, construction and operation of toll roads, communications—including the telephone system—radio and television, banking, and retail distribution. In 1972 there were about 350 companies within the state holding sector, with more than 500,000 employees in Italy and 22,000 others abroad and a total investment of 1.9 trillion lire (about US\$3.3 billion).

The largest of the state holding companies is the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale—IRI). IRI was established in 1933 by the fascist government with the initial purpose of rescuing the three largest banks in Italy from collapse in the depths of the worldwide depression. These banks—the Italian Commercial Bank (Banca Commerciale Italiana), Italian Credit (Credito Italiano), and the Bank of Rome (Banco di Roma)—had large investments in Italian industrial enterprise and real estate, which were also in financial difficulties. The takeover of the banks by IRI thus

gave it control of a substantial share of majority industry. During the rest of the 1930s IRI control was extended to other strategic industrial areas, such as steel, shipbuilding, and heavy engineering. At the same time IRI sold off many of its interests in such sectors as textiles, agriculture, and real estate, which were of less significance for the regime's war potential or for the furtherance of its imperialistic ambitions.

In the postwar reconstruction period IRI was continued, despite its fascist origins, because there were no private capital resources able or willing to take over its industrial assets, many of which had suffered war damage and all of which lacked appeal to investors in an uncertain economic period. After the reconstruction, which IRI weathered with considerable difficulty, particularly because of the continuing losses in the shipbuilding and heavy industry sectors, the agency was continued because it was the only available mechanism with the resources to engage in activities for which private capital was still inadequate and in which the state's interest in development was paramount. For example, IRI took over the state's share in Alitalia, the national airline, and its domestic subsidiaries. It also assumed the concessions for the construction and operation of the network of national expressways (*autostrade*). Urban redevelopment, transit systems, and telephone, radio, and television services are among other public services that have come under IRI control, along with the large number of manufacturing companies, major banks, and engineering and shipping concerns that it has controlled since the prewar period.

Until 1957 all IRI-controlled industries were members of the General Confederation of Italian Industry (*Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana—Confindustria*) and were represented by it in collective-bargaining negotiations. Although Confindustria was a staunch opponent of national planning and of public ownership of industry and regarded the furtherance of private enterprise as its principal mission, it held stubbornly to this influence on the state-run industries, particularly after 1953 when the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (*Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori—CISL*) proposed that IRI be used more positively as an instrument for government planning and that as a public employer it provide guidelines and set standards in industrial relations. The anomalous situation was finally eliminated in December 1956 with the establishment of the Ministry of State Enterprises and the separation of the IRI industries from the free enterprise sector. They failed, however, to serve effectively as examples for other industries and as instruments of national planning, and up to the mid-1970s efforts to carry out such functions had been ineffective (see ch. 9).

Another major state holding company is the National Hydrocarbons Agency (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi—ENI*). Although ENI was not

established until 1953, it also had its roots in fascist Italy, taking over from the former state petroleum agency, which had been formed in 1926. The assets of this agency and its subsidiary companies were shattered during the war, but in the postwar period its northern sector under the dynamic leadership of Enrico Mattei, a former partisan, engaged in a major effort to explore and later exploit the hydrocarbon potential of the Po valley. This effort paid off in the discovery of major natural gas resources and some petroleum in the region. The discoveries resulted in the establishment under Mattei's leadership of ENI, a state monopoly for further exploration and exploitation in the Po valley. During the next decade it became Italy's second largest state holding company and one of the world's largest international petroleum concerns.

In addition to ENI's international exploitation, refinery, and transportation functions, it soon branched out into nuclear energy as well as into hydrochemical and petrochemical activities. It has also become involved in textiles, machine manufacture, motel construction and operation, and even newspaper publishing. In the late 1950s Mattei's freewheeling behavior in international oil operations made ENI something of a pariah among major international oil companies.

For example, Mattei reached agreements with Egypt and Iran for oil exploration and exploitation rights under which ENI would keep only 25 percent of the profits, thus breaking the traditional fifty-fifty arrangement that had previously been enjoyed by international oil companies. He also made a barter arrangement in 1959 with the Soviet Union, trading petroleum exploitation and refinery equipment and pipeline for Soviet oil. Since this not only was a breakthrough in East-West trade relations between a member of the Western alliance and the communist world but also involved a substantial cut in the rigid price for international oil purchases maintained by the oil consortium, Mattei's reputation as a maverick was enhanced. His death in a plane crash in 1962 brought an end to the more flagrant free-wheeling of ENI, but in the succeeding decade the agency continued to grow and remained one of the leading international oil combines with both domestic and worldwide operations conducted by over 180 subsidiary companies. The Italian economy as a whole has also continued to play a leading role in East-West trade relations, particularly in the design and construction of complete plants within communist countries.

Although considerably smaller than IRI and ENI, the state Agency for the Administration of Metallic Mineral Enterprises (*Ente di Gestione per le Aziende Minerali Metallurgiche*—EGAM), set up in 1971, had shown the same tendency to expand its activities beyond those contemplated when it was established. Between 1971 and 1975 it had taken over forty-three companies, some with activities remote from mineral extraction. The other state holding companies are the

Manufacturing Industry Financing and Participation Agency (Ente Partecipazioni e Finanziamento Industria Manifatturiera—EFIM), which operates a wide range of medium-sized firms and has spearheaded the development of such firms in the south; the Agency for the Administration of Hot Springs (Ente Autonomo di Gestione per le Aziende Termali—EAGAT); and the Agency for the Administration of the Cinema (Ente Autonomo di Gestione per il Cinema).

To the extent that there is a distinction between the state holding companies and the nationalized industries, it lies in the degree of control and the nature of financing. The nationalized industries usually involve full government monopoly control over a basic sector with financing entirely by government funds and their own operating revenues; the state holding companies usually do not control the whole sector in which they operate, and ownership is shared with private capital. Thus they often own less than the total or even less than a majority interest in their subsidiary operating companies. The nationalized sector has a more static role and exists primarily to provide basic infrastructural service or handle state monopolies, such as tobacco, salt, and matches, whereas the state holding companies have the more dynamic responsibility of stimulating and sustaining economic growth. Since those with a manufacturing function as well as some others compete with private enterprise, they are supposed to act as pacesetters in labor relations, technological innovation, and development of managerial talent. Critics have pointed out, however, that politics and the need for political balancing often play a role in managerial appointments in the state holding companies, and the quality of management at the decisionmaking level is suspect.

A major public policy objective served by the state holding sector has been to promote industrialization in the south. The companies have been required by law since 1957 to place 40 percent of all investments and 60 percent of their industrial investment in the south. These percentages were raised in 1971 to 60 and 80 percent respectively. As a result there has been an impressive addition not only to the industrial plant in the south but also to transportation and telecommunications investment in the region. Although the increases in industrial employment and in ancillary private industrial development that were expected to follow have been disappointing, it is generally agreed that without the effort made by the state holding sector the south would have fallen further behind (see ch. 9).

Other public policy objectives for which the state holding sector has had a responsibility have been the maintenance of employment—particularly in the shipbuilding and heavy engineering sectors during the reconstruction period—and the injection of capital and managerial expertise into failing enterprises. This rescue function, which occupied a major portion of IRI's efforts from the immediate postwar period until the end of the 1960s, was less of a burden on ENI, which

because of its mission and its entrepreneurial leadership was oriented more to new expansionary high-technology and high-risk ventures. In 1971 a new finance company, the Industrial Participation Administration (Gestione Partecipazione Industriali—GEPI), was established with the specific mission of providing capital and managerial guidance to ailing small and medium-sized firms, thus assisting them to remain in business and to continue providing employment. This agency was supported by funds contributed by the large state holding companies and by the large state credit institute, Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, each of which received an increase in its endowment fund from the government for the purpose.

Among the criticisms of the state enterprise sector has been its failure to pay its way. Although self-financing is supposed to be the main source of capital, much of the capital requirement of the sector is provided by the state. For example, the four principal state holding companies were revealed early in 1975 to be planning a four-year investment program calling for the expenditure of about 18 trillion lire (the equivalent of about US\$27.5 billion), of which the state was expected to provide about one-quarter in the form of capital endowment funds. Capital, whether in the form of state capital endowment funds or of shareholdings, is dangerously low as a proportion of assets. The ratio of capital to assets in IRI was reportedly down to 9.6 percent early in 1976, and the group had more than 9.6 trillion lire in debts (more than US\$10 billion), of which more than two-thirds was short-term debt. In spite of preferential interest rates the interest burden on this debt was reported to be the major factor in the operating losses of the group.

In mid-1976 there was widespread feeling that the state enterprise sector was out of hand. Its accomplishments in southern development, in rescuing bankrupt companies, and in leading the way into the years of sharp industrial growth were acknowledged. It had been held up as a model for developing countries of the potentialities of a combined government and private enterprise system for achieving important social and economic objectives without sacrificing economic efficiency or the benefits of a market economy. With the economy in trouble and the political future of the country in doubt, however, many of its weaknesses were showing. The political basis for many of the top managerial appointments was apparent, and there was allegedly widespread use of state enterprise funds for political purposes as well as other large-scale corruption. In the spring of 1976, for example, the chairman of IRI's principal engineering subsidiary, according to press reports, was illegally involved in the purchase of Lockheed transports for the Italian air force. A parliamentary commission was set up to investigate the alleged payoff by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation of US\$2 million to Italian government officials in the air transport transaction. In November 1976 it was reported that the parlia-

mentary commission was in the United States, pursuing its investigations into the Lockheed affair (see ch. 11).

The Bureaucracy

Few observers of the Italian political and economic scene have failed to note the overelaborate structure of government ministries and agencies that deal with economic affairs. The three principal economic ministries are the Ministry of the Budget and Economic Programming, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of the Treasury, with a theoretical separation of functions between planning, collection, and spending state revenues. These are supplemented by ministries in charge of nationalized activities, such as those for transport and civil aviation, the merchant marine, and postal service and telecommunications; the Ministry of State Enterprises; and separate ministries for industry, labor and social welfare, foreign trade, tourism and entertainment, and public works. Coordination is theoretically in the hands of the Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica—CIPE). This committee has not been staffed adequately or provided with appropriate powers to carry out its many functions, which include not only coordination of the national economy and approval of the programs of the state holding companies and of the nationalized electrical industry but also supervision of the program for economic development of the south (see ch. 9).

In addition to the ministerial bodies there also existed what was described in 1976 as a bewildering number of economic committees and special institutes that theoretically had an advisory function. Although most were moribund, they continued in existence because each had sufficient political connection with the ruling hierarchy to ensure its continuation. The National Council of Economy and Labor, for example, was set up by the Constitution of 1948 to provide advice on economic and social affairs. It did not start to function until 1957 and even then did not function very effectively. It was reported to be still in existence but inactive in 1976; members who had died had not been replaced, and no president had been selected for several years.

Among the consequences of the overelaborate bureaucracy and departmental jealousies that negate the formal efforts at interministerial coordination has been the inordinate delay between decisions to make certain expenditures and the actual release of funds. Such delays have reportedly averaged 500 days and have been as long as 900. In some instances the funds wind up being spent for other purposes.

Public Expenditures

Italian budgets have run chronically in the red throughout the post-World War II period. Public expenditures rose by more than 300 per-

cent between 1965 and 1974 while revenues rose at a considerably slower pace. As a consequence the combined deficits of central and local governments—excluding public enterprises, which were also operating at heavy losses—were 11.1 percent of GDP in 1975, the highest proportion among OECD countries. One of the principal causes of the increased expenditures was the necessity for the government to assume increasing portions of the cost of social security and other welfare programs that were supposed to be supported by employer and employee contributions (see ch. 9).

An important weakness in Italian public finance was caused by the delays in the expenditure of funds. Through a combination of administrative inefficiency, legislative delays, and poor accounting practices, large unspent appropriations constituted a larger portion of each annual budget. Not only do spending delays mean the failure to carry out presumably desirable government programs in a timely fashion but, along with the uncertainty of revenues arising from the complicated and widely evaded tax system, they make it virtually impossible to carry out effective demand management policies through fiscal measures. That is, attempts to control the economy through the government's exercise of its taxing and spending powers had little chance of success because the magnitude and timing of specific taxes or expenditures could not be planned and carried out with confidence.

Tax Reform

The Italian tax system has been subjected to two major reforms in the 1970s. Indirect taxation, which produces more than two-thirds of the tax revenues, has since January 1, 1973, been based on the value-added principle in accordance with EEC practices. The value-added tax replaced a number of indirect taxes, of which the major one was a turnover tax. Like the value-added tax, this was levied at each stage of production and distribution, but it differed from the new tax in that it was levied on the total value of the commodity at each stage rather than on value added only. The turnover tax was regarded as more easily evaded, but the principal objection to it from the EEC viewpoint was that it provided a greater opportunity for export subsidies in the form of rebates. It also placed a premium on limiting the number of transactions, which was believed to encourage vertical integration of industry and discourage wholesale trade.

Other advantages of the value-added principle included a more logical basis for price determination and a greater flexibility in adjusting tax rates as a means of controlling consumption. Thus the initial basic rates of 6 percent on essentials, 12 percent on other nonluxury goods and services, and 18 percent on luxuries were adjusted upward in 1976 so that a number of items formerly taxed at 12 percent and most items formerly taxed at 18 percent were to be taxed at 30 percent.

The introduction of the value-added tax was also intended to simplify or eliminate a large number of minor taxes on specific commodities and transactions as well as local consumption taxes. Although some of this simplification had taken place by 1976, the roster of indirect taxes still included a wide range of stamp taxes on legal documents, transfer and capital gains taxes on real estate sales, and additional excise taxes on several goods, including alcohol, petroleum, and mineral oils. Thus the tax structure was still reputed to be one of the most complicated in Europe.

The system of direct taxation was also reformed with the adoption of a new comprehensive income tax system on January 1, 1974, after more than a decade of studies and proposals. The old system was a complicated structure of scheduled income taxes with differing rates for different classes of income, together with surtaxes and ad hoc taxes that added new rates to existing taxes for supplemental funds to meet emergency situations. On top of this structure was a communal family tax, which permitted the local tax official to adjust a tax bill if he thought the declared income did not reflect the taxpayer's living standard. Some tax collection, in a reflection of ancient Roman practice, was farmed out to private collecting agents. It is not surprising that tax evasion was widespread as each person or corporate entity engaged in a battle of wits with the tax collector to determine the ultimate tax liability.

The new system provides for the replacement of some seventeen direct taxes with four new taxes: a single progressive income tax on wages, salaries, dividends, interest, and income from professional services; a corporate and other company or legal entity tax; a municipal income tax on both individuals and firms, which replaced the old family tax; and a municipal capital gains tax on property. It was hoped that this simplified system would make it easier for the taxpayer to determine his tax and harder for him to evade it, since it was based on more standardized accounting procedures and incorporated an extended system of tax collection at the source. It was also hoped that the new system would make it possible for the government to determine the impact of tax rate changes on revenue more accurately and thus carry out its fiscal policy more effectively. In mid-1976 it was not possible to assess the extent to which these hopes were being realized but, as long as direct taxes constituted a relatively small portion of government revenues, fiscal policy measures based on such taxes were not apt to be very effective.

Corporate taxes are levied on all corporate entities, but the rates differentiate sharply between ordinary corporations, which as of January 1, 1976, were taxed at 25 percent on total net income; finance companies, which were taxed at 7.5 percent; and companies with a majority state participation, which were taxed at 6.3 percent. This tax advantage, together with the preferential interest rates available to

firms with majority state participation, were obvious reasons for the predominant and growing stature of the state holding sector as against private enterprise. They also helped render ineffective the demand management techniques of fiscal and monetary policy and limited the effectiveness of the Italian government in dealing with economic crises.

THE BANKING SYSTEM

The Bank of Italy, which was created in 1893, did not become a full-fledged central bank until a financial crisis in the mid-1920s led the fascist regime to grant it the sole right to issue currency. As the central bank in the post-World War II era it also acts as a central clearinghouse, attempts to control the supply of money through credit restrictions and manipulation of the bank rate, and regulates the exchange market through dealings in foreign exchange.

The banking system has two basic sectors—commercial banks, which handle short-term loans, and special credit institutes, which handle medium- and long-term loans. Although there are over 1,200 so-called independent banks with some 10,000 branches in the commercial banking segment, it is dominated by the three banks of national interest—that is, those whose majority share capital is held by the state through the IRI—and by six large public law banks. These nine banks account for about 45 percent of total lending. There were also a large number of small ordinary credit banks, corporative people's banks, savings banks, rural banks, and artisan banks and a postal savings system.

A pattern of heavy bank involvement in industrial financing was established early in the twentieth century, led by the Italian Commercial Bank and Italian Credit, both of which had been established with the help of German capital in 1894, only one year after the Bank of Italy was established. This pattern made the commercial banking system particularly vulnerable to shifts in the fortunes of large industry and thus laid the groundwork for state intervention in industry through the banking system, which occurred in the IRI takeover of these banks together with the Bank of Rome in the 1930s. Recognition of this weakness in the banking structure led to the Banking Act of 1936, which limited all commercial banks to short-term credit operations and reserved medium- and long-term lending to the special credit institutes. This restriction continued into the postwar period in some degree, but the larger commercial banks have participated indirectly in longer term lending. For example, the three national interest banks have been allowed to set up Mediocredito Centrale, a special refinancing institution for medium-term (five- to ten-year) loans.

The other major sector of the banking and credit system consists of about eighty special credit institutes, most of which are, like the ma-

major banks, under public or quasi-public ownership and control. The largest of these institutes is Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, which was set up by the government in 1931 and became the major supplier of longer term credit in 1936, when the Banking Act restricted the role of the commercial banks to short-term loans. Other special credit institutes specialize in industrial, agricultural, real estate, or construction financing. All these organizations ordinarily raise their investment funds through long-term bond issues in both domestic and international capital markets.

Most of the lending of the special institutes is at subsidized interest rates in order to foster government objectives, such as the development of the south, the development of tourism, the encouragement of medium-sized and small industry, and the stimulation of exports. Since about three-quarters of total enterprise indebtedness in the 1970s was based on subsidized credit—it had been only about one-third at the beginning of the 1960s—the high degree of government involvement in financing the economy is apparent. It would also appear that, to the extent that industry is financed at rates that differ from the market rate, the effectiveness of central bank interest rate adjustment as a tool of monetary policy is blunted.

The large role played by the banks and the special credit institutes in financing the economy is associated with a relatively undeveloped equity capital market. Although there are ten stock exchanges in the major cities throughout the country, the largest of which is in Milan, fewer than 150 companies were listed on the exchanges in the early 1970s. Stock market development has also been stifled by tax problems relating to the registration of shares and by archaic rules and regulations.

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Literature on the Italian economy in the 1970s is far from abundant, but there are two excellent works published in Great Britain that provided both descriptive and analytical background for this survey. These are Kevin Allen and Andrew Stevenson's *An Introduction to the Italian Economy* and Gisele Podbielski's *Italy: Development and Crisis in the Post-War Economy*. A more general recent work in a journalistic vein is John Earle's *Italy in the 1970s*, also published in Great Britain. The most detailed works on Italian economic history unfortunately go only up to the early 1960s. These are Shepard Clough's *The Economic History of Modern Italy* and George Hildebrand's *Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy*. Also useful but dated analyses that link economic and political developments are Joseph La Palombara's *Italy, the Politics of Planning and Interest Groups in Italian Politics*. The annual economic survey of Italy for 1976 prepared by the OECD, as well as that organization's 1973

monograph *Monetary Policy in Italy*, have been useful, supplemented by United States government publications and recent periodical material, primarily from the *Economist* and the *Financial Times*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 8

ECONOMIC SECTORS

The contributions of the major economic sectors to Italy's gross domestic product (GDP) in 1974 were agriculture, forestry, and fishing—8.4 percent; industry, public utilities, and construction—41.6 percent; and miscellaneous services and public administration—50 percent. Overall these proportions are fairly typical for a mature industrial economy, but the rapidity of change that produced this pattern over the post-World War II period left many structural problems, and in a number of respects Italy continues to show characteristics of underdevelopment along with those of maturity.

The dualistic nature of the Italian economy is evident, for example, in the disproportionate size of the agricultural work force (16.5 percent) relative to agriculture's contribution to the national economy. It is also evident in the existence of large and sophisticated industrial conglomerates side by side with many small establishments burdened by obsolete equipment and staffed by self-employed and family workers or nonunionized, low-wage labor. The dualism is evident in the differences in working and living conditions between north and south, as well as in the differences in the remuneration and fringe benefits of white-collar workers as compared with manual workers and of employees of large firms—many of which are state owned—and those of small establishments and of state employees as compared with non-state employees. Such discrepancies, particularly those between north and south, have been major targets of political action and of economic and social planning and legislation since the end of World War II (see ch. 9).

NATURAL RESOURCES

The Italian economic performance in the mid-twentieth century, although in some respects still behind those of the other members of the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), is creditable considering the meager natural endowments of the peninsula. Agricultural land, including marginally productive pasture, is only 17.6 million hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres), about 58 percent of the total area. In 1973, of the land classi-

fied as agricultural, 9.3 million hectares, about 53 percent, were in annual crops, temporary pasture, or fallow; 3 million hectares, about 17 percent, were under permanent cultivation in vineyards, orchards, and olive or almond groves; and 5.3 million hectares, about 30 percent, were in permanent pasture. Much of the land that is under cultivation in Italy would probably not be considered for agricultural use in a country more favorably endowed, and much of the pastureland is suitable for extensive raising only of sheep and goats, rather than of the more valuable cattle that can economically be raised only in the scarce well-watered grassy areas. In addition most of the 6.2 million hectares classified as forest are of little value for timber production. Forestry contributed only about 1 percent of the total value of the agricultural sector in 1974.

Italy's natural resources also provide a poor basis for industrial viability. There is little coal, iron ore, or petroleum, and the only non-ferrous minerals in adequate supply are mercury and antimony. Non-metallic minerals, such as potash, rock salt, and marble, are in somewhat better supply, and Italy is a net exporter of these products.

The major power resources are the hydroelectric facilities created by the Alpine lakes and rivers and the natural gas fields discovered in the Po valley in the late 1940s. Since these resources are mostly concentrated in the north—as is the most productive agricultural land—this region's economic leadership is foreordained (see ch. 3).

The marked regional variation in economic resources and development is among Italy's most intractable economic problems and, accordingly, is a major contributor to social and political problems as well. By every measure the south has lagged behind the north in economic well-being; this remains true in spite of efforts in the more than 100 years since the unification of the country, and particularly since World War II, to improve the situation of the south.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture's role in the national economy, as measured by its contribution to the GDP, has been in decline since the mid-1800s. In 1861 it was an estimated 56.7 percent; by the turn of the century it had reached about 50 percent, and it continued to decline to about 30 percent in the 1936-40 period. After the disruptions of World War II it resumed a downward trend, reaching 21.5 percent in 1960. The decline sharpened in the 1960s with the dramatic spurt of the industrial and services sectors, and by 1970 agriculture's share of the GDP was only 8.8 percent. This proportion appears to have stabilized in the 1970s and, barring unforeseen technological developments, should remain between 5 to 10 percent during the remainder of the decade. In 1974 the share was 8.4 percent.

Although agriculture's contribution to the GDP was declining, agricultural production increased significantly in the postwar period. At the end of World War II production was only 40 percent of what it had been in 1938, but by 1950 it had regained the 1938 figure and by 1960 was 40 percent above it. Further gains took place in the 1960s and 1970s. These reflected significant increases in yields—cereal yields increased by 38 percent between 1961 and 1972—offsetting a gradual reduction in the amount of land devoted to farming, which shrank by about 10 percent between 1962 and 1974, and a sharp decline in the agricultural labor force from 6.2 million in 1960 to about 3.1 million in 1974, a decline of 50 percent. Agricultural labor was, however, 16.5 percent of the total employed labor force in 1974, compared with an EEC average of less than 10 percent.

In 1975, when Italy recorded its first absolute decline in the GDP since the end of World War II, agriculture was the only principal economic sector to show a gain, registering a 2-percent increase over the 1974 figure. On a long-term basis the gross salable product of the agriculture sector increased about 80 percent from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.

The productivity gains appear to be attributable more to increased use of fertilizers and mechanization and to land reclamation and other improvements, including irrigation and drainage measures, than to redistribution of land under the land reform program of the 1950s; however, in the few areas where land reform has been effected, it has possibly been a contributor (see ch. 9). Also, although productivity gains have been noted in practically all phases of agriculture, substitution of higher productivity items—such as meat, dairy products, and table vegetables—for low-yielding cereals and vines has also been a factor.

In spite of impressive gains in productivity since 1945 Italy has become increasingly unable to feed itself. From near self-sufficiency in foodstuffs before World War II, the annual food deficit had grown to over US\$4 billion in 1974 in terms of the excess of imports over exports in foodstuffs and related agricultural products. This growing deficit reflects not only an increased caloric intake but also a rising standard of dietary demands that emphasizes meat and other protein products.

The declining agricultural labor force and the increasing agricultural productivity have, of course, meant higher farm incomes but have also resulted in an aging farm population and a shortage of skilled agricultural workers. In spite of land reform measures aimed at increasing farm size and reducing the number of farms, there remained in the mid-1970s about 3.5 million individual agricultural units, a figure larger by about 500,000 than the number of agricultural workers. It is evident that many persons, recorded as employed in manufacturing or

service industries or as unemployed, supplement their food supplies and their incomes by use of family farm plots.

Regionally there is considerable variation in employment patterns; in the mid-1970s agriculture accounted for only 4 percent of the work force in the north and about 28 percent in the south. The size of the agricultural work force relative to its economic contribution continues to constitute a major social problem. Many farmworkers are day laborers with little or no job security. There is a large element of underemployment in agriculture because of sporadic employment, and the average income of farmworkers is less than half that of industrial workers (see Labor Force, this ch.).

Regional Variation

In 1970 there were over 3.5 million agricultural holdings recorded and over 25 million hectares included in the area held; the average landholding in Italy for that year was only about seven hectares, compared with twenty-two hectares in France. The Italian figure conceals a wide range of landholding practices and conditions, some of them reflecting ancient and medieval arrangements, which vary from region to region and within regions. They have also been in a state of transition under the impact of land reform programs in the post-World War II period (see ch. 9).

Among the major regions is the Alpine frontier area, but it can support agriculture only in the valleys. Grain, potatoes, wine grapes, and fruits are raised in the lower valleys, cattle and fodder grasses at higher elevations. Most of the country's limited timber resources are found there—primarily pine, fir, and larch. Most agricultural production comes from the smallholdings of independent farmers, which provide only a precarious existence in the highlands. Farmers in the lower regions, including the Ligurian coast, are more prosperous, particularly those whose lands are sufficiently productive to serve the industrial centers of the lower region with market garden crops.

The Po valley, with about 30,000 square miles of agricultural land, is the country's richest agricultural region. Major crops, including wheat, corn, rice, fodder grains, wine grapes, apples, peaches, pears, and vegetables, are found in abundance. It is also the principal area for meat and dairy products. Intensive cultivation in the region is made possible not only by the favorable terrain and climatic features but also by the extensive drainage and irrigation facilities, some of which date back to Etruscan times. An elaborate network of canals started in the fifteenth century formed the basis for the land reclamation projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is also the region of Italy's major natural energy resource—extensive natural gas deposits discovered in the 1940s. Within the region the upper Po valley and most of Lombardy have been the more prosperous areas,

characterized by capital-intensive farming using hired laborers who are usually given long-term contracts and paid wages that are not out of line with industrial wages of the region. In contrast the lower Po valley, though also intensively farmed, is more dependent on day laborers and sharecroppers. It also is more dependent on such industrial crops as hemp and sugar beets.

Agriculture in central Italy is handicapped by the Apennine ridge of mountains, which limits arable land to the narrow coastal plains, the mountain valleys, and some plateau areas. It is an area of mixed farming, dominated by cereal grains and vineyards, with some livestock, olive groves, and other tree crops, including figs and almonds. Sharecropping has been the most common system of farming, although its character has been changing under the impact of land reform (see ch. 9).

Southern Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, is known as the Mezzogiorno. It has chronically been the most backward agriculturally and in other economic respects because of climate, terrain, and soil deficiencies. Along the coasts there are relatively fertile belts that provide land for tomatoes and other garden vegetables, vineyards, orchards, and olive and almond groves, but the hilly interior of the region has been able to support only a limited agricultural activity based on sheep and low-yielding cereal grains. Apulia, the heel of the peninsula, is relatively flat but lacks water resources. Citrus fruits are a principal crop in the lower coastal regions.

Landholding patterns vary considerably throughout the Mezzogiorno. The large estates (*latifondi*), owned by absentee landlords and worked by landless day laborers, are disappearing under the impact of land reform. They are being replaced by small independent farms (see ch. 9). Most of the peasants in this area, whatever their status with regard to the land, live in large villages or towns rather than on the land they work. The inadequate size of the landholdings remains a major problem even in the higher yielding coastal areas, where vines and such tree crops as olives, citrus, and almonds predominate. Individual units tend to be so small that poverty and underemployment reportedly are as prevalent as in less productive areas.

Major Crops

Wheat is the principal grain crop throughout the country. The area devoted to wheat declined from 4.4 million hectares annually in the 1961-65 period to 3.5 million hectares in 1974, but production rose from 8.9 million to 9.7 million tons. Yields, though up from 2.0 tons per hectare to 2.6 tons, were still considerably below the European average of 3.3 tons per hectare in 1974. Based on the relation of domestic production to net imports, Italy appears to be about 90 percent self-sufficient in wheat. Corn is the second major grain crop, but

it is produced only in the northern region. The 5.1 million tons produced in 1974 appeared to be about half of national requirements. The yield of 5.8 tons per hectare is one of the highest in Europe. Annual rice production of nearly 1 million tons ranks Italy as Europe's leading producer. About 50 percent of the annual production is exported. Other grains, all well under 1 million tons, include barley, rye, and oats.

Horticultural and orchard crops are produced in considerable variety and abundance, contribute considerably to export earnings, and provide major elements of the national diet. Italy is Europe's major producer of a number of these crops, including tomatoes, cauliflower, pumpkins and other gourd-like vegetables, green peppers, green beans, watermelons, pears, peaches, lemons, and limes. Fresh, dried, and preserved fruits and vegetables earned the equivalent of US\$1.14 billion in export revenues in 1974—about 4 percent of total exports.

Wine is another major product, and Italy vies with France for the leadership of Europe in wine production. In the mid-1970s efforts to develop an export market in France for table wine resulted in the so-called wine war that contributed to Italy's difficulties in adapting its agriculture to the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC (see ch. 7).

In 1974 Italy was the world's leading producer of olives and olive oil, having 35 percent of the world's total. It is also the world's largest net importer of olive oil, importing about 150,000 tons a year from 1970 to 1974 and exporting only about 15,000 tons a year. Its imports are over one-half of the world's total imports of this product. Italy also imports large quantities of other oils and seeds. In 1974 the estimated imports were: peanuts and peanut oil, 151,000 tons; soy beans and oil, 1.4 million tons; sunflower seed and oil, 42,000 tons; rape seed and oil, 79,000 tons; sesame seed, 19,000 tons; copra and coconut oil, 25,300 tons; palm kernels and oil, 40,200 tons; butter, 115.5 million pounds; and tallow and greases, 57,000 tons.

Although it is an important feature of Italian agricultural production, olive grove cultivation as a provider of agricultural employment presents some problems. Cultivation of the olive trees does not require much labor, and the harvest employment requirement is markedly sporadic because the natural cycle of the tree results in sharp variations in yields in alternate years. In the early 1970s Italian olive oil production averaged 544,000 tons in the even-numbered years and less than 400,000 tons in the odd-numbered years.

Livestock and Other Animal Protein Foods

Italy produces considerably less than 10 percent of the livestock raised in EEC countries, sheep being more significant in its contribution than cattle. The country produced 495,000 tons of cheese in 1975.

ranking it fourth after the United States, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). It is nevertheless also a major importer of cheese and other dairy products and the world's leading importer of nonfat dry milk. Fishing makes only a minor contribution to the domestic production of protein foods.

Although the demand for protein foods has been rapidly growing in the post-World War II period, meat consumption in Italy—estimated at forty-six kilograms (one kilogram equals 2.2 pounds) per capita in 1974—is the lowest among EEC countries and only a little more than one-half that of the United States. Meat production was only about thirty-six kilograms per capita in 1974, compared with the EEC average of fifty-nine kilograms per capita. Italy is also behind the EEC average in grain production with 303 kilograms per capita compared with the EEC's 415 in that year.

The gap between meat production and consumption makes meat the most significant food-deficit item and makes Italy the world's third or fourth largest importer of meat and meat products. In addition there are significant imports of young beef cattle and of feed with which to fatten them. In 1974 about 1.8 million head of beef cattle and 675,000 hogs were imported, together with cattle, hog, and poultry feed valued at over US\$500 million.

INDUSTRY

Italian industry, including manufacturing, mining, public utilities, and construction, contributed 41.6 percent to the GDP and employed 43.6 percent of the work force in 1974. The largest sector of the manufacturing industry was the metal products industry, which includes machine tools, automotive and other transportation equipment, and a wide range of other capital consumer goods. Often referred to as the engineering industries, this major subsector, in most years composed of about 60 percent automobiles and other consumer durables, is heavily dependent on export markets. The gross value added contributed the equivalent of US\$12.6 billion to the GDP in 1974. It was followed in importance by the textile, apparel, and footwear industries with about US\$6.5 billion in gross value added. The next major industry comprises the food, beverages, and tobacco products areas, which contributed US\$6.2 billion in 1974 in gross value added. Outside the manufacturing sector, the construction and public works contribution was US\$12.3 billion, and the energy industry's share was valued at US\$7.5 billion.

Italian industry had a late start compared with other European countries, but by about 1900 several of the firms that led the industrial expansion of the mid-twentieth century had been launched. Like most Italian businesses they started out as family ventures. These in-

clude not only Fiat, which was founded in 1899 by the Agnelli family as the Italian Automobile Factory of Turin (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino—Fiat), but also some that are still identified by the name of the founding family, such as Pirelli in tire manufacture and Olivetti in office machines. The present-day structure of large modern industry is a combination of few family-dominated firms, a considerable number of more broadly held corporations that have developed from family firms, firms with varying degrees of foreign interests, and firms under complete or partial control of the major state holding companies (see ch. 7).

The great mass of Italian industry as well as of service enterprises, however, continued to be small family enterprises. Of the 150 largest industrial companies in the EEC in terms of sales in the mid-1970s, Italy had only eight. The average size of industrial establishments in 1971 was 8.4 workers per firm in manufacturing, 6.2 in construction, 12.2 in the extractive industries, and 12.2 in public utilities. With many small establishments, most of them characterized by low productivity and nonunionized low-wage labor, a considerable portion of the work force was estimated to be effectively outside the social security system. The same circumstance also applied to service industries, such as retail and catering. It should also be noted that many industries depended in whole or in part on cottage industry workers not usually covered by official statistics but generally considered to number between 1.5 and 2 million workers. These persons, predominantly women employed part time and without social security or the wage and employment protection available in large-scale industry, were believed to have increased substantially since World War II (see ch. 9).

A major characteristic of Italian industry is its dependence on external resources and markets. Over three-quarters of the energy consumption is dependent on foreign fuels, and the need for imported raw materials is equally great. The iron and steel industry and the engineering industries import approximately the same proportion of their materials and supplies. Thus Italian imports in 1974 were roughly: industrial material and supplies, 75 percent; capital goods, 10.5 percent; and consumer goods, 14.4 percent. Italian exports also were overwhelmingly manufactured products, 96 percent being so classified in 1974. The total value of manufactures exported in that year was US\$29 billion, equal to about 60 percent of the manufacturing sector's output by value.

Regional Concentration

Italian industry, particularly the large-scale manufacturing units, is concentrated in the northwestern triangle formed by the cities of Turin and Milan and the port city of Genoa. There are a number of sec-

ondary industrial centers in the north and a short way down the peninsula as far as Livorno and Florence. Farther south there are significant industrial concentrations around Rome and Naples and smaller ones in the south at Bari, Brindisi, and Taranto on the mainland, Palermo and Catania in Sicily, and Cagliari in Sardinia. Much of the southern industry is of postwar origin and has resulted from programs to increase the economic importance of the south (see ch. 9).

One reason for industrial concentration in the north is, of course, the existence of power sources, both the hydroelectric resources created by the Alps and the natural gas fields of Lombardy and Piedmont. Port and other transportation facilities also play a large part. Because of its agricultural wealth the north has also offered more readily available capital than the chronically impoverished south.

Energy

Among the industrial countries of the world only Japan depends more on imports to satisfy its energy needs than Italy, which gets about 75 percent of its requirements from imported oil and an additional portion from imported coal and natural gas. Available coal supplies are found in the dwindling lignite deposits in the Arno valley in Tuscany and in some hard coal deposits in Sardinia and Valle d'Aosta. Italy is the EEC's largest importer of hard coal—8.8 million tons in 1973—which amounted to 28.9 percent of the EEC's total imports. About 60 percent of the electric energy used is for industrial purposes. Some 21.6 percent of electricity for industrial use was self-generated, that is, produced at the plant. This was one of the highest percentages in Europe, surpassed only by West Germany's 28.5 percent. The per capita consumption of energy in 1974 was the equivalent of 2.47 tons of oil—the lowest in the EEC except for Ireland and less than one-third of the per capita consumption in the United States.

Electric and nuclear energy production was largely fragmented among some 1,200 companies until it was nationalized in December 1962 and placed under the control of the National Electric Power Agency (Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica—ENEL). Natural gas, crude oil production, and the refining, transportation, and distribution of products are controlled by the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi—ENI), the second largest Italian state holding company. Italy has the largest refining capacity in Europe and exports a large portion of the refined products. Extensive pipelines connect Italy with its northern neighbors and provide internal distribution. Domestic crude oil production, primarily from fields in Sicily, reached a peak of about 3 million tons per year in the 1950s but declined to about 1 million tons in the 1970s, less than 1 percent

of crude oil imports. Natural gas—primarily from fields in the Po valley and secondarily from fields in central and southern Italy, Sicily, and offshore in the Adriatic Sea—comes much closer to supplying Italy's domestic needs, but imports from North Africa, the Soviet Union, and the Netherlands are significant and contribute to the conservation of an estimated 9.2 trillion cubic feet of reserves.

Most of the hydroelectric production is provided by Alpine waters, supplemented by some production from the Apennines and in Sardinia. Italy is the second largest producer of hydroelectric power in Europe. Though proportionally much less significant, Italy's geothermal energy production is the greatest in the world. This exploitation of volcanic activity in Tuscany, the central Apennines, Sicily, and Sardinia contributed 391 megawatts installed capacity in 1972.

Nuclear power is playing an increasing role in Italy's energy production. Three small plants were built in the 1960s, two in the Rome-Naples area and one at Trino in the Turin-Milan industrial zone. A larger nuclear plant of 8,500 megawatts capacity was due for completion in 1976 at Caorso on the Po River. ENEL's plant investment program calls for electric power capacity of about 25,000 megawatts by the end of 1983, about three-fifths to be generated by conventional thermal means, one-fifth by hydroelectric and geothermal means, and one-fifth by twenty nuclear power plants.

Mining

Mining is relatively insignificant in the Italian economy, contributing less than 1 percent to the GDP and providing employment for less than 1 percent of the labor force. Italy is self-sufficient in only antimony and mercury among the extractive minerals, and most other mineral resources are approaching exhaustion. Imports of metals and ores are accordingly major factors in Italy's import requirements, particularly iron ore and iron and steel scrap. Italy's only significant mineral export is mercury; it produces about 15 percent of the world's supply.

All subsurface assets belong to the state, so all mineral exploitation is carried on either by government concerns or under license from the government. The state holding company for the mining sector is the Agency for the Administration of the Metallic Mineral Enterprises (Ente di Gestione per le Aziende Mineralie Metallurgiche—EGAM). In 1975 the first national mining plan was approved by the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning. This plan called for a stepped-up program of mineral research and exploration, strategic stockpiling, subsidized mining operations, foreign mining participation, and reorganization of the mining sector.

Quarrying, though not a significant contributor to overall production or employment, is of some international interest because of the

world-famous marble quarries at Massa and Carrara, which provided most of Italy's renowned sculptors with their raw materials and are still the source of building materials for both domestic and export use. Rock salt, particularly in Sicily, is another significant product of the quarrying industry.

Small-Scale Industry

Most Italian industries are small, and it has been estimated that over 250,000 establishments are one-man operations and that a large number have from one to five employees. About 19 percent of the full-time manufacturing labor force is employed in such establishments. There are also many businesses employing part-time help. For instance, in the textile business there are a large number of part-time pieceworkers, primarily women working in the home while the men of the family are engaged in other occupations or are unemployed. These small operations also include a vast number of bakers, pasta makers, and other food processors who serve local neighborhoods, as well as shoemakers, tailors, mechanics, furniture makers, and the like. More elaborate skilled crafts include jewelry making, embroidery, pottery, glassworking, and leatherworking. Some of the finer products of these crafts, of course, have ready markets among tourists and other foreign buyers, thus contributing to some degree to Italian export earnings.

Although much of the small local industry is geared to local needs, it is, at least in the south, often inadequate to meet these needs. Calabria, for instance, was reported in the early 1960s to import 85 percent of its manufactured needs from the north. Even in the mid-1970s foreigners traveling in Calabria have noted the difficulty of purchasing local produce or handicrafts. Except for such major cash crops as olives and citrus fruits, the production of both food and crafted products is oriented to home needs, and potential markets are unexploited.

LABOR FORCE

The labor force has slowly been decreasing since about 1960, when it was about 20 million. The officially recorded figure for 1974 was 18,898,000 gainfully employed and 560,000 unemployed, for a total labor force of 19,458,000. This decline reflects a number of social and economic changes. There was a continuing emigration of workers to more lucrative jobs in northern Europe during the period, and the large numbers of males leaving rural areas for work in the industrial cities—both north and south—or abroad were usually accompanied by female family members who often left the labor force entirely. The average period of school attendance was also lengthening in the 1960s and 1970s, and increased pension benefits were encouraging earlier retirements.

The Italian employed labor force in 1974 consisted of 16.5 percent in agriculture (compared with 43.9 percent in 1951), 43.7 percent in industry (29.4 percent in 1951), and 39.8 percent in services (26.6 percent in 1951). These marked shifts in the composition of the labor force over a twenty-year span are striking evidence of the changing economy. However, only about 35 percent of the total population is considered in the work force—a percentage about 5 to 10 percent below other industrialized countries.

The sharp decline in agricultural labor from 8.6 million in 1951 to a little over 3.1 million in 1974 was not wholly accounted for by the increases in manufacturing employment, which amounted to about 1.6 million over the period. Other subsectors that increased substantially were construction (an increase of 732,000), trade and related services (762,000), transportation and communications (442,000), public administration (668,000), and miscellaneous services (364,000). Also, as mentioned, some workers left the labor force, and others emigrated.

The decline in the total number of workers has also reflected a transition in the role of self-employed and marginal workers, that is, those working less than thirty-three hours per week. The majority of the 5 million workers who left farms in the 1950s and 1960s were in this category. In most other sectors the number of such workers also declined both absolutely and as a percentage of the total labor force. Thus full-time employees rose from 8.7 to 12.5 million between 1951 and 1971, whereas full-time self-employed workers declined from 6.9 to 5.3 million, and marginal workers declined from 4.9 million to 1.6 million. Construction employment was the only major subsector that recorded an increase in marginal workers. This sector has chronically been marked by many small firms with floating part-time workers.

Although these changes can be interpreted as a favorable economic development signaling a switch from low-productivity to high-productivity employment, they also involve significant movements from rural areas and life-styles. This exacerbates urban problems by placing greater demands on housing, transportation, health, and education facilities (see ch. 9).

SERVICES

The services sector as a whole contributed about 50 percent to the GDP in 1974. This proportion represents about what might be expected in a developed economy, and its rise from about 25 percent in 1950 is an indication of the rapid growth of the Italian economy since that time. The service subsectors are by nature more diverse than the agriculture and industry sectors (see ch. 7).

Transportation

The country's elongated shape, its mountainous terrain, and the limited usefulness of river valleys as transportation routes have

placed obstacles in the way of political unification and have contributed to the backwardness and isolation of the southern part of the country. For these as well as military reasons Italian leaders have made the building of a transportation system a top priority.

Nineteenth-century Italian leaders considered railroad construction extremely important as a way of binding the country together. Most of the railroad system was constructed between 1860 and 1895, and those links that private investors would not finance were financed by the state. The rapid construction of railroads in the last century was accomplished in spite of formidable natural obstacles. During the fascist era railroads and port facilities were improved, and airfields and a modern highway system were built. As military considerations were paramount, the greater part of such construction was in the strategically important northern part of the country. After World War II the badly damaged transport system was quickly repaired, and the system of superhighways in the industrial heartland was improved, linked with the Alpine passes and, most important, extended to the southern parts of the country.

Railroads

In 1976 a railroad system of 12,857 miles (standard gauge, 50 percent electrified) linked Italy with other European countries through several Alpine passes and provided service to all parts of the country. The system uses several of the world's longest tunnels; the second longest—13 1/2 miles—is in the Appenines on the route between Florence and Bologna. Only major routes are double tracked, however, and quadruple-track lines are found only in the vicinity of major centers.

Italy has few minerals of its own to transport and, because industries using bulky raw materials tend to locate near the sea, the railroad system is used less for freight than are those of other large European countries. Passenger use of railroads is greater in Italy than in England or France, and passenger service is better to the north of Rome than to the south of it.

Highways

The road system was 197,000 miles in 1976 and included over 3,000 miles of *autostrade*, or superhighways. Highways are used more extensively than railroads for passenger and freight travel.

Although under Mussolini strategic improvements to the transportation system tended to be concentrated in the northern part of the country, existing roads were repaired and new roads built in all parts of Italy. The *autostrade* system in the industrialized north has been greatly improved and connects with roads from other European countries at the Alpine passes. The *autostrade* system has also been extended along the eastern and western coasts of the peninsula and has replaced several of Sicily's main routes.

Construction of the *autostrade* on the peninsula and Sicily, as well as the improvement of major roadways on Sardinia, was done to meet the government's objective of making locations in the south more attractive to industry and of aiding southern agricultural producers by expanding their market. The *autostrade* link between Rome and Naples has attracted a considerable amount of industry. From 1968 to 1973 about 600 new firms were established in this general area, including a large automobile manufacturing plant at Cassino. The *autostrade* system has also promoted industrial growth in Foggia, Bari, and Taranto. On Sicily expansion of the road system has stimulated hotel and motel construction and allowed Sicily to share more fully in the tourism industry than formerly.

The *autostrade* have influenced shifts in population since the 1950s. Of the provinces that gained population from 1951 to 1971, those that were linked with the system grew faster than those that were not. One such fast-growing area was Bologna, which is at the intersection of the fastest routes to all parts of the country and consequently has experienced considerable industrial growth.

Air Transport

Italy has twenty-three international airports; those in Rome, Milan, and several other major cities have direct flights to other European centers. Air travel is an important part of the domestic transportation system, and in 1973 about 10 percent of all passengers on domestic flights in Europe were carried on Italy's national airline, Alitalia. Rome is the hub of domestic air routes. Routes to the south are most significant because they link the islands with the mainland and supplement rail and steamship service, which are not of high quality.

North of Rome the most extensively used air links are those from the capital to Turin and Venice. Passengers going to other northern destinations often prefer to use the railroads. The availability of swift train service to northern cities has tended to reduce demand for flights between such destinations and Rome.

Water Transport

Difficult land travel and the sea's proximity to much of the country make coastal transportation an important part of Italy's transportation system. For thousands of years the Mediterranean, which is easily navigable except during seasonal windstorms, served as a tie with various points on the mainland and the islands. The long irregular Italian coastline has many small harbors suitable for coastal commerce.

Italy has five good natural ports—Genoa, Venice, Naples, Palermo, and Trieste. These and most of the thirty-five smaller ports are hemmed in by mountains. None of Italy's ports is as well situated with respect to major shipping routes and to the principal industrial areas of Europe as are such northern European ports as Rotterdam.

Genoa, Italy's busiest port, serves the industrialized northwestern part of the country and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland. Freight unloaded at Genoa must move by train across the mountains, however, and Genoa is at a disadvantage relative to other ports that can unload onto barges or onto railroad cars that travel along more level routes.

Other major ports include Venice, which also serves the North Italian Plain; Trieste, which serves the Danube valley; Naples the major southern port; and Palermo, the major port on Sicily. The government and major industrial firms have made a heavy investment in improving Taranto on the peninsula, Augusta on Sicily, and a new port and petroleum refinery, Porto Foxi, on Sardinia.

Inland waterways are of negligible importance. The lower Po is navigable as far as Pavia, but little use is made of this route. The country has 708 miles of navigable river routes, including parts of the Tiber and the Arno. There are 500 miles of navigable canals, but these are not extensively used. The busiest inland waterways are the 300 miles of routes on the sub-Alpine lakes, such as Maggiore, Como, and Garda, which have regular and well-patronized passenger service.

Pipelines

In 1976 about 6,900 miles of natural gas pipeline carried both imported and domestically produced gas. Most of this system served the North Italian Plain, but there was a small section between Rome and the fields on the Adriatic coast and another on Sicily.

There were 1,000 miles of crude petroleum pipelines in 1976. One high-capacity segment runs north from Genoa, principally to industrialized area, although a small share of the crude goes to Switzerland. Another high-capacity segment runs from Trieste to Ingolstadt, West Germany. Smaller crude oil pipelines on Sicily hold some promise for its industrial development. Italy also has about 900 miles of pipeline that carry refined products.

Domestic Trade

Retail trade represents an extreme case of the fragmentation of the Italian economy. According to a Ministry of Industry survey in the mid-1970s there were over 1 million separate retail establishments, about evenly divided between food and nonfood outlets. They were supplemented by about 250,000 coffee bars, ice-cream parlors, restaurants, and other purveyors of prepared food and by nearly 300,000 peddlers (*commercio ambulante*)—a category that includes the many stall and pushcart operators and other itinerant salespeople found in the markets and streets of Italian cities and towns. Although modern shops, department stores, and even supermarkets exist in the larger cities, they account for only about 6 percent of retail trade and are overshadowed by the small merchants, who provide Italy with a colorful but inefficient and costly distribution system. Italy has the highest

proportion of shops to population in the EEC. These establishments are resistant to change, and their operators' exercise of political power has been given credit for effectively blocking legislation that would authorize the expansion of new large-scale business units.

These small shopkeepers and peddlers are of necessity served by small operators at the wholesale level. Large wholesale operations have been slow to develop in Italy not only because the retail trade is fragmented but also because the turnover tax, which prevailed until 1973, discouraged the additional transactions that wholesaling entailed (see ch. 7). In order to save taxes most manufacturers prefer to sell directly to the larger retailers.

In one respect, however, Italian domestic trade has achieved a modern characteristic. Since automobiles and large consumer durables, such as refrigerators, sewing machines, and television sets, have fairly broad markets in the more prosperous areas, installment credit is well established. From 30 to 50 percent of such sales are based on consumer installment loans arranged through local banks.

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Much of the material in this chapter has been pieced together from periodical literature and statistical data appearing from 1975 to mid-1976. Excellent, though dated, descriptions of the dualistic nature of the Italian economy appear in Vera C. Lutz' *Italy: A Study in Economic Development*, Shepard B. Clough's *The Economic History of Modern Italy*, and George H. Hildebrand's *Growth and Structure of the Economy in Modern Italy*. The problems that this dualism continues to create in the 1970s are well described by Kevin Allen and Andrew Stevenson in *An Introduction to the Italian Economy*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 9

SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Although Italy is among the leading industrial nations of the world, the uneven pace of its economic development in the post-World War II period has been accompanied by an equally uneven development of the social infrastructure. This is particularly evident when viewed from a regional perspective. The southern portion of the country and the islands, known as the Mezzogiorno, continue to lag behind the rest of Italy in economic and social development in spite of major efforts to correct the imbalance. On a countrywide basis there are also severe deficiencies in social welfare programs, housing, and education.

By the early 1950s the Italian economy had, with the help of massive aid programs from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and from the United States, recovered from the impact of World War II, but the country remained poor and backward in socioeconomic terms. Both agriculture and industry were inefficient and unable to provide enough employment opportunities at adequate wages to bring per capita national income—estimated at about equal to US\$260 in 1950—much above the US\$200 level that was then regarded as the mark of an underdeveloped country by United Nations (UN) criteria.

By most statistical standards the picture was far different in the early 1970s. Economic growth had been rapid, and a number of significant socioeconomic measurements showed a sharp improvement. Per capita national income had reached the equivalent of US\$2,710—still somewhat low by standards of the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market) but a gratifying increase over 1950. Socioeconomic progress was also evident in the low level of official unemployment and in the extent of social welfare programs. There has been, however, much illusion in the statistical evidence of the 1970s. Because a great deal of the unemployment was not recorded, the true figures were believed to be higher than official statistics showed, and much of the expenditure on social welfare programs has been dissipated in waste, red tape, and other administrative leakage. Massive expenditures for the rehabilitation of the south have achieved some success, but the problem of raising the area to full

economic and social equality with the north has proved to be more intractable than expected. Thus in the mid-1970s Italy still had a large gap between its impressive record of economic growth and its generally unfavorable performance in social development. This gap, when viewed in political terms, was probably the principal reason for the diminishing popular support for the ruling Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC).

ECONOMIC PLANNING

Economic planning on a national scale has not been fully realized in spite of considerable political pressure and in spite of the increasing scale of government operations in the economic realm (see ch. 7). The so-called Vanoni Plan of the 1950s—sponsored by Minister of the Budget Ezio Vanoni—was not actually a full-fledged economic plan but rather a set of proposals and projections for the ten-year period 1955 through 1964. Its aim was to overcome unemployment and poverty through investment on a scale that was expected to stimulate a real rate of economic growth of 5 percent per year. This growth rate became the official government target of that period. The fact that this goal was overachieved can be attributed not to the wisdom of the plan, which was never implemented in detail, but to other factors (see ch. 7). The economic upsurge of the late 1950s and early 1960s soon made the Vanoni Plan's goal obsolete, and in fact the whole subject of national planning was shelved until the economic difficulties of the 1960s led to its reconsideration.

The economic boom of the late 1950s gave considerable weight to the argument of entrepreneurs and members of the Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano—PLI) that economic planning was not necessary or even desirable; but conditions in the early 1960s, combined with a new political alignment of left-wing Christian Democrats and Socialists, gave those who favored government intervention and planning a stronger voice. The economic upswing had sharpened the discrepancies between north and south and between wealthy and poor. The fourth government of Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, which came into being in February 1962, was able with the support of the Socialists to move the Italian government to a more active role in the economy. For example, one of the major acts of that government was the nationalization of the electric power industry (see ch. 8). In addition the Ministry of the Budget was given broader powers and a new title. It became the Ministry of the Budget and Economic Programming (Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica—the Italian word *programmazione*, literally programming, was considered less offensive to opponents of a planned economy than *pianificazione*, planning).

Also set up was the National Committee for Economic Programming, later renamed the Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica—CIPE). This body had been intended to play a key planning role, and accordingly it included not only several of Italy's leading economists but also representatives of the three major labor unions and the major employer and financial groups. This broad representation reportedly limited the effectiveness of the committee. Since the unions were generally strong advocates of economic planning, although differing among themselves as to details, and the other groups were generally opposed to it, the conflicting interests resulted in prolonged debates and ultimately in compromise solutions that had little force.

The first national economic plan produced was for the period from 1966 through 1970, but it was not approved by Parliament until July 1967. Like the Vanoni Plan, it called for an overall growth rate goal of 5 percent, which was exceeded. Little significant progress was made, however, toward fulfilling the other objectives of the plan, which included full employment; elimination of the gap between the south and the rest of the country; equalization of income between agricultural and nonagricultural workers; and a redistribution of resources for such objectives as increased investment in social infrastructure, transportation, and urban development. The improvements in living standards were particularly disappointing. In spite of the achievement of the projected growth rate, employment—which was to increase by 800,000—declined by 172,000. Although the goal for expenditure on housing was surpassed, it was accomplished almost entirely in high- and medium-cost dwellings, while the supply of low-cost housing remained inadequate.

It is apparent that many of the objectives were beyond attainment even if the complete cooperation of all parties had been forthcoming. Opposition to the concept of planning, particularly from the PLI and from the General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confederazione Generale dell' Industria Italiana—Confindustria), has continued. The large industrial organizations, both public and private, have shown little enthusiasm for planning and have taken advantage of the lack of statutory authority behind the plan to ignore it as much as possible. The Communists also have been lukewarm toward government economic planning. They promise to implement their own concept of economic planning if they come to power (see ch. 7).

The second national economic plan, like the first, failed to achieve parliamentary approval until after its projected starting date. Designed for the 1971-75 period, it contained the same general objectives. The sporadic course of the economy during this period again prevented significant progress toward its goals, and there was little evidence that opposition to the concept of planning had materially lessened.

THE PROGRAM FOR THE SOUTH

Regional planning in contrast to national planning has been generally recognized as appropriate and necessary by a broad spectrum of political opinion. This is because there is wide agreement that a full-scale attack on the backward social and economic position of the south is necessary. The Mezzogiorno—the six southernmost regions of the Italian peninsula plus Sicily and Sardinia—has suffered from poor communications, agricultural stagnation, and inefficient small-scale industry and has lagged far behind the rest of the country in economic development since before unification in the nineteenth century. The area has been handicapped not only by natural conditions of aridity, poor soil, and erosion but also by its quasi-colonial status within Italy. Historically and culturally it has been oriented more to the other Mediterranean lands than is northern Italy, which is linked to a much greater degree to the economies and cultures of the European continent.

Although there were some efforts to improve the status of the Mezzogiorno after unification, the area fell further behind. From the middle of the nineteenth century to World War I the south continued to stagnate, whereas the north, which was also somewhat behind the rest of Europe in economic development, enjoyed comparatively rapid industrial growth. The gap between the two areas widened further during the period of fascist rule because of migration curbs and because of an ill-starred attempt to force greater grain production from lands that were poorly suited to such cultivation. This added to the erosion problem and, except for Mussolini's much-publicized program of draining the Pontine Marshes south of Rome, agricultural potential in the area was reduced. Furthermore the limited industrial capacity of the south was diminished by an estimated 30 percent from damage sustained in World War II, whereas the north suffered only a 5- to 7-percent industrial loss.

Land Reform

Although the need for a sweeping program of economic rehabilitation was apparent in the post-World War II period, land reform received particular attention. This reflected a need that was not confined to the south because all of Italy—like other Mediterranean countries, notably Spain and Portugal—had been plagued by extreme variations of landownership inherited from Roman and medieval feudalistic traditions. Large estates were characteristic in the southern region, including Sicily and Sardinia, and were marked by extensive low-yielding agricultural lands worked by an underemployed and poverty-stricken peasantry and neglected by an absentee landowning aristocracy. In the central regions landholdings were usually worked by share-

croppers (*mezzadristi*). Although in the northern regions small holdings were more common, these holdings were in most cases so small that the farmers were required to hire themselves out, in addition to farming their own holdings, in order to make a living.

The need for reform was most marked in the south, where the large estates were infrequently visited by their landlords and were used primarily as hunting preserves and for other recreational purposes. Agricultural activities on the estates were managed by agents and carried out by laborers hired by the day. By tradition and through force of economic circumstances, the bulk of the population lived in large settlements that sometimes numbered 40,000 inhabitants and were concentrations of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment. These conditions were exacerbated by the low productivity of agriculture and by the seasonal nature of dominant southern crops, such as olives and citrus, as contrasted with the more regular employment provided in the northern areas of more intensive agriculture, particularly by horticultural crops and stockraising.

After the elections of 1948 the government of Alcide De Gasperi hastened to prepare a program of land reform legislation aimed primarily at the south. Although the Communists and other left-wing groups had agitated for land reform and had in fact encouraged landless peasants in Calabria and Apulia to seize some estates, the reforms that emerged were only in part a response to left-wing pressure. The recognition of need for reform was widespread but, when land reform legislation did appear in 1950, it was opposed by the Communists as inadequate. From their point of view it was inadequate because it was primarily limited to holdings of the politically and numerically insignificant large landowners of the south, the *Mar-emma* (a narrow coastal strip on the Tyrrhenian Sea between Pisa and Rome), and a relatively small area of the Po delta, also characterized by underemployed landless peasants. In all areas the more productive holdings that were able to meet specified standards of productivity and employment were exempted from expropriation.

The land reform programs of the 1950s succeeded in eliminating the worst features of exploitative labor contracts, tenancy, and sharecropping arrangements. The tenant's share in the product, traditionally 50 percent under the sharecropping (*mezzadria*) system of central Italy, was raised to 58 percent. The most blatant cases of absentee ownership were eliminated and at relatively low cost. (Compensation payments to landlords in the form of twenty-five-year low-interest bonds were estimated to have imposed a burden of less than 8 percent of the total appropriation for all operations and investments of the land reform agencies.) Only about 15 percent of the landless actually received land under the programs, however, and comparatively little was done for the smallholder peasants whose lands were inadequate to provide a sufficient livelihood.

In addition to land redistribution, among the more impressive features of the agrarian reform activities in the postwar period has been the extension of land reclamation (*bonifica*) projects. Although irrigation and other water control procedures have been extensive in the Po valley for centuries, other areas of Italy have suffered from prolonged droughts interspersed with devastating rainfalls that bring floods, washouts, and erosion. Land reclamation projects have been promised but rarely carried out by various governments since unification. Under the fascist regime the most publicized and expensive reclamation scheme was the drainage of the Pontine Marshes, a 75,000-hectare (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) region of dunes and marshes about seventy kilometers (one kilometer equals 0.62 miles) from Rome. Although many of the fascist reclamation projects were abandoned before completion in order to concentrate on imperialistic adventures, some aspects of the Pontine Marshes project were completed and served as examples for the agrarian reforms of the 1950s. These included drainage, deep plowing, roadbuilding, settlement of farmers on the land, and the introduction of new crops and modern methods of farming.

In the 1960s agrarian reform was oriented more to national than regional problems, and the specific effort at land reform—that is, the creation of new farms from inefficient estates in the south—was deemphasized in favor of national agricultural development planning, which became known as the Green Plans. The First Green Plan (1960-65) called for a 550 billion lire (for value of the lira—see Glossary) investment in agriculture, over one-half of which was earmarked for loans to encourage agricultural workers and tenants to purchase land, equipment, and livestock and to improve farm buildings. The balance was to be spent on land reclamation, reforestation, soil conservation, and similar projects. The land reform agencies were converted into regional development agencies; their promotion and investment activities were extended in principle to all farms in their territories, rather than just those that had been earmarked for reform.

The Second Green Plan (1966-70) was coordinated with the first national Five Year Plan. Some 900 billion lire were allocated to agriculture. Stockraising, mechanization, irrigation, and reforestation continued to be emphasized; greater crop specialization, development of cooperatives, and technical training were also stressed.

In addition to criticisms about the overall adequacy of the land reform program, there have also been questions about its character. Some critics have observed that agricultural reform efforts resulted in the application of enlightened nineteenth-century practices to twentieth-century problems. The attempt to create sturdy, independent peasants in an age of industrialized large-scale corporate farming has in their view doomed Italian agriculture to a permanently uncompetitive position.

Although the agricultural work force had declined from about 8.6 million in 1951 to 3.1 million in 1974, it was still far too large relative to arable land and capital resources. It is estimated that further departures from the farm, reducing the agricultural work force to about 1 million, would result in an appropriate allocation of resources for efficient agricultural production. Unfortunately it has been primarily the young workers who have left the farms in large numbers, and the proper incentives to develop a well-trained, vigorous agricultural labor force have not been found. Many of the so-called model farms that were established have been abandoned because of an inadequate labor force. One possible reason for these developments is that, in spite of the effort to equalize incomes, in 1974 incomes in the agricultural sector averaged only one-half to three-fifths those of the other sectors; furthermore farm incomes in the south were still only 70 percent of those in the north.

Industrial Development

Since its inception in 1950 the southern rehabilitation program has been in the hands of the Development Fund for the South (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno). The initial funding amounted to 365 billion lire. About half of the original appropriation was made available from counterpart funds of the Marshall Plan. Supplementary appropriations brought the total expenditures of the fund up to about 2.5 trillion lire by 1965.

Initially the fund concentrated on land reform roadbuilding, drainage, electricity, land reclamation, and other agriculturally related infrastructural projects, but its purposes were broadened in the late 1950s to encompass aid to industrial development. Italy's large state holding companies, including the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale—IRI), were required to make at least 40 percent of all new investment and 60 percent of industrial investment in the south, figures that had been successively raised to 60 and 80 percent by 1971. Private companies above a certain size were required to submit future investment plans to the government for a review of their benefits to the Mezzogiorno. Foreign and domestic investors have also been encouraged through various incentive measures to invest in the south. These have included outright capital grants and low-interest loans, tax exemptions, reduced social security payments, reduced transportation rates, and improvement of local infrastructural facilities.

In the industrialization phases of the program the area around Naples was initially the focus of attention. By the late 1950s and early 1960s Apulia—and its regional development triangle of Bari, Brindisi, and Taranto—was receiving particular attention, primarily reflected in the integrated steelworks at Taranto. In the mid-1960s emphasis was

on developing the Syracuse-Augusta area of eastern Sicily. Sardinia became a focal point in the late 1960s, and it was hoped that refining, metalworking, and synthetic fiber industrial development would take up the slack created by the decline in sheepherding and the exhaustion of mining resources.

Although the post-World War II development program for the Mezzogiorno—including agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural measures—has been described as “the EEC’s most important and concrete experience in large-scale regional development,” the investments of capital and other resources in the development of the south have had a mixed success. Statistically it can be shown that the south has grown more rapidly than the nation as a whole in many respects, but in others it fell further behind during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, although the number of workers engaged in industry in the south increased by 34.5 percent, the region’s share of national industrial employment actually decreased from 17.1 percent in 1951 to 15.1 percent in 1971. Unemployment in the south increased in the 1960s both absolutely and in relation to the national average. In spite of larger than anticipated emigration from the region (438,000 against a forecast of 350,000), the south accounted for almost one-half of all those unemployed in 1970, compared with only 40 percent in 1960. In addition the gap in per capita national income between the Mezzogiorno and the three richest northwest regions, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, reportedly widened between 1951 and 1971.

As of the mid-1970s, although much had been accomplished, many of the problems of the south remained. Government investment—totaling about US\$20 billion—during the twenty-five-year existence of the Development Fund for the South had made a noticeable impact on the area through the construction of schools, houses, roads, and other infrastructural projects. Several impressive industrial complexes had been built, including a large integrated steelworks at Taranto, the Alfa Sud automobile plant near Naples, and petrochemical industries near Gela and Prjolo in Sicily and Porto Torres in Sardinia.

Although about 35 percent of all industrial investment between 1961 and 1971 was placed in the south, most of it involved public funds and featured capital-intensive industries that provided fewer new jobs than had been hoped. Private investment, in spite of encouragement in the form of tax and credit concessions, has not met expectations. Particularly unresponsive to such incentives have been small and medium-sized industries. It is said that potential entrepreneurs for such enterprises continue to be wary of the south’s traditional practices of crime-boss control of labor and the customary exaction of protection payments from business. As a result most industrial development in the south has been restricted to large industries in a few areas without the satellite smaller industries and service facilities that would be expected to follow. These industrial projects are sometimes

sardonically referred to as "cathedrals in the desert." Such smaller installations as have been introduced are reputed to result from local political pressure, and they are referred to scornfully as a *pioggia* (rain-drops).

SOCIAL WELFARE

Article 38 of the 1948 Constitution specifies that "workers are entitled to adequate insurance for their requirements in case of accident, illness, disability, old age, and involuntary unemployment." However, Italy's social welfare system antedates this constitutional requirement by several decades. Old-age pensions and insurance against occupational accidents began in 1898. During the following five decades maternity insurance, disability pensions, unemployment insurance, protection against tuberculosis and occupational diseases, and family allowance systems were introduced. Since World War II the haphazard development of the system and the erosion of accumulated funds from inflation have brought considerable pressure for reform, but proposed reorganizations have failed to materialize—probably because of the many vested interests in the existing mélange of programs and agencies and the sheer magnitude and complexity of the task.

In addition to the range of state-run health services, pension funds, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, and family allowance programs, a profusion of private and semipublic agencies have developed that deal with health and social insurance and provide other welfare services. These range from charitable agencies established by the Roman Catholic Church to organizations for professional, fraternal, social, cultural, and recreational groups and to the remnants of agencies originally set up in response to long-forgotten crises. For example, an organization established to deal with victims of the 1906 eruption of Vesuvius was reportedly still functioning in 1972. This was discovered in an investigation that also found almost 60,000 such separate agencies in existence, over half of which had some health and social welfare concerns and many of which were the beneficiaries of government subsidies.

In spite of this impressive array, discontent with the services and their high cost is widespread. Not only is there an estimated 10 to 12 percent of the population outside the system, but the benefits are often inadequate and subject to considerable erosion as they move through the administrative bureaucracy. Thus promises to clear up the social insurance confusion and streamline its administration are standard planks in the political platforms of virtually all political parties, including the ruling DC.

Social Security

Most of the Italian population and particularly all industrial workers are in principle entitled to social security benefits. Whatever the shortcomings of the system, and they are reported by critics to be many, there is some provision for social insurance for about 50 million of the 56 million people—a considerable mark of progress since 1950 when about 20 million were covered.

There are three major agencies that administer the official social security system, supplemented by a plethora of separate private and semipublic organizations that have assumed responsibility for special interest groups. The National Institute for State Insurance administers old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, and compulsory insurance plans for farmers and for employees in the private sector. Compulsory health insurance is administered by the National Institute for Health Insurance. The benefits cover free medical care, including medicines, hospitalization, maternity benefits, and in some cases sick pay compensation. The other major agency in the system is the National Institute for Assistance to Injured Workers. Industrial workers covered by the system receive two-thirds of their regular wages during temporary disability and a lump-sum settlement for permanent disability of 120,000 to 180,000 lire. Finally there are separate agencies that provide insurance for state employees and for the employees of public sector enterprises.

The Italian pension system is, on paper, one of the more generous in the industrial world. The retirement age is the lowest in Europe—sixty for men and fifty-five for women—and a worker with forty years' contribution to the system receives a pension equal to 74 percent of the average of his highest three years' earnings during the final five years of employment. Most pensions are linked to the cost-of-living index, providing a hedge against inflation similar to that enjoyed by workers who are covered by wage-indexing arrangements. About one-third of all pensioners are on disability pensions, which ease the period of work requirements for a minimum pension. Pensioners are in most cases covered for doctors' fees, hospitalization, and medicines. Because of the low retirement age and the low proportion of employed in the total population (about 35 percent—the lowest in Europe) the ratio of pensioners to workers is very high. Since there are about 9 million pensioners and about 19 million workers, there is almost one pensioner for every two persons employed.

The generosity of the pension system as described is not, however, enjoyed by many pensioners. More than half of all pensioners receive only the minimum pension—234,000 lire in 1970, the equivalent of about US\$375 per year. Included in the group are most of the previously self-employed and the 750,000 social pensioners, that is, those who did not qualify under any existing scheme and were wholly de-

pendent on their families or on charity until the social pension concept was introduced in 1969. Basic unemployment benefits are also inadequate, averaging less than the equivalent of US\$1 per day, accompanied by a family allowance system that pays less than any other system in the EEC.

The wide coverage of the system constitutes a major portion of employers' labor costs. In 1970 the employee paid 6.5 percent of his earnings into the system, and the employer paid the equivalent of 52.1 percent of earnings in the form of social security contributions. This was the highest burden of its kind on employers in the EEC. Among the other EEC partners, employer contributions ranged from 14.7 percent of earnings in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to 32.5 percent in France. This high cost, which must be added to overall labor cost, is one of the more frequently heard criticisms of the Italian system, along with its cumbersome administration, widespread evasion, and alleged inadequacy of payments. Proposed reform efforts have been primarily aimed at shifting some of the cost burden from the employers to the general revenues and at streamlining the bureaucratic structure.

Complaints of the inadequacy of health services have been particularly widespread both from those served and from doctors and hospital staffs, who frequently strike for higher wages and better working conditions. Prices of medicine have become a political issue, and nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry has been among the pledges of the Communists, who have not otherwise stressed further nationalization of industry in their political programs. The vested interests against reform are strong, however, and draft reform programs put forward by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists in the 1960s and 1970s have foundered in Parliament.

There is little doubt that the cost of the system constitutes a considerable burden on the economy. Not only does it take an estimated 6.5 percent out of the average workers' wage as a payroll tax and an amount more than half the actual outlay for wages from employers, but its huge annual deficits are a large portion of government expenditures. In 1974 the cost to the government of social welfare programs amounted to 5.1 trillion lire (the equivalent of US\$7.9 billion), about 18 percent of total government expenditures and a 48-percent increase in funding over 1973.

Aside from the overall cost burden the system operates as a constraint on higher employment. New investment funds flow more readily to laborsaving equipment than to production expansion. If a firm plans increases in production, it is usually cheaper to increase the working hours of the existing work force than to add new workers because of the added costs, not only their wages but also the additional lump-sum payments that must be made into the system. Thus the burden of added labor costs and the difficulty of laying off work-

ers in slack periods have discouraged additions to the work force even when economic conditions would have encouraged stepped-up productivity. These factors inhibit increased production and impede the introduction of new products and other risk-taking ventures.

Housing

The Italian Constitution has given official encouragement to home-ownership, and under legislation of the early 1970s the communes have been authorized to expropriate sites for subsidized housing and to offer advantageous terms to purchasers of property for housing; but in the mid-1970s inadequate housing for working families remained a major problem with little prospect for early solution. The Committee for Residential Building estimated that, at the end of 1970 there was a shortage of over 12 million rooms—the equivalent of about 4 million new housing units. The existing supply of housing units was approximately 17 million—about 80 percent of the estimated need. Building has been at the rate of about 200,000 to 300,000 units per year. Not only has this clearly been inadequate to meet the need in the foreseeable future, but most of the building has been in the luxury and middle-class categories. It is known, for example, that most of the landowners who were dispossessed in the Maremma area under the land reform program tended not to use their indemnification payments to improve the agricultural land left to them but to speculate in real estate in the coastal and mountain areas—seeking to capitalize on the tourist resort potential of the region. There has been comparatively little construction in the area of greatest need—low-cost housing. Estimates of publicly subsidized low-cost housing as a proportion of all residential building are at the most optimistic about 7 percent.

The effects of the chronic shortage of low-cost housing are particularly apparent because of the large-scale migrations related to job-seeking. The slum areas in and shantytowns around industrial centers become more and more crowded while the rural areas tend to become underpopulated. Thus there is the anomaly of a housing shortage of serious proportions along with a large number of unwanted and unoccupied houses. A survey in the early 1970s revealed that 15.4 of the 17.5 million houses in existence were occupied. Similar problems exist with respect to the educational system. Gross overcrowding occurs in the schools in the industrial centers, and comparatively more space is available in rural areas that have experienced large-scale emigration (see ch. 4).

LABOR AND THE LAW

Because Italian labor unions have traditionally been linked to political parties and have usually pressed their interests through the politi-

cal process rather than as bargaining agents for the worker in his relations with the employer, there is a rich body of legislation establishing the rights of the worker. Article 1 of the Constitution states that "Italy is a democratic republic founded on labor," and subsequent articles provide a basic charter for labor's rights, which include the right to work and the duty to undertake an activity contributing to the "material and moral progress of society," as expressed in Article 4. Articles 35 through 40 establish the rights to vocational training, adequate wages, maximum hours, paid holidays, and equal pay and rights for women. Maternity benefits, a minimum working age and equal pay for juveniles, social security, the right to organize, and the right to strike are also established in these articles. Article 46 recognizes the *right of workers to participate in management*.

These fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution have been elaborated on by subsequent legislation, of which the most sweeping was the Labor Law of 1970—later known as the Workers' Charter. Its passage grew out of the labor unrest of 1968 and 1969, culminating in widespread strikes and violence in the so-called hot autumn (*autunno caldo*) of 1969, which was in several respects a turning point in Italian industrial relations. In addition to substantial wage increases labor achieved several long-sought objectives through this legislation. Trade union activity within firms and plants was guaranteed, and union officials were assured of paid leave while in pursuit of their union duties. Workers in a firm employing more than 200 people were allowed to assemble for up to ten hours per year on company time and on company premises. Employer-organized paternalistic unions were outlawed, and employers were no longer allowed to discriminate on the basis of political, religious, or trade union affiliation. Unfair labor practices—including surveillance by audiovisual equipment, searches or other supervision by security guards, and physical fitness checks by company doctors to detect malingering—were outlawed.

This opportunity for more union activity at the plant level and the provision of facilities for union operations increased union bargaining power. It also increased union identification with the immediate concerns of members at the plant level and lessened union identification with political party considerations. The legal right to collect dues through the checkoff system also strengthened the unions' financial position and further lessened their dependence on party funds. The newly established union strength has been used most effectively in achieving wage increases (see Wages and Inflation, this ch.).

There is also a complex system of factory legislation and a corps of labor inspectors at the regional and provincial level to enforce the system. Reportedly the system is overly complex and the inspection system inadequate to permit just and impartial enforcement—conditions that invite arbitrary actions by the inspectors as well as corruption in enforcement procedures.

The results of these labor gains have been a mixed blessing for Italy. Along with improved conditions for the Italian worker in large industry must be noted Italy's reputation as the most strike-prone country in Europe. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s Italy lost more days through strikes per 1,000 workers than the United States, Japan, Canada, or any of the industrialized countries of Europe. Job security provisions established since the major labor unrest in 1969 have made it so difficult to lay off workers that companies, particularly those in private enterprise, are discouraged from increasing capacity or other risk-taking ventures for fear of adding new workers who cannot be fired if the projects are unsuccessful. Workers, however, are rarely concerned that their demands may threaten the viability of the employing concern, whether state-controlled or private, because they have been encouraged to believe that the state will salvage the companies rather than let them go into bankruptcy.

The major state holding companies have in fact frequently carried out such rescue operations with respect to large firms in financial difficulties, and since 1971 a state finance company has existed to perform this function for small and medium-sized firms. This company was created with financing from the major state holding companies and the large state credit institute, Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, and performs its rescue operation either by buying shares—in some cases acquiring majority holdings—or by extending credit on favorable terms (see ch. 7).

WAGES AND INFLATION

In the 1951-71 period both agricultural and industrial wages rose faster than the cost of living. The average annual increase in agricultural wages was 8.1 percent and in industrial wages 7.2 percent, while the cost of living increased at an average annual rate of only 3.5 percent. In both cases wage increases were higher than productivity gains, which averaged 4.7 percent and 4.8 percent in agriculture and industry respectively. These improvements for the average worker were more pronounced in the 1960s than in the 1950s, a reflection of the growing bargaining power of the workers through more effective and stronger unions. Not only were annual wage increases greater during the decade of the 1960s, but the unions were able to achieve gains in overtime pay and other forms of remuneration that raised average earnings above the basic wage rate increases.

In spite of these substantial and steady gains union pressures for even higher wages and other benefits became acute in the late 1960s. Many observers link the beginning of Italy's chronic economic troubles of the 1970s to the wage settlements that resulted from the labor unrest that characterized the autumn of 1969. The increased pressure resulted in the Labor Law of 1970 and a new acceleration of wage

increases, which under the so-called threshold clauses provide a wage-indexing mechanism or a sliding scale of wages to price increases (see Labor and the Law, this ch.). The law was designed to keep workers' purchasing power more or less constant, but the effect has been wage increases that have outrun the price index and have tended to make inflation self-perpetuating.

Industrial wage increases averaged 25.5 percent in 1973 and 27.3 percent in 1974, while increases in the consumer price index in those years were 10.8 percent and 19.1 percent respectively. During the early 1970s through 1975 the consumer price index rose to 171 (based on 1970 equals 100) while on the same scale wages rose to 249. These developments have virtually wiped out the low labor cost advantage enjoyed by Italian industry in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which was a major contributor to the so-called economic miracle of the period (see ch. 7).

Labor costs increased by 12.5 percent in 1973 and by 22 percent in 1974. These rates were among the highest in Europe, surpassed only by the United Kingdom in 1974. Presumably the Italian figure included not only the wage bill but also the cost of social security and other fringe benefits paid by the employer. These constitute more than one-third the labor cost of Italian industry and, according to a leading European journal in mid-1976, make the Italian "the most expensive industrial laborer in Europe."

* * *

The most detailed and analytical work on social and economic developments in Italy up to the early 1970s is found in Kevin Allen and Andrew Stevenson's *An Introduction to the Italian Economy*. In view of its frequently expressed caveats about the inadequacy of Italian statistics for comparative purposes, it is perhaps overdependent on statistical analysis. A considerably less detailed but equally persuasive analysis of economic conditions—and social and political conditions as well—is found in John Earle's *Italy in the 1970s*. More dated material but much useful background is to be found in George H. Hildebrand's *Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy*. Each of these books gives considerable attention to the problems of making the economic status of the south more nearly equal to that of the north, but readers who desire more detail on the land reform aspects of this effort are referred to Russell King's *Land Reform: The Italian Experience*. Periodical literature on the economic and social problems of the mid-1970s is relatively sparse, but occasional articles in the *Financial Times* in 1975 and 1976 have proved useful. Among magazine articles of particular interest are John Earle's "The Italian Economy: A Diagnosis" in *World Today* (June 1976) and Guido Carli's "Italy's Malaise" in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1976). (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 10

GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY

Italy's history dates back for hundreds, even thousands, of years. The Italian Republic, however, was only thirty years old in 1976. It was not surprising that, with this comparatively short period of constitutional interpretation and practice, the powers and operation of certain administrative organs and of the republican governmental system as a whole had yet to develop fully. The 1948 Constitution was grafted to, or superimposed on, certain political and legal traditions established long before. Because many of the Constitution's provisions introduced concepts that were fundamentally different from established traditions, the evolution and full development of the republican state were all the more impeded.

In structure the Italian Republic resembles other West European parliamentary democracies; like the French Fifth Republic it includes a president set above the regular governmental system. In operation, however, certain aspects of the political system are unique to the Italian state. These include, for example, the lawmaking power of Italian parliamentary committees and the fact that governments are responsible, though unofficially, to extraparlimentary political parties rather than to the legislature.

Together with the continuing evolution of the formal republican state, a transitory process seemed to be occurring in 1976 whereby left-wing political parties were being co-opted by the very system they had initially opposed (see ch. 11). As these parties' involvement in the system increased, it appeared that there may have been broadening agreement on the desirability of perpetuating the republican form of state. A consensus regarding Italy's role in international affairs also seemed apparent among the major political parties by the mid-1970s.

CONSTITUTION

The Albertine Statute served as Italy's basic law or constitution from 1861, when the Italian state was proclaimed, until 1922, when Benito Mussolini rose to power. The statute was issued in 1848 by

King Charles Albert of Sardinia and Piedmont. Through it Albert's kingdom was modified from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Executive power was placed in the hands of the king and his ministers, but the ministers were made responsible to a popularly elected unicameral legislature. Suffrage was limited to males who fulfilled certain age, education, and property requirements; universal male suffrage was implemented through a 1912 electoral law. Italy's transformation into an authoritarian, fascist state under Mussolini as Il Duce was formalized by a legislative enabling act in 1925. During Mussolini's regime the Albertine Statute, including its provision for the king's right to appoint the head of government, was ignored but not officially displaced. In 1943, after Italian defeats during World War II, King Victor Emmanuel III revoked Mussolini's governmental authority. The action affected only southern Italy; Mussolini, with the support of occupying German troops, established the Italian Social Republic in the central and northern sections of the country. The social republic lasted until 1945.

Between 1943 and 1946 the Italian monarch appointed the prime minister and cabinet with the advice of various political parties and subject to the oversight of the Allies. In 1946 a legislative decree provided for a referendum to decide whether the future Italian state would be a monarchy or a republic. A constituent assembly, elected under universal suffrage, would draft a new constitution accordingly. The referendum of June 2, 1946, decided in favor of a republic, and 556 deputies were elected to the assembly. The final version of the constitution was ratified by a vote of 453 to eighty-three (the other deputies abstaining) in late 1947 and became effective January 1, 1948.

The Constitution of the Italian Republic vested sovereignty in the people and established a unitary state (see Subnational Government, this ch.). Its provisions included a number of basic principles, such as freedom of religion (while recognizing the primacy of the Roman Catholic Church based on the Lateran Pacts of 1929) and the recognition of equal social status regardless of sex, race, language, or religion. The Constitution guaranteed such civil rights as personal liberty, the inviolability of the home, freedom and security of correspondence, freedom to travel and to associate, freedom of the press, and due process of law. It also charged the state with improving the quality of life and with contributing to the development of the individual through the elimination of obstacles to health, employment, and education. Thus the Constitution included both specific legal norms and broader, idealistic norms that set general goals to be pursued by future executive and legislative actions.

The Albertine Statute was flexible in that it could be amended by the passage of ordinary legislation. The 1948 Constitution is rigid, requiring a special process for amendments. An amendment must be

passed by two separate votes at least three months apart in the bicameral Parliament. A plurality in each house is required on the first vote; an absolute majority in each house is required on the second. Furthermore there are constitutional provisions for a national referendum on proposed amendments that do not receive at least a two-thirds majority on the second vote in each house.

Although the Constitution became effective in 1948, it took several years to create many of the major governmental and administrative organs for which it provided. The main reason for the delay was partisan politics; the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC) attempted to prevent left-wing parties from gaining access to governmental power or influence. The established bureaucracy also balked at the creation of rival institutions.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Italy has a parliamentary form of government. In theory the executive branch or cabinet is responsible to the legislature. The cabinet is usually made up of members of the legislature, although there is no constitutional requirement for this. The Constitutional Court, outside the regular judicial structure, rules on the constitutionality of laws passed both before and after the 1948 Constitution took effect. The office of president of the republic is removed from the three-branch governmental organization (see fig. 14).

President of the Republic

According to the Constitution, "the President of the Republic is the Head of State and represents the unity of the Nation." The only specific requirements for the office are that the candidate be at least fifty years old and possess full civil and political rights. The president is elected for a seven-year term by both houses of Parliament sitting in joint session, together with three representatives from each region (except for the small region of Valle d'Aosta, which has one representative). Voting is secret, and a two-thirds majority is required on the first three ballots; an absolute majority is sufficient thereafter. There were six presidential elections between 1946, when Enrico De Nicola was elected by the constituent assembly on the first ballot, and 1974, when twenty-three parliamentary ballots were required to elect Giovanni Leone.

Successive increases in the number of ballots required to elect a president illustrate the growing importance that political parties are assigning to the office. Because the balloting is secret, the presidential election is one of the few occasions when enforced party discipline may break down; the result has been that the victor has sometimes been a compromise candidate rather than the first choice of one or

more of the parties. Whether a president may succeed himself is open to question, since the Constitution is silent on the matter. No president has to date been reelected, although some have been in the running in subsequent elections. Should the president of the republic be incapacitated, his duties would be assumed by the president of the Senate.

In actual power the Italian presidency ranks somewhere between the dominant position of the president in the French Fifth Republic and the position of contemporary West European constitutional monarchs. The Italian president is assigned duties similar to those of a constitutional monarchs, including promulgating laws, accrediting and receiving diplomats, conferring state honors, and so on. More important, the president appoints the president of the Council of Ministers (prime minister) on the basis of who may be acceptable to the Parliament. Because Italy's politics are so fragmented, at any given time there may be several party or factional leaders who enjoy significant support. Consequently the president may well have a very real choice when appointing a prime minister. The president may also, at his discretion, refuse the resignation of a prime minister, thereby allowing a government to remain in office and attempt to rally the required support of the legislature. Exercised infrequently, this presidential power has maintained governments in office at times when no viable alternatives seemed apparent and thus has contributed a certain element of stability to the Italian political scene (see ch. 11).

Some authorities have stated that presidents have sought and received certain concessions from those they were considering for prime minister on such matters as which parties would be invited to form the coalition government and which particular party programs the government would pursue. The president operates in such instances from a secure position because, although governments frequently change, the president serves his fixed term. On the recommendation of the prime minister the president appoints the members of the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. During his term he also appoints five lifetime members to the Senate and five of the fifteen judges of the Constitutional Court.

The president must authorize the presentation of all government bills to the Parliament for legislative action. Presidents have on occasion refused to grant such authorization. In such cases the government may circumvent the president's refusal by having the proposal introduced as a private member's bill. A suspensive veto power also belongs to the president, although it has been used sparingly. A plurality of those voting in each house is necessary to override the veto. In the event of legislative impasse the president may, after consulting with the presidents of the legislature, dissolve one or both houses and call for new elections. To prevent the president from eliminating parliamentary government in Italy, the Constitution places several re-




Figure 14. Organization of the Republican State, July 1976

strictions on his power of dissolution: Parliament may not be dissolved during the last six months of the president's term; new elections must be held within seventy days of dissolution; the new Parliament must meet within twenty days after its election; and the old Parliament continues to exercise power until the new Parliament's first session.

The major restraint on presidential power is Article 89 of the Constitution, which states: "No act of the President is legal unless it is countersigned by the Ministers who have proposed it." An act having the force of law must also be countersigned by the prime minister. The restriction does not seem to apply to the exercise of the suspensive veto, dissolution of Parliament, appointment of the prime minister, or appointment of lifetime senators and Constitutional Court judges. Because of the countersignature requirement, however, the exercise of all other formal presidential powers is effectively in the hands of the cabinet.

The ultimate limitation on presidential power is impeachment, which requires an absolute majority vote of a joint session of Parliament. The use of impeachment is limited to cases of high treason and violations of the Constitution. Impeachment and other formal restrictions notwithstanding, activist presidents have succeeded in extending their power or influence through such unofficial acts as issuing public statements, sending private communications, making private visits to foreign leaders, and even dispatching private emissaries. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent such unofficial initiatives.

Constitutional Court

The tradition of judicial review of legislation did not exist in Italy before the republic. Consequently the provision for a court that judges the constitutionality of legislative acts marked a major innovation in Italian jurisprudence and politics. The fascist experience, in which the Albertine Statute was ignored, was in large part responsible for this innovation. Second thoughts regarding the introduction of the principle of judicial review, however, and rivalry between the president and the government over who would appoint some of the court's members delayed its actual creation until 1956.

The Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen members, five of whom are appointed by the president, five by a three-fifths majority vote of a joint parliamentary session, and five by components of the ordinary and administrative courts systems (specifically the Court of Cassation, Council of State, and Court of Accounts). Members must be active or retired magistrates, legal professors, or attorneys and must have a minimum of twenty years of professional experience. They serve nine-year terms; appointment to successive terms is prohibited, as is concurrent membership in another branch or organ of government.

The court decides controversies involving the constitutionality of national and regional laws; resolves issues concerning the constitutional assignment of power within the state (for example, between branches and organs of government), between the state and the regions, and between different regions; and decides impeachment cases involving the president of the republic or government ministers. In impeachment trials sixteen additional lay members are appointed to the court temporarily. Access to the court is relatively limited. During a trial in a lower court the defendant, the public prosecutor, or the trial judge may raise the issue of constitutionality. If the trial judge decides that the constitutional issue is not unfounded, he may forward the case to the Constitutional Court. Because of judicial rivalry and suspicion, however, the power of the ordinary courts judges to decide whether to send a case to the Constitutional Court has frequently prevented that body from being utilized. The court has no power to remove a case for review from a lower court (as does, for example, the United States Supreme Court); it can act only after a lower court judge sends a case to it.

The Constitutional Court has no way of enforcing its decisions. Its first president resigned in 1957, reportedly in protest against the government's refusal to abide by a court decision that fascist-era police powers (employed primarily against local leftist political parties) were unconstitutional. In an attempt to preserve its own power, the government also felt compelled to intervene for several years as a so-called friend of the court to defend every disputed law under consideration by the Constitutional Court.

Since the mid-1950s the Constitutional Court has protected civil rights in such areas as freedom of speech, religion, and the press. At first it decided most cases between national and regional governments in favor of the central authority. Favorable rulings for the regions, however, have become more common in recent years. Fortunately the court has never had to adjudicate politically sensitive conflicts between branches of government, nor has it been called upon to judge impeachments. Most observers agree that the court has genuinely attempted to protect the Constitution and has met with considerable success, particularly considering the resistance with which its early efforts were met. Although the older, more entrenched members of the established judiciary still regard the Constitutional Court with suspicion and are reluctant to use it, magistrates in lower courts have accepted the principle of judicial review and frequently send cases to the court for Constitutional rulings.

Branches of Government

Executive

The executive branch, called the government, comprises the prime minister and the cabinet. The prime minister is responsible for the

direction and general policy of the government and for the promotion and coordination of the activities of the cabinet ministers. Technically he and the cabinet are collectively responsible to the Parliament for the conduct of government. Within ten days of formation a government must receive a vote of confidence from both houses. A specific confidence motion may be introduced at any time thereafter in either house. Certain restrictions prevent an excess of such motions or the sudden defeat of a government without adequate warning: a confidence motion must be signed by a minimum of 10 percent of the membership of the originating house and debate cannot begin for a minimum of three days after introduction, a period of time in which the government can attempt to rally support. Defeat of government legislation by the Parliament does not constitute a no-confidence vote.

Despite such parliamentary rules, the Italian political system is noted for its instability. Between 1948, when the first government took office under the Constitution, and August 1976 thirty cabinets governed Italy (see table 3). Of utmost importance is the fact that it is not the Parliament but the political parties that end the life of Italian governments. A party executive may decide it can no longer support a coalition government and order its party members to leave the cabinet; or, more often, the executive of the dominant DC may decide to reorganize the coalition by shuffling the member parties.

Cabinet instability is offset somewhat by ministerial stability; that is, many ministers continue to serve through successive government changes. A number of individuals have been prime minister more than once, some of them four or five times. The tenure of the heads of the more important ministries is usually longer than the eleven-month average life of cabinets. For example, the average ministerial tenure in the public works, agriculture, and industry ministries has been one and one-half years, of the treasury and defense ministries, more than two years. Conversely there are individuals who are held over from one cabinet to another but whose ministerial duties are shifted. In short, although cabinets change, they frequently draw many of their members from among the same politicians.

Although ministerial stability may contribute positively to some sort of ongoing government, cabinet instability makes long-range policy planning and implementation difficult. The problem is exacerbated by partisan and factional politics. Because they come from different parties and factions, rivalries often exist among cabinet members, between the prime minister and some cabinet members, and between individual ministers and their under secretaries. One or more ministerial under secretaries (usually members of parliament) are appointed to each ministry by the prime minister; they are thus political rather than civil service positions.

The size of the cabinet varies slightly. A cabinet includes the prime minister, the nineteen department ministers, perhaps as many as six

Table 3. Republican Governments, 1948 Through July 1976

Prime Minister	Date Formed	Tenure			Member Parties ²
		Years	Months	Days	
Alcide De Gasperi . .	May 23, 1948 ¹	1	7	19	DC, PSLI, PRI, PLI
Alcide De Gasperi . .	January 27, 1950	1	5	19	DC, PSLI, PRI, PLI
Alcide De Gasperi . .	July 26, 1951	1	10	3	DC, PSLI, PRI
Alcide De Gasperi . .	July 16, 1953	0	0	12	DC
Giuseppe Pella	August 17, 1953	0	4	19	DC
Amintore Fanfani . .	January 17, 1954	Failed confidence vote			DC
Mario Scelba	February 10, 1954	1	4	12	DC, PSDI, PLI
Antonio Segni	July 7, 1955	1	10	4	DC, PSDI, PLI
Adone Zoli	May 16, 1957	1	1	0	DC
Amintore Fanfani . .	July 1, 1958	0	6	25	DC, PSDI
Antonio Segni	February 19, 1959	1	0	9	DC
Fernando Tambroni	March 26, 1960	0	3	24	DC
Amintore Fanfani . .	July 26, 1960	1	6	7	DC
Amintore Fanfani . .	February 21, 1962	1	2	25	DC, PRI, PSDI
Giovanni Leone . . .	June 22, 1963	0	4	15	DC
Aldo Moro	December 4, 1963	0	6	22	DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI
Aldo Moro	July 22, 1964	1	5	30	DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI
Aldo Moro	February 23, 1966	2	3	13	DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI
Giovanni Leone . . .	June 24, 1968	0	4	26	DC
Mariano Rumor . . .	December 13, 1968	0	6	23	DC, PRI, PSI
Mariano Rumor . . .	August 5, 1969	0	6	2	DC
Mariano Rumor . . .	March 29, 1970	0	3	7	DC, PRI, PSI, PSU
Emilio Colombo . . .	August 6, 1970	1	5	12	DC, PRI (withdrew February 27, 1971), PSI, PSU
Giulio Andreotti . .	February 17, 1972	0	0	11	DC
Giulio Andreotti . .	June 26, 1972	0	11	17	DC, PSU, PLI
Mariano Rumor . . .	July 7, 1973	0	7	23	DC, PSI, PSU, PRI
Mariano Rumor . . .	March 15, 1974	0	6	18	DC, PSI, PSDI
	(tendered resignation June 10, 1974; refused by president)				
Aldo Moro	November 23, 1974	1	1	15	DC, PRI
Aldo Moro	February 12, 1976	0	2	18 ³	DC
Giulio Andreotti . .	July 29, 1976	---	---	---	DC

¹ De Gasperi also formed the four preceding governments (December 10, 1945 to May 23, 1948).

² DC (Partito Democrazia Cristiana) Christian Democratic Party; PSLI (Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani) Socialist Party of Italian Workers; PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano) Italian Republican Party; PLI (Partito Liberale Italiano) Italian Liberal Party; PSDI (Partito Socialisti Democratico Italiano) Italian Social Democratic Party; PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano) Italian Socialist Party; PSU (Partito Socialista Unitario) Unitary Socialist Party.

³ A cabinet that has resigned remains in power as an interim caretaker government until the president of the republic appoints a new prime minister. Thus, for example, Aldo Moro's fifth government remained in office from its resignation on April 30, 1976, until July 9 just before Giulio Andreotti's appointment as the new prime minister on July 13.

⁴ Government still in power in late 1976.

ministers without portfolio, and one or more deputy prime ministers (vice presidents of the Council of Ministers), an office that has developed from practice rather than from constitutional provision and has duties similar to those of a minister without portfolio. The large number of ministers, when added to the general problem of political infighting, makes policy coordination all the more difficult. The situation has been somewhat alleviated through the use of ministers without portfolio to monitor specific policies or problems and through the creation of interministerial committees limited to the department heads directly involved in a particular policy area. Examples of such committees included those on economic planning, prices, and the 1976 European drought. The chances for improved coordination were also increased in the early 1960s with the conversion of the budget ministry into the Ministry of the Budget and Economic Programming, which possessed at least limited potential authority over the other ministries.

Ministries are hierarchically organized into directorates, divisions, and sections, each subdivision being headed by a member of the career civil service (see table 4). Each minister usually appoints a personal cabinet, headed by a *chef de cabinet* (an upper level civil servant from the ministry or elsewhere) who is loyal to him. By using a personal cabinet to administer the ministry, the minister avoids both the possible political differences with the under secretary and the possible intransigence of entrenched civil servants in the ministry's official organizational chain of command.

As well as having administrative duties the cabinet may, in special circumstances, issue decrees. The Parliament may pass enabling legislation that allows the cabinet to issue legislative decrees for a limited time, covering specific subjects or policy areas. In emergency situations the cabinet, or the prime minister acting in its behalf, may issue decree laws, which expire within sixty days unless the Parliament enacts them into law. Few decree laws had been issued by mid-1976.

In addition to the cabinet ministries, several specialized government agencies with varying degrees of autonomy have developed. They include state-financed enterprises that administer railroads, telecommunications, and state commodity monopolies; major health and insurance bodies, such as the National Institute for Social Security; and administrative agencies, such as the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale—IRI) and the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi—ENI) (see ch. 7).

Legislative

Italy's Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; elected memberships were fixed by a 1963 constitutional amendment at 315 and 630, respectively. Five lifetime senators are appointed by each president of the republic, and anyone who has served as

Table 4. Ministries and Their Directorates, 1970

Ministry	Directorate
Office of the President of the Council of Ministers.	Central Statistical Office Interministerial Committees National Center for Research Press Office
Agriculture	Staff and Administration Agricultural Production Economic Control of Agricultural Products Food Land Improvement Land Reclamation and Resettlement Mountain Economy and Forests
Budget and Economic Programming	Staff and Administration Execution of Plan Planning
Defense	Administrative Inspections Air Force Army Budget and Fiscal Matters Carabinieri General Staff of Defense Legislation and Legal Matters Military Preparations Navy Organizational Matters, Mechaniza- tion, and Statistics
Education.	Staff and Administration Academies and Libraries Adult Education Antiquities and Fine Arts Artistic Education Arts, Sciences, and Teacher Training Cultural Exchanges Diffusion of Culture Pensions Physical Education Primary Education Private Intermediate Schools Professional Training School Construction and Supplies School Maintenance Secondary Education Technical Training University Education

Table 4. Ministries and Their Directorates, 1970—Continued

Ministry	Directorate
Finance	Staff and Administration Claims Comparative Legislative Studies and International Relations Customs Duties and Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Fees and Indirect Taxes on Businesses Local Finance Lotteries Organization of Tax Services Real Property Taxes State Property
Foreign Affairs	Staff and Administration Ceremonies Cultural Relations Diplomatic Careers, Treaties, and Legislation Documentation and Archives Economic Affairs Emigration and Social Affairs Overseas Offices Political Affairs Press and Information
Foreign Trade	Staff and Administration Development and Trade Exports Imports Trade Agreements Valuations
Health	Staff and Administration Pharmaceutical Services Public Health Social Medicine Veterinary Services
Industry	Staff and Administration Artisans and Small Industry Energy Supplies and Basic Industries Industrial Production Internal Commerce and Industrial Consumption Mines Private Insurance and Collective Interest

Table 4. Ministries and Their Directorates, 1970—Continued

Ministry	Directorate
Interior.	Staff and Administration Civil Administration Civil Protection and Fire Services Public Security Public Welfare Religious Affairs Religious Funds and Aid State Archives
Justice	Civil Affairs Judicial Organization and Administration Penal Affairs Prisons and Penitentiaries
Labor and Social Welfare	Staff and Administration Cooperation Employment of Labor Labor Relations Professional Training of Workers Welfare and Social Security
Merchant Marine	Staff and Administration Maritime Fishing Maritime and Port Labor Maritime and Port Property Navigation and Maritime Traffic Shipping
Postal Service and Telecommunications	Staff and Administration Postal Service and Telecommunications
Public Works	Staff and Administration Disaster Relief Health Works Maritime Works Public Housing Roads and New Railroads Construction Town and Country Planning Water and Hydroelectric Works
State Enterprises	State Enterprises
Tourism and Entertainment	Staff and Administration Entertainment Tourism
Transport and Civil Aviation	Civil Aviation Civil Highways and Transport Concessions Coordination State Railroads

Table 4. Ministries and Their Directorates, 1970—Continued

Ministry	Directorate
Treasury	Staff and Administration Deposits and Credit Funds General Accounting Office General Purchasing Office Public Debt Special Services and Claims Treasury War Damages War Pensions Welfare Agencies

Source: Based on information from Italy, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, *L'Ordinamento Costituzionale e Amministrativo dello Stato*, Rome, 1971, pp. 35-48.

president has the right to sit as a lifetime senator. The Chamber of Deputies is generally considered the more prestigious of the two houses. Technically it is the lower house, although these distinctions are artificial inasmuch as both houses possess the same powers.

The Constitution requires that a senator be at least forty years of age, a deputy twenty-five. The minimum age requirement for voting in Senate elections is twenty-five; the minimum age required to vote in Chamber of Deputies elections was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen with the June 1976 electoral contest. Aside from the minimum age requirements, Italian suffrage is direct and universal. The Chamber of Deputies represents the national electorate; the Senate represents the regions. Italy is divided into thirty-two multimember electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies and twenty for the Senate (the regions acting as senatorial electoral districts). All of the senate districts and all but one of the chamber districts elect a number of representatives, based on the total membership in each house, in proportion to their populations. This rule is modified in the case of the Senate, in which minimum regional representation is fixed at six senators (except for the smaller regions of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Molise, and Valle d' Aosta, guaranteed a minimum of three, two, and one senators, respectively).

A proportional representational system is used in both senate and chamber elections, resulting in political party representation from each district roughly in proportion to the strength of the parties there. Because the systems used to elect both houses are so similar, there is little difference in their composition (except that, because of the age requirement, the average age in the Senate is higher). A novel aspect of the electoral system is the preference vote, whereby the voter may indicate a preference for or against as many as four of the candidates

nominated by the party of his choice. The top four preferred candidates are the first to fill any seats won by the party in a given constituency. Most of the electorate ignores the preference system, usually voting a straight ticket as predetermined by the party bureaucracy. To the extent that it is used, however, the preference vote contributes to party factionalism, especially in the DC.

Legislation is usually initiated by the cabinet or by a private member of either parliamentary house. Regional governments, an auxiliary national governmental organ called the National Council of Economy and Labor, and private citizens (by obtaining a minimum of 50,000 signatures on a petition) may also initiate legislation.

In addition to its legislative work the Italian Parliament has duties and powers similar to those usually assigned to legislatures in other countries. It must approve the national budget (although it exercises little real fiscal control over the government) and approve treaties with foreign nations. It may also conduct investigations and temporarily delegate legislative power to the executive branch. Either house may bring down a government through a no-confidence vote. Parliament may formally question cabinet members to gain information about the conduct of government. Opposition parties frequently use these powers to embarrass the government or a particular minister. Joint parliamentary sessions are held to elect the president of the republic, five of the fifteen members of the Constitutional Court, and seven of the twenty-one members of the Higher Judicial Council. A joint session would be used to impeach a president, prime minister, or cabinet minister. The Parliament also has the power to amend the Constitution.

Each house of Parliament elects its own president, who determines (subject to appeal) the order of business of each session and assigns bills to standing committees for consideration. The standing committees are organized by legislative or policy fields. Those of the chamber include agriculture, budget and state-controlled enterprises, commerce, constitutional affairs, defense, education, finance, foreign affairs, internal and religious affairs, justice, labor, public health, public works, and transportation and communications. The Senate combines the public works committee with the transportation and communications committee and has no committee on constitutional affairs or on budget and state-controlled enterprises. Political parties are proportionally represented on all standing committees in each house. This means that members of small parties must often serve on more than one committee. Although standing committees formally elect their chairmen, chairmanships are usually allocated by and among the government coalition parties and their supporters. In June 1976 the strongest opposition party, whose cooperation was needed to ensure the formation and life of the government, also received several chairmanships (see ch. 11). Since there is little prestige attached to committee serv-

ice and seniority does not determine chairmanships, there is extensive turnover in committee memberships.

On the one hand standing committee chairmen have significant indirect control over legislation in that they have the sole power to convene their committees and otherwise set committee agendas. The committees have extensive amending powers, and the bills they pass or report to the floor may bear little resemblance to their original forms. On the other hand the powers of the standing committees are severely limited by a lack of research facilities and support staff. A committee usually has one overcrowded meeting room, and neither the members nor the chairman is entitled to a private office. Instead they have seats, or in some cases desks, in a large workroom. Furthermore Italian committees do not enjoy the subpoena, hearing, or investigative powers possessed by their American counterparts.

When assigning a bill to a committee, the president of the house decides whether it must be reported back to the full house or can be the subject of final action by the committee. Thus the committee has either an advisory or a legislative function, depending on which procedure is used. The second procedure has been used to enact four-fifths of the bills that have become law. It cannot be used, however, for constitutional amendments, electoral legislation, treaty ratification, budget and appropriations bills, or delegations of legislative powers, all of which require action by the full houses. Any bill being considered solely by a committee may be brought to the full house if requested by the cabinet, one-tenth of the house's membership, or one-fifth of the committee's membership. The committee-legislative process, then, is primarily used as a timesaving device for relatively noncontroversial legislation. A third, rarely used procedure has committees draft bills that are voted on, without debate, by the whole house. There is no provision for conference committees between houses; bills must be sent back and forth between separate houses or committees until passed in duplicate form. Should Parliament be dissolved, incomplete legislation is killed. To become law it must be resubmitted and go through the entire process in a future parliamentary session.

Except for foreign treaties and tax, budgetary, and amnesty legislation, a law may be repealed as a whole or in part by a referendum supervised by the Constitutional Court. A referendum may be demanded by one-fifth of the members of either house of the national Parliament, a minimum of five regional assemblies, or 500,000 enfranchised citizens. Certain restrictions are intended to prevent overuse of the referendum. The more important of these include a stipulation that a specific law may be subjected to only one referendum per parliamentary session and a prohibition on holding a referendum during the first or last years of a parliamentary session.

All Italian legislators belong to parliamentary party groups based on extraparliamentary political party affiliation. Parliamentary groups are

supposed to have a minimum of ten members but may contain fewer so long as all members belong to a particular national political party. Independents and members of regional parties belong to a so-called mixed group. Each group elects its own president and decides which members will serve on the various standing committees. Group presidents and the parliamentary house presidents confer to plan the legislative agendas, and the president of the republic consults with group presidents when selecting a prime minister. Group members are not independent agents but are subject to party discipline as determined by extraparlimentary party executive bureaus. Party discipline extends so far as to cover legislators' votes in Parliament. The final standing committee vote on bills, however, is by secret ballot, which affords group members the opportunity to violate party directives.

Judicial

The Italian legal system is based on Roman civil law. Italy's legal scholars and magistrates within this tradition have emphasized the compilation and application of a comprehensive set of codified laws. The concept of judicial review was nonexistent. The judge's role was only to apply law mechanically, not to make law through his interpretations and decisions. Thus the resistance by the established judiciary to the Constitutional Court is understandable.

Italian courts are organized on a centralized national basis. An exception is the High Court of Sicily, which is little more than a historical anachronism, its major powers having been lost to the Constitutional Court. There are two judicial hierarchies: ordinary courts, which handle civil and criminal law, and administrative courts.

Ordinary Courts. At the lowest level of the ordinary courts system is the justice of the peace, who has no special legal training and receives fees but no salary. Usually a local notable, the justice of the peace hears only civil cases involving a maximum amount of 50,000 lire (for value of the lira—see Glossary). Cases involving larger amounts may be heard by mutual agreement of the parties involved. There are approximately 8,000 justices of the peace, one in each commune (see Subnational Government, this ch.).

Above the justice of the peace is the praetor, the lowest rank of salaried career magistrate. The praetor hears civil cases involving amounts up to 750,000 lire and criminal cases in which the maximum possible penalty is three years' imprisonment. He also hears appeals from justices of the peace on both fact and points of law. There are over 1,000 praetors, at least one in each of 900 judicial districts and more in the more heavily populated ones.

The tribunal—a panel of three judges—ranks above the praetor and hears civil cases involving amounts over 750,000 lire, criminal cases in which the maximum possible penalty is seven years' imprisonment, and appeals from the praetors. The tribunals also have exclusive ju-

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jurisdiction over tax cases. There are approximately 150 tribunals in Italy, one in every provincial capital and some fifty others in major towns, primarily in the south. The courts of assizes are special sections of the tribunals consisting of a panel of two regular and six lay judges, each of whom has an equal vote (a majority convicts, a tie acquits). The assizes courts are usually the courts of first instance for more serious felony cases.

Civil and criminal appeals from the tribunal go to a court of appeal. There are twenty-three courts of appeal, located in almost all regional capitals and a few other major cities. Each appeals court employs a panel of five magistrates who judge both the facts of the case and the application of law. Besides their appellate jurisdiction, the courts of appeal have first-instance jurisdiction over specialized matters, such as the domestic effect of foreign legal judgments. A special tribunal attached to each court of appeal hears criminal cases involving defendants under eighteen years of age.

Appeals from the courts of assizes go to a special section of those courts called courts of appeal of assizes. There an eight-member panel, organized as are those in the ordinary assizes courts, judges both law and fact.

The highest ordinary court is the Court of Cassation, sometimes referred to as the Supreme Court, which has appellate jurisdiction over points of law in cases from the lower courts. It is divided into four criminal and three civil sections. Seven-judge panels are used in each section. In addition so-called united sections (one for criminal cases and one for civil cases), comprising the highest ranking judges from other sections, hear the most serious cases.

Administrative Courts. There are two administrative law jurisdictions in Italy: one protects against negligent or arbitrary actions by state authorities, and the other hears cases involving the misuse of public funds. An individual who feels victimized by local administrative decisions may complain to a regional administrative tribunal in a regional capital or other large city. Appeals from regional tribunals go to the Council of State, which is also the administrative court of first instance for complaints against the central or national administration. The Council of State also advises ministries and other executive agencies on the legality of proposed legislation, regulations, contracts, and the like. In its judicial role the council can only annul an unlawful administrative act; it cannot award damages, which must be sought through the ordinary courts system. Appeals from the Council of State on the grounds of jurisdiction only go to the Court of Cassation.

The Court of Accounts hears cases against public officials charged with the misuse of public funds. General appeals from it go to a special section of the same court. Jurisdictional appeals are heard by the Court of Cassation, appeals pertaining to constitutionality by the

Constitutional Court. The Court of Accounts also oversees the fiscal transactions of enterprises receiving state funds. Another of its duties is to audit the national budget after its promulgation.

Personnel. Judges and Public prosecutors form a career service, a kind of judicial civil service. The 1948 Constitution specified that "the Judiciary is an independent structure and is not subject to another authority." Consequently the responsibility for judicial assignments, promotions, and discipline was taken from the Ministry of Justice and placed under a new, independent organ, the Higher Judicial Council. The president of the republic serves as chairman of the council, which has twenty-one members who serve unrenovable four-year terms. Seven of the members are selected by a joint parliamentary session; fourteen are selected from and by judges of the ordinary courts (six from the Court of Cassation, four from the Courts of Appeal, and four from the tribunals). All council members must be magistrates, law professors, or attorneys with a minimum of fifteen years of professional experience.

The council, consisting of established senior judicial and legal personnel, has been very conservative, exercising a rather stultifying, if nonpolitical, control over the judicial service. Reformers eventually gained control of the major legal professional body, the National Association of Italian Magistrates, only to have the higher ranking conservative members secede to form the Union of Italian Magistrates. Judges in Italy, then, are relatively independent of political control but not of their own judicial hierarchy.

Law school graduates between the ages of twenty-one and thirty who are of good character and family background enter the judiciary through competitive examinations. The judicial service has accepted women since 1963. Perhaps because a judge may gain tenure, enjoys a higher salary than most civil servants, and will eventually receive a pension, more applicants to the judicial service come from the south, where career and earning potentials are limited, than from other sections of Italy. Promotion through the judicial hierarchy up to the Court of Appeal is based in large measure on seniority. Above that level promotion is very slow and selective. A frequent criticism of the promotion system is that it encourages lower ranking judges to write conservative, lengthy, and complex opinions to impress senior judges (who rule on career advancement) rather than brief, simple opinions that the public might be expected to understand.

Graduates of law schools who elect to pursue legal rather than judicial careers spend a one-year apprenticeship with a practicing attorney and then take a state examination for admission to the bar. Rarely does a successful practicing attorney become a member of the bench, for to do so would usually require starting over at the lowest judicial position. This may well eliminate much of the trust and rap-

port that exists between the two professions in such countries as the United States and Great Britain, where the bench draws on the bar for its personnel.

Civil Service

The Italian civil service is divided into four classes: the administrative class—limited to university graduates; the executive class—limited to graduates of secondary school (roughly equivalent to American junior college); the clerical class—secretaries, clerks, and business-machine operators, who have graduated from the Italian equivalent of American junior high schools; and the auxiliary class—doormen, janitors, messengers, and the like, who have completed elementary school. The upper two classes are recruited by a combination of written and oral examinations; the lower two grades require written tests only. Promotion from one class to another is possible but not frequent; promotion within classes is based primarily on seniority. There is no overall civil service commission. Instead each ministry has an administrative council, composed of high political officers and civil servants, which is responsible for administering entrance tests and other personnel matters. Each ministry also has its own civil service disciplinary council.

Although pay is low compared with that offered by private industry, a civil service career does offer such advantages as job security (tenure is virtually automatic despite an eighteen-month probationary period), paid holidays and leave, health care, and a pension. As in the career judiciary there is an overrepresentation of southerners in the civil service. Civil servants are permitted to unionize. They may participate in politics and are granted leaves of absence if elected to office.

The low salaries, combined with a relatively short workday, lead many lower level civil servants to take a second job. Top-level civil servants often engage in a variation of this practice—accumulating several different posts (and their benefits) through appointments to various government boards and commissions. In 1962 Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani attempted to end this practice but had little success.

High-level promotions are involved in partisan politics. As top-level bureaucrats become aligned with political factions, their assignments and promotions frequently depend on which leader or faction gains control of what ministry. Conversely careers undoubtedly have been enhanced for some civil servants who deliberately avoid identification with any particular group so as to be acceptable to all of them.

A basic criticism of the Italian civil service is that its decisionmaking process is too centralized and too concentrated. It is centralized in that ministries in Rome refuse to delegate authority to their field offices to make any but the most unimportant decisions. Similarly the

process is overconcentrated in that matters of any importance within a ministry must be decided by one of its top bureaucrats, such as a director general or even the minister himself (or perhaps the minister's party executive bureau). Overcentralization and overconcentration, bureaucratic inefficiency, and the inability of the civil service to recruit an adequate number of highly skilled technicians has led to the increasing use of special government agencies not staffed by civil servants.

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Italy is a unitary state; in other words, all authority flows from the state, that is, the central government; there is no residual power belonging exclusively to subnational governmental units. According to the 1948 Constitution, "the Republic, which is one and indivisible, recognizes and promotes local autonomy," but this means only that the state has given certain powers and authority to subnational governmental units. The central government closely monitors the subnational governmental units' use of those powers, and it may alter or revoke them at its discretion. The three levels of subnational government are, in ascending order, the commune, the province, and the region.

Commune

The commune is usually a municipal entity, such as a city, town, or village, plus the surrounding territory. There are approximately 8,000 communes in Italy, each governed by a council and a junta consisting of the mayor and the assessors, or heads of the communal administrative departments. The mayor and assessors are elected by the council from among its members. The council is composed of fifteen to eighty members, depending on the size of the commune, who are popularly elected for a four-year term. A proportional representation system is used in communes of over 10,000 population, which minimizes the number of communal governments dominated by one political party. At the same time, however, it not infrequently results in councils that are deadlocked and unable to govern because of party and factional rivalries.

Communes have such responsibilities as recording vital statistics, providing fire protection and sanitation services, and maintaining local roads and primary school grounds and buildings. Education and the preservation of law are functions of the state, which provides and administers teachers and police forces at all levels of government. Local taxation is very limited; even with grants from the state, it was estimated that by 1970 nearly half of the communes operated at a deficit.

Province

The ninety-four provinces rank above the communes in subnational government organization, but their powers are very limited. Provincial administration is similar to that of the commune, having a council (varying in size from twenty-four to forty-five members) that elects a five- to nine-member junta, which in turn elects one of its members as provincial president. Members of the council are popularly elected for four-year terms through a system of proportional representation. Most communal and provincial elections are held on the same day in what are called administrative elections. Party politics plays a major role in provincial administration, just as it does in the commune.

Provincial responsibilities are limited to such matters as care for paupers, orphans, and the insane; prevention and control of disease; maintenance of secondary school buildings and grounds; game and fish conservation; and the construction and maintenance of roads not under communal or regional control. The province has no taxation powers and must depend on the state for funds. It has been reported that in 1968 over 70 percent of the provinces were in debt.

Inasmuch as the province is an artificial entity with no particularly distinctive social, economic, or cultural traditions and because it has such limited governmental responsibilities, its major significance is as an administrative field area of the state. Most state ministries maintain offices in the provinces. The prefect is the state's chief representative in the provinces. He is appointed by the president of the republic on the advice of the prime minister and is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. The prefect is usually a high-level civil servant, but he enjoys no tenure in office; demotions or transfers from the office of prefect are entirely at the pleasure of the central government. The prefect does not coordinate or otherwise control any of the ministries' field offices; those offices remain under the control of their own hierarchies.

Although they are agents of the state, prefects frequently function in a partisan political manner. Their appointment to office is political. During electoral campaigns the prefect and the provincial DC party secretary jointly plan strategy for the government parties. Through the mid-1960s prefects also used their administrative and police powers to harass communist and other left-wing parties and local governments. More recently, however, the trend appears to be one of increasing cooperation between prefects and local left-wing governments. Ironically the close scrutiny by the prefects over local left-wing administrations has generally caused them to be much less scandal ridden than local DC and other centrist party governments.

Until 1970, when all regions had been legally established, the office of prefect possessed considerable powers. The prefect could annul communal and provincial acts he judged to be not in accordance with

the law; his approval was required for the negotiation of local government contracts; he controlled the police; and he could recommend that the president of the republic dissolve provincial and communal councils that were unable to form stable working majorities and dismiss executives whom the prefect felt had acted in violation of the law. A prefectural commissioner appointed to replace a dissolved council or dismissed executive was supposed to govern only until new elections could be called; in practice commissioners often continued their direct rule on behalf of the prefect for extended periods.

Region

The 1948 Constitution provided for the highest subnational government unit, the region (see fig. 1). The five special and fifteen ordinary regions have eclipsed much of the importance if not all of the formal powers of the province and the prefect. Four of the special regions, Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Sicily, and Sardinia, were created by 1949; the creation of the fifth, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, was delayed until 1963 because of a territorial dispute with Yugoslavia. The creation of the fifteen ordinary regions—Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Venetia, Marche, Tuscany, Umbria, Abruzzi, Molise, Latium, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, and Calabria—did not occur until 1970. This delay was primarily due to the concern of the DC and other centrist parties that the Communists might gain control in some of the new subnational units. The DC began courting left-of-center support in the early 1960s and, although not a paramount condition, the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI) demanded the completion of regionalization as part of its price for cooperation.

The special regions, based on unique geographic, linguistic, cultural, or economic distinctions, have somewhat more autonomy than the regular regions. The power to annul communal and provincial council acts has been transferred from the prefects to organs of the special regions. Two special regions, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige, have eliminated the office of prefect altogether. All regions are similar in organization to the lower levels of subnational government; each has a popularly elected council, a junta, and a president. The major distinction between the authority of the regions and that of the lower units is legislative power. The lower units possess only minor regulatory powers, subject to annulment by the prefect or the special regions. The regions possess exclusive legislative power in some fields and share complementary and integrative legislative power with the central government in other fields. All of the region's legislative powers, however, must be exercised in compliance with the Constitution and the national interest, as judged by the central state government.

In each region the central government maintains a commissioner— analogous to the provincial prefect—who is assisted by a regional control commission. The commission has the power to veto regional council acts. Acts passed a second time but vetoed again are submitted to the Constitutional Court or the National Parliament (depending on whether the point of contention is legality or national interest) for resolution.

The central government may dissolve a regional council after conferring with the national interparliamentary Committee on Regional Problems. Elections must be held within three months of dissolution. The dissolution of a regional council would, of course, be a far more serious political matter than the dissolution of a communal or even a provincial council.

INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY

Serious limitations confront the republican governmental structure. The president's powers and his relationship with the prime minister have yet to be clearly established. The partisan, factionalized nature of the cabinet prevents the formation of long-term, stable working majorities and thus impedes strong executive leadership. The Parliament, also subject to extreme partisan pressures, cannot provide strong alternative leadership and in fact relinquishes its ultimate power over the duration of governments to extraparliamentary political parties. The distribution of power between the central and regional governments (or the amount of power the central government is willing to grant the regions) has yet to be fully determined. Added to these problems of the republic are limitations that have become inherent in but are not unique to the Italian political system: an entrenched, conservative judicial hierarchy, a swollen civil service marked by an overcentralized and overconcentrated decisionmaking process, and local governments that frequently fail to promote citizen participation in the political process.

Many of the problems unique to the republican form of government, particularly those relating to the distribution and allocation of power between and among governmental branches and organs, are in large part due to the brief existence of the Italian Republic and the even briefer existence of many of its specific governmental and administrative units. The republican system has not had the benefit of a lengthy period of constitutional interpretation and practice in which to evolve and solidify. The problems are all the more complex because the 1948 Constitution was not created or applied in a vacuum. Many of its provisions contradicted long-established political and legal traditions.

The Italian press and many serious political studies have documented several scandals, inefficiency, vested interests, and corruption of

Italian politics. These are not unique to Italy, except perhaps in degree, although their effect on the public possibly is more significant there than elsewhere. Numerous scholarly works and some mass survey data suggest that Italians are apathetic, distrustful, and even cynical toward their government. These attitudes are apparently based on historical experience—generally negative—with public authority and government in general. There is little, if any, data to indicate that Italians direct their dissatisfaction specifically toward the republican form of government.

The republic has thus far been unable to break with the past and reform Italian politics, an inability that probably accounts for much of the public's continued apathy. Even worse, it has been ineffectual in dealing with very serious problems, particularly in the economic sector, during the 1970s. This lack of efficacy (due more to politics than to governmental form) must be considered in assessing the republic's future legitimacy and viability (see ch. 11).

FOREIGN POLICY

Traditions and Trends to 1945

From 1859 to 1871 Italian foreign policy consisted of Piedmontese maneuvering to annex the other areas of the peninsula (see ch. 2). After unification the Italian state was generally considered to be a major European power but without the military and economic strength of its neighbors. Consequently until 1945 Italy's basic motive in foreign policy was to gain prestige and establish itself as a genuine world power. The main point of contention among policymakers was just how to accomplish this end. Some believed Italy should seek ties with France and Great Britain to counter the power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which held territory the Italians claimed. Others saw a colonial role for Italy, primarily in Africa, where France and Great Britain would be its main competitors. The second option was selected, and in the 1880s Italy became one of the last European powers to join the race for colonial acquisitions. In 1882 Italy signed the Triple Alliance Pact with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Italy did not wish, however, to align itself fully with either side of the European power struggle. Quite to the contrary, the real policy was one of shifting and balancing alliances in order to maintain flexibility and freedom of action while attempting to gain equal power with neighboring countries. Thus in 1902 Italy renewed its Triple Alliance membership but allowed the pact's 1888 military conventions to lapse. At the same time Italy concluded an understanding with France regarding neutrality in the event that either became engaged in hostilities; in doing so Italy undermined the Triple Alliance Pact.

Italy's policy of shifting and balancing was successful for some time after the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1911 and 1912, for example, Libya became an Italian colony with little opposition from other European powers. Italy realistically believed there was little to be gained from fighting on the side of the Triple Alliance in World War I. The policy alternatives were seen as neutrality (if the Austro-Hungarian Empire conceded the territory Italy coveted) and entrance into the war on the side of the Triple Entente (if entente powers promised Italian territorial gains in return). The second alternative was adopted, but Italy later felt that it never received its just rewards for entering the war. After the war the Italians returned to their balancing policy. With the defeat of the Triple Alliance Italy's policy was aimed at countering French power on the continent, primarily through a close relationship with Great Britain and support for limited German recovery.

Mussolini's decision to join Germany in the Axis and enter World War II was an aberration in Italy's established foreign policy of balance and flexibility. The goal was no longer parity of power with European neighbors. Instead Mussolini eventually elected to commit Italy fully on the Axis side in an attempt to alter the European balance of power permanently by establishing his country's undisputed primacy in the Mediterranean area.

Post-World War II Foreign Policy

The conclusion of World War II ended Italy's delusions of grandeur and its dependence on arms to achieve foreign policy goals. The world had changed as the European balance of power gave way to a polarization of blocs behind two superpowers. Italy could not resume her traditional shifting-and-balancing approach to international affairs, although some leftist politicians favored a nonaligned, third-force role for the nation. Realistically, however, such a role would have required a strong domestic economy and probably a strong military, both of which Italy lacked. A basic foreign policy consideration was whether Italy's orientation should be toward Western Europe or the Mediterranean area. Most centrists and rightists believed Italy's future lay in a West European orientation.

Italy received more than US\$1 billion in postwar American aid between 1946 and 1948. In 1947 Italy elected to join other West European nations in receiving economic assistance from the United States under the Marshall Plan, and it had received more than US\$1.5 billion by 1952 through that program. In 1949, after heated debate with left-wing political parties (the Communists then advocating a pro-Soviet stance, the Socialists, Italian neutralism), the parliamentary majority of DC and other centrist and rightist parties approved membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Italy also joined the

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) at its inception in 1951 and played host in 1957 for the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market). The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), of which Italy is a charter member, was also founded in 1957.

Like other members of the European Communities (EC), Italy sends delegates to the EC administrative bodies—the Commission of the European Communities, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the Court of Justice. Most of the real decisionmaking is undertaken by the council. The parliament, however, would be the legislature of a future European union. Its delegates, presently selected by the national legislatures of the member countries, sit by party blocs, not by nationality. Italy, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) have thirty-six delegates each in the 198-member parliament. Direct, popular elections, seen as the first step in strengthening the European Parliament, are scheduled for 1978, when that body's membership will be expanded to 410 delegates. The four larger EC countries will each send eighty-one delegates to the expanded parliament. Italy's policy has traditionally supported the conversion of the EC from an economic orientation to a fuller political union; however, enthusiasm for this idea has varied among Italian political leaders.

Italy's Western orientation was based not only on international considerations but on domestic ones as well. A noted American scholar has stressed that even the Italian centrists never conceived of Italian membership in NATO as necessary to help prevent possible Soviet aggression in Western Europe. He suggests that Italy's membership was deemed necessary to secure continued foreign aid and, in the realm of domestic politics, to prevent the necessity of opening governing power to the left (specifically, the Socialists), which eventually occurred in any event. Italy's ties with NATO, ECSC, and EEC were all undertaken in large measure to protect the domestic private-economy market from possible internal left-wing threats. The Italian newspaper editor Arrigo Levi also noted the initial economic importance of Italy's various Western alliances. At the same time, however, he felt that Italy had originally looked also to its strong identification with the West as a means of avoiding Czechoslovakia's fate in 1948.

Whatever the motives for forming alliances with the West, Italy has consistently pursued a policy of supporting international military arms limitation. It has actively contributed to negotiations leading to such international agreements as the 1963 Moscow Treaty barring underwater, atmospheric, and space nuclear weapons tests; the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and other treaties in 1967, 1970, and 1971 on the peaceful uses of space, the denuclearization of seabeds, and the prohibition of biological weapons. Italy has also taken part in negotia-

tions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries regarding more general disarmament plans for Europe.

Its strong West European orientation notwithstanding, since World War II Italy has attempted to establish a separate identity, to assert itself and gain some prestige and voice in international affairs. It opposed a command structure in NATO from which it was excluded but supported a proposed similar group within the EEC to which it would have belonged (much to the chagrin of the Benelux countries, which were not to be represented). Italy also supported Great Britain's membership in the EEC, at least in part to counter France's near domination of that organization during the 1960s.

Other attempts to reassert its presence in international affairs resulted in the development of a perceived Italian role as a mediator between East and West and between developed and underdeveloped countries. Italy believes it might be able to form a special relationship with underdeveloped nations because it was the first European country to relinquish colonies after World War II. Whether the potential actually exists for such a special relationship is questionable in light of Italy's experience in Ethiopia and the fact that its colonies were not really voluntarily given up. Nevertheless the idea of establishing special relationships with underdeveloped countries has led to what has been called a Mediterranean vocation, wherein Italy might serve as a political and economic bridge between that area and the rest of the world. Thus the original dilemma of whether Italy should pursue a West European or a Mediterranean orientation has evolved into a combination of the two; the West European orientation has taken precedence, but it has been supplemented by a continuing interest in the Mediterranean area. This has been manifested in a generally balanced, perhaps slightly pro-Arab, Italian policy toward the Middle East. Although supporting Israel's independence, Italy has repeatedly warned that Israeli intransigence in relinquishing occupied Arab territory only increases the potential for future war. Based at least in part on its petroleum import requirements from Arab countries, Italy denied the United States use of airbases on Italian soil for operations in support of Israel during the 1973 Middle East war.

As well as taking unilateral initiatives, Italy has been quick to adapt to general international political trends. For example, during the cold war Italy was in the forefront of nations opposed to the People's Republic of China (PRC). When it became obvious in 1970 that the United States was altering its policy toward the PRC, Italy quickly recognized the communist regime.

Italy has achieved notable foreign policy successes, particularly where its has had specific negotiable interests. Negotiations were successfully concluded with Austria in 1948 and again during the 1960s regarding the rights of the German-speaking majority of Trentino-Alto Adige's population. There still are activists in the region, but by the

late 1960s the issue had subsided somewhat and had become more a domestic than an international affair. In 1954, after lengthy negotiations initiated by Great Britain and the United States, Italy and Yugoslavia agreed on the partition of the territory of Trieste (see ch. 3). The agreement was updated by negotiations between the two countries concluded in November 1975. By exercising restraint in the face of Libyan provocations after the Muammer al Qadhaafi regime took power, Italy preserved one of its major sources of petroleum and natural gas. Italian diplomacy has also been credited with assisting Great Britain in negotiating a new military bases agreement with Malta in 1972.

Mid-1976: Relations, Problems, and Prospects

In mid-1976 Italy maintained diplomatic relations with approximately 130 foreign nations. A member of the United Nations (UN) since December 1955, Italy also joined and maintained membership in all the specialized agencies of that organization. Economic problems occupied much of the time of the Italian ministries of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and finance during the first half of 1976. In January Italy sought assistance from the United States, West Germany, and the International Monetary Fund in bolstering the value of the lira. In May the EEC granted Italy US\$500 million for the same purpose. Italy participated in the Western Economic Summit Meeting held in Puerto Rico in June.

As a member of the EEC, Italy's economic trade is oriented toward the West. At the same time Italy has concluded significant bilateral trade agreements with both the Soviet Union and the PRC. During the first half of 1976, for example, an Italian machine tool consortium concluded contracts worth US\$130 million with the Soviet Union for earth-moving equipment, technology, and factory construction. A subsidiary of Italy's ENI received a contract worth US\$9 million from the PRC for technological equipment, one of the largest fiscal agreements thus far negotiated between the PRC and any EEC member.

Politically during the first part of 1976 Italy resumed normal relations with Cambodia, established diplomatic ties with Angola, and supported Angolan membership in the UN. Italy also concluded an agreement with West Germany whereby Italian workers in that country (estimated to number as many as 650,000) were allowed to return home to vote in the June elections.

Ironically perhaps, Italy's worst problems in the foreign policy field have stemmed from domestic politics. As early as 1974 the United States began to be concerned over the growing strength of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano-PCI) as shown in Italian administrative elections. The apprehension grew throughout 1975 and

especially during the spring of 1976 as Italy's parliamentary elections of June approached. For several months before the elections Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald Ford expressed public concern that the PCI might be called on to join or form an Italian government, depending on the electoral results. The United States felt that a wholly or partly communist government in Italy would set a dangerous precedent for West European political systems in general and call into question the Italian relationship with NATO in particular.

Most West European nations were also concerned about the prospect of PCI participation in an Italian government. France and West Germany, for example, were reportedly concerned that such a government might cause shifts in Italy's domestic economic priorities (such as a deemphasis of austerity measures needed to control inflation) and thus interfere with the relationship between Italy and the EEC.

The immediate result of the June elections was not encouraging for those worried about PCI influence. Although the DC won a plurality, the PCI narrowed the gap in the two parties' parliamentary strength. Whether the Communists would be asked to join a coalition was not clear for several weeks. In the interim West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt disclosed that his country, the United States, France, and Great Britain had considered refusing further economic aid to Italy if Communists were included in the government. The Italian press was extremely critical of what it interpreted as foreign interference in Italy's political process. Great Britain later denied it was party to any agreement, and France dissociated itself from the chancellor's statement. The United States acknowledged that the four countries had discussed the matter but denied that any agreement had been reached.

By mid-August a minority DC government had received the required parliamentary vote of confidence. Although it included no Communists, its formation was made possible only with PCI acquiescence. Clearly the PCI would have some input into the policymaking process; its strength within the institutional framework was enhanced by the assignment of several important parliamentary posts to communist members. Inasmuch as the Communists were not members of the government, however, Italy's Western allies, though not enthusiastic, expressed no objection to the Italian governmental situation.

The domestic political problems having apparently abated, Italy did not appear in August 1976 to face any grave foreign policy problems in the near future. Despite dissatisfaction with some of the EEC's economic policies and disappointment over the state of West European political integration, there did not appear to be any practical alternative to its established foreign policy of EEC membership (augmented perhaps by its Mediterranean vocation) for Italy to pursue.

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John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile's *The Government of Republican Italy*, Peter A. Allum's *Italy—Republic Without Government?*, and Raphael Zariski's *Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development* are very good, fairly recent works on Italian government. Also quite good but somewhat dated is Norman Kogan's *The Government of Italy*; the contributions of Adams and Barile and of Zariski supply brief but informative sections on Italian foreign policy. A more lengthy work on this subject to the early 1960s is Kogan's *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy*. Mauro Cappelletti, John Henry Merryman, and Joseph Perillo have written an excellent account of the Italian judicial system in *The Italian Legal System; An Introduction*. Robert C. Fried's *The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics* is probably the most authoritative work in English on the subject. George Woodcock has provided additional information on regional administration in "Regional Government: The Italian Experience," in *Public Administration*. There has been an abundance of recent journal material on Italian politics. Journals have, however, provided much less coverage on Italian government structure and institutions—particularly since the late 1950s, when the creation of most of the republican governmental organs was completed. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 11

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The division and factionalization of Italian society was reflected in the politics of the mid-1970s. Parliamentary political parties represented a broad range of ideologies from far left to far right, while antisystem extremist groups perpetrated violence and contributed to the instability caused by the government's inability to solve long-existing economic problems. All of the political parties were subject to factionalism based on philosophy and personality. Much of the ebb and flow of Italian politics was played against the backdrop of church-state relations as the Roman Catholic Church consistently interjected itself into the political arena. Acceptance of the concept of the Italian state was undermined by the population's enduring allegiance to the province or the locality, which significantly interfered with feelings of national unity and purpose.

There were a multitude of organized interest groups in operation, based on the specialization of interests that occurs as a country develops and on such traditional social cleavages as culture, religion, ideology, geography, and economic class. The interest groups focused attention on both the government bureaucracy and the major political parties. Special, mutually beneficial relationships had developed between the more powerful interest groups and the political party that had dominated the Italian political system from the creation of the republic in 1946 until the mid-1970s. In large part because of the inefficiency of the official bureaucracy, a system or process of political favoritism had become nearly institutionalized.

In the thirty years since the creation of the republic, Italy's political parties had modified, and in many cases moderated, their general ideologies and their specific policy stands. Party alliances had shifted over the years as coalition government based on postwar collaboration among all parties gave way to periods of center-right and center-left rule.

In the fall of 1976 it appeared that Italian politics was experiencing a period of transition as old party alliances and government coalition formulas had proved inadequate in solving long-term economic problems. The Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI), the republic's second largest party, had nearly closed the electoral gap

with the Christian Democratic Party, usually referred to as Christian Democracy (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC). Awarded several important parliamentary posts after the June 1976 general elections, the Communists' official participation in future national governments seemed a distinct possibility— a possibility viewed with considerable concern by significant elements of the Italian society and with even more concern by Italy's Western allies.

FORMAL POLITICS: ISSUES AND COALITIONS TO 1976

Several antifascist political parties formed the coalition known as the Committee of National Liberation, which governed Italy from 1943 to 1946. These included, from left to right on the political spectrum, the PCI, the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI)—then known as the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria—PSIUP)—the Action Party, the DC, and the Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano—PLI). After the June 1946 referendum that ensured Italy's future as a republic, the provisional head of state, Enrico De Nicola, selected DC leader Alcide De Gasperi as the republic's first prime minister.

From 1946 to 1947 the collaboration between parties of the left and right continued as De Gasperi formed coalitions comprising the PCI, PSIUP, DC, and Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano—PRI). Growing tension between the DC and the PCI led to the PCI's ejection from the coalition in 1947. The PSIUP also left the government, because of intraparty factionalism. Both the DC and the PCI profited from the brief period of cooperation. The DC had gained PCI support for the parliamentary passage of the republican 1948 Constitution, including its provision recognizing the Lateran Pacts of 1929 as the basis for the relationship between the Catholic church and the Italian state. The PCI, already respected for its leading role in wartime antifascist resistance, gained a certain legitimacy by working within the system and contributing to the government.

Between 1948 and 1976 the dominant DC shifted its political alliances as it attempted to find coalition formulas that would meet the requirements of changing times. The seven parliamentary sessions can thus be seen as fairly distinct periods, based on the composition and effectiveness of the governing coalitions between 1948 and 1976.

Center-Right Rule, 1948-53

The general elections in 1948 were the first to send representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate under the republican Constitution. Fought on the basis of Communists versus anti-Communists the electoral contest confirmed the end of the period of postwar collaboration between left and right. Marshall Plan aid, which the PCI

opposed as likely to result in Italian subservience to the United States, was an issue. The PCI's identification with the Soviet Union caused much of its unpopularity as that nation opposed the return to Italy of the Trieste territory claimed by Yugoslavia and had also recently engineered a coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia.

The 1948 election was a triumph for the DC, which won an absolute majority of chamber seats as well as an absolute majority of elected seats in the Senate (then temporarily enlarged by the addition of delegates who sat by virtue of past service to the state, especially during the resistance). The DC could easily have formed a strong *monocolore* (single-party) government and was under considerable pressure from the Vatican to do so. De Gasperi wished to establish the independence of the DC from the Catholic church and thus opposed the formation of a *monocolore* Catholic government. Instead he formed a coalition, beginning a period of quadripartite, center-right government that lasted until 1953. The three parties that joined the DC were the PRI, PLI, and Giuseppe Saragat's right-wing socialist party, called the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani—PSLI), which had left the PSIUP in 1947.

The quadripartite period lasted technically only until 1950, when the PLI left the coalition. The PSLI followed suit in 1951. Both parties, however, continued their parliamentary support of the government. Italy's orientation to Western Europe solidified during the 1948-53 period as it continued to receive Marshall Plan aid and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Coal and Steel Community. Domestically the center-right government passed legislation in 1950 establishing the Development Fund for the South (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), an ambitious, long-term economic development plan that included provisions for land reform. Conservative southern landowners responded with increasing support for monarchist parties and the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano—MSI), a fascist party in all but name.

Transitional Period, 1953-58

The DC pushed an electoral reform bill through Parliament before the 1953 general elections that would have given a bonus amounting to an absolute majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to any party alliance receiving over 50 percent of the popular vote. The centrist alliance comprising the members of the quadripartite government narrowly missed the goal when it received 49.9 percent of the vote. The DC lost its own absolute majority but retained a large plurality in both legislative houses. De Gasperi's hopes of reestablishing the quadripartite, center-right coalition were dashed by the refusal of Saragat's Italian Social Democratic Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano—PSDI), formerly the PSLI, to participate. The PSDI's

refusal was in large part due to its left wing's condemnation of the party's acceptance of the DC electoral modification scheme. De Gasperi rejected an alternative coalition plan that would have included the DC, PLI, and monarchists, feeling that such a shift further to the right would have violated the principles of his centrist party.

The 1953-58 period was thus one of transition in which minority DC governments ruled alone much of the time. The PSDI and PLI joined the DC governments in 1954 and again in 1955, but the overall period was marked by changing party orientations that eventually led to a new coalition formula. The PLI moved toward the right as the party's conservative supporters of classic laissez-faire economics gained control from the more progressive wing. At the same time the leftist PSI, headed by Pietro Nenni, moved toward the center and renewed an earlier offer to join the DC in a coalition government. At the local level the DC increasingly competed with left-wing parties for the working-class vote. Committed to at least some economic planning by the state (especially in developing the south), the DC could no longer count on the PLI for support, and some DC leaders began to view the PSI as a possible replacement.

Foreign affairs also helped make what Nenni had termed the opening to the left (*apertura a sinistra*) a future possibility. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 condemnation of Joseph Stalin's rule and his proclamation of the legitimacy of different approaches to socialism had profound effects on the PCI and PSI. PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti felt that Khrushchev's remarks regarding the socialist movements simply formalized what was already the Italian Communists' view. He coined the term *polycentrism* to describe the various national approaches to socialism. The right wing within the PSI, which wanted greater socialist autonomy from the PCI, found its argument strengthened by the admission of Stalin's excesses. Nenni openly criticized not only Stalin but the whole Soviet system. He also began talks with Saragat regarding the eventual reunification of the PSI and PSDI. The Hungarian and Polish uprisings in the fall of 1956 further contributed to the separation between the PCI and PSI. At its 1957 party congress the PSI informally nullified the Unity of Action Pact, the official basis for PCI-PSI cooperation, which dated back to 1934.

Increasing Center-Left Agreement, 1958-63

The 1958 general elections resulted in the retention of the large DC parliamentary plurality. During most of the 1958-63 period the DC ruled through minority *monocolore* cabinets, though it was occasionally joined by the PSDI and PRI. To stay in power in 1957 a short-lived minority DC government had been forced to accept parliamentary support from the monarchists and MSI, in large measure because of continued Vatican opposition to any opening to the left. A similar

situation occurred in 1960, when another DC minority accepted MSI parliamentary support, a move that caused considerable dissension among Christian Democrats. Matters were aggravated when the MSI attempted to hold its party congress in Genoa, a center of antifascist resistance during World War II. Violent strikes and riots caused the cancellation of the congress, and the MSI withdrew its support from the government, which subsequently fell. The event enabled left-wing DC spokesmen, such as Aldo Moro, to argue effectively to church and business leaders that the DC's future lay in a shift not to the right but to the left.

During 1961 and 1962 the DC and PSI found policy areas of increasing agreement. The DC recognized the necessity of state centralized economic planning and agreed to nationalize electricity. It further agreed to complete the process of regionalization, that is, the establishment of regional governments as provided in the Constitution. The PSI finally withdrew its objections to Italian membership in NATO. Also during the period the Catholic church began to support an opening to the left as Pope John XXIII's moderation replaced Pope Pius XII's intransigence on the issue.

In January 1962 Moro formed a DC-PSDI-PRI coalition government. The PCI voted against the coalition, as did the PLI, monarchists, and MSI. The PSI, however, abstained on the confidence vote and promised parliamentary support for the government so long as it pursued a program based on the areas of DC-PSI agreement developed earlier.

Center-Left Rule, 1963-68

The 1963 general elections resulted in a surprising decrease in the DC's popularity together with what seemed to be a concomitant increase in the vote of the PCI. Since the PSI gained slight support, the vote was probably not one by leftist and rightist dissenters against the DC opening to the left, then clearly under way. Some observers even felt that a significant portion of the PCI's increased vote was the result of the Vatican's new stand supporting an opening to the PSI, which may have been misinterpreted by some of the Catholic electorate as also signifying approval of the PCI. Another possible explanation for the increase in PCI support at the expense of the DC was the working-class migration from the rural south to the urban north, where the communist propaganda appeal was strongest. In any event the DC retained its parliamentary plurality, and in December 1963 Moro finally formed the first coalition with PSI membership. The PSDI and PRI were also included in the cabinet.

The DC right wing was unhappy with the center-left government, but strong pressure from the Vatican helped to preserve the general unity of the party. The PSI left wing also opposed cooperative DC-PSI rule and bolted from the party to form a new political group with

the old name of PSIUP. The PSI and PSDI, in an attempt to increase socialist influence, reunited in 1966 to form the United Socialist Party, headed by Nenni.

Although governments fell and were replaced, the center-left coalition formula was maintained throughout the 1963-68 period. Opposition to it by the business community eventually dwindled somewhat as it became clear that center-left governments posed no revolutionary threat to Italian big business interests. Yet the caution that the center-left governments exercised seemed to be reflective of a general political malaise; specific cabinets and the center-left concept in general were increasingly criticized as being unable to solve Italy's economic problems and provide effective government.

Center-Left Rule in Doubt, 1968-72

The 1968 general elections resulted in few surprises, although they proved a disappointment for the United Socialist Party, which lost significant support compared with the 1963 showings of its separate PSI and PSDI components. The DC won its usual parliamentary plurality, and the four-party, center-left coalition continued as the basis for government during the 1968-72 legislative session (shortened from five years to four years when the president of the republic dissolved Parliament and called for new elections one year early). The political malaise in which the previous parliamentary session concluded continued, and the economic situation worsened as the number of labor strikes increased and the inflation rate rose. The strikes and student demonstrations became particularly violent during the summer and fall of 1969. The United Socialist Party divided again into Socialists and Social Democrats; the Socialists reclaimed the name PSI, and the Social Democrats formed the Unitary Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Unitario—PSU) and later reverted to the PSDI in 1974.

During the late 1960s the PCI began to moderate its policies in order to improve its relations with DC leftists and Socialists. Rather than exploit the violent demonstrations of 1969, the PCI condemned them. It also supported the government's 1970 attempts to decrease inflation and otherwise improve the economic situation through increased taxation and the extension of incentives to encourage business investment and production.

Major riots occurred in Calabria in 1970 and 1971 over the selection of the provincial capital. The economic situation further deteriorated in 1971. Local elections in June of that year showed significantly increased support for the MSI, and reports circulated of right-wing plots against the state. Tensions were also heightened by scandals involving the misappropriation of public funds and by the campaign surrounding the 1974 referendum on Italy's liberalized divorce law. By early 1972 observers were questioning whether the viability of the center-left coalition formula had come to an end.

Demise of Center-Left Rule, 1972-76

The 1972 general elections resulted in continued gains and losses for the PCI and DC respectively, though not in major proportions. Socialist support, divided among the PSI, PSU, and PSIUP, remained about what it had been in 1968. Most surprising was the showing of the far right. The monarchists combined with the MSI to form the Italian Socialist Movement-National Right (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale—MSI-DN), which gained fifty-six chamber seats compared with the total of thirty seats the parties had won separately in 1968.

After the election the DC dropped the PSI from the government and attempted to form a new center-right coalition. Although the attempt failed and the Socialists were brought back into the government a year later, the future of the center-left coalition formula was clearly limited.

The divorce law referendum caused significant dissension within the DC and proved to be a traumatic experience for most of the parties. Only the MSI-DN joined the DC in favoring the law's repeal; the small Radical Party and the PSI, PSDI, PLI, and PRI joined the PCI in supporting the law. In fact most parties had apparently hoped to avoid a final confrontation on the issue: the PCI because it feared that the accompanying campaign would weaken its improved relations with the DC; the center-left and center-right parties because of the disruptive effect the campaign would have on cooperation with the DC and on possible future coalitions; and the DC because it was not at all sure the law would be defeated. The Vatican strongly opposed the liberalized law and pressured the DC, especially its right wing, into the final contest. The referendum resulted in a 19 million to 13 million vote in favor of retaining the law, which weakened the prestige of the DC and the unity of the center-left DC-PSI-PSDI government.

The economic recession continued to worsen over the next eighteen months. Center-left governments and *monocolore* DC governments with moderate leftist parliamentary support seemed powerless to rectify the situation, and tension developed between the DC and the PSI. The PSI finally withdrew its support and brought down the government in January 1976; this action, combined with the PSI refusal to back a subsequent DC government, led to the June 1976 general elections. The PSI demanded that a future government include direct PCI participation. This the DC was not ready to accept, although the idea gained favor that somehow Italy's second largest party must have greater influence in government if Italy's political malaise were to be ended. The PCI disliked the PSI's precipitation of the governmental crisis, but it had advocated since 1972 the historic compromise where-

by the so-called democratic forces (specifically the DC, PSI, and PCI) would form the basis for a new coalition formula.

In withdrawing its support for the government the PSI ended the old center-left coalition scheme. That little could be accomplished until new elections were held became obvious; consequently the president of the republic dissolved Parliament, prematurely ending a legislative session for the second consecutive time.

Transitional Period, 1976-

The 1976 general elections were quickly reduced to a DC-PCI contest and, in the view of the Catholic church, the affair took on the dimensions of an anticommunist crusade. The DC ran a negative campaign of opposition to the Communists. The PCI touted its historic compromise as a solution to the governmental malaise, which had been underscored by the demise of the center-left coalition formula.

Campaign issues included Italy's continuing economic problems, the increasing violence surrounding the elections (radical left and radical right groups employed kidnappings, shootings, and bombings to demonstrate their discontent), and interference in Italian politics by foreign nations. The interference was in the form of public warnings regarding the reaction of Italy's allies—particularly the United States and also Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)—should the PCI be included in a postelection cabinet (see ch. 10). Political scandals were another issue, since leading members of the DC and PSI were alleged to have received payments from the American Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in exchange for agreements to purchase planes for the Italian air force. An Italian parliamentary commission's investigation into the Lockheed affair continued into the late fall of 1976; no indictments had been made public by that time, but arrests were reported to be impending.

The 1976 general elections culminated in a substantial increase in PCI strength over its 1972 showing: a gain of 7.3 percent of the popular vote and forty-nine seats, for a total of 228 seats, in the Chamber of Deputies and a gain of 5.4 percent of the vote and twenty-one seats, for a total of 116 seats, in the Senate. In the popular vote only about 5 percentage points separated the DC and PCI in 1976 (38.7 versus 34.4 percent in the chamber and 38.9 versus 33.8 percent in the Senate). The other parties, particularly the PSDI and MSI-DN, experienced substantial losses (see table 5).

Shortly after the election the DC initiated bilateral talks with the other parties (excluding a far-left electoral front and the far-right MSI-DN). In recognition of the PCI's electoral strength and the necessity of providing it greater influence if the government malaise were to be remedied, it was agreed that Communists would be given the post of president of the Chamber of Deputies and the chairman-

Table 5. Results of the General Elections of 1972 and 1976 by Party

Party ¹	1972			1976		
	Votes	Percent	Seats	Votes	Percent	Seats
Chamber of Deputies:						
DC	12,912,466	38.7	266	14,211,005	38.7	262
PCI	9,068,961	27.1	179	12,620,509	34.4	228
PSI	3,208,597	9.6	61	3,541,383	9.6	57
MSI-DN	2,894,862	8.7	56	2,243,849	6.1	35
PSDI (PSU)	1,718,142	5.1	29	1,237,483	3.4	15
PLI	1,296,977	3.9	20	478,157	1.3	5
PRI	954,357	2.8	15	1,134,648	3.1	14
SVP	153,674	0.5	3	184,286	0.5	3
Other	--- ²	3.6	1	--- ²	2.9	11
Senate:						
DC	11,465,529	38.1	135	12,215,036	38.9	135
PCI	8,573,662	28.4	95	10,631,871	33.8	116
PSI	3,225,707	10.7	33	3,208,382	10.2	29
MSI-DN	2,767,059	9.2	26	2,088,318	6.6	15
PSDI (PSU)	1,613,810	5.2	11	965,478	3.1	6
PLI	1,316,172	4.1	8	436,506	1.4	2
PRI	918,440	3.0	5	845,629	2.7	6
SVP	113,452	0.4	2	158,605	0.5	2
Other	--- ²	0.7	0	--- ²	2.9	4

¹ DC (Partito Democrazia Cristiana) Christian Democratic Party; PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano) Italian Communist Party; PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano) Italian Socialist Party; MSI-DN (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale) Italian Social Movement-National Right; PSDI (PSU) (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano) Italian Social Democratic Party—known as PSU (Partito Socialista Unitario), Unitary Socialist Party, between 1969 and 1974; PLI (Partito Liberale Italiano) Italian Liberal Party; PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano) Italian Republican Party; and SVP (Südtiroler Volkspartei) South Tyrolean Popular Party.

² Insufficient data.

Source: Based on information from *Notiziario Per La Stampa* [Rome], No. 173, June 21, 1976, pp. 2-4.

ships of seven parliamentary committees. It was the first time the PCI had attained such high institutional positions, positions that carried with them significant parliamentary power as well as obvious symbolic value (see ch. 10).

The DC refused to consider inviting the PCI to join a coalition government, although the Communists had claimed such representation as a right on the basis of their strong electoral showing. The DC preferred a coalition with the PSI and an unofficial dialogue with the PCI. The PSI steadfastly refused to join such a coalition, maintaining its insistence that the PCI be a member of the next government. The DC, led by the prime minister-designate, Giulio Andreotti, had little choice but to form a minority *monocolore* government; because the PSI and its other former center-left colleagues abstained, the absten-

tions of the PCI on the confidence vote and later crucial legislative votes were necessary to sustain the government and maintain it in office.

In early August 1976 Andreotti publicized an austerity program designed to alleviate the economic situation and attract PCI support. It included provisions for curbing tax evasion and improving the efficiency of the civil service, both prime PCI concerns, as well as plans for higher luxury taxes, police reforms, and stronger attempts to curb political violence and terrorism. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate gave Andreotti the required votes of confidence on August 7 and 9 respectively. The Communists abstained in both houses.

In mid-1976 domination of the political system by the Christian Democrats appeared to be a phenomenon of the past, as did eras of center-right and center-left government. A transitional period in Italian politics was under way that could eventually lead to the PCI's sharing formal governmental power at the national level. The process seemed much like that experienced by the PSI during the late 1950s and early 1960s, which culminated in the opening to the left. The PSI, however, had been invited to join a coalition clearly dominated by the DC. In August 1976 the electoral support and the parliamentary representation of the DC and PCI were nearly equal.

Barring unforeseen changes in Italian politics that might alter the near balance of power between the DC and PCI, three kinds of government coalition appeared possible in the future. First, the DC could continue to govern with the parliamentary support of the PCI. Though possible and even probable in the short run, that kind of unofficial coalition obviously offered no long-term solution for Italy's governing problems. Second, a leftist front composed primarily if not exclusively of the PCI and PSI might form a majority government, forcing the DC into opposition. The PCI publicly opposed that governing concept, however, in the belief that it would result in a polarized leftist-antileftist society. Third, a coalition comprising the DC, PCI, and most if not all of the other political parties (excluding the far left and the far right) might be formed as the basis of a new period of government. Such a national government has been advocated by the PCI, as a modification of its original historic compromise, and by some DC leaders.

Considerable opposition existed and was likely to continue to exist in the immediate future to allowing the PCI to share formal governing power. There was still fear among a significant portion of the Italian population that the PCI, once having attained power democratically, might not relinquish it in a like manner should its electoral fortunes fail. Unlike its eventual approval of the opening to the left to include the PSI, the Catholic church remained adamant against extending power to the PCI, as did the right wing of the DC and parties further to the right. Finally Italy's Western allies, which welcomed the cen-

ter-left, continued to oppose the extension of formal power to the PCI. Their opposition could have a very negative effect on Italian foreign relations should the Communists join a future government (see ch. 10).

INFORMAL POLITICS: *CLIENTELA*, *SOTTOGOVERNO*, AND *PARENTELA*

As societies become more developed, interests within them become more specialized. Groups organize to articulate particular interests and to ensure that they are adequately represented within the political system. Furthermore the number of interest groups is usually greater in a fragmented society such as Italy, where similar interests are protected by groups differentiated religiously, culturally, and ideologically. For example, organized labor in Italy is represented by separate Catholic, communist, socialist, and even fascist union confederations. Ideally the state's neutral administrative bureaucracies impartially adjudicate group demands and ensure generally fair group competition.

In reality, of course, state institutions are not neutral. They increasingly tend to develop what has been termed a *clientela* (patronage) situation in which they come to regard a specific group as a major, or even the exclusive, spokesman for a particular interest. It is to that group that institutional bureaucracies go to request expert advice, statistical data and other information, opinions on proposed regulations, and the like. Once established, such a *clientela* situation tends to endure over long periods of time and to cover a broad range of issues. The group that enjoys a special relationship with state institutions has advantages not afforded its competitors.

If institutional bureaucracies are not impartial, the same is even more true of political parties holding governmental power. Ruling parties have the power to influence or even decide the letting of government contracts, filling of government posts, approving of building permits, granting of commercial licenses, and the like. They not infrequently use such power to reward their supporters. The Italians have a term for the phenomenon: *sottogoverno* (subgovernment). In a political system in which official administrative channels are clogged by bureaucratic inefficiency, the unofficial channels of *sottogoverno* frequently provide relatively swift authoritative action. Although the phenomenon of *sottogoverno* is not unique to the Italian political system, the extent to which it is used may well be. Probably more than in any other West European nation, *sottogoverno* has become something of a quasi-political institution in Italy, in large part because a single party has nearly dominated the Italian political system for most of the life of the republic.

When an interest group concentrates its influence not on government institutions but on the political party (or parties) controlling those institutions, the result is what is called a *parentela* (pl., *parentele*), meaning a relationship, originally a relationship of political kindred. In Italy such relationships first developed in the south on the basis of feudal relations between the local landowning family and the surrounding landless peasants. The landowner, or patron, provided for the basic living requirements of the peasants, who in turn paid him deference, worked his land, and with the introduction of electoral political institutions cast their votes as he directed.

Interest groups in contemporary *parentele* attempt to gain influence in and favor from the ruling party, offering financial contributions, significant electoral support, and volunteer campaign workers in return. Interest groups also try to establish their own bloc or faction within the party by voting for deputies and senators sympathetic to their cause. This is made easier by the Italian preferential voting system (see ch. 10).

An authoritative study in 1964 estimated that approximately 3,000 interest groups maintained offices in Rome. Many of the groups were associated, either directly or indirectly, with political parties, the Catholic church, or both. Not all groups were politically active—many concentrated on scientific, cultural, sports, or philanthropic interests. Aside from the Catholic church those politically inclined groups representing certain economic interests were the most powerful and influential.

Economic Groups

Private and Public Corporations

The major private corporations, such as Fiat, are so powerful that they are able to communicate directly with the government and the ruling DC about mutual interests and problems; they do not require the good offices of intermediary interest groups, although their officers frequently are also the leaders of those groups. Political parties often seek influential industrialists to run on their tickets. For example, the managing director of Fiat, Umberto Agnelli, agreed to run for Parliament as an independent on the DC ticket in the 1976 general elections. He was reportedly interested in revitalizing the DC. Some reports also indicated that he felt that cooperation from the PCI should be accepted by the government in order to end the continuing political problems.

Although they are state holding companies, such organizations as the National Hydrocarbons Agency and the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction are also active politically. Both have sought parliamentary support and gained positions of power within the DC. Involved in such fields as banking, communications, transportation, and heavy industry, the various state holding companies have been esti-

mated to control as much as 50 percent of the activity in their economic sectors, thus greatly overshadowing lesser private firms or groups (see ch. 7).

Business and Management Groups

Despite the expenditure of large sums of money and the control of several newspapers, Italian big business has failed to prevent the DC from shifting to the left. It has also failed to build the PLI into a major conservative, business-oriented party that could replace the DC as the major defender of Italian capitalism. An important factor in the business interests' weakness in this regard has been their inability to muster and influence large numbers of voters.

The two major business groups are the Italian Confederation of Small and Medium Industry (*Confederazione Italiana della Piccola e Media Industria—Confapi*) and the General Confederation of Italian Industry (*Confederazione Generale dell' Industria Italiana—Confindustria*). Confapi comprises small businessmen, shopkeepers, and some bankers. Confindustria represents large industrial interests, trade associations, and possibly more small businessmen than Confapi. It is one of the most powerful interest groups in Italy, having established a *clientela* situation with the Ministry of Industry. Confindustria is also very influential within the DC, though not so dominant as to exclude the influence of other industrial groups.

Organized Labor

The major Italian unions were founded by political parties. Thus the unions long existed more as ancillary party organizations than as workers' associations in their own right. This kept the organized labor movements politically divided and numerically weak for some time. In the early 1970s Italy's working population was estimated at 19 million; claimed union membership was approximately 9 million, and numerous observers placed the correct figure closer to 6.5 million.

Organized labor emerged from World War II in the form of the communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (*Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro—CGIL*). In 1948 Catholics, Socialists, and Republicans began leaving CGIL, which retained its communist membership and a small minority of Socialists. In 1950 Catholics, right-wing Socialists, and Republicans formed the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (*Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori—CISL*), left-wing Socialists formed the Italian Union of Labor (*Unione Italiana del Lavoro—UIL*), and Fascists formed the Italian Confederation of National Syndicates for Workers (*Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Nazionale Lavoratori—CISNAL*). CISNAL has remained a small, relatively unimportant organization.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the unions remained moderate in outlook, usually seeking to limit labor-management disputes rather than energetically to pursue working-class interests. Organized labor

became more independent, activist, and political as a result of a number of factors: the end of the cold war and the lessening of suspicions between union confederations founded on differing political ideologies, nearly full employment, and the growing inability of the government to solve economic problems. In 1969 the CGIL and CISL declared that parliamentary and trade union offices could not be held concurrently, a move that severed some of the ties between those confederations and the PCI and DC respectively. Also in 1969 the unions took cooperative strike action in support of a pension bill and reforms in housing and the national health service. By the early 1970s a trend toward the unification of the three major union confederations had begun.

During the 1976 electoral campaign the CGIL and CISL reiterated their position on the incompatibility of political and union offices, threatening that union officials at any level who ran for political office would lose their union posts. The UIL joined the other two large groups in that policy. After the PCI's parliamentary abstentions, which allowed the minority DC *monocolore* government to take office, a number of PCI members who were also midlevel CGIL officers reportedly left the party in protest against the moderation in its policies.

Agricultural Groups

There are numerous interest groups in the agricultural sector of the economy. Most are private organizations with limited influence and memberships. The National Confederation of Small Farmers (Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti—Conacoltivatori), however, is the exception. Though also a private group, Conacoltivatori is extremely large and powerful because of its association with a quasi-public network of marketing organizations that provide discounts on fertilizer, petroleum products, and farm equipment; arrange credit; and even raise prices of agricultural produce through the storage of crops. In return for the preeminence in the agricultural sector provided by its quasi-public links, Conacoltivatori mobilizes a large rural vote for the DC.

Roman Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Church has been an integral part of Italian society—and politics—for hundreds of years. Therefore the Vatican's frequent involvement in politics should be seen as a manifestation of its continuing interest in all aspects of Italian life. The church's interest in Italian political affairs has been very apparent since World War II as it responded to what it perceived to be threats from the left in general and communism in particular.

In 1949 the church excommunicated members and supporters of the PCI. Three years later the Vatican unsuccessfully attempted to pres-

sure the DC into a local electoral alliance with the MSI to prevent the possible election of a PCI mayor in Rome. DC leader De Gasperi maintained his party's independence from Vatican control and refused to accept an alliance with the far right. At the same time the DC, lacking sound local organization, was dependent on the church for mobilizing the electorate. Even after local DC organization improved in the late 1950s, the Vatican's organizational assistance remained important, especially in the south.

The church was a staunch opponent of the opening to the left that the DC wished to extend to the PSI during the late 1950s. Between 1958 and 1961, as more and more DC members grew to support the opening, the church increased its criticisms of Catholic leftists. In 1960 an editorial in the unofficial Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, emphasized the duty of the church to make political judgments and of the faithful to heed them. The editorial stated: "On the political ground, the problems of collaboration with those who do not admit religious principles may arise. In that case, it is up to the ecclesiastical authority, and not to the choice of the individual Catholic, to decide [the issue]. . . . It is the duty of every Catholic to bow to these rulings and these opinions, even in the field of politics."

Some questioned why the church had sanctioned Catholic-socialist cooperation in other West European countries but had continued strongly to oppose it in Italy. It was the church's contention that Catholic party cooperation with socialist parties that had long held power through their own electoral strength was quite a different matter from the Socialists' gaining power solely on the initiative of a governing Catholic party.

As the intransigence of Pope Pius XII gave way to the moderation of Pope John XXIII, the church reversed itself and began supporting the opening to the left. By the mid-1960s, after the PSI had finally joined the government, it appeared that the church was at least partially withdrawing from Italian politics to concentrate on broader humanitarian and spiritual concerns. The prolonged dispute over the divorce law, which lasted from 1965 to 1974, brought the church back into Italian politics, though its intervention proved unsuccessful in nullifying the statute.

The Vatican took a strong anticommunist stand during the 1976 general election campaign. In November 1975 Pope Paul VI rejected the historic compromise inspired by the PCI. He later noted that one could not "be a Christian and a Marxist at the same time." In January 1976 the executive of the Italian Episcopal Conference reportedly condemned not only the PCI but other secular political parties as well, implying that only the DC was worthy of Catholic electoral support. As the election approached, the pope strongly condemned dissident Catholics who agreed to run for office on the PCI ticket. During late May and June the church continually exhorted the elector-

ate not to vote for the Communists. According to an editorial in the official Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore della Domenica*, the election choice could be reduced to that between "liberty and dictatorship."

Regarding the broader issue of the church's official relationship with the Italian state, both the Vatican and the government have expressed interest in renegotiating the 1929 Lateran Pacts. In September 1976 Prime Minister Andreotti reiterated the government's interest in such negotiations.

Together with the Vatican hierarchy there are several church-associated groups that play political roles. The most important by far is Catholic Action, a multifaceted, international lay organization, which runs youth, student, women's, and mass media groups, maintains close union ties, and the like. Catholic Action, having organized on the grass-roots level before the turn of the century, was a major element of the fascist resistance. It strongly supports the DC's conservative right wing and has served as a training ground for leaders of it and other DC persuasions. Catholic Action's civic committees mobilize DC electoral support, supplementing the party's local organization (and substituting for it where it is lacking, as in some southern areas). During the 1976 electoral campaign the civic committees reportedly produced campaign posters that read: "Budapest, Prague—Are You Still Voting Communist?"

Women's Groups

Two of the largest women's interest groups have ties with political parties. The Italian Union of Women is closely but unofficially related to the PCI, though its membership is open to all women regardless of class, ideology, or religion. Its constitution establishes such goals as equal employment opportunities and full participation in cultural, social, and political life for women. The Italian Union of Women has been a leader in campaigns to retain the liberalized divorce law and institute a more liberal abortion statute. Its high-level leadership posts have been filled consistently by PCI members.

The Catholics' Italian Female Center was also founded in 1944; it was intended to counter the influence and popularity of the communist group. The center exists to represent Christian women before public authorities and institutions; defend the interests of the family, women, and children; and restore public morality and social justice. It attempts to underplay its close associations with Catholic Action and the DC.

Women in Politics

In mid-1976 women made up 51 percent of the Italian electorate and were being increasingly courted by the political parties. The PCI

reportedly had 145 women parliamentary candidates in the June general elections; the DC had forty-eight. Many observers believed that women were becoming increasingly receptive to appeals from the political left as they were being politicized. If true this could have important ramifications, for over 60 percent of the centrist DC's electoral support (significantly more than the other major parties) traditionally comes from women.

In July 1976 DC member Tina Anselmi became the first woman to be appointed to an Italian cabinet when she was selected to head the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. She had led Italy's delegation to the United Nations women's conference in Mexico City the year before. Although they have had definite policy differences with Anselmi (the abortion issue being a case in point), the Italian Union of Women, as well as some high-ranking communist labor leaders, welcomed her cabinet appointment.

Student Organizations

The major organized student group is the Italian National University Representative Union, which claims to be nonpolitical and interested primarily in improving higher education. Local-level union chapters are, however, usually dominated by groups representing either Catholics or a combination of the various secular political interests. The MSI-DN also had a university group for some time, but it eventually merged with the fascist secondary school organization and the fascist general youth organization to form a youth front. In the late 1960s Italian students on the political left and right began participating in increasingly violent protest demonstrations against social conditions and injustice, the political and economic situation, and each other.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Membership, Organization, and Finances

Membership in Italian political parties is a much more serious affair than in such countries as the United States, where one usually joins a party by unilateral declaration or by voting habits. The prospective Italian party member must have his or her name proposed and seconded by an active member in good standing. Members must pay dues and support the party line. Most parties have a minimum age requirement of eighteen years, though the MSI-DN accepts youths of fourteen and the PRI and PSDI require members to be twenty-one.

Most Italian parties are organized on a geographic and hierarchical basis and have local or communal units called sections, intermediate federations in the provinces and since 1972 in the regions, and a national unit for the country as a whole. Each unit usually has both an

executive and a representative organ, each representative organ usually electing delegates to the corresponding body in the next higher unit. The DC has a unit below the section called the precinct committee; the PCI's cell and the PSI's nucleus are roughly equivalent except that they are organized in workplaces and schools rather than on a geographic basis. These lowest organizational units, numbering several thousand for each party, exist more on paper than in fact.

Each party has a national congress, to which the lower units elect delegates. A delegate's voting strength at the congress is usually based on the number of dues-paying party members in his constituency. The congress meets annually or every few years. It elects a national or central committee (depending on the particular party), which in turn elects the executive committee. The executive committee, sometimes in concert with the national or central committee below it and sometimes not, again depending on the party, elects the party secretary or president. In parties having both a secretary and a president the latter post is usually honorary. In 1976 the DC national congress began electing the party secretary. The secretary and the executive committee form the top level of the party bureaucracy, which decides policy and generally runs the party.

A study by political scientist Norman Kogan shows that regionalization has had a definite effect on organization and authority in the Italian political parties. The regionalization process was completed in 1972 when regional governmental organs began operating. Soon thereafter all of the parties began organizing complete party apparatuses at that level. According to Kogan, "the fundamental approach of the national authorities, including many political leaders, is to treat the regions as field offices of the national administration, executing orders and policies handed down from Rome." Regionalists, however, see the regions as political entities, which exist to decide policy, not simply to implement it on behalf of a higher authority.

The question of regional versus national authority has become an issue within the political parties, and regional party apparatuses early exhibited definite autonomous tendencies. The PRI has made its regional units responsible for a number of duties formally assumed by the national party apparatus, including for example, the recruitment of new members and the collection of dues. PRI provincial federations are under the supervision of the regional apparatus. One PRI regional leader has expressed the feeling that the party's parliamentary figures should confine themselves to national and international concerns and leave oversight of local and provincial party matters to the regional bodies.

The PSI has kept power in the hands of the national party organs, though PSI regional leaders do not appear content with this state of affairs. One such regional leader reportedly predicted in 1973 that the national party leaders would in the future make important decisions.

even including whether the party would join a national coalition, only after consultation with regional party authorities.

The situation within the DC was mixed, some regional party apparatuses having more autonomy than others. The divisive effects of DC factionalism appeared muted at the regional level, where factional leaders seemed reluctant to attempt to use the regions as power bases in the party's ongoing internecine warfare at the national level. Some regional leaders who were members of factions avoided their own and other factions in attempting to gain partywide support for regional autonomy. Other regional factions have contributed in a sense to regional autonomy, as they have on occasion deviated from the policy lines of their national factions.

The PCI has thus far established the regional party organization as the administrative link between national and provincial organs. To improve national party input from and output to the regions, a number of regional secretaries have been placed within the national bureaucracy. Yet despite the centralization and control there has been at least one case of regional deviation from a national party line. One observer, a DC member, reportedly has suggested that growing regional autonomy could eventually threaten the PCI's process of democratic centralism, whereby policy decisions were made in secret, the exclusive purview of top national party leaders, and not open to question by subordinate leaders.

Party finances and particularly sources of funding are kept secret. Members' dues provide some of the financial support. Other sources are profits from party-owned producers' and consumers' cooperatives, party taxes on the salaries of their parliamentary senators and deputies (50 percent in the case of the PCI), charges placed on party-sponsored gatherings, and contributions. Contributions come not only from idealistic party members but also from those who have benefited (or hope to benefit) from the process of *sottogoverno*. *Sottogoverno* is not limited to national government, and thus parties that govern at subnational levels participate significantly in the process.

The subject of party subsidies from foreign governments periodically becomes a campaign issue. In January and February 1976 the *New York Times* and other newspapers (both American and Italian) alleged that the United States had funded anticommunist parties, particularly the DC, from 1948 to 1973 and perhaps later. American corporations including Lockheed and Exxon have admitted making payments to parties or party leaders. Such revelations appear to have had little impact on Italian domestic policies, however. More important before the 1976 general elections was the question of the PCI's funding. The PCI has claimed to be independent of the Soviet Union for several years; yet observers have questioned whether it might still be receiving funds from the Soviet government and other East European countries. The PCI has denied such financial ties; yet leaders of the CISL

claimed in early 1976 that the Communists were still receiving at least indirect monetary aid from Eastern Europe, allegedly in the form of commissions paid to the PCI for arranging commercial agreements between Italian companies and East European countries.

Factionalism

Of paramount importance in understanding the Italian parties is a realization that they are not monolithic organizations. They are instead collections of factions, called *correnti* (currents) in Italian politics. *Correnti* are usually led by one or two individuals who enjoy personal power bases in provinces or large cities. Not static, the *correnti* continually rise, combine, and fall depending on the evolution of issues and on their leaders' popularity within the party. Factionalism is most evident within the party parliamentary groups. It extends down to provincial party federations and even to local sections.

All parties experience factionalism to some degree, and it has affected the three largest parties differently. The DC has become a confederation of many competing factions, some of which at times have more in common with neighboring parties at their end of the political spectrum than with other factions within their own party at the opposite end. The numerous *correnti* and differences over basic policy have not infrequently prevented the DC, and thus the DC-controlled governments, from providing strong, decisive leadership in the formulation and implementation of national policy. The PCI has maintained at least the outward appearance of unity by expelling particularly radical or divisive *correnti*. What one scholar has termed "significant tendencies" remain in the party, even if they are not as organized as the *correnti* in other parties. The PSI has been unable to deal effectively with factionalism and has consequently experienced a history of division, reunification, and division again.

Major Parties

Although it has received more votes than any other party in each of Italy's general elections, the DC's legislative plurality has continually been eroded since the first elections in the new republic were held in 1948. The PCI, always the second strongest electoral party, has consistently increased its votes until, in 1976, it came within approximately 5 percent of the DC in the popular vote. Unable to unite effectively, the PSI and PSDI seemed destined to keep the socialist vote fragmented and thus mute the power of Italy's third potential major political force.

Christian Democratic Party

The Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC) developed from the broader Christian Democratic movement,

undertaken to preserve the spiritual values of Christianity and the interests of the Catholic church in European countries that had experienced historical conflict between church and state. The DC was created in 1943, the descendant of the prefascist Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano)(see ch. 2). Because of the church's protection of the older party's cadre during the regime of Benito Mussolini and because of the DC's reliance on Catholic Action for local political organization, the DC's independence from the church was in question into the 1950s. Its first leader, De Gasperi, succeeded in establishing and maintaining that independence, though the Vatican's influence remains strong, particularly within the party's right wing.

The DC claimed a membership of more than 1.5 million in 1976, but like other Italian parties it may well inflate its membership figures. It was particularly strong in the northeast, the rural northwest, the area surrounding Rome, and the south. In 1970 the DC's electorate was composed primarily of housewives and those in middle-class occupations (see table 6). More than 60 percent of the party's vote came from women.

The basic issue on which all DC factions agreed until the late 1960s was anticommunism. Rather than champion a comprehensive ideology the DC concentrated on an image as a moderate governing party. Domestically its left wing has favored state centralized economic planning and state intervention to promote social justice; the politics of the right wing were based on near classic laissez-faire economics. In foreign policy the DC has generally been an enthusiastic supporter of NATO and West European integration.

Table 6. Party Electoral Strength by Occupational Class, 1970
(in percent)

Party*	Upper Class (professional and management)	Middle Class (white collar and artisans)	Working Class	Housewives	Other
DC	2	29	13	40	16
PCI	1	17	38	27	17
PSI	3	27	31	25	14
PSDI (PSU) ..	4	33	24	27	12
PRI	3	42	9	33	13
PLI	6	31	10	37	16
MSI-DN	3	38	24	4	31

*DC (Democrazia Cristiana) Christian Democracy or Christian Democratic Party; PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano) Italian Communist Party; PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano) Italian Socialist Party; PSDI (PSU) (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano) Italian Social Democratic Party—known as PSU (Partito Socialista Unitario), Unitary Socialist Party, between 1969 and 1974; PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano) Italian Republican Party; PLI (Partito Liberale Italiano) Italian Liberal Party; and MSI-DN (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale) Italian Socialist Movement-National Right.

Source: Based on information from Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, New Haven, 1970, pp. 332-335.

During the 1950s and early 1960s two basic factions struggled for control within the DC. The left-wing Morotei favored the opening to the left; the moderate right-wing Dorotei was less enthusiastic about the concept and strongly opposed such specific aspects of the final DC-PSI agreement as the nationalization of electricity.

In 1973 six organized factions were operating within the DC. Three were on the left: the Basic Left (*Sinistra di Base*), led by Ciriaco De Mita; the New Forces (*Forze Nuove*), led by Carlo Donat Cattin; and the Morotei, led by Aldo Moro. In the center were the Popular Initiative (*Iniziativa Popolare*), led by Mariano Rumor, Flaminio Piccoli, and Paolo Emilio Taviani; the Democratic Pledge (*Impegno Democratico*), led by Andreotti and Emilio Colombo; and the New Chronicles (*Nuove Cronache*), led by Amintore Fanfani and Arnaldo Forlani. A right-wing faction, the Free Forces (*Forze Libere*), headed by Oscar Luigi Scalfaro and Franco Restivo, had been dissolved the previous year. The Popular Initiative and the Democratic Pledge resulted from the division of the Dorotei.

The dichotomy that has existed within the DC over the Communists' historic compromise was exemplified in the March 1976 election for party secretary. The incumbent, Benigno Zaccagnini, believed in the politics of consensus. Although he did not favor a coalition that would formally include the PCI, he did feel that the government should consult with the Communists and request their support on specific measures. One of Zaccagnini's strongest supporters, Moro, was prime minister until July. Zaccagnini's opponent for the party secretaryship was Forlani, the defense minister at the time. Forlani was supported by Fanfani, whom Zaccagnini replaced as party secretary in 1975. Rather than strive for a multiparty consensus, Forlani believed the DC should develop its own distinctive policies and not treat with the PCI in the process. He was quite suspicious of the PCI's motives and good faith. The 1976 contest was the first to be decided by the whole party congress rather than by the national committee. Zaccagnini won reelection by the narrow margin of 52 to 48 percent of the congress' vote. Another significant anticommunist DC group was that within the Milan party organization, led by Massimo de Carolis. Should their strength within the national party grow, such groups could pose a threat to the postelection cooperative relationship between the DC and PCI.

Italian Communist Party

The Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*—PCI) was created when left-wing Socialists broke away from the PSI in 1921. Its traditional strength has been in the so-called Red Belt, which comprises the north-central regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria. By mid-1976 the PCI either alone or in concert with other parties governed six of Italy's twenty regions, more than forty of its

ninety-four provinces, and all major northern cities, including Rome, Milan, Turin, Florence, and Venice, as well as Naples in the southwest. The largest Western communist party, the PCI claimed a membership of 1.7 million. Most of its support into the 1960s was limited to the industrial working class. Since that time it has openly sought support from what it terms the productive middle class: technicians, white-collar workers, and even small industrialists (whose operations are relatively insignificant compared with those of the larger Italian corporations). Although its class appeal had been broadened, the PCI still received a higher percentage of its electoral support in 1976 from the working class than did any other party.

A member of the Third International (also known as the Communist International—Comintern), the PCI was under considerable Soviet influence until after World War II. The influence was manifested primarily in the PCI's consistent acceptance of the Soviet interpretation of international affairs. The party opposed Italian receipt of Marshall Plan assistance, the creation of NATO, and United States involvement in the Korean War. In 1956 the PCI supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary. At the same time the PCI pursued domestic policies with relative independence.

Not long after its creation the PCI became a mass party representing the Italian working class, shunning the Marxist-Leninist concept of a communist party's role as one of an elitist vanguard of militants removed from the masses. The party's alliance with the working class developed not as an abstract intellectual concept but as the result of a clear analysis of Italy's culture and specific history, coupled with early attempts to organize factory workers. Thus the party was not a group of intellectual revolutionaries isolated from the mainstream of Italian society but rather the representative of a major element of that mainstream.

The PCI participated in national governments until 1947 and in local governments thereafter. Over time it became more closely associated with moderate reformist politics than with revolutionary dogma. Togliatti's enunciation of the concept of polycentrism in 1956 led to the party's eventual independence from the Soviet Union in international policy.

In 1968 the Italian Communists strongly denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By 1974 the PCI had reversed its original policy stand on NATO and had come to accept Italian membership in that organization, reasoning that so long as much of the world was polarized into East-West blocs, unilateral dismantlement of the security system of one bloc would upset the equilibrium. The PCI believed the blocs would exist until they could be mutually phased out.

Having recognized its beneficial impact on the Italian economy, the PCI no longer opposed the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market). It continues to oppose the capi-

talistic interests within the EEC but has apparently become convinced, in large part by the CGIL, that such opposition can be more effectively carried out from within the structure of the European Communities (EC). It supports not the supranational organization envisioned by some West European integrationists but a looser form of economic integration. An economically integrated Europe (not limited to Western nations) could, the PCI feels, end the need for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A unified left, led by the various national communist parties, could ensure that an economically integrated Europe would be free from United States so-called domination but at the same time remain neutral between the United States and the Soviet Union.

By the mid-1970s the PCI had become the leader of so-called Eurocommunism, a kind of umbrella communist movement within which could be found the different national forms of communism of the West European countries. The right of each national communist party to make its own policies—domestic and foreign—without Soviet interference was stressed by PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer at the Soviet Party Congress in February 1976 and at the European Communist Conference in East Berlin in June. For Italy at least, according to Berlinguer, such independence meant that "the historic missions of the working class . . . should be fulfilled only within a pluralistic and democratic society."

Much was heard of the PCI's concept of historic compromise in the months that preceded the 1976 general elections. The concept was developed as a result of the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende's Marxist regime in Chile. According to the PCI that event showed the futility of a Western leftist party's attempting to govern without a strong majority of public support. Where the majority was close, the population would be polarized; instability, foreign intervention, and civil war could result. Italy was a country where, because of the strength of the DC, a leftist government (even a PCI-PSI coalition) could not hope to win a large majority. Because no ideological force could succeed alone and because the DC-dominated center-left and center-right governments had proved incapable of providing strong, positive leadership, an alternative had to be found. That alternative was a coalition government comprising the democratic popular forces and "based on the broadest popular consensus within a highly developed pluralistic system protected by democratic guarantees." For Italy, according to the Communists, that meant a coalition of the DC, PCI, and PSI.

The PCI modified the historic compromise concept before the June election. Apparently believing the tripartite coalition premature and because of what it believed to be a political crisis best attacked with a broader consensus, the PCI called for a government of national unity.

which would include all parties except the far-left electoral front and the MSI-DN.

The steadily increasing PCI vote, coupled with some sporadic survey data, indicated by mid-1976 that a growing number of Italians believed that the PCI posed no threat to Italy's democratic institutions—indeed that the PCI might have a positive, constructive role to play in Italian government. Yet even the party's leaders admitted that some of its strong electoral showing was based on a protest vote against the DC, the party that had dominated the political scene for so long. Furthermore there were a significant number of skeptics in Italy and elsewhere in the West who were genuinely concerned about the PCI's sincerity. Serious questions have been raised about the PCI's finances and whether the party was truly independent from the Soviet Union, whether its new policies on NATO and the historic compromise were not simply ploys to be used to gain power, and whether despite specific pledges by PCI leaders the party would freely relinquish power once it was attained. Doubters pointed out that there were no precedents for Communists' democratically relinquishing power. They questioned whether a party that practiced democratic centralism in its decisionmaking process was the party to guarantee democratic institutions in Italy. There was also the concern that, even if present PCI leaders were sincere, a change in communist leadership after the party took office could have dire effects on the democratic aspects of the Italian political system.

Supporters of the new, moderate PCI retorted that the party was unique—based on Italian history, culture, and society; past experiences with other communist parties established no precedent because they were inapplicable to the Italian case. Democratic centralism, they argued, was actually a positive attribute that eliminated much of the factionalism that paralyzed other Italian parties. Sergio Segre, head of the PCI's International Department, has argued that the party's credibility has been established through its consistency: its choice of democratic methods in 1946 and its consistent support for them since; its consistent willingness to work with other parties and to encourage collaboration among them (particularly at the local level); its consistent expression of the idea of a separate, independent Italian socialism; and its consistent elaboration and defense of its own policies over several years.

Considerable dissension has been caused within the party by moderation of PCI policies, including support for the mixed economy, opposition to further major nationalization, and acceptance of NATO; an increasing emphasis on general reformist and consensus politics; and indirect parliamentary support (through abstentions on crucial legislative votes) for the DC government that took office in August 1976. By the fall of 1976 militants were beginning to feel that the party leadership was weak or, worse, revisionist. The dissension was signif-

icant enough for the leadership to call a series of meetings with the party rank and file in September and October in an attempt to pacify the militants by demanding that the DC convert its programs into specific actions lest it face renewed PCI opposition. Similar dissension among the PCI leadership occurred in an October central committee meeting in which party president Luigi Longo attacked secretary Berlinguer's tacit support of the DC government's austerity program. The fact that the disagreement was openly reported in the PCI newspaper, *L'Unità*, may indicate a decreasing reliance on democratic centralism as the basis for party decisionmaking.

In 1970 the Manifesto Group of rebel leftists was expelled from the PCI. The group had charged that the party was both insufficiently revolutionary and too subservient to the Soviet Union. In the early 1970s there were four basic but unorganized factions within the PCI. The leftists, led by Pietro Ingrao, have rejected reformist politics as being not Marxist but social democratic in inspiration. They have opposed the PCI's collaboration with other parties, especially the PSI. The rightists, led by Giorgio Amendola, were very much afraid a successful center-left coalition of DC and PSI would isolate the PCI. They supported collaboration with the PSI to forestall such isolation. The rightists believed limited social reforms should be pursued, though not necessarily to the exclusion of the goal of fundamentally changing society, long the espoused aim of all communist parties. Berlinguer headed a third, moderate group, which attempted to encompass the other two but whose policies seemed more reflective of the rightists. Finally there was a small, hard-line, pro-Soviet group. It was headed by Tulio Veccheitti, who had consistently supported the Soviet Union's policies, including its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and criticized West European economic integration. By mid-1976 division between the groups appeared less pronounced. Leftist Ingrao was selected by the PCI to be president of the Chamber of Deputies in July. None of the groups seemed likely to follow the Manifesto Group into forced exile from the PCI.

Socialist Parties

The Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI) was formed in 1892 and has been subject to constant divisions and schisms, based primarily on the question whether the party should be revolutionary and attempt to overthrow the existing system or be evolutionary and attempt to reform the system from within (see fig. 15). In the 1940s and early 1950s the basic issue became how closely the PSI should work with the PCI. Nenni was the leader of the comparatively revolutionary, fusionist PSI Socialists who favored close association with the PCI; Saragat headed the autonomous reformists who became the Social Democrats and who joined several DC-dominated governments long before serious thought was being given to an opening to the left.




Figure 15. Major Socialist Party Schisms, 1892-1975

In the mid-1950s, particularly after the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, Nenni began moving the PSI away from the PCI and moderating its revolutionary dogmatism. By the late 1950s he championed the cause of DC-PSI coalition, an idea he had first broached years before. Such a coalition (together with some minor parties) was formed in 1963 and continued to be the basis of government well into the 1970s. Opposed to the PSI's moderation, left-wingers dissociated from the party in 1964 to establish a new group with the old name Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria—PSIUP). The new party lasted until 1972 when, in the absence of electoral support, it was absorbed by the PCI. In 1966 the PSI and the Italian Social Democratic Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano—PSDI) formed the United Socialist Party, only to divide again in 1969. The Socialists went back to the name PSI; the Social Democrats took the old name Unitary Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Unitario—PSU) but reverted to PSDI in 1974.

Before joining the 1963 government the PSI accepted Italian membership in NATO. The PSI also had advocated nationalization and centralized state economic planning and had supported regionalization long before it was completed as provided for in the Constitution. The PSI suffered from its identification with the DC in the late 1960s and the 1970s as part of the electorate became impatient with what it perceived as the inadequate government provided by the Christian Democrats and their center-left allies after 1963. Long caught between the DC and the PCI, the Socialists opposed the historic compromise, fearing that their party, as the obvious subordinate partner in a DC-PCI-PSI coalition, would have no real influence. The PSI instead supported a so-called left-wing alternative, a coalition of PCI, PSI, and minor leftist parties. Proponents of the idea saw the PSI as the party around which the lesser parties would coalesce and together could balance the PCI's strength and share government with it. At the same time the left-wing alternative could implement socialist reforms that a government that included conservative DC membership would be reluctant to pursue. The PCI opposed the left-wing alternative on the grounds that it would polarize the population into leftist and antileftist groups.

Nenni withdrew from active leadership of the PSI after the PSDI split from the United Socialist Party in 1969. The leadership went to Francesco De Martino, who resigned after the PSI's poor showing in the 1976 general elections. He was replaced by Bettino Craxi. Ricardo Lombardi headed a strong left-wing faction. Although it has been opposed to the PSI's participation in center-left governments, the Lombardi faction has seemed little disposed toward leaving the party.

The PSDI has consistently supported NATO and close Italian ties with the United States. It has also supported West European integra-

tion. Domestically the PSDI favored state intervention in the economic sector as a pragmatic means of managing the economy, not as an ideological end in itself. The party has been an advocate, in short, of welfare state reformism. After leaving the leadership position for a few years, Saragat returned to the post of party secretary in 1976, succeeding Mario Tanassi, who was allegedly implicated in the Lockheed scandal.

Minor Parties

In mid-1976 the minor Italian national parties included, from left to right on the political spectrum, Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria), the Radical Party, the Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano—PRI), the Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano—PLI), and the Italian Social Movement-National Right (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale—MSI-DN). There were also several regional parties, of which only the South Tyrolean Popular Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei—SVP) was significant. Since its creation in 1948 three of the SVP's members have been elected to the Chamber of Deputies in each set of general elections, including those held in 1976.

Proletarian Democracy

Proletarian Democracy was a far-left electoral front comprising three small parties: Avant-garde Operations, the Democratic Proletarian Unity Party for Communism, and Continuous Struggle (Lotta Continua). The Democratic Proletarian Unity Party for Communism, formed in 1974 by a combination of the Manifesto Group and the Democratic Proletarian Unity Party (left-wingers from the 1964 PSIUP), was the largest; it claimed a membership of 15,000.

Among other demands Proletarian Democracy wanted immediate Italian withdrawal from NATO, the conversion of defense spending into funding for economic development, state control of multinational corporation investments in Italy, and full employment as Italy's primary domestic policy goal. Allegations have been made that all three of the far-left electoral front's members had been involved either directly or indirectly in acts of violence that occurred during the 1976 election campaign. In the June elections the front won six seats in the Chamber of Deputies but none in the Senate.

Radical Party

The Radical Party split from the PLI in the early 1950s in opposition to what its members believed to be the Liberals' increasing subservience to big business. The name Radical is from the classic European tradition and does not reflect anything approaching a contemporary, antisystem definition. The Italian Radicals have, instead, been likened to American Progressives or New Deal Liberals. Because the

Radical Party lacked funds, its members used picketing, sit-ins, and hunger strikes to publicize their political positions. Although some estimates in late 1975 placed its membership at fewer than 5,000, the Radical Party has been in the forefront of civil rights drives since its creation. It strongly supported the passage of the liberalized divorce bill and opposed the attempts to repeal it. It also supported liberalization of Italy's abortion law. Anticlerical and stressing the necessity of the separation of church and state, the Radicals have fought for the abrogation of the Lateran Pacts. The Radical Party has also staged demonstrations for free speech, the elimination of military tribunals, and the elimination of the NATO air force base on Sardinia.

In late 1975 some within the Radical Party suggested the possibility of eventually forming a federation with the PSI in an effort to rejuvenate the latter. Many moderates see a strengthened PSI as the only party that could prevent future PCI domination. Formal Radical Party-PSI ties had yet to be established in the fall of 1976. In the general elections earlier in the year the Radicals won four seats in the Chamber of Deputies but none in the Senate.

Italian Republican Party

The Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano—PRI) traces its philosophical heritage to the nineteenth-century Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini. The PRI is one of the two important parties of the secular tradition as distinct from the more blatant communist or socialist anticlerical tradition in Italy. Based on nineteenth century liberalism, secularism advocates limiting church political and social involvement especially in education and is important in contemporary Italian politics as witness the divorce and abortion liberalization issues. Never intended to be a mass party, the PRI is a group of elitists that attempts to prod the government into taking positive action. It was a member of government coalitions in the late 1940s and early 1950s and again fairly consistently from 1962 to 1974. A knowledgeable observer, John Earle, has described the PRI as "the most Italian of parties, wanting a mixture of liberal democracy without liberalism, enlightened socialism without Marx, change without disruption, realistic policies without loss of idealism." Other have likened the PRI to the liberal Eastern wing of the American Republican Party.

The PRI has gone on record as opposing the so-called left-wing alternative but is apparently not against a coalition based on the historic compromise, assuming the DC and PSI could reach some agreement on the matter. For its part the PRI has set Italy's continued adherence to its Western military alliances and democratic political traditions as a precondition for PRI participation in any future government. The small factions that existed did not appear to pose a threat to the established leadership in mid-1976. Oddo Biasini was the par-

ty's secretary, and Ugo La Malfa, the PRI leader for the previous twenty-five years, was its president.

Italian Liberal Party

The Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano—PLI) is in fact a conservative party, which shares the secular tradition with the more moderate PRI. The name Liberal is used in the historical sense to designate an advocacy of classic laissez-faire economics. The party has opposed socialism, the welfare state, state centralized economic planning and regulation, nationalization, and any curb on private profit-making. It has been the champion of private enterprise against state competition from public and quasi-public corporations. Originally a spokesman for Confindustria, the PLI represents merchants and small to medium-sized business interests.

Two leftist factions, Renewal and Liberal Presence, existed in 1975. Neither apparently posed a threat to the party's unity, however, or to the control of its leader, Valerio Zanone, the successor to the long-time secretary, Giovanni Malagodi.

Italian Social Movement-National Right

The Italian social Movement-National Right (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale—MSI-DN) is the far-right, fascist political party. It was formed clandestinely during the 1940s by unimportant former fascist officials of Mussolini's government. Although it is usually described as neofascist, the party's older members do not use the term and openly recall their direct links to the old fascist regime. The cold war situation in the late 1940s allowed the MSI to become public and run candidates beginning in the 1948 general elections. The party absorbed the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchist Unity (Partito Democratico Italiano di Unità Monarchica—PDIUM, the result of the combination of the National Monarchist Party and the Popular Monarchist Party in the early 1960s) to become, formally, the MSI-DN in 1973. A year earlier the two groups had formed an electoral alliance of the same name.

The merger of the MSI and the monarchists gave at least superficial support to the party's claim that it represents not fascism but broader far-right interests (which has prevented it from being prosecuted under an Italian law prohibiting the formation of fascist parties). The MSI-DN, under the leadership of Giorgio Almirante, claims to be a better Catholic party and a stronger opponent of communism than the DC. Its main locus of support is Rome, where numerous retired government workers of the fascist era reside, but it also has notable strength in Sicily. The surprising electoral strength it showed in 1972 had been significantly eroded by 1976. Despite its denials the MSI-DN has frequently been linked in the Italian press to fascist gangs that have engaged in acts of violence.

Antisystem Extremist Groups

Extremist antisystem groups proliferated in Italy in the early 1970s. Leftist groups espouse ideological rhetoric and occasionally focus attention on NATO bases or multinational corporation offices. For the most part, however, the role of both leftist and rightist groups is simply to contribute to instability in Italy by beating, kidnapping, and bombing their opponents.

Sixty or more extreme leftist groups were estimated to exist in mid-1976. They included revolutionary Maoists, Trotskyites, and anarchists; most condemned the PCI for what they perceived as its revisionism. Some of the better known groups were the New Partisans, Red Brigades, Worker's Power, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Italy, Union of Marxist-Leninist Italian Communists, Partisan Action Groups, and Armed Proletarian Nuclei.

Equally well known rightist groups included the National Avant-garde, National Front, European Civilization, Black Order, New Order, Compass Card, and Mussolini Action Squad. One of the newer groups, the Italian Tri-Color Army, declared war against the Red Brigades in early June 1976. It also pledged to prevent the June general elections from taking place.

The confusion surrounding the irrational acts of political violence was such that, when the chief public prosecutor of Genoa was assassinated (for motives that were not immediately clear) just before the June 1976 elections, two leftist groups (New Partisans and Red Brigades) and one rightist group (National Avant-garde) all reportedly claimed responsibility. The increasing political violence led the government to pass new legislation and increase police attempts to locate and eliminate the involved groups (see ch. 12).

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Numerous excellent political and general histories covering postwar Italian politics exist. Some of them are Giuseppe Mammarella's *Italy after Fascism: A Political History, 1943-1965*; Norman Kogan's *A Political History of Postwar Italy*; Muriel Grindrod's *Italy*; and John Earle's *Italy in the 1970s*. Some of the better works published in the early and mid-1970s about Italian political parties are Earle's book *The Government of Republican Italy*, by John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile; Peter Allum's "Italy," in *European Political Parties, A Handbook*, edited by Stanley Henig; and Neil McInnes' *The Communist Parties of Western Europe*. Joseph La Palombara's *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* is probably the most authoritative and complete work on the subject. Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi provide survey data on Italian political participation in *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*. Three works of special note are Kogan's "Im-

pact of the New Italian Regional Governments on the Structure of Power Within the Parties" in *Comparative Politics*; Sergio Segre's "The 'Communist Question' in Italy" in *Foreign Affairs*; and Martin Clark, David Hine, and R.E.M. Irving's "Divorce—Italian Style" in *Parliamentary Affairs*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

CHAPTER 12

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

The armed forces in 1976 comprised four services: army, navy, air force, and Carabinieri. The army, navy, and air force are conventional forces committed to the defense of the homeland and the roles assigned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Italy is a charter member. The Carabinieri is actually a national police force but in effect is a small, self-contained army that is equipped, trained, and organized as a military force and would revert to military control during time of war.

The bulk of the armed forces, excluding the Carabinieri, have been assigned NATO roles since 1949 when the alliance was founded. Italy in the mid-1970s had become an important NATO base and a key element in the defense of Western Europe's southern flank. There is a primary NATO headquarters at Naples that commands all three services in that part of Europe. The major subordinate headquarters are located at Verona for ground forces and at Naples for naval and air forces. The United States Sixth Fleet has its home port at Gaeta, about fifty miles north of Naples. Most of the Italian army having a NATO role is deployed in the northern part of the country where it guards mountain passes and invasion routes. Most naval and air bases are located in the south and on the islands, where they maintain open sea and air routes in the Mediterranean Sea and conduct antisubmarine surveillance.

The centralized police system was under the operational control of the Ministry of the Interior. It included the Carabinieri and two other armed, paramilitary organizations: The Public Security Police (Pubblica Sicurezza—PS) and the Customs Police (Guardia di Finanza). The PS was a basic law enforcement organization; the Customs Police handled such cases as tax evasion, smuggling, and counterfeiting. The Urban Police, located in the cities and towns, were subordinate to the PS and were generally concerned with routine police functions, such as traffic control, licensing, and inspections. The Urban Police did not have investigative duties, which were the responsibility of the PS.

In 1975 and 1976 internal security authorities were concerned with the increase in political terrorism and the violence that accompanied it as well as with other kinds of crime. Police were criticized for being

too easy on right-wing demonstrators; reacting to criticism from politicians, they demonstrated to protest restraints on their use of firearms and their low wages. A cumbersome, slow-moving, and anachronistic court system eroded respect for authority, as did rumors of partiality and corruption on the part of police and judicial officials.

ARMED FORCES

Historical Background

Some units of the armed forces of Italy trace their beginnings to the armies raised by Napoleon Bonaparte from among the citizens of his Italian domains. Napoleon established the Kingdom of Italy in 1805 and named himself king; but there had been no Italy as such before his conquests, and the troops he conscripted referred to themselves as Piedmontese, Sicilian, Neapolitan, or any number of designations pertaining to the myriad of states—republics, kingdoms, and duchies—that occupied the geographic area known as Italy. Men from all regions of Italy were trained at the military academy founded by Napoleon at Modena. During the Napoleonic campaigns these “Italians” from all regions fought side by side under the green, white, and red banner that became the flag of a united Italy in 1861. After the defeat of Napoleon, Austrian Habsburgs and Spanish Bourbons returned to resume their control of large areas, and the pope again became temporal ruler of another large area, the Papal States. Italy was divided once more, and much of it was under foreign domination; but during the Napoleonic era peoples from very disparate regions had learned of characteristics—cultural and linguistic—that they shared in common.

Among the Italian rulers restored to power after the defeat of Napoleon was the king of Sardinia of the House of Savoy. Actually the title is misleading because the most important part of the kingdom and the base of power for the king of Sardinia was Piedmont, which in addition to the present-day regions of Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, and Liguria included Savoy and Nice (ceded to France in 1860). The traditions of several Italian military units date back to the Piedmont of the 1830s, where the Piedmontese army was taking on a nationalistic flavor and attracting young men from other regions to serve in its ranks as volunteers. Charles Albert, a vacillating king, led the army to severe defeats at the hands of Austrians in 1848 and 1849, but Piedmont survived and became the nucleus for a unified Italy.

When unification was finally achieved in 1861, the core of the new nation’s armed forces was the Piedmontese army. National leaders called that army “the great school of the people” and viewed military service as an opportunity to provide young men from the different regions with a common experience and an opportunity to combat illiteracy and backwardness.

The Piedmontese army and navy became nuclei for national forces after unification, and both became important in the late nineteenth century as Italy belatedly entered the European race for colonies. The first major commitment of Italian land and naval forces came early in the twentieth century when Italy challenged Turkey for control of Tripolitania and Cyrenacia, Turkish dominions in North Africa. It was during this war (the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12) that the fledgling Italian air force first saw combat service. The Italian forces prevailed against the Turks in North Africa but at a heavy cost, leaving them ill prepared for their entry into World War I.

In 1915, despite strong neutralist sentiments, Italy's leaders entered World War I in pursuit of irredentist ambitions to annex parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Bolzano, Trento, Udine, the port of Trieste, the Istrian Peninsula, and much of the Dalmatian coast. Benito Mussolini, then a socialist leader, was one of those advocating war against Austria, causing his expulsion from the socialist party. Italy mobilized 5 million men but lacked the industrial base to arm and equip such a force, which subsequently sustained huge losses—650,000 killed and 1.7 million disabled.

In 1919 Mussolini started the fascist movement. Three years later he had become powerful enough to be called by King Victor Emmanuel III to become prime minister, and by 1925 he had become dictator of a totalitarian regime. Italy was a poor country, without natural resources or industrial capacity; nevertheless Mussolini, seemingly taken in by his own rhetoric and bombast, initiated grandiose military adventures that eventually contributed to World War II, which for the Italians was one great military debacle. The alliance with Nazi Germany, arranged by Hitler and Mussolini in April 1939, made militarily weak Italy little more than a German satellite. Hitler failed to inform his friend and ally that he was negotiating for a pact with the Soviet Union that would clear the way for a German attack on Poland. The Nazi-Soviet pact signed on August 23, 1939, led to the German invasion of Poland nine days later. France and Great Britain fulfilled their commitments to Poland and retaliated, and World War II was under way. Italy was woefully ill prepared for war, and Mussolini managed to keep the country out of the conflict until the summer of 1940, when he assumed that France and Great Britain were no longer capable of continued operations. Mussolini's first move was to send an invasion force into France, which was almost prostrate from German battering, but somehow the French rallied and fought the Italian invasion force to a standstill. From that ignominious beginning things got worse, and for the Italian armed forces World War II was a series of military disasters.

After the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 Victor Emmanuel III ordered the arrest of Mussolini and the formation of a nonfascist government. The new government arranged for an armistice, which

went into effect on September 8, but by that time the Germans had become well entrenched on the peninsula; they were not defeated there until April 1945. The war brought widespread destruction to the country and intense suffering to the people. Despite the fact that Italian units switched over in the middle of the war and fought against the Germans as cobelligerents with the Allies, Italy was treated as a vanquished nation by the victors when the Italian Peace Treaty was signed in 1947. The treaty limited the size of the Italian armed forces and divided part of the Italian fleet among some of the victors.

The limitations on Italian military strength imposed by the peace treaty were made moot in early 1949 when Italy joined nine other West European nations plus the United States and Canada in signing the pact that created NATO. In committing itself to the new alliance Italy pledged to expand its army to twelve divisions and to rebuild its air force and navy over the ensuing four years. As a NATO partner Italy received assistance from the United States in rebuilding war-damaged military installations, and in 1950 the two countries signed a bilateral military assistance agreement whereby Italy received about US\$2.3 billion in military aid over the next twenty years.

Organization

According to Article 87 of the 1948 Constitution the president of the republic "commands the Armed Forces, presides over the Supreme Defense Council as constituted by law, and declares a state of war when it has been decided by Parliament." In practice the president delegates administrative control of the armed forces to the minister of defense and operational control to the country's top military officer, the chief of the Defense General Staff. National defense policy is established by the Supreme Defense Council, whose meetings are chaired by the president. The regular members of the council include the prime minister, who is the vice chairman; the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, industry, the interior, and the treasury; and the chief of the Defense General Staff. The council is required by law to meet at least twice each year, and its meetings are held in secret. At the discretion of the president other members of the government or outside technical experts may be invited to meetings of the council to serve as advisers or consultants.

The key decisionmaking body within the armed forces in the mid-1970s was the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff, which consisted of the chief of the Defense General Staff, its chairman and dominant member; the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force; and the secretary general of defense, a high-ranking military officer within the Ministry of Defense who handled scientific and technical matters common to the three services. The chief of the Defense General Staff determined what scientific research and development pro-

grams would be undertaken, was charged with liaison with NATO and the military of Allied nations, was consulted on important military assignments, and supervised the Defense Intelligence Service (Servizio Informazioni Difesa—SID).

Army

At the beginning of the 1975 active army strength was 306,500, of which about 83 percent consisted of twelve-month conscripts. Backing up the active army was a reserve force that numbered about 550,000 officers and men. Army strength is to be reduced by about 35 percent over a ten-year period according to a modernization plan announced in 1975. In addition to reducing personnel strength the army's ten-year program calls for a general reorganization of combat units, a streamlining of support units, increased mobility, and the phasing out of obsolete weapons and equipment. Although tanks and artillery pieces will not be replaced item for item, more modern weapons will partially compensate for decreased numbers.

The army's major units were five infantry divisions and two armored divisions. Other combat units included five Alpine brigades, four independent infantry brigades, a missile brigade, an armored cavalry brigade, an airborne brigade, and an amphibious regiment. The army has its own light aviation, including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Many of the units of the modern army carry the names and *continue the traditions of nineteenth-century elite military organizations*. Under the ten-year reorganization program the army will increase its armored divisions from two to four, but the five infantry divisions will be disbanded to be replaced by a number of more mobile brigades.

Most combat units have NATO assignments and are deployed in the north-central and northeastern part of the country. Defense of the southern part of the peninsula and the islands has generally been left to the navy and the air force. Non-NATO army units in the southern part of the country are mostly training brigades with the mission of preparing conscripts for later assignments to the combat divisions and brigades. The NATO chain of command insofar as it affects the Italian army runs from the Allied Command Europe (ACE) with headquarters at Mons, Belgium, to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AF-SOUTH) with headquarters at Naples, to Allied Land Forces Southern Europe, commanded by an Italian general with headquarters at Verona.

The weapons and equipment used by the Italian army in 1976 varied in age and quality. At the beginning of the year about 1,300 main battle tanks were in service, but more than half of these (700 United States M-47s manufactured during the Korean War) would be considered obsolete or at least obsolescent. The remaining 600 main battle tanks are divided evenly, 300 each of the M-60 A1 from the United

States and the Leopard from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Many of the M-60 A1 tanks have been produced in Italy under license from the American companies holding the patents.

Armored infantry and mechanized infantry units employed a total of 3,300 American-made M-113 armored personnel carriers. An improved version of the M-113, designated the A1, was being produced under license in Italy during 1975, as were two locally designed armored vehicles—the Fiat 6614, an amphibious armored personnel carrier, and the Fiat 6616, an amphibious armored car.

The army used several kinds of artillery weapons, but the ten-year modernization plan called for greater standardization and a reduction in the variety of weapons. A new 155-mm gun was being jointly developed by Italy, Great Britain, and West Germany. Mountain units were equipped with a lightweight, readily assembled 105-mm pack howitzer (Model 56), which was developed in the 1950s by the Italian army. The missile brigade had an Honest John surface-to-surface rocket battalion, a Lance surface-to-surface missile company, and four Hawk surface-to-air missile companies.

In the mid-1970s Italian scientists and engineers were capable of developing and producing advanced weapons for the army and the other services, but budgetary limitations restricted production of many new weapons. Weapons being developed included the Spada, a low-altitude, all-weather, short-reaction missile system. Spada was designed to protect a few extremely important areas, such as airfields and harbors, from low-flying aircraft. An advanced antitank missile, Sparviero, was also being developed. In use in 1975 was the Mosquito, a lightweight, wire-guided antitank weapon designed for infantry protection.

In the 1970s the army continued to bolster esprit through the adaptation of the wealth of colorful military traditions to the modern army. Personnel of the Alpine brigades wear the mountaineer cap decorated with a large black feather, and they continue to be drawn largely from inhabitants of mountainous parts of Italy. Alpine units, which were first formed in 1872, have a distinguished combat record and are well regarded by the public because of their prompt assistance to the victims of natural disasters, most recently after the 1976 Friuli earthquake.

The Bersaglieri—the term means expert marksmen—are light infantry. They were organized in 1836 and are noted for their vigorous physical training. Characteristically Bersaglieri advance at a double-time pace, led by buglers; On parade they are always the final element. In 1976 the Bersaglieri were the infantry of the armored divisions.

The amphibious regiment bears the name of a sixteenth-century Venetian military unit, and its personnel are known as Lagunari, or Lagoon Infantry. This unit selects many of its personnel from the

inhabitants of the Adriatic coast near the mouth of the Po River, especially fishermen and game wardens. Since 1877 the Italian army has had special military units suited to operate in the lagoons, marshes, and canals of this region.

The army educational system consists of more than twenty major schools. The military academy at Modena provides officer training for all combat arms. There are branch training schools for all arms, a mountain school, an amphibious school, and a light aviation school. On a more advanced level the army has the School of Higher Military Studies in Rome and the War College at Civitavecchia. At the regimental level the army runs schools that provide literacy and general education courses.

Navy

In early 1976 the navy had 44,500 men and a reserve of 65,000. Conscripts, serving tours of eighteen months, made up 24 percent of naval personnel. Recruits and conscripts tend to be selected from the inhabitants of coastal areas. Included in the naval strength were two battalions of marines totaling 1,700 men.

The navy emphasizes antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and relies on speed and maneuverability rather than tonnage and massive firepower. It has a tradition of innovativeness and audacity and led the world in such areas as miniature submarines, motor torpedo boats, and the use of explosives by frogmen. During World War II the navy was known for daring, unconventional attacks. In the mid-1970s the navy's more modern ships contributed to NATO capabilities in the Mediterranean Sea.

Ships included three cruisers, nine destroyers, eighteen frigates, ten submarines, fifty-five minesweepers, ten fast patrol boats, two hydrofoils, two landing ships, and sixty-four landing craft. Some of these vessels were armed with high-performance guided missiles and anti-submarine weapons and equipped with modern radar and sonar systems. The three cruisers and some of the destroyers and frigates carried antisubmarine helicopters piloted by naval personnel. Most of these were light helicopters, such as the Agusta Bell 204B, which must work in pairs, one carrying the missiles and the other the ASW sensors. Naval expansion plans call for the acquisition of larger helicopters that will carry both. In 1976 two submarines and four frigates were under construction, and older ships were being reequipped with advanced weapons and electronic equipment.

Expansion plans also involve the construction of a carrier to handle helicopters and short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) aircraft. In 1976 the navy's fixed-wing aircraft were flown by air force personnel. The most modern of these aircraft was the French Breguet Atlantic (BR 1150), a long-range maritime reconnaissance plane. Weapons in use and under development in 1976 included the Sea Killer, a surface-to-

surface tactical shipborne missile system; the Sea Indigo, an anti-aircraft shipborne weapons system; and the Marte, an antiship, helicopter-borne missile system.

Major naval bases are located at La Spezia and Taranto. There are secondary bases at Gaeta, Brindisi, Augusta, Messina, La Maddalena, Cagliari, Naples, and Venice (see fig. 17).

Air Force

In 1975 about 38 percent of the air force's 70,000 men were conscripts serving twelve-month terms of active duty. The air force reserve numbered 30,000. Most combat aircraft were American Lockheed or Italian Fiat, and the air force was considered a creditable element of the overall NATO defense structure.

Shattered in World War II, the air force had a small contingent on the side of the Allies as the war ended; it was rebuilt after 1951 with major United States assistance. In 1975 the air force had 372 combat aircraft, including all-weather fighters, ground attack fighters, and maritime and electronic reconnaissance aircraft. Other kinds of aircraft included transport, communications, and search and rescue. The air force also had about 280 helicopters. Air defense fighter units were backed up by air force Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile units.

In 1975 the air force had a modern territorial electronic surveillance system and a semiautomatic integrated system for air defense. Air force personnel were controllers for all civilian and military aircraft.

The Air College at Pozzuoli combines scientific and technical training with a general education conducive to the development of future officers. Graduates receive commissions as either flying or engineering officers.

Aircraft produced by the Italian aerospace industry included the C-91Y tactical fighter-bomber, G-91R reconnaissance aircraft, G-91T trainer, and the MG-339 two-seat trainer and ground attack aircraft. An air-to-air version of the Aspide-1A multirole, high-performance missile system was being developed for the air force in 1975.

In 1976 Italy was cooperating with West Germany and Great Britain in the development of two aircraft, the G-222 twin turboprop general-purpose military transport and the Tornado multirole combat aircraft (MRCA). The G-222 was in production; approval by Parliament for Italy's initial share of the MRCA—100 planes—was expected before the end of 1976, after which construction of the aircraft would be started by aerospace firms of all three countries.

Acquisition by the air force of the MRCA was part of a bill being considered in Parliament in late 1976 that would provide for the expenditure of 1,265 billion lire (for value of the lira—see Glossary) for aircraft and weapons for the air force over a ten-year period.

Italian Rank	Generale d'Armata	Generale di Corpo d'Armata	Generale di Divisione e Tenente Generale	Generale di Brigata e Maggiore Generale	Colonnello	Tenente Colonnello	Maggiore	Capitano	Tenente	Sottotenente
ARMY										
U.S. Equivalent	General	Lieutenant General	Major General	Brigadier General	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	First Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant
Italian Rank	Generale d'Armata Aerea	Generale di Squadra Aerea	Generale di Divisione Aerea e Tenente Generale	Generale di Brigata Aerea e Maggiore Generale	Colonnello	Tenente Colonnello	Maggiore	Capitano	Tenente	Sottotenente
AIR FORCE										
U.S. Equivalent	General	Lieutenant General	Major General	Brigadier General	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	First Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant
Italian Rank	Ammiraglio d'Armata	Ammiraglio di Squadra	Ammiraglio di Divisione	Contrammiraglio	Capitano di Vascello	Capitano di Fregata	Capitano di Corvetta	Tenente di Vascello	Sottotenente di Vascello	Guardiamarina
NAVY										
U.S. Equivalent	Admiral	Vice Admiral	Rear Admiral	Commodore	Captain	Commander	Lieutenant Commander	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Ensign

Figure 16. Officers' Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1976



Figure 17. Naval Bases, 1976

According to the press all Italian political parties favored passage of this bill.

Carabinieri

The 80,000-man Carabinieri was the best disciplined and most efficient element in the military or internal security structure in 1976. Often referred to as an auxiliary military formation, the Carabinieri in effect was something more than a paramilitary force and something less than an active army organization. The Carabinieri is a centralized police force, but by tradition, organization, and training it is an auxil-

iary army. In peacetime it functions as an element of the Ministry of the Interior even though its personnel are recruited, administered, and paid by the Ministry of Defense; during wartime it reverts to army control. Many Carabinieri officers have been trained as army officers and have completed tours of duty in the army, and the commander of the Carabinieri is always an army general rather than an officer who has worked up through police ranks.

Formed in Piedmont in 1814 as a lightly armed, fast-moving elite security organization, the Carabinieri fought in the nineteenth-century struggle for unification and in both world wars. For police duties in 1976 the force was divided into three divisions, ten brigades, twenty-four legions, and over 5,300 posts, extending down to the lowest administrative level, the commune. Two of the legions were motorized, a third had M-47 tanks and armored cars, and a fourth was mounted. The Carabinieri also had such specialists as skiers, frogmen, parachutists, and helicopter pilots.

One of the Carabinieri's responsibilities is apprehending art thieves, who have been particularly active in postwar Italy. They run special courses to train their personnel to deal competently with such problems, and they publish a special listing of stolen works of art. They also have responsibility for the safeguarding of military information and for the physical security of some military installations. They are the military police for the army, navy, and air force. A select unit, the Cuirassiers, serves as the ceremonial bodyguard for the president of Italy.

The Carabinieri tend to be more favorably regarded by the public than other police organizations because of their discipline and reputation for restraint. The uniform most frequently worn consists of a high, stiff, early nineteenth-century bicorne hat, a dark blue, long, tailored coat, and dark blue trousers with a white stripe. They also have a modern, army-style uniform. The Cuirassiers wear a metal helmet and armor.

Military Expenditures and Manpower

Although in the years just after joining NATO in 1949 Italy assumed a heavy burden of military spending, it has been unwilling to do so since the mid-1950s. In the mid-1960s the Italians opposed moves within NATO to increase military expenditures for member states. In the mid-1970s military appropriations bills continued to receive rough treatment from legislators. The long-range modernization programs, wanted by all of the services and costing several billion lire, had not received final approval from Parliament near the end of 1976.

In 1974 and 1975 the Ministry of Defense announced plans to upgrade and streamline the armed forces in harmony with NATO objec-

tives, a move that would call for greater defense expenditures. The plans for all services included acquiring up-to-date weapons and equipment, modernizing other weapons and equipment, and cutting down the quantity of certain kinds of weapons. In addition the size of the army is to be gradually reduced and its organization restructured. In 1974 Parliament approved a ten-year program to provide the navy with new ships and planes, and the construction of two submarines and several small surface craft was under way in Italian shipyards in 1976. A similar program for the air force was being considered in the autumn of 1976; but Parliament had not given complete approval, nor had it approved the army's ten-year modernization plan. The tenuous grip on power by Italian governments and the country's overall economic difficulties made it uncertain that the modernization program for all three services would be completely carried out.

In 1976 the ability and inclination of the Italian government to provide the armed forces with budgetary increases that would enable them to carry out complete modernization programs was doubtful, but there were also domestic political factors that made any sharp reduction in military expenditures unlikely. In the first place the armed forces were a source of jobs in a country with a chronic unemployment problem. Second, cuts in military expenditure would hurt the aerospace, shipbuilding, and electronic industries.

In the early 1970s the Ministry of Defense estimated that 65 percent of military expenditures went for salary and other personnel costs. Only 35 percent was assigned for weapons, ammunition, equipment, supplies, and research.

In 1975 military expenditures were 8.6 percent of total government expenditure. Military spending was about 30,000 lire per capita, among the lowest in European NATO countries, and 2.8 percent of gross national product (GNP). From 1972 to 1975 military spending increased, but the military share of total government spending declined because nonmilitary spending increased considerably more during this period.

In 1976 compulsory service continued to be accepted as an inevitable part of life by most Italians. In earlier decades some young men emigrated to avoid military service, but those who remained generally took a positive attitude toward it. Until the 1960s there had been little sympathy for conscientious objectors, but by late 1972 antimilitarist sentiment among some constituents impelled the members of Parliament to legalize conscientious objection and to specify alternative service.

All major political parties, including the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI), favor conscription on the grounds that a predominantly conscript armed forces will mirror the political loyalties of the entire population and reduce the danger of the army's being used by any particular faction. Among many Italian military

service is still viewed as an experience likely both to overcome deficiencies in education and vocational training and to instill a sense of patriotism.

Men become eligible for military service when they have reached age twenty-one. By 1976 the tour of duty for the army and air force had been reduced to twelve months and for the navy to eighteen months. At the expiration of their required tours conscripts enter the reserves; they remain on the reserve rolls until age forty-five. All reserves are subject to periodic recalls for brief periods of refresher training.

In 1976 the armed forces were having difficulty retaining noncommissioned officers with scientific and technical training, and there probably was some sentiment within the officer corps favoring an all-volunteer army. Nonetheless officers tended to oppose an end to conscription for fear that this would lead to reduced appropriations and diminished power and perquisites for the officer corps.

The Armed Forces and Politics

Traditionally the armed forces have kept out of politics and have remained loyal to constitutional authority. In 1864 and again in 1943 a military leader became prime minister, but only at the urging of the head of state. There are indications, however, that from 1964 to 1976 some high-ranking officers were engaged in plotting rightist coups.

General Giovanni di Lorenzo, head of the SID in the early 1960s, transformed that organization into an instrument of internal politics by expanding its files to include information, some of it derogatory, on virtually everyone in public life. After investigating the matter Parliament in 1971 ordered the improper dossiers destroyed, but only after repeated insistence by Parliament did a later head of the SID finally do so in August 1974.

During the summer of 1964 some leaders of the Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC) were concerned about the possibility of the leftists' gaining increased power. General di Lorenzo, at that time head of the Carabinieri, prepared lists of persons to be arrested by that organization should an emergency political situation develop. Di Lorenzo did this without informing either the minister of the interior, who was responsible for the internal security activities of the Carabinieri, or senior military officers. After lengthy investigations Parliament determined that di Lorenzo had behaved improperly but did not accuse him of planning a coup. Many observers, however, were convinced that he was plotting to overthrow the government. In the early 1970s di Lorenzo resigned from the military and was elected to Parliament as a member of a far-right faction. He died in 1973.

In December 1974 another head of the SID, General Vito Miceli, and another army general were arrested and subsequently accused by the judicial authorities of conspiring with eighty-two other individuals to take over the government by force in 1970. All these persons were accused of being associated with the extreme rightist Compass Card organization. These persons were still awaiting trial in October 1976.

The major bulwark against officer involvement in politics was that the officer corps did not constitute a politically cohesive group. Officers had many associations with one another, but these were balanced by associations with economic leaders, high-ranking civil servants, and politicians, as well as family and regional ties. In 1976 most officers appeared to be less interested in politics than in prestige, status, and the prerequisites of office.

From the end of World War II to 1976 the public showed little interest in conditions within the armed forces, and in 1975 no Italian newspaper had a regular military correspondent. Political leaders have attempted to discourage political involvement on the part of senior officers by careful selection of the chief of the Defense General Staff from officers considered dependable, by frequent reshuffling of top military assignments, and by a liberal promotion policy.

Political plotting by high-ranking military officers detracted from public confidence in the military but did not appear to be a serious danger to constitutional government, partly because it appeared to be inept and partly because officers could be expected to be restrained by the knowledge that a military takeover would be unacceptable to the public and would plunge the country into civil war. Influence by extreme leftist political organizations among enlisted personnel appeared to be a more substantial problem.

Leftist sympathies among soldiers were manifested frequently during 1975. In January and February off-duty soldiers helped picket factories struck by labor unionists. In April soldiers, their faces covered by red scarves, appeared at rallies in Milan, Rome, and other cities held in sympathy with Portuguese leftists. Some of these soldiers carried signs lettered "Today's Soldiers—Tomorrow's Partisans," and other posted leaflets denouncing certain individual officers as "undemocratic." These April soldier rallies may have been instigated by an underground newssheet—*Struggle in the Barracks*—which was the work of the terrorist organization Continuous Struggle. Again masked by scarves, soldiers protested in Milan, Rome, and other cities in December, carrying banners protesting restrictions on the freedoms of military personnel. By December four illegal national assemblies of soldiers had been formed.

In June 1975 about 2,000 air force sergeants took to the streets in Rome to explain their grievances to the public. They were protesting low pay, poor working conditions, and restrictions on their freedoms,

and they threatened to strike if their complaints were ignored. As they were the controllers for civilian as well as military traffic, they could have brought air travel to a standstill, and the government quickly agreed to look into their grievances.

In mid-1976 the PCI and the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano—PSI) continued to press for improvements in conditions of military service and urged an overhaul of the SID and precautions against that organization's abuse of its powers. In response to an unusual degree of public interest in the armed forces as a result of the soldier protests and at the insistence of the PCI and PSI, which were in a position to unseat his shaky new government, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti announced in August his firm intention of overhauling the SID, revising the system of officer promotions, and making the regulations pertaining to military service more compatible with a democratic society. Andreotti also pledged to reform the police and the criminal justice system.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Police System

In 1976 the police system was built primarily on three armed, national-level organizations whose tasks and functions overlapped (see fig. 18). These were the Carabinieri; the Public Security Police (Pubblica Sicurezza-PS), which had broad responsibilities for maintenance of order, law enforcement, and assistance to citizens; and the Customs Police (Guardia di Finanza), whose responsibilities pertained to tax evasion, other fiscal offenses, and smuggling.

The PS and Customs Police were quasi-military. Except at the top levels they were uniformed, and uniformed personnel were subject to the military justice system. Service in these organizations fulfilled an individual's requirement to perform compulsory military service, and large contingents of these organizations usually lived in barracks.




Figure 18. Internal Security Organization, 1976

All three organizations had jurisdiction throughout the entire national territory. The Customs Police often were found along the borders, at airports, and in urban areas because of the nature of their duties. The Carabinieri policed all sparsely populated parts of the country but had contingents in all towns and cities as well. The PS predominated in urban areas, but mobile units could be sent wherever they were needed.

Each city and town had its own armed Urban Police, which supplemented the PS. The Urban Police were concerned with vehicular traffic, enforcement of local regulations, building inspections, and so forth; but they were not used to control demonstrators, nor did they have any jurisdiction over the investigation of crime. Whenever members of the Urban Police apprehended someone in the act of committing a crime, they immediately turned him over to the PS. The Urban Police organizations, which consisted of about 2,000 men in Rome and Milan in 1976 and ranged downward in size in smaller cities and towns, freed the PS of minor duties.

Coordination of the work of the three national police forces and of municipal police occurs primarily at the prefectural (province) level. The usual arrangement was for the prefect to meet daily in his office with the PS chief for the prefecture and the local commander of the Carabinieri, plus the representatives of other organizations as needed.

There were also top-level coordinating committees concerned with certain kinds of serious crimes. Since 1967 the PS has had a special national headquarters unit, referred to by the acronym Criminapol, which was concerned with armed bank robberies, kidnapping, narcotics traffic, illicit arms dealings, and homicides. Criminapol provided for the exchange of information on criminal activities and police techniques and facilitated liaison among all law enforcement organizations. The PS had an active office dealing with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and Criminapol served as a link between this organization and the other Italian law enforcement agencies.

In August 1976 Prime Minister Andreotti included in the objectives of his new government an overhaul of the police system to make it compatible with a democratic society. He urged a clearer delineation of tasks and functions of the various organizations and stressed the need to cope with terrorism.

Earlier, in May 1974, the government responded to terrorist bombings in Brescia by organizing the General Antiterrorism Inspectorate. In August 1976 the influential Milan newspaper *Corriere della Sera* reported that the Ministry of the Interior was seeking parliamentary approval for legislation that would expand the responsibilities of the General Antiterrorism Inspectorate at the expense of military counter-intelligence in the SID.

Public Security Police

The 76,000-man PS was a component of the Ministry of the Interior but in the event of war or national emergency would come under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The top officials of the PS in Rome as well as the chief senior associates in each of the ninety-four provinces were civilians, called *funzionari* (functionaries). The PS was organized into the Territorial Force, distributed throughout the country, and the Mobile Force, which included highway police, railroad police, and frontier police. Because of the nature of its duties the Mobile Force was commanded from Rome rather than through the chiefs at the provincial level. The highway police had jurisdiction on the *autostrada* system and other intercity routes, and the Urban Police controlled traffic on local routes. The frontier police patrolled the land frontier, airports, and maritime ports of entry. The PS has river and canal lifesaving patrols, frogmen, mountain climbers, skiers, and horsemen.

In 1976 the Mobile Police was an antiriot unit whose personnel were carefully selected and highly trained. It was formed in the late 1940s by the minister of the interior, Mario Scelba, at a time when leftist demonstrations and disorders were a serious problem for the government of Alcide De Gasperi. Small, highly mobile units called *Celeri* (flying squads) used jeeps and were backed up by other more fully equipped police in larger vehicles. The Mobile Police had a full range of antiriot equipment, including water cannon and armored cars.

The PS had an intelligence system in which plainclothes personnel made use of informants. The police often had prior knowledge of demonstrations with a potential for violence. In such instances high-ranking civilian PS officials were present and directed police activities closely. For example, they would give the signal to don riot equipment and charge the demonstrators.

In 1973 there were only about 500 women in the PS. Many of these were *funzionari* and were concerned with family and juvenile matters.

The PS makes extensive use of modern scientific techniques for combating crime. In 1973 it had a high-capacity computer at its disposal. It also had 102 forensic crime laboratories, several of which were mobile, and an efficient fingerprint classification system.

In 1973 police schools included the Superior Police School for *funzionari* at Rome and the Police Academy and a noncommissioned officers school at Genoa. The PS had an extensive program to train its personnel in technical subjects in keeping with the PS policy of making the organization as self-sufficient as possible. The PS tried to reduce the need for experts outside its ranks to a minimum and tried to have all experts and specialists be full-fledged PS personnel rather

than civilian employees, on the theory that PS personnel would be less vulnerable to subversion and less attracted to labor unionism than civilians.

In 1976 the PS had less popular acceptance than the other internal security organizations. The educational level of PS personnel tended to be lower than that of the Carabinieri or the Customs Police, and there was rarely mutual sympathy and respect between them and the populace. Urban Police most often were natives of the locality, and the nature of their duties made it unlikely that they could cause anyone serious trouble; so, unlike the PS, they met with little public resentment.

The PS also suffered from an image of irresponsibility. For example, in 1969 a PS Mobile Force contingent sent to a southern city to put down disorders gave vent to their hostility by damaging the schoolhouse in which they were billeted, in contrast with members of a Carabinieri unit, who left their temporary quarters in better condition than when they moved in. In another southern town beset with disorders, things quieted down immediately after the PS were withdrawn and replaced by the Carabinieri.

In Battipaglia, in Campania, two demonstrators were killed in a clash with the police in 1969, and hostility toward the PS spurred demands by several political factions in the capital that the police be disarmed to avoid further bloodshed. The beleaguered government rejected the notion that disarming the police when disorders were at their peak would help maintain order and refused to do so. Nonetheless the well-supported popular demand that they be disarmed probably had an adverse impact on PS morale, especially because police casualties had been increasing.

Since 1969 the use of firearms in such crimes as bank robberies has been on the increase. Some police have been killed or injured in shoot-outs with robbers, and others have been the targets of terrorist bombings and ambushes.

In March 1975 PS personnel held a rally in Rome in which they demanded that restrictions on their use of firearms be eased. Two months later Parliament passed a legislative package to combat the mounting problem of political violence, including authorization of freer use of arms by police and more stringent penalties for violence directed at the police.

A large segment of the population viewed the PS as the mainstay of conservatism and the status quo and a force that was tougher on leftists than on rightists. In 1975 the head of the police in Milan was replaced after his organization was severely criticized for being too lenient toward neofascists during street battles and rioting.

During the March 1975 PS rallies in Rome grievances other than restraints on the use of arms were voiced. The policemen protested serving as chauffeurs and personal servants for high officials and also

demanding higher pay and the right to organize. By August 1976 PS personnel were demanding that their organization's regulations be changed to give it a less military character, and they were becoming more emphatic in their demand for the right to have a labor union.

In August an advocate of unionization and extensive changes in the PS, Captain Salvatore Margherito, was arrested and imprisoned. He was charged with sedition on the grounds that he questioned the validity of orders and regulations in conversations with fellow members of the PS in Padua, thereby fomenting discontent in the ranks. Margherito's arrest created a furor in labor circles and focused public attention on conditions within the PS and on widespread demands for change.

Customs Police

In 1975 the 40,000-man Customs Police (*Guardia de Finanza*) was responsible for protecting land and sea borders from smugglers and persons attempting to enter illegally and for apprehending counterfeiters and tax evaders. The Customs Police, known as *finanzieri*, were directly subordinate to the minister of finance but would be controlled by the minister of defense in wartime or during a state of emergency.

The Customs Police evolved from a military border guard established in Piedmont in 1814. Their ground and naval units have served in combat in wartime. Customs Police had several uniforms; those performing coast guard duties wore a navy-style uniform; those on the Alpine borders were outfitted in skiing garb; and uniformed personnel elsewhere wore a grey-green, hip-length jacket and matching trousers and a peaked cap emblazoned with the corps insignia, a yellow flame. There is also a small plainclothes branch, whose personnel investigate tax evasion and similar offenses.

Recruits enlisted for three-year tours. If their performance was satisfactory, they continued to serve successive three-year tours until they reached retirement age. Officers were selected through a nationwide competitive written examination from persons who had graduated from secondary school. Individuals who passed the test and were selected were provided four years of education at the Customs Police Academy in Rome. Noncommissioned officers were also selected by a competitive written examination and underwent a two-year course at the Customs Police School at Lido di Ostia.

Customs Police who showed aptitude for Alpine border duties and mountain rescue activities were trained in the organization's mountain school at Predazzo. Personnel selected for coast guard duties were trained in the organizations' nautical school at Gaeta. Those who showed suitable aptitudes were provided instruction in economics, accounting, and law in the organization's Rome school for personnel dealing with tax evasion and fiscal crimes.

The duties and responsibilities of the Customs Police were laid down in regulations formulated during the Mussolini era. They may search a citizen's home on their own initiative if they have well-grounded suspicions that financial laws are being broken, and they have access to business records.

Activities other than those pertaining to fiscal crimes include suppression of narcotics traffickers, anticounterfeiting measures, and apprehending of smugglers of works of art and archaeological treasures. The coast guard element of the Customs Police maintains surveillance of shallow coastal waters through the use of 150 skilled divers for the purpose of detecting and apprehending individuals removing artifacts from these areas.

Criminal Justice System

The criminal justice system is based on the Napoleonic code, which in turn was based on the codification of Roman law under Emperor Justinian. Crimes and punishments are spelled out in great detail in the penal codes, which have a strong moral aspect and deal with matters that in many countries are left to the individual. The codes attempt to be as complete as possible; for example, there is a section pertaining exclusively to athletics.

In contrast with adversary proceedings, the Italian system relies heavily on an investigating judge who balances the interests of society with those of the suspect. The investigating judge has the function of determining whether a person is to be charged with a crime. During the investigation, which sometimes goes on for years, the suspect is ordinarily kept in prison.

During criminal trials the accused is confined in the dock. The presiding judge takes a major part in the questioning. The rules of evidence tend to be less stringent and therefore less advantageous to the accused. The purpose of the trial is not limited to establishing guilt or innocence in respect to a specific charge but is rather to discover all the facts about the matter in question.

In contrast with practice in some countries, which excludes information about prior arrests or convictions from the proceedings in which guilt or innocence for the present offense is determined, prior arrests or convictions are admissible in Italian trials. The penal codes provide for declaring a person to be a habitual criminal, but this provision has rarely been used.

Italy had no death penalty in 1976, although in recent years some people had advocated such a penalty for terrorists who assassinate police or other public officials. There seemed to be little public sentiment in favor of the death sentence. Most serious crimes had life imprisonment as their maximum penalty, and persons so sentenced had no prospect of release until they were near death.

Magistrates and judges are not selected from experienced lawyers but are civil servants for their whole careers. After completing his basic legal education, an individual decides whether he will become a lawyer or become a magistrate or judge. For the latter careers competitive examinations determine whether he gains employment and whether he subsequently advances to the higher grades in the Ministry of Justice.

Judges and magistrates are divided by their allegiances to professional associations that have strong political coloration. In the early 1970s higher ranking judges and magistrates belonged mostly to conservative organizations, and their middle and lower ranking colleagues belonged to associations that ranged from middle-of-the-road to the moderate left. Such ideological differences among the magistrates and judges probably have an adverse effect on the way the system functions.

The criminal justice system works within a framework of constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties, due process, and equality before the law (see ch. 10). Nonetheless the system is archaic in some respects, its workings are difficult for the public to comprehend, and its slow, cumbersome functioning has heightened public distrust of government.

Although agreement was reached in 1948 on the new Constitution, Parliament was unable to accomplish a revision of the penal codes; despite widespread dissatisfaction with them, the penal codes in 1976 had a structural framework that reflected their 1931 origin. Since 1948 the Constitutional Court has nullified some provisions of the codes that were particularly unsuitable for a democratic society. Parliament has revised some parts of the codes. Nonetheless some other parts still have the flavor of the fascist era; charges are still brought under such catchalls as "subversive propaganda," "association for criminal purposes," and "instigation to class hatreds." The codes make it a crime to insult a government official, and a verbal insult to a policeman can bring imprisonment for months.

In 1976 a person's freedom could be restricted for years by imprisonment or other restraints without his ever being brought to trial. An individual could be incarcerated for up to four years while an investigation proceeded to determine whether he should be brought to trial. A 1965 addition to the penal codes permitted the government to place anyone whom they declared to be a danger to society in "obligatory domicile." In such cases persons were usually sent to small islands where they could be easily controlled. This provision has been used to keep persons suspected of involvement in Mafia kidnappings and other crimes out of circulation. In August 1976 two individuals held in prison for the four-year maximum period for which they could be detained awaiting trial were let out of jail and immediately placed in obligatory domicile.

The Constitution establishes the control of the judiciary over the police in their criminal justice activities, and the penal codes closely regulate police actions in this area. The penal codes make it clear that the police exercise their routine functions under the direction of public prosecutors and investigating judges and that the police are obliged to assist judicial authorities in their investigations.

If the police apprehend a suspect in the act of committing a crime or if they have a basis to believe that a suspect in a serious crime is about to make his escape, they are permitted to act on their own initiative but are obliged to inform the judicial authorities within a specified time. The actions the police may take on their own initiative include arrest and preliminary interrogation of the suspect and search of his domicile. Arrested persons must be taken promptly to a judicial official, and the public prosecutor must be notified within forty-eight hours. A magistrate must be informed of the house search, and any sealed papers must be transmitted unopened to the appropriate judicial authority. Prior judicial approval is necessary before the police can tap telephones.

The slow, ineffectual, and apparently improper handling of the December 1969 terrorist bombing in Milan that resulted in sixteen deaths intensified dissatisfaction with the justice system. The Milan bombing coincided with others in various cities, and the police appeared to have first attributed the crimes to anarchists. They arrested Pietro Valpreda shortly after the Milan bombing, and he was held in prison until December 1972, when he was released by the court. The government tried to bring Valpreda and three other anarchists to trial in Rome in February 1972, but further delays ensued, and the trial was moved to Milan and then to southern Italy. The evidence against Valpreda and the other anarchists had several flaws, and the government appeared to have much stronger evidence against rightist suspects, against whom it brought court proceedings in March 1972.

There was considerable public sympathy for Valpreda, who was in poor health, and the press and some opposition political parties portrayed him as grossly wronged by the police and courts. The campaign to free Valpreda was given impetus by press stories that some police officials were trying to railroad him and to cover up for the rightist suspects. Moreover judicial officials who first pursued the trial leading to the rightist suspects were swiftly transferred to other jobs.

In August 1976 the government, still unable to bring the three rightist suspects to trial, had to let them out of jail because they had been imprisoned for the maximum time they could be held without trial. They were then put under obligatory domicile on an island.

Newspapers reflecting most political viewpoints castigated the police and courts for being unable to discover and punish the perpetrators of the 1969 bombings in the almost seven years that had elapsed. The newspapers also criticized the government for not getting to the bot-

tom of the allegations of wrongdoing by police and SID officials in connection with the investigation of the Milan bombing.

Deficiencies in the criminal justice system occur partly because of rivalries and overlapping jurisdictions among the police organizations and partly because of poor cooperation between police personnel and those of the Ministry of Justice. Moreover the system suffers from many of the ills that beset the entire bureaucracy (see ch. 10). For example, in 1969 in some courts proceedings went very slowly because they were being recorded in longhand, and judges carefully summarized each step of the proceedings for the court secretary. The reluctance of magistrates and justices to serve in out-of-the-way places contributed to long backlogs of investigations and trials in those parts of the country.

Successive Italian governments have responded to the pileup of court cases and overcrowding in the prisons by giving amnesty to large numbers of people on religious and other holidays. In May 1970 a backlog of over 1.3 million serious criminal cases prompted an amnesty—the twenty-fifth since 1945. Such amnesties were a poor substitute for reforms in the justice system and contributed to a lack of respect for the law. Innocent persons who were released after years in prison as a result of an amnesty were probably embittered because the government had not provided an opportunity to have their innocence confirmed, and the premature release of hardened criminals tended to erode police morale and further discredit the judicial process.

In July 1975 Parliament approved a partial revision of prison regulations under the pressure of continuing disorders in the nation's overcrowded and harsh prisons. These new regulations provided for improved conditions and the separation of various kinds of prisoners, but the government lacked the personnel and funds necessary to put these reforms into effect. In August 1976 there were simultaneous disorders in prisons in various parts of the country protesting the government's failure to make good on its promises to improve prison conditions.

In early 1976 an official Italian publication reported that Parliament was planning to revise the prison regulations. Political uncertainties, however, precluded the accomplishment of this objective, and it was not included in the major proposals made by Prime Minister Andreotti in August 1976. Thus in 1976 the prisons continued to be administered by regulations drawn up in 1931, although the harshest of these have been modified by the Constitutional Court.

Prison conditions vary widely. Prisons in some cities have been designed for the purpose, but in other places centuries-old monasteries and convents and other unsuitable and poorly maintained structures are used. Some prison officials have been in the forefront of the campaign to improve prison conditions and have instituted humane and

rehabilitative programs. Nevertheless a publication of the government's information services conceded major shortcomings, including overcrowding, poor food, inadequate educational services, insufficient provisions for assisting the families of prisoners, failure to separate various categories of prisoners, and the prevalence of homosexuality. The information service publication also noted the insufficient numbers and poor qualifications of the guards and their frequent use of beatings and other harsh punishments.

Since 1969 there have been frequent prison riots and disorders. These appear to have been partly a spontaneous reaction to prison conditions but have been accentuated by the increase among the prison population of students and other members of radical leftist organizations, such as Continuous Struggle, Red Brigades, and Armed Proletarian Nuclei. In April 1969 simultaneous uprisings took place in every major prison in Italy. In 1972 there were seventy-two prison uprisings, in 1973 there were 225, and in 1974 there were 214. Uprisings were frequent in 1975 and 1976 and showed signs of having been coordinated by extreme leftists.

A high proportion of the prison population consists of persons awaiting trial. In December 1973 of a total of 28,556 prisoners there were 18,226 awaiting trial. About half of the persons tried are found innocent, many of whom have spent years confined in close proximity to convicted felons. Many persons are held in prison only a few days, and the number of persons who had been in prison sometime during 1973 was probably more than 300,000—or about 6 percent of the population.

The prison system is run by the Ministry of Justice. Top officials are magistrates, who tend to serve one or two tours in the prison system but the bulk of their career elsewhere in the criminal justice system. Prison guards, who are armed, numbered about 12,000 in 1974. Over 85 percent of these came from the Mezzogiorno. Many had been unemployed immediately before taking jobs as guards, and most of them had little education.

Threats to Order

From 1969 to 1976 the police and courts faced formidable challenges in the form of increasing crime of all kinds and especially crimes of violence. Political kidnappings, assaults, and bombings—usually the work of extremist factions of the left or the right—have been common since 1969.

Ordinary Crime

From 1969 to 1976 there was an increase in most kinds of crime. From 1973 to 1974, for example, burglaries rose 15 percent, robberies 11 percent, and murders 11 percent. The Italian public was extremely

anxious over the rapid rise in crime, especially such violent crimes as kidnappings and armed robberies.

Before World War II Italy was a predominantly agricultural country, and in most regions crime was not a serious problem. Banditry was a well-established custom in Sardinia, and in Sicily and Calabria the legacy of centuries of foreign rule and weak, corrupt governments bolstered the Mafia, which was still largely confined to agricultural areas. In Sicily and Calabria kidnappings, extortion, assaults, and murders were an accepted part of life.

Before 1969 kidnapping for ransom tended to be unusual except in Sardinia, Sicily, and Calabria. By the mid-1970s, however, it was a serious problem throughout the country. In 1975, for example, there were forty-four kidnappings for high ransoms. In the preceding year both a leading jeweler and a member of the family of a wealthy oilman were reported to have been ransomed for more than US\$2 million each. Some wealthy persons have moved from Italy for fear of kidnapping.

Drug abuse appears to be less severe than in many countries, but it has been on the increase during the 1970s and is a matter of considerable public concern. An Italian official information service estimated that the number of people addicted to hard drugs probably did not exceed 3,000; an additional 40,000 people used such drugs on a regular basis but were not considered to be addicted. In 1972 a parliamentary investigating committee placed the number of drug users at 600,000, and this figure has appeared frequently in the press. Some official sources considered that the 600,000 estimate probably included persons who had tried marijuana once and was therefore unrealistically large. The law imposes severe penalties on persons possessing or trafficking in drugs, and the police and courts enforce the law vigorously. Each of the three major internal security organizations has a special bureau for drug law enforcement.

In 1972 the Ministry of Health tightened rules on the dispensing of amphetamines and barbiturates after a survey found that 1.7 million Italians used these substances regularly in small quantities. Italian authorities consider abuse of these medicines the country's primary drug problem.

The increase in crime has its roots in social problems, such as the crowding of migrants from the Mezzogiorno into the slums of modern cities and the downturn of the Italian economy, which added to the numbers of unemployed. Rome, for example, had a population of 2.4 million in 1976 contrasted with 1.0 million thirty years earlier. There were 800,000 people crowded into squalid shantytowns on the outskirts of the city. Social welfare services tended to be inadequate.

Thefts of works of art and items of archaeological interest have been a serious problem in Italy for decades, and such crimes have been on the increase in the 1970s. The quantity of works of art is

immense, and many are found in rural churches and small museums. They are difficult to guard, and the number of watchmen and guards is insufficient. Many items of archaeological interest, which belong to the state, are located in isolated rural areas or in shallow coastal waters, and it is difficult to guard such locations from persons intent on removing artifacts illegally. Once stolen, artistic works and artifacts are quickly smuggled out the country, often to Switzerland, and sold through a network of middlemen and unscrupulous art dealers. The ready market for these stolen goods compounds the problems of protecting Italy's artistic heritage.

Terrorism

Politically connected violence is rooted in the Italian past. For many centuries defiance of foreign overlords often took a violent character, and disorders and loss of life preceded and followed the unification of the country in 1861. In 1869, for example, 250 people were killed and 1,000 wounded during protests in southern Italy over a tax on grain imposed by the distant Piedmontese rulers of the newly united country. The new government had to undertake military campaigns several times to put down dissidents, especially in the south. A high number of casualties resulted from political disorders in the late 1890s. During the early 1920s street clashes between political factions were commonplace, and Mussolini's rise to power was aided by the willingness of his supporters to use violence.

From the end of World War II until the late 1960s Italy tended to be preoccupied with recovery from the war; a booming economy held promise of increasing living standards, and the authorities were able to handle challenges to order emanating from political extremists. In 1968 and 1969 students formed anarchist and radical-leftist terrorist organizations, which fomented disorders at several universities and clashed in the streets with far-rightists. Amid worsening economic conditions and a stalemate on the part of the national political parties, labor unionists engaged in strikes and disorders in the summer and fall of 1969. Some of the unionists also formed anarchist and radical-leftist groups similar to those of the students, and these labor extremist groups engaged the far-rightists and the police in street battles. Since the December 1969 bomb explosion in Milan, one of a series there and in Rome, politically motivated bombings, street clashes, murders, and kidnappings of adversaries and security officials have been a regular feature of Italian life.

The formidable nature of the problem of political extremist violence is revealed by official estimates. In April 1971 two right-wing newspapers published a confidential report by the prefect of Milan, which had been submitted in late 1970 to the minister of the interior. This report stated that in Milan alone there were "20,000 armed extremists," who were well trained and equipped and capable of launching numerous attacks at any time. After the publication of the letter the

minister of the interior confirmed the authenticity of the province chief's statement and added that, of 1,290 people charged in 1970 with violence, 800 belonged to extremist political organizations.

In late September 1972 a subsequent minister of the interior gave details of political violence. He said that up to that time in 1972 there had been ninety-five politically associated beatings and stabbings, thirty-three by rightists, thirty-eight by leftists, and the rest by unknown persons. Later in 1972 police searches uncovered large quantities of rifles, ammunition, and explosives as well as a few heavy weapons. During these searches the police arrested 239 people.

Political violence continued through the mid-1970s. During the regional and local election campaign in mid-1975 and the parliamentary election campaign in mid-1976 there were frequent street clashes, bombings, and other political disorders.

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A good source of information on the armed forces is the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The *Military Balance, 1975-76*. More detailed information may be found in Frederick Wiener's *Die Armeen der NATO Staaten: Taschenbuch den Landstreit Krafte*. Peter A. Allum's *Italy—Republic Without Government?* provides a brief interpretative description of the armed forces and their place in society. The best brief summary of the internal security situation is found in Peter Nichols' *Italia, Italia*. James Cramer's *The World's Police* has the best treatment of the various police organizations. (For further information see Bibliography.)

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GLOSSARY

DC—Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy). Italy's Christian Democratic political party. Title sometimes includes the word *partito*, but abbreviation is always DC.

EC—European Communities; also known as the European Community and often simply "the Community." Made up of European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Each community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have shared certain central institutions. Italy is an original member. Other members are Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Fasci di Combattimento—Combat Groups made up of followers of Benito Mussolini, also known as Blackshirts. The term *fascism* (pertaining to the principles of the National Fascist Party) is derived from *fasci* (literally, bundles), used to describe any political association. Historically the *fasci* (from the Latin *fasces*) was a bundle of rods bound around an ax and borne by a Roman magistrate as a symbol of the authority of the state. The *fasci* was adopted as the national emblem by the fascist regime in Italy.

fiscal year—Correspond to calendar year.

GDP—Gross domestic product. The value at market prices of all domestically produced goods and services during a specified period.

GNP—Gross national product. The GDP (q.v.) plus net income received from foreign transactions.

hectare—10,000 square meters. Equal to 2.47 acres.

lira (pl., lire)—Basic currency unit. From 1949 to August 23, 1971, 625 lire equaled US\$1. Average annual exchange rates for subsequent years were: 1972 and 1973—583 lire equaled US\$1; 1974 and 1975—652 lire equaled US\$1. In 1976 the value fluctuated between 766 and 897 lire to US\$1.

metric ton—1,000 kilograms. Equal to 1.1 short tons, or 2,204.6 pounds.

Mezzogiorno—Literally, midday or noon. Name used to designate the southern part of the Italian peninsula—including the regions of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, and Calabria—and Sicily and Sardinia.

OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Organization of industrialized nations established in 1960 to promote trade and to aid underdeveloped countries. Italy is an original member.

value-added tax (VAT)—A tax applied at each stage of production or exchange of goods and services and passed on so that the total tax is borne by the final consumer. Adopted by Italy in January 1973 to accord with EEC practices.

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